A budget strategy that courts disaster

Posted By Dov Zakheim Thursday, January 5, 2012 - 4:38 PM Share

My colleague Kori Schake goes some way toward taking the administration to task for what it calls a new strategy. But she does not go far enough; her critique appears to postulate that the strategy is not new. On the contrary, in my view it is indeed a new strategy of sorts, and a very dangerous one at that.

This is, of course, a budget-driven strategy -- after all, the DoD's Strategic Guidance, which was released together with the president's announcement, specifically states that the strategy "supports the national security imperative of deficit reduction through a lower level of defense spending." Leaving aside for a moment the question of how a reduction of some $50 billion a year will enhance national security given an annual deficit that exceeds $1 trillion, such an assertion leaves little doubt regarding the reason for a new strategy.

It should be recalled that the administration's own Quadrennial Defense Review, written in the shadow of the president's pledge to depart from Iraq, was committed to "maintain ability to prevail against two capable nation-state aggressors." Now, however, the administration proposes to plan for our forces to fight just one war, while being "capable of denying the objectives of - or imposing unacceptable costs on - an opportunistic aggressor in a second region" (emphasis in original document). What changed since the QDR appeared, other than the explosive growth of the national debt? What exactly does denying the objectives mean? Would we necessarily know what those objectives are? Where would we find the forces to deny those objectives if they were enmeshed in a major conflict elsewhere?

This budget driven strategy is a throwback to the discredited "win-hold-win" strategy that the Clinton administration proposed early in its first term. At that time, it quickly became clear that the strategy could not work. There was no way of knowing whether forces engaged in one combat theater could be freed to fight in another theater, and, even if they could be freed, whether they could arrive in a timely fashion to defeat the enemy.

The Obama administration does not even offer the pretense of "holding" an enemy. The troops fighting elsewhere will somehow miraculously arrive in time to fight a second war. But our forces are not the cavalry in a 1940s Western. With the cuts that are being proposed, there is no way that they can arrive in time to fight a second war, assuming there are enough of them to do so. As for our enemies, it is a virtual certainty that they would do all they could to ensure that our forces do not arrive in time and, indeed, would exploit American preoccupation in another theater to realize long held objectives of their own. North Korea and Iran both come to mind in this regard.

The new strategy asserts that "everything is on the table," meaning perhaps, that everything is subject to cuts. Given the administration's concomitant commitment to preserve benefits and avoid a hollow military, it is clear that, in addition to force structure (which must mean the land forces, since naval and air forces have been cut significantly over the past decade), the acquisition accounts will be the bill payers.

There is nothing in the two regional contingency strategies that needs fixing. We have potential and real enemies in several theaters, and encountered difficulties conducting two wars in the same regional theater. What is needed is a focus on accounts that the administration shies away from: civilian personnel, staff augmentation contractors (which Robert Gates identified as a major budget concern) military retirement, and military entitlements. The latter have grown as much, if not more quickly, than civilian entitlements and both need to be ratcheted back.

The administration itself acknowledges that the world remains a dangerous place. It wants to maintain its commitments to Europe and NATO, and to the Middle East, and to our Asian allies and friends. It wants to do so with a strategy and budget priorities that belie its high flown pronouncements. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs asserts that the new strategy accepts more risk. That is quite the understatement. This is not a strategy that merely invites risk, it is one that courts disaster. 

Mario Tama/Getty Images

EXPLORE:THUMBS, NORTH AMERICA, MILITARY
 

TACOROCCO

11:29 PM ET

January 5, 2012

You still have friends.

I think the 'new' Pentagon strategy is brushing over is the fact that the US still has allies able to assist and project power into regions while the US focus' on the Asia Pacific.

Take my nation Canada for example. We have SOF in Africa, just sent another ship into the Med. and work with the USN and CG in anti-narcotics ops in the Caribe. Canada is fully able and has a national interest in securing the Arctic, the Caribbean and Latin America so that our Allies can focus their forces and resources to areas more in line with their national aims.

Another example are the Brits. Just take a look at the recent lecture given to RUSI by General Sir David Richards, Chief of the Defence Staff, UK Ministry of Defence http://www.rusi.org/events/past/ref:E4EA01B5272990/

Some highlights from his speech that relate to my comment:

"Greater US military focus on the Pacific meaning less emphasis on Europe and her problems. For the first time the Pentagon has specified that its Main Effort will be South East Asia. I know this does not mean it will turn its back on Europe and NATO but countries this side of the pond need to think through what this means to us."

"Already our collaboration with countries in the Gulf and Africa has delivered results in the region, for surprisingly little financial, military or intellectual cost. Perhaps we should be focussing our defence relationships on these regions rather than competing for influence, with many others, in China or India?"

 

WOLFBOY

3:35 AM ET

January 6, 2012

Budget-driven Strategy

Yes, Dr. Zakheim, it's a budget-driven strategy. We're operating under significant budget constraints, have you not noticed?

