In
a recent remark that has stoked considerable controversy, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey said that it is. Dempsey underscored
the importance of this assertion when he said that it was based on this
conclusion -- that the regime is a "rational actor" -- that he felt the current
U.S. approach to Iran "is the most prudent path."
To
determine whether Gen. Dempsey is right or wrong, it is important to understand
what it means for a government to act rationally. It does not necessarily
imply that the government sees the world the way we do, or makes the decisions
we would make. Simply put, there are two essential criteria for
rationality -- first, that decisions are arrived at through a process of logical
reasoning; second, that the decisions made are the best ones given the choices
available.
Most
discussions of whether the Iranian regime is rational focus on the first
criterion. Does the regime make its choices by weighing costs and
benefits, or through a capricious process guided by whim and claims of divine
revelation? The U.S. intelligence community believes that it is the
former: for all of the regime's unhinged rhetoric, the regime is calculating in
its decisionmaking. The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's
nuclear program puts it this way: "Tehran's decisions are guided by a
cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the
political, economic, and military costs."
However,
this conclusion raises a critical question -- what does the Iranian regime see
as costly, and what does it see as beneficial?
This
leads to the second criterion for rationality: a rational actor makes the best
decision given the choices available. But "best" according to whose
interests, and whose values? Whether an action is costly or beneficial,
and thus whether a decision is best, depends vitally on the answers to these
questions. Our own domestic political experience -- witness the Democrat-Republican
divide over the national debt -- demonstrates that two rational actors, faced
with the same sets of facts and circumstances but holding different interests,
philosophies, or values, can reach very different conclusions about what to do.
So
for a conclusion that the Iranian regime is rational to be useful in predicting
its behavior -- not to mention making and judging our own policy -- we must
assess how the regime perceives its interests. Otherwise the "costs" we
impose may not be viewed as costly by the regime, and the "benefits" we offer
may not be seen as beneficial.
All
indications are that the regime values its own survival above all. This
likely fuels its drive to obtain a nuclear weapon, which it may see as a
guarantee against external foes. To the extent the regime defines its
interests parochially rather than as national interests, it may also discount
the economic suffering of the Iranian people except to the extent it leads to
political turmoil. Thus, to be perceived as truly "costly" by the regime,
any sanctions or other measures imposed or threatened by the U.S. and our allies
must place at risk the regime's interests, including its prospects for
survival. What's more, they must threaten those interests so much that
the regime is willing to sacrifice something it apparently values greatly -- a
nuclear weapon.
Likewise,
any benefit offered by the U.S. and our allies, if it is to affect the regime's
calculus, must be seen by the regime as advancing its interests. Many
things the U.S. sees as "carrots" -- for example, free trade or normal diplomatic
relations -- may in fact be seen as threatening to an authoritarian regime which
is leery of the West. Conversely, what the regime would see as beneficial
-- for example, assurances that the U.S. would cease its support for human rights
or democracy in Iran -- we are unlikely to be willing to offer.
There
are two other important points to consider about how the regime decides which
option facing it is best. First, we must be aware that there are other
costs and benefits at play than simply the ones we generate through sanctions
or diplomatic appeals. Individuals in the regime face their own
incentives -- for example personal wealth generated in the black markets that
sanctions give rise to -- as well as disincentives -- for example the possibility
of ending up imprisoned or worse for too vocally bucking the regime's line.
Second,
we must also be aware that the regime likely lacks complete information or
anything close to it. This is where the assumption that Iran acts
rationally runs into the most trouble. Decisions in Iran are made by one
man -- Ali Khamenei. By all accounts, he has not traveled outside Iran
since becoming Supreme Leader in 1989, is likely insulated by his aides from
bad news or criticism, and depends on an increasingly narrow and homogenous
power base which may not expose him to alternative opinions. One is
unlikely to make a good decision if ill-informed or unaware of all the
options. Nor can the regime make accurate judgments about U.S. intentions
if we do not clearly communicate our policies or red lines.
There
are indeed examples that suggest rational cost-benefit decisionmaking by the
Iranian regime, including the one cited in the 2007 NIE -- the regime's apparent
decision to suspend its nuclear "weaponization" research in 2003 following the
U.S. invasion of Iraq. But other Iranian actions seem untethered from
cost-benefit considerations. For example, why would Iran try to blow up a
restaurant in Washington in an effort to assassinate the Saudi ambassador, when
such an action could spark a war that Iran would surely lose? Or, why
would Iran not make a show of cooperation with the IAEA delegation that
recently visited Iran, if for no other reason than to delay an Israeli military
strike that seems increasingly likely?
More
importantly, even if we were to conclude that the Iranian regime is a rational
actor, we would not necessarily be able to predict its decisions or behavior.
We have a poor understanding of how the regime sees its interests, what
it perceives as costly and beneficial, what information is available to its
leader, and therefore what it would consider the best decision in a given
circumstance. And of course, even otherwise rational actors are prone to
the occasional -- and sometimes very consequential -- irrational decision. And in an authoritarian state with an aging and increasingly isolated leader,
this risk goes up exponentially.
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