It
is almost banal to observe that the Iranian nuclear challenge is a hard policy
problem. Back in the day, even during some dark periods on Iraq, Bush
insiders tended to view the Iranian nuclear file as the more vexing problem. I remember vividly President Bush authorizing a fresh zero-based look at
our Iranian policy in late 2005 even while the White House's public posture was
focused on the Iraq problem. Bush's term ended with a sense of greater
progress on Iraq than on Iran. And, measured differently, I suspect
Obama's national security team would likewise believe they have accomplished a greater
proportion of their objectives regarding Iraq than Iran. It is just that
thorny a problem.
Which
is why I do not fully understand the arguments of the vocal and energetic
anti-war faction. Perhaps I am reading the critics the wrong way, but it seems
like they make the Iranian challenge an easier policy problem than it really is
by arguing that all of the relevant considerations point in the the same
direction. Thus, the use of force is a bad option, they say, because the
costs of attacking Iran are high:
- An airstrike would not destroy the targets.
- Even if we could destroy the targets, we don't know where they all are.
- Even if we did destroy all the targets, the Iranians would rapidly rebuild.
- Attacking Iran would convince Iran to develop nuclear weapons.
- After we attacked Iran, they would retaliate with unacceptable damage to our interests
- Iran is never going to abandon the quest for nuclear capability anyway.
- An airstrike would be pointless because Iran hasn't decided to weaponize and only has an enrichment program at the present time.
So
far, these are all logically plausible, reinforcing, and perhaps even
co-related, points. Experts can debate them, but where I have a problem
is the next phase of the argument, where they argue that the costs of not
attacking Iran are low:
- We needn't worry about Iranian nuclear weapons because it will be easy to contain Iran.
- We won't need to sacrifice our interests to manage relations with a nuclear Iran.
- We will be better off sacrificing our previously stated interests to manage relations with a nuclear Iran.
- A nuclear Iran will not meaningfully alter proliferation incentives in the region.
- Even if a few (several) states develop nuclear weapons in response to the Iranian nuclear arsenal it will not substantially complicate crisis dynamics in the region.
Again,
it is logically possible for (almost) all of these to also be true at the same
time. But it is not as plausible, which may be why it is rarely people
with actual responsibility for policy making arguments like this. In the
real world familiar to policymakers, the choices often involve unpalatable
lose-lose options, especially on issues like the Iran nuclear case that have
commanded decades of attention. The further one moves away from actual responsibility
for the consequences of decisions, I suppose the easier it is to make the call. (For a persuasive take on a related policymaking conundrum -- the
interconnectedness of policy choices -- see Frank Gavin and Jim Steinberg's
simultaneous defense of "muddling through" and appeal for more
analytical rigor here.)
Put
another way, why do people who say military action to destroy the Iranian
nuclear program is too hard also insist that it will be easy to contain Iran? Why can't they acknowledge that it would be quite a daunting challenge
to contain Iran? This would not preclude them from making the tough call
in favor of containment over preventive strikes, though it might undermine the
dogmatism of the argument.
Political
psychologists would point to that as the reason: The tendency in hard choices
for individuals to bolster, seeking and seeing ever more reinforcing arguments
for the choice they have adopted. It is something like a confirmation
bias and it is very hard to resist. And I do not think it is a problem
only affecting one side in the debate. It is not too hard to find
examples of advocates of a military option doing much the same thing (air
strikes will be easy; Iranian retaliation will be manageable; containing Iran
will be impossible; etc.).
The
analysts I find most compelling, especially when dealing with hard problems
that have bedeviled the policy community for a long time, are those who concede
that not all of the logic and evidence stacks up on their side of the argument. The Iran debate needs more analysts like that.
In
some cases, the same critics who pride themselves in their capacity to spot
such cognitive pathologies when policymakers commit them seem to be the ones
the most afflicted now. Perhaps this a function of the Iraq experience. Perhaps this what the Iraq syndrome looks like.
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