China tried its hand at coercive diplomacy recently when it
announced the establishment of an "air defense identification zone" around the
disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. The dispute, along with a
similar case over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, is a good case
that illustrates how to think about U.S. national security interests. It shows
both the bad and, ultimately, the good reasons for U.S. engagement abroad.
The United States has no intrinsic interest in who owns a few
islands half a world away. Some things -- many things -- simply do not matter
to the United States; on first glance, it seems that the territorial disputes
over a few islands are among them. Learning how to stay uninvolved is an
important virtue of international diplomacy. Two cheers for the old British strategy of "masterly inactivity."
But, some might argue, shouldn¹t the United States get involved to
"demonstrate resolve" or "reassure allies" or "protect credibility" or "show
leadership?" No, for two reasons. First, resolve, reputation, credibility,
and leadership are not ends in themselves. They are tools to employ when some
concrete thing is at stake. Organizing foreign policy around U.S. leadership puts
the cart before the horse: The United States cultivates leadership to protect
its interests, not the other way around. If the islands are irrelevant to U.S.
interests it doesn't show very wise leadership to spend time and resources
worrying about them. The only reputation this would cultivate is that of a
Second, these concerns turn international politics into an
elaborate game of psychology. In this view, the U.S. position abroad is
perennially under threat from others' opinions. Every move, every policy should
be calculated with reference to its impact on perception. Policy isn't so much
about accomplishing actual things as manipulating world opinion. America's
preeminent interest is, apparently, that the world believes the United States is strong, resolute, indispensable, or
some such thing.
That emperor, I have come to believe, is naked. Making world
opinion the centerpiece of U.S. grand strategy strains credulity. Perceptions
are important, but not more important than the alliances, trade relationships,
and deployments of U.S. forces abroad that give the United States the power to
objectively change reality. And the "perceptions first" school of thought
exaggerates the ability to manipulate others' beliefs. Perceptions are fickle,
unpredictable things, and the United States does not have a reliable science of
If that were the end of the story, the United States should stay
neutral towards the disputed islands. Sadly, that is not the case. There are
real things at stake in the disputes over the Spratlys and the Senkaku: not the
physical territory, which is negligible, nor the perceptions and opinions about
U.S. resolve that might be formed by U.S. policy or non-policy towards them, but the balance of power in East Asia.
The inexorable rise of China is the largest shift in the
distribution of world power since the fall of the Soviet Union. According to
the Correlates of War (COW) National Military Capabilities composite index,
China is already more powerful than the United States and has been for some
time (the index heavily weights China's large urban population and industrial
base that could be harnessed in wartime).
That does not make China an enemy of the United States, but it
does make China a competitor, rival, and potential threat. (No, the rise of
India is not the same, for the same reason that Europe and Japan are not
threats: because they coexist happily with the United States within the zone of
the democratic peace.) That means China's efforts to expand its power anywhere
in the world, especially by illegitimate means, are of interest to the United States.
These considerations elevate the otherwise unimportant disputes
over a few minor islands on the other side of the world into a matter of great
power diplomacy. Again, the United States doesn't care about the islands, but
it should care about how China throws its weight around, how it relates to its
neighbors, and what it thinks it can get away with.
So when China unilaterally attempts to impose an air defense identification
zone over a disputed area, the United States should understand that China is
attempting to rewrite the rules of international diplomacy in its favor. That
really is a threat to the United States and the global order it has
underwritten since the second world war.
There is still an argument for passivity: The United States is so
powerful it can afford to float above China's relatively small efforts to
challenge the status quo. That is often a defensible response to rogue states
or other minor discontented actors who enjoy symbolic gestures of opposition to
the United States (such as Cuba or Venezuela).
China is different. With every passing day, China's power grows
relative to that of the United States. If there is ever a confrontation between
the United States and China, it is to U.S. advantage for it to happen earlier
rather than later, while the power differential is still very large and in the
United States' favor (the COW dataset notwithstanding). China, by contrast, would benefit from delaying a confrontation until it feels confident of its ability to win.
The disputed islands thus provide an excellent opportunity for the
United States to force the issue with China now, on its own terms. Such a
confrontation need not be belligerent or mean-spirited, but it should be firm. The
goal is not to start a war as an excuse to humiliate the People's Republic, but
to counter China's coercive diplomacy and forcibly socialize China into responsible great power behavior.
The Obama administration's decision to fly B-52s through the air
defense identification zone in defiance of China's announcement is a good
start, as is its public criticism and efforts to rally a regional response.
These may be insufficient in the absence of a broader regional strategy to
engage, balance, and, if necessary, contain China (the last if relations sharply deteriorate or China becomes markedly more
The administration has been forced into action by China's misstep,
but a more proactive approach to the region would assure greater long-term
stability in the relationship.
Mandy Cheng/AFP/Getty Images