Shadow Government

Neither Historic nor a Historic Mistake

The November 23rd nuclear agreement between Iran and six great powers has already been called "historic" and a "historic mistake" "worse than Munich." In reality, both descriptions are overwrought.

The six-month interim deal is simply a standstill agreement, generally providing that neither party will be further disadvantaged while a broader settlement is negotiated. Whether or not such an accord can be completed and enforced remains in doubt. Already the two sides are sparring over what the interim deal means.

The White House case for the agreement notes that it: halts production of uranium enriched above 5 percent and requires that existing stocks be diluted or turned to oxide form; halts installation of new centrifuge capabilities; freezes stocks of 3.5 percent enriched uranium (unless converted to oxide); freezes construction of the Arak heavy water reactor; and affords the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) better access and more information. These provisions generally slow progress on declared civil nuclear activities, and in the case of the uranium enriched to near 20 percent, impose a modest rollback.

In return, the U.S. administration claims that Iran will receive only "limited, temporary, reversible" relief from sanctions, amounting to about $7 billion, while broader sanctions will remain in place, with over $100 billion in funds frozen, and restrictions on oil sales continuing to cost Tehran $4 billion per month.

Why, then, has the deal evoked such opposition in the United States, with even influential Democratic Senators Robert Menendez and Chuck Schumer criticizing it?

First, the deal does not halt Iran's uranium enrichment program, despite U.N. Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors resolutions requiring Tehran to suspend this work. More importantly, this likely presages a more permanent agreement allowing Iran to enrich uranium. Why is that problematic? An overt Iranian enrichment program will make it more difficult to monitor for a secret weapons program. Imports, manufacturing capability, the work of technicians could all be ascribed to the licit program, but instead might well be diverted to a covert capability. Is it likely that Iran would develop a clandestine enrichment facility? There has hardly been a time over the last 15 years that Iran was not doing so.

Second, the deal does nothing to affect military activities. Iran's missile programs will continue unabated. Tehran still has not satisfied the IAEA's specific and detailed concerns about "possible military dimensions" to Iran's nuclear programs.

Third, there is real concern that once any sanctions are lifted, they will be impossible to reinstate, and that oil thirsty China, India, and Korea will seek more trade. Once efforts to isolate Iran are reversed, the momentum could be impossible to stop. For example, even the hope of a deal lifted prospects for Iran's tourism industry.

How should these concerns be resolved? A key test will be whether or not Tehran resolves the IAEA's concerns about "possible military dimensions" to the Iranian nuclear program. Those concerns are based on specific, credible information from multiple sources about activities that could only logically be explained by a nuclear weapons program. Moreover, some of the information points to a covert uranium processing capability, which would be a means to evade IAEA safeguards. If the IAEA is afforded proper access to people, sites, and documents, it can determine the nature and extent of the activities and, if necessary, root them out. This would be a strong indication that Iran has made a strategic decision not to pursue nuclear weapons.

If, on the other hand, Tehran is grudging and disingenuous in addressing the IAEA's concerns, compliance with any broader nuclear settlement will likely also be incomplete. We would then know that Tehran would rather protect its nuclear weapons options than to live under a lasting agreement. Sanctions should not only be re-imposed, but also strengthened. The six months provided under the interim agreement is more than enough time to test Tehran's sincerity in addressing these issues, even if an ultimate resolution will likely take longer.

If these issues remain unresolved in six months, some will say, "Why let problems from the past prevent progress today? Let's look forward, not back." It is, however, only by understanding the Iranians's past actions that we can have confidence in their future ones.

The administration maintains that, "The set of understandings also includes an acknowledgment by Iran that it must address all United Nations Security Council resolutions -- which Iran has long claimed are illegal -- as well as past and present issues with Iran's nuclear program that have been identified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This would include resolution of questions concerning the possible military dimension of Iran's nuclear program, including Iran's activities at Parchin."

