Shadow Government

Bringing 'Smart Power' Back to U.S. Foreign Policy

Former State Department official Christian Whiton's book Smart Power is a needed and useful book on "the missing middle" in American foreign policy. Relying on history as well as the tried and true understanding of the term diplomacy before it was neutered by time-servers, place-seekers and the McGovernite left, Whiton outlines an approach that urges policymakers to adopt tactics that fall between the extremes of simply dialoging and a shooting war. Importantly, he argues persuasively that smart power is not only a matter of tactics that are part of a well-laid strategy; it is also a mindset about defending one's country and its interests everywhere and at all times. Personally, I think the book is a good read for those who are desperately in need of a little bit of self-reflection on whether or not they are cut out for foreign policy officialdom.

Whiton begins the book by relaying stories about the use of tactics short of U.S. military force but much more involved than simply issuing démarches and convening conferences during the early years of the Cold War. Ronald Reagan and his allies abroad and in the United States (Democrats and Republicans) were masterful at bringing down the communist system, but the policy foundations of U.S. resistance to Soviet aggression were set long before by Truman and Eisenhower when we fought in various ways to keep Western Europe free. The Soviets knew we would resist and that we would not just talk but act to support our allies and the underground freedom fighters in whatever way was necessary to ensure their success--including supplying bags of cash and inventing ways to broadcast real news into closed states, all in an effort to harm the Soviets' ability to capture nations. Communist leaders knew how the U.S. defined its interests and they experienced measured pain in response to their efforts to deny us the fulfillment of our goals.

Whiton contrasts this success story by showing how things are different now that we've had thirty years of an academic-inspired approach that assumes that the United Nations and international lawyering will somehow cause everyone to work out differences and establish peace. The problem with this approach is that it most obviously does not work very often and so the only thing left in the basket of tools is to drone or bomb or invade. Whiton argues that we have done the latter far too often, or our officials on the left and the right have argued for that, when smart power thinking and tactics would have been the wiser choice.

Mining his time in the Bush '43 State Department for examples of missed opportunities, Whiton tells of poor judgment and careerist-thinking (both among political appointees and FSOs) that left the U.S. with only two options: convene a conference or bomb someone. Missing were a thorough examination of who are real enemies are, our interests over time, the setting of goals (short, mid-range and long-term), and the choosing of appropriate tactics to achieve each.

It is worth noting that smart power is not "soft power" because the latter almost never means the use of force in any form. Whiton argues that there are various forms of persuasion as well as force short of war that should be available to policymakers to complement the use of whatever Foggy Bottom means by "soft power."

Whiton and I served together and I experienced some of what he laments firsthand in my work on the Freedom Agenda. I believe President George W. Bush had the right mindset and knew U.S. interests well, but especially in the second term he was ill-served at times by some political appointees who were captured by the career officials who wanted a return to the old system of démarche and convene. This is especially unfortunate given the development of the Freedom Agenda and all the good theory and practice (that drew on successful experiences of the Cold War) that it entailed. We were stymied more than once and the president was in turn frustrated by the failure to achieve his goals. I am not as critical of neoconservatives as is Whiton because I think he and most of them share not only the same goals but also a similar approach and mindset. The few whom he considers trigger-happy do not discredit the whole lot. Besides, those too quick to bomb have been moved by frustration at the return of the lawyering and conferencing approach to foreign policy. If there were more tools to choose from-smart power tools-they would readily embrace them. As to Whiton's judgment of the (Ron) Paulist isolationsists, I share his views wholly.

Whiton's book is useful in reminding us that embracing smart power not only has facts and logic on its side, it has a successful track record borne out by history. But it is worth stressing once more: if policymakers in both the executive and legislative branches do not have the right mindset and attitude about the role and interests of the United States in the world, they will never move beyond the current approach practiced with vigor by the Obama administration. They will be reluctant to do anything but what is considered the polite and genteel approach to foreign policy which his to démarche and convene. And then when that fails, as it so often does, they will be moved to use exceedingly large amounts of force with all the political, diplomatic and collateral damage that comes with it. The public will react negatively and our alliances will be harmed. It's time to get smart again.

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Shadow Government

Saudi Arabia's Unhappy. So What?

Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Saudi Arabia's intelligence chief, is venting to journalists and foreign diplomats about his irritation at feckless Obama administration policies in the Middle East, ominously suggesting his country is at the point of making a "major shift" away from the United States. Prince Turki al-Faisal, former director of Saudi intelligence, joined in with an address to the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations, saying, "The current charade of international control over Bashar's chemical arsenal would be funny if it were not so blatantly perfidious and designed not only to give Mr. Obama an opportunity to back down, but also to help Assad to butcher his people." The Saudi complaints include not attacking Syria, not providing weapons and support to Syrian rebels, American support for the elected Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt, U.S. cuts of assistance to the military that overthrew that government, and a lack of consultation on negotiations with Iran.

