Shadow Government

Spain's election and U.S. foreign policy after 2012

Republicans and conservatives may have missed some important news this past weekend as they prepared for the Thanksgiving holiday: the historic victory of the conservative Popular Party (PP) last Sunday in Spain. Mariano Rajoy, the prime minister elect and leader of the PP, won an absolute majority and sent the Socialists to their biggest defeat ever.  If a Republican is elected president in 2012, we will have as strong a friend and ally as we have in Britain on a range of issues.

The change is a welcome one given the collapse in U.S. and Spanish relations between Bush and Zapatero after Zapatero's politically motivated and accelerated withdrawal from Iraq and soon after Afghanistan. As a result of these actions, that many in the United States saw as a betrayal, Spain has not been on the radar screen in Washington since 2004 and basically persona non grata with Republicans and Conservatives. The price paid by Spain has been a more limited influence on the international stage. As a medium sized European country with many interests that overlap with ours, the right leadership will now be in place to work with the U.S. on a range of issues that will confront us over the next three to five years.  Whether they have their economic house in order or not, Spain will have a strong voice in the EU and NATO, influence in the Maghreb and Latin America, U.S.  bases on Spanish territory and a sizeable military that it will be able to deploy in a number of scenarios. 

Most of the media coverage -- as it should be, has been about the economic crisis -- which is going to crowd out almost everything else for the next 12 months until and through the U.S. election.  The economic crisis will certainly mean drastic cuts in its budgets for foreign assistance and military expenditure but its interests will be in line with the United States and expect a Rajoy government to look for ways to work with the U.S. regardless of its financial situation.

The Popular Party leadership has been willing to take principled and politically costly stands in defense of the principles of enlarging human freedom, supporting the Atlantic alliance and defeating terrorism. After finishing Mariano Rajoy's book En Confianza, I was pleased to see a chapter dedicated to his proposed policy of a much stronger relationship with the US. Rajoy has been forced to speak in indirect ways as part of the campaign so his strong and clear views about a stronger Spain-U.S. relationship is notable.  Many readers of this blog will remember that the PP was slated to win the 2004 elections before the terrorist attacks in Madrid.  The terrorists act perpetrated by al Qaeda were designed to sabotage the PP and "punish" Spain for participation in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rajoy lost that election and lost again in 2008.  Jose Maria Aznar, the former Prime Minister, famously met with George W. Bush before the Iraq War along with the prime ministers of Portugal and Great Britain.  Ana Palacio, then foreign minister of Spain, chaired the critical sessions of the Security Council in 2003 before the (ultimately unsuccessful) Iraq vote.  Both Jose Maria Aznar and Ana Palacio are remembed well and have many friends in the United States.  Rajoy was the first interior minister from a major ally to meet with U.S. officials after Sept. 11th. 

Opportunities for the United States to work with the new government will include:

  • A long term strategy for supporting "small d" democrats in the Arab Spring: Spain brings unique experiences from its transition to democracy that it can and should bring to bear. Also the changes going are right next door and so if the experiments in democracies fail in Tunisia and elsewhere, expect more immigrants coming to Spain on boats. This possibility will focus minds at the Moncloa (the equivalent of the Spanish White House) on ways to help support the long process needed to make the Arab Spring a success.
  • A constructive actor in a possible Cuba transition: the Castro brothers could take Spanish citizenship at any time through their father and go into exile. The problem is "entrepreneurial" judges like Baltazar Garzon making this difficult
  • A constructive actor in a possible Venezuela transition: Chavez may not have long to live and Spain has a role to play here
  • A vote in NATO, the UN and the EU: Spain could also serve as a constructive actor seeking to ensure Iran does not go nuclear
  • A stronger (if muted) supporter of Israel: Madrid may help push for a lasting Israel-Palestinian peace deal (Hope springs eternal).

There are going to be a number of challenges over the next couple of years where a Rajoy government could be the determining factor in U.S. success or failure just as it was prior to the 2004 defeat of the Popular Party. 

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Shadow Government

How many nuclear-armed countries does Obama want in Asia?