In evaluating any final nuclear deal six months from now, Iran must be held to this standard, otherwise we would indeed be making a "historic mistake."


Shadow Government

Obama Administration Is Right: Interim Iran Deal Only Matters in Terms of What Comes Next

Defenders and critics of the interim deal with Iran on nuclear issues apparently agree on one thing: What is most important about this deal is what will come next.

To their credit, officials within Barack Obama's administration have been more careful than some outside boosters in emphasizing how limited this deal is. It does not stop Iran from making progress toward building a nuclear weapon. It does not even irreversibly slow Iran's progress. At best, it slows that progress slightly and, more consequentially, introduces more intrusive inspections that offer the hope of detecting violations sooner.

The most important result of the interim deal is the establishment of a short six-month timeline for securing the ultimate long-term deal. In the next six months we will discover whether the critics are right that the Obama administration made too many concessions on the pressure front -- alleviating the pressure that had helped propel the diplomacy thus far and thus eroding our bargaining leverage too much. If the defenders of the deal are right, then Iran will negotiate in good faith and, if not, the West will have the wherewithal to re-ratchet up the economic pressure.

This will likely prove harder than the boosters admit. The Achilles' heel of most multilateral sanctions regimes is that it's usually easier to pressure too little than it is to pressure too much. Once sanctions are relaxed a little bit, it is even harder to reimpose them. And if sanctions are linked directly to ongoing diplomatic negotiations, this problem is multiplied many-fold. It is always easier to block or delay new sanctions even if they are warranted on the grounds that imposing them would kill off what little diplomatic momentum remains in the negotiations. (Remember: President Obama vigorously opposed the sanctions he now claims were decisive in bringing Iran to this point -- it was congressional hawks who forced the pace, not the administration.) Even if some states are willing to run that risk, it is hard to reach consensus across a large and diverse coalition. That is why hawks were so eager to keep the maximum sanctions in place at the outset of the direct negotiations and why they worry that the relaxation in sanctions already promised to Iran will be a one-way door to ever-decreasing economic pressure.

(Doves had a compelling answer to this concern, but one that raised other worries: Doves pointed out that if the United States did not reach this interim deal, then the global support for sanctions would erode markedly and so sanctions would be eased regardless. This may well have been true, but it raises doubts about the ability to reimpose sanctions if Iran cheats in clever ways. If the international coalition is so fraught, is it likely to support renewed sanctions if circumstances warrant?)

Yet there is one more less-heralded way that this interim deal is but a precursor to the more decisive showdown: It was the necessary antecedent to the military option.

Although Obama has been adamant that "all options are on the table," in fact the credibility of military options has been receding dramatically in recent years. The dramatic growth in Iran's nuclear program means that there is a more sizable nuclear footprint that would need to be destroyed to have high confidence that a military strike had "succeeded." Moreover, for the past five years, the Obama administration has signaled in myriad ways that it is reluctant in the extreme to resort to military force on Iran -- and, for that matter, the Bush administration signaled a similar reluctance in the last five years of its tenure.

In other words, Obama made it clear that he considered the military option to be so undesirable that he would only consider it if all other alternatives that offered any prospect of preventing Iran from developing a weapons capability had been exhausted. The only way to convince Obama -- as well as the domestic and international allies that Obama would need in order to support a military option -- that all other alternatives had been exhausted was to pursue the apparent opening offered by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani's charm offensive. Put another way, the necessary first steps either toward a diplomatic deal or toward a military confrontation were one and the same: securing an interim agreement that put Rouhani to the test.

Only if Rouhani failed that test would other options be politically viable.

Even that may not be enough. People much closer to Obama than I am have told me they think Obama might opt to learn to live with a nuclear Iran in the same way that the world learned to live with a nuclear China and a nuclear Pakistan rather than launch a military strike.

We will discover whether this is the case soon enough, just as we will discover whether Israel can live with this interim deal. Either way, what matters most is not what happened this past weekend but what transpires from here on out.