The exclusive focus of you and your colleagues on Obama's role in this situation defies reason. He does not have unilateral power to remove the budget constraint. It is plainly the Republicans in congress, who insist on extending the unaffordable Bush tax cuts, and whose plans call for deeper cuts, who bear primary responsibility for this budget constraint. It is a mark of your lack of seriousness than none of you has mentioned the role of congress in connection with this issue. Do they have nothing to do with foreign or defense policy?

 

RICHARD ROLAND

7:14 AM ET

January 6, 2012

When is enough enough?

With due respect, Doctor Zakheim.
As a society we have decided we are out of money. We are in a significant economic recession. We have massive budget deficits..and the military's budget has been raised by 70% in the last decade. That isn't counting the huge amounts of off the books budgeting or 'emergency' spending which has been used to pay for the wars.

There must be cuts. The 'two wars at one time' thing is trotted out every time some hawk wants to spend more money on alternative engines for jet fighters, or battallions of tanks.

Ignoring the rather silly idea that we 'need' to be able to fight and win two wars at once at different sides of the globe...why is it we can't simply fight those wars in succession? It isn't like the United States is the strongest military by one bullet, we have a military budget as big as the next seventeen countries combined. We have control of the North American continent, dozens of allies all over the world, and an arsenal of nuclear weapons.

The US is secure. Our ALLIES are secure. Even if the US was fully involved in screwing up Iran, and couldn't get immediately to slap down North Korea, North Korea couldn't hope to hold out when we got around to smacking them.

Who..exactly..do you think we're going to be fighting? Or is international politics just a giant game of Whack a Mole?

 

DRLAKE777

2:32 PM ET

January 6, 2012

Nothing in the two regional

Nothing in the two regional contingencies strategy that deserves revision? How about the very strategy? Why do we have to be prepared at all times to fight two major regional wars, regardless of the cost? That standard is completely arbitrary, and in effect outsources national strategy (which should be concerned with evaluating the threats to our interests and managing them so they are as low as possible) to the defense complex, which never saw a problem it couldn't blow up.

FP, you really need to quit printing this neo-con bullshit.

 

PROTOKNOWLEDGE

4:13 PM ET

January 6, 2012

Libya as a model

The US has been hounding Europe, NATO and Japan to take a larger role in their own defense, and in military actions in other regions. This "new" strategy moves the US beyond just talking about this to acting on it. With the ending of the two war capability the future of US wars may resemble the war in Libya more than the war in Iraq. Europe and France took responsibility for that conflict with our support, and France is now doing the same with Iran. This could eliminate the disastrous continuation of US involvement in Iran.

 

UBOAT53

5:09 PM ET

January 6, 2012

Quick Question

Even if the United States were to retain its' stated goal of fighting two wars at once, the criticism that Mr. Zakheim levels would stand. Disengaging some forces from one opponent to fight another seems to me to be a wrench in the whole concept of multiple wars, not a specific argument against the President's plans.

Also, for an example of a time when that last happened, I would point Mr. Zakheim to world war 2, when our nation last fought such a two front war, and point him to the first commenter's comment on allowing our allies to assist us as they did then.

 

KUNINO

6:03 PM ET

January 6, 2012

And who the hell is Dov Zakheim?

He's one of the short-time wonders of the George W Bush department iof defense, From 2001 to April 2004 he was an under secretary of Defense and CFO of the department. There, he boasts, he led over 50,000 bean counters and was Donald Rumsfeld's principal advisor on financial and budgetary matters.

His glory days.

His effectiveness in office might best be assessed by recalling that from 2002-2004 he was DOD’s coordinator of civilian programs in Afghanistan. He also "helped organize" -- whatever that means -- the 2003 New York (UN) and Madrid Donors conferences for Iraq reconstruction. These latter was not an achievement much noted in the great world.

Elsewhere in foreignpolicy.com a few days ago, Tom Ricks equated the early Bushies now stepping forward to offer the current president unsought instruction about how to manage the country, and compared it to asking George Armstrong Custer for advice on how to deal with native American tribes. Mr Zakheim, currently a business consultant putting food on the gfamily table by advising the deep-pocketed ranks of the military-industrial complex, now steps forward to join the ranks Mr Ricks identified.

How honest or otherwise he is, is laid bare by his astonishing sentence here that starts "Leaving aside for a moment the question of how a reduction of some $50 billion a year will enhance national security given an annual deficit that exceeds $1 trillion."

So here we have an accountant who professes being unable to understand that spending $50 billion less a year will save money. And, search how you will through the rest of his article, you will not find that he ever picks up what here, he claims to be leaving aside for jes' a moment.

Much of the rest of his piece seems similarly shady.

 

KIRBANG

7:07 PM ET

January 6, 2012

article by The Dov

What a misnomer, Dov you are never to old to serve. Please get your chicken hawk heart down to the recruiter so the US armed forces can benefit directly from your genius.

 

Shadow Government is a blog about U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration, written by experienced policy makers from the loyal opposition and curated by Peter D. Feaver and William Inboden.

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