Shadow Government

What should the role of the private sector be in international grant making?

American power overseas comes from many sources, including the power of our ideas, our research, and our entrepreneurial private sector. One of our greatest investors in the American entrepreneurial model has been the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation based in Kansas City, Missouri. The Kauffman Foundation is at a cross roads as its former CEO, Carl Schramm, recently retired after 10 years as CEO and as it picks a new leader. The Foundation's board should be cognizant of its important role internationally, especially in the field of international development and the emerging field of expeditionary economics as it makes a new CEO hiring decision and as the board deliberates about future directions for the Kauffman Foundation.

There are concerns in the international development community that the Kauffman Foundation will turn inward towards U.S. programs only as a way to more fully honor the "donor intent" of the original donor of the Foundation -- Mr. Ewing Kauffman -- with an intensified focus on all things Kansas City. Over the years, the donor intent has been interpreted to include U.S. based institutions including the World Bank and the U.S. Army via West Point or the Army War College. (In the full disclosure department, I have received modest grant funding from Kauffman (under $50,000) over the years and have worked closely with the Kauffman folks in my last three day jobs -- hosting (with no funding support from Kauffman) DC-based events around Global Entrepreneurship Week since 2008.) 

The Kauffman Foundation has funded research that demonstrates the power of entrepreneurship, the traits of being an entrepreneur and the impact that public policy has on allowing for entrepreneurship to flourish. The Kauffman Foundation also has endowed chairs all over the world supporting the study of entrepreneurship at business schools -- creating a very robust network of scholars, researchers and thinkers. Its research continues to shape the debate.

Kauffman has been one of the voices that has made entrepreneurship and support for private sector lead development to be "politically correct" -- something international leaders and policy makers now must say but often times don't back up with appropriate allocations of resources.

Partially as a result of Kauffman research and support, there is rhetorically a bipartisan consensus about the attraction of entrepreneurship as an American export and as part of our foreign policy. That consensus, however, is not backed up by allocations of people, time, or money in the international aid architecture -- neither in the U.S. bilateral or multilateral systems. Over the last ten years, resources have reluctantly flowed to supporting private enterprise. The fact is that even with all the intellectual arguments on one's side, foreign assistance budgets are still allocated through a mix of pressing foreign policy crises, bureaucratic politics and domestic interest group politics.  The two most critical investments one can make in international development -- supporting economic growth and democracy and governance are "orphans" in the perennial fight for limited foreign assistance dollars.

That is where Kauffman comes in. Kauffman has an unfinished agenda internationally that no one else will pick up if they move in a different direction with their grant making.  Kauffman has won the argument enough that almost everyone involved in development business will talk about the power of the private sector and even the importance of entrepreneurs in prosperity. Kauffman's challenge internationally is to help finish moving the international consensus so that far greater allocations of scarce dollars flow in this directions. Many foundations have succeeded in doing just this over a ten to fifteen year period -- the Green Revolution in the 60s, spending on HIV/AIDS since the late 90s, increased spending on Malaria over the last five to ten years and the increased resources and attention around agriculture and food security are the results of long term, strategic investments by other U.S. foundations. 

One innovation the Kauffman Foundation has also funded with strong support from the British Government under Gordon Brown is Global Entrepreneurship Week, which has literally spawned a global movement for entrepreneurship. It is not surprising that Global Entrepreneurship Week has generated so much energy -- there is a global hunger for policies, training and financing to start businesses and the American System has proven most adept at facilitating that and people the world over admire that and want to emulate it. For example, the Gallup World Poll has found that 20 percent of young Africans (both men and women) plan to start their first business sometime in the next twelve months.

Another area of critical focus that could be at risk is the work started over the last three years in "Expeditionary Economics" -- the use of a variety of instruments by government to help quickly jump start an economy after a conflict or a humanitarian disaster. One may quibble with where Kauffman would like to house this function (I always read between the lines ..."at the pentagon") or quibble with their sense that we should be funding a series of "Afghan Steve Jobs" that may or may not exist but the increased focus on standing up private enterprise (e.g. cell phone companies, hotels, water and electric power) are central functions from security and development perspectives and need better instruments and need to be better supported by government agencies. Kauffman helped force the national security community and secondarily the development community to think about what works, what does not and what instruments and authorities are going to be needed in future conflicts or disasters. The U.S. military and the U.S. foreign policy and aid communities have not settled on "where" these should be housed and there is a still significant work around the sorts of instruments, policies and authorities needed for these challenges but Kauffman has succeeded on putting this firmly on the agenda.