Of course President Obama does not want any more nuclear powers in Asia. But his policies are hastening that reality. Why? First "global zero" and deep cuts in conventional forces are both tempting Beijing to up its nuclear arsenal and giving allies pause about our "extended deterrent." Second, Obama has continued the Bush and Clinton policies that have allowed North Korea to become a nuclear power.

Let's turn to "New Start" and global zero. Without regard to China's modernizing strategic arsenal, Obama signed an agreement with Russia to reduce the number of deployed U.S. nuclear warheads from 2,200 to between 1,500 and 1,675. Both countries are also reducing their strategic delivery systems.

China, however, is not part of any meaningful nuclear reduction treaties. In addition, it has no incentive to reduce its ballistic missile arsenal. As I previously wrote with Mark Stokes, Beijing is not bound by the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Agreement and therefore can build conventional and nuclear tipped ballistic missiles of all ranges with reckless abandon. Contrast that with the coming stark reduction in U.S. conventional forces in East Asia.

The Obama defense cuts -- and make no mistake, there will much less conventional striking power in Asia by the time he leaves office -- are all the more problematic given that the president justified his nuclear reductions by claiming that U.S. supremacy in precision-guided conventional weapons changes the calculus of deterrence. The logic was the U.S. can rely on conventional weaponry to have the same effects of nuclear weapons. 

But all of our credible delivery systems (for conventional and unconventional weaponry) are threatened by the budget knife (nuclear submarine fleet, stealthy aircraft, next generation bomber.) And, the administration's plans for prompt global strike -- the ability to hit any target in the world rapidly -- are also of concern. First, Obama does not plan on employing very many of these systems, which undermines the stated objective of conventional supremacy. Second, if an administration decided to increase the number of missiles in the prompt global strike arsenal, those missiles would count against the New Start limits (which include conventional ICBMs against the total limit of delivery systems).

As a consequence we are getting close to a worst-case scenario in Asia. We are tempting Beijing to increase its strategic arsenal. As mentioned, China has no treaty limits on nuclear weapons or their delivery systems. At the same time, with our AirSea battle concept, we talk more openly about conventional strikes on the mainland to shut down a Chinese attack. Even if we had the conventional capability to hit targets in China that would have a strategic effects, this approach could lead toward more nuclear weapons in China. If I were a Chinese strategist, I would look at every option to negate the consequences of a massive conventional strike on my homeland - I would build a more robust nuclear arsenal. And apparently that is what China is doing.

If our strategy is to respond to a Chinese attack on an ally with massive conventional strikes on the mainland, we better have the nuclear arsenal we need to deter a nuclear response.

In short, China has every incentive to add to its arsenal. And, without a nuclear, conventional, or missile defense answer, our allies must be growing nervous. According to a State Department report cited by my colleagues Tom Donnelly and David Trachtenburg, "[t]here is clear evidence in diplomatic channels that U.S. assurances to include the nuclear umbrella have been, and continue to be, the single most important reason many allies have foresworn nuclear weapons."

The bipartisan success of this decade's long strategic policy is undeniable. South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Australia are all quite capable of acquiring nuclear weapons but chose (sometimes with U.S. prodding) not to do so. Now South Korea and Japan have at least two reasons to reconsider-North Korea is a nuclear weapons state and China may be a growing one. Taiwan is less confident that it will get the conventional arms it needs from the U.S., and we would do well to remember that it sought nuclear weapons when it was previously abandoned by the U.S.  

And Australia? While the administration's decision to place Marines in Darwin is a move in the right direction, it stands to be undercut by the problems described above. With the fraying credibility of a U.S. nuclear or overbearing conventional capability, an Australia hosting Marines may come to look like a juicier target for Chinese defense planners. In terms of deterrence, the question may cease to be whether we will trade Taipei for Los Angeles. Instead allies may ask, why host U.S. troops if Washington does not have a credible extended deterrent? The next question will be, if North Korea and China have nuclear weapons, why not us?

Global Zero may quickly turn to Global Many.

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