The Saudis are not alone, of course, in their criticism. Every country in the region is exasperated, as are many Americans. As former Centcom commander Jim Mattis so memorably put it, "I defy anyone to tell me what U.S. strategy is in the Middle East." But the Saudis' unhappiness is not proof that U.S. policies are wrong. Obama administration policies are wrong, but not in the ways or for the reasons the Saudis excoriate them. And bringing U.S. policies into alignment with Saudi Arabia is likely to create a Middle East even less in America's interests than the Obama administration's bungling has.

Saudi Arabia wants a very different Middle East than we do. The Saudis oppose democracy. They oppose freedom of the press. They oppose freedom of conscience and practice of faiths other than Islam. They oppose women's equality before the law. They oppose the idea that individuals have rights and loan them in limited ways and for limited purposes to governments. They deny rights to their own Shiite citizens in Saudi Arabia, while advocating and enforcing the same in Bahrain. They denigrate domestic opposition as solely agents of Iran.

Not only do the Saudis oppose these fundamental values of American society, but they have funded and armed some of the most virulent jihadists. Rachel Bronson's superb history of U.S.-Saudi relations, Thicker Than Oil, makes clear that the United States was complicit in Saudi Arabia's fostering of the mujahideen in Afghanistan; the Saudis now want U.S. complicity in supporting jihadists in Syria and the return to power of the deep state in Egypt (a model they would perpetuate throughout the region).

Secretary of State John Kerry did a fine diplomatic turn in London on Tuesday, outlining the areas of U.S.-Saudi common interest, toning down the problem, and conveying a calm confidence that the two countries will continue to work together. The policy question is what form greater Saudi opposition to U.S. policies might take.

Arab diplomats have suggested that the Saudis would increase assistance to Islamist rebels in Syria, both to punish the United States and to defeat the Iranians. Defeating Iran in Syria and toppling Bashar al-Assad is a great outcome for American interests, provided what comes next isn't worse. And even if the Saudis put a new, Saudi-looking authoritarian regime in power in Damascus, the United States will not be without means to influence its choices. Israel has consistently demonstrated detailed knowledge and willingness to act to prevent such outcomes; the United States can likewise up its game. Russia and China are less, not more, likely to support Saudi polices in Syria without American heft. Nor will Syrians themselves, who seem disinclined to replace one repression with another, be without influence.

Would the Saudis unleash jihadists in Syria? There is precedent from Afghanistan in the 1980s. But the Saudis are themselves as much at risk as we are from that scourge, and since the attacks in 2005, they know it and have stepped up their domestic efforts against radical Islamists. More likely is a misperception by the Saudis that they can control rebels in Syria, an eventuality that would cause problems for the United States -- but the country is likely to incur those problems whether or not Saudi succor is the instigation.

The Saudis might discontinue or curtail intelligence and anti-terrorism cooperation. That is a serious threat to American security. But again, the Saudis are at risk and need U.S. intelligence as much as the United States needs theirs. Moreover, recent cooperation is the exception; more frequent has been limited cooperation while the Saudis fund activity we feel threatened by.

On Palestine and a nuclear-weapons-free Middle East, the Americans and the Saudis have long worked to different ends. The Saudi plan for Palestine has foundered because of Palestinian choices, not lack of American support; it is difficult to see a path to progress on either their or America's preferred policy. It's easy to see why the Saudis support a nuclear-free Middle East, since it would remove Israel's deterrent as well as Iran's program, but difficult to see why it would now get traction even with major investments on their part.

The Saudi equivalent of a nuclear option is the price of oil, something the Saudis have been very helpful with in recent years. As Meghan O'Sullivan convincingly argues, their ability to do so is declining, and any sudden moves to impose costs will benefit Iran and stimulate non-OPEC suppliers, including the United States itself.

The Saudis (along with the United Arab Emirates) have already moved to bankroll the Egyptian military, supplanting by a factor of 12 the assistance the United States had provided. This could have a huge and deleterious effect on American interests if, for example, the Saudis and Egyptians eliminated preferential transit of the Suez Canal by U.S. military vessels. The U.S. ability to project military force would be dramatically curtailed.

We should never underestimate the trouble countries can make for us by withholding cooperation, even if they don't overtly work against our interests. American power is sustainable in the international order in part because so few countries actively oppose it. The United States should try to soothe Saudi concerns where it can, consulting more fulsomely on Iran in particular.

Too often, though, the U.S. assessment of enemy action overlooks that the United States, too, has choices to make that can impose costs: Without American intelligence, the GCC states would be subject to Iranian military harassment and less able to manage domestic extremists, and without American military support, they'd be substantially more vulnerable to a nuclear-armed Iran. And if there's one red line that President Obama has made credible, it's his willingness to abandon countries relying on American assistance.

Photo: JACQUELYN MARTIN/AFP/Getty Images