Kauffman's research and work in the international field has helped position the arguments and bring about a rhetorical consensus. Its work internationally is only partially complete. If it makes a major change in direction away from its current international commitments it puts at risk much of the progress it has supported. 

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Shadow Government

The president finally leads the war effort

It's been an alarming few weeks for the Afghan war: American servicemembers videotaped disrespecting Afghan corpses, coalition forces assassinated by Afghan National Security Forces, American servicemembers burning Qurans provoking deadly Afghan riots, an American shamefully killing Afghan civilians, and President Karzai demanding Coalition forces be confined to bases. Given all these events, Americans can be forgiven for doubting we are making any progress in the war effort, or that the mission in Afghanistan is worth what we are paying for it in lives, effort, and money.

Which makes it all the more meritorious that President Obama and his national security team have not used these events to rush for the exits.  It is easy to imagine the president reprising his Iraq end game: summoning a stentorian tone and explaining that we can't want this more than Afghans do, that the time has come to give Afghans the opportunity to determine their own future, etc. Thankfully, he did not. Because the mission in Afghanistan really does matter, and difficult as it is, remains worth the effort.

The United States and its allies went to war in Afghanistan not simply to retaliate for an attack on our own country, but to ensure the territory of Afghanistan ceased to be a terrorist training ground and operating base. Our military operations have forced al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist organizations to focus on their survival, which diminishes their attention to plotting, training for, and conducting attacks. There should be no doubt that the objectives of these groups remain deadly and directed at us.

There should also be no doubt that simply killing bad guys is an inadequate strategy.  Without a positive program for governance in Afghanistan, the territory will remain an attractive locale for terrorists to organize and operate. The nature of this threat is that it migrates to ungoverned spaces, and a quarantine strategy won't be good enough -- the crises of governance and adaptation to global modernity that feed this threat will continue to produce networks of killers.

Moreover, it is difficult to see how coalition forces can continue to pressure terrorists inside Pakistan if we write off Afghanistan. From where would we collect intelligence and base the forces and weapons we use in counter-terrorist strikes? How would we convincingly portray ourselves as different from what we are fighting? This war is ultimately won by delegitimizing our enemies, and that requires persuading the broader society that we can and will protect them, can and will help them improve the governance of their society -- not just forcing compliance. 

Counterinsurgency is extraordinarily difficult and costly. It requires an extraordinary level of discipline and discriminating intelligence all the way down the line, even of the most junior soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. Even when we prove good at it, as we did in Iraq and are in Afghanistan, progress is slow and setbacks are numerous. We make this difficult task much more difficult by too little civilian power (why is the military running the anti-corruption task force?) and imposition of politically-expedient deadlines unconnected to achievement of our objectives. But alternative strategies are also deeply problematic, with costs and vulnerabilities often underestimated.

The corruption and unreliability of President Karzai is another significant impediment to achieving our goals in Afghanistan. But agreeing to his proposal for an end to Coalition military operations would actually hand him the country. It is instructive that other Afghan leaders object strongly to the proposal; they see the progress we are making. What is working in Afghanistan is the patient construction of capable local and regional governance by Coalition forces and Afghans working together. That is a threat to Karzai's power; it is also a threat to the Taliban, which is why they embarked on a campaign of assassinating Afghan officials and seek to sow distrust between the Coalition and Afghan National Security Forces.

Which is why sticking with our strategy for Afghanistan through 2014 is so important. The 2014 elections in Afghanistan have the potential to institutionalize power in a country that has known little constraint, usher forth a new generation of Afghan leaders and coincide with Afghan security forces coming on line in numbers and proficiency to take over the work we are now doing. If we walk away before then -- or settle for just securing polling places rather than affecting the political ecosystem by our involvement -- we should expect Afghanistan to return to worse than how we found it in 2001. Our enemies will be emboldened, our friends will be punished, and our credibility will be deeply suspect.

Part of the reason the American public is inclined to question the war effort is that the president has put so little effort into defending it. But when given the opportunity to walk away from it, President Obama made clear this week that he intends to continue taking the fight to the Taliban, training Afghan National Security Forces so they can do the work Coalition forces are now doing, handing over those operations to Afghans with us in a supporting role to stabilize the transition, and remaining in some numbers in Afghanistan even after 2014. In recommitting himself to the agreed NATO strategy and its timeline, the president is finally leading the war effort.

President Obama deserves our praise and support for keeping a strategic perspective on what needs doing in Afghanistan, even with the buffeting of damaging events in the last couple of weeks.

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