Much of the speculation following Hugo Chávez's
admission this week that he wasn't miraculously cured of cancer and must return
to Cuba for more surgery has centered on the impact his failing health
will have on Venezuela's presidential
elections scheduled for this October.
What happens if an incapacitated
Chávez wins? Or, will a dying Chávez's anointing of a successor succeed
in overcoming a unified and energized opposition for the first time in a
decade? Or, will
voters, burdened by declining economic conditions and rising crime, opt
for a new direction in the face of the uncertainty surrounding Chávez
and the lack of a legitimate standard-bearer for his movement?
All legitimate questions. Yet a better question to ask is whether there
will be an election at all if Chávez succumbs to his illness before October
-- and whether the Obama administration is prepared for an interruption of the democratic order in Venezuela if hard-line
Chavistas see their political fortunes going south.
Such a scenario is hardly far-fetched considering a series of
personnel moves
by Chávez in December that scrambled the slate of possible civilian
successors, but saw two controversial and well-known hard-line military
loyalists placed in key positions.
The first, Diosdado Cabello, a
notoriously corrupt former military colleague of Chávez -- he joined
Chávez in his 1992 coup attempt -- who had been marginalized in recent
years, was rehabilitated
and appointed head of the National Assembly. His military rank was
restored as well, even though Venezuelan law states that an acting
military officer cannot serve in the legislature. Cabello is known as a
ruthless, extremely savvy operator, and hardly one
to be considerate of democratic niceties.
The second controversial appointment
was the elevation of another loyalist, General Henry Rangel Silva, to
Minister of Defense. Rangel Silva, who also joined Chávez in his failed
1992 coup, was
designated by the U.S. government in 2008 as a co-conspirator with the
Colombian narco-terrorist FARC in shipping drugs through Venezuela to
the U.S. and other markets. He is one of a cohort of Venezuelan
narco-generals implicated by U.S. authorities.
Rangel Silva's other bout with
notoriety came in 2010, when he publicly stated he was wedded to
Chávez's political project and said that the Venezuelan military would
not recognize an opposition
electoral victory in 2012.
In short, both individuals are
eminently capable of kicking over the table if they see their prospects
for staying in power frittering away. Neither they nor the other
narco-generals are not about
to risk the impunity they now enjoy should the opposition appear to be
gaining significant ground among the Venezuelan electorate heading into
October.
Nor are they the only ones with a considerable interest in the survival of
Chavismo without Chávez. Russia, China, Cuba, and Iran have all
developed quite lucrative and beneficial relations with Chávez, his oil
riches, and his unaccountable spending. Any of them certainly would be
untroubled, to put it mildly, by any actions
that preserved their privileged access to Venezuelan oil and/or
petro-dollars.
That leaves the United States as the
only player left capable of mobilizing a multinational effort to defend
the democratic process in Venezuela should conditions radically
deteriorate. You can
bet everyone mentioned above is busy gaming out what happens next in
Venezuela; the question is, are we?
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