Of course President Obama does not want any more nuclear powers in Asia. But his policies are hastening that reality. Why? First "global zero" and deep cuts in conventional forces are both tempting Beijing to up its nuclear arsenal and giving allies pause about our "extended deterrent." Second, Obama has continued the Bush and Clinton policies that have allowed North Korea to become a nuclear power.

Let's turn to "New Start" and global zero. Without regard to China's modernizing strategic arsenal, Obama signed an agreement with Russia to reduce the number of deployed U.S. nuclear warheads from 2,200 to between 1,500 and 1,675. Both countries are also reducing their strategic delivery systems.

China, however, is not part of any meaningful nuclear reduction treaties. In addition, it has no incentive to reduce its ballistic missile arsenal. As I previously wrote with Mark Stokes, Beijing is not bound by the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Agreement and therefore can build conventional and nuclear tipped ballistic missiles of all ranges with reckless abandon. Contrast that with the coming stark reduction in U.S. conventional forces in East Asia.

The Obama defense cuts -- and make no mistake, there will much less conventional striking power in Asia by the time he leaves office -- are all the more problematic given that the president justified his nuclear reductions by claiming that U.S. supremacy in precision-guided conventional weapons changes the calculus of deterrence. The logic was the U.S. can rely on conventional weaponry to have the same effects of nuclear weapons. 

But all of our credible delivery systems (for conventional and unconventional weaponry) are threatened by the budget knife (nuclear submarine fleet, stealthy aircraft, next generation bomber.) And, the administration's plans for prompt global strike -- the ability to hit any target in the world rapidly -- are also of concern. First, Obama does not plan on employing very many of these systems, which undermines the stated objective of conventional supremacy. Second, if an administration decided to increase the number of missiles in the prompt global strike arsenal, those missiles would count against the New Start limits (which include conventional ICBMs against the total limit of delivery systems).

As a consequence we are getting close to a worst-case scenario in Asia. We are tempting Beijing to increase its strategic arsenal. As mentioned, China has no treaty limits on nuclear weapons or their delivery systems. At the same time, with our AirSea battle concept, we talk more openly about conventional strikes on the mainland to shut down a Chinese attack. Even if we had the conventional capability to hit targets in China that would have a strategic effects, this approach could lead toward more nuclear weapons in China. If I were a Chinese strategist, I would look at every option to negate the consequences of a massive conventional strike on my homeland - I would build a more robust nuclear arsenal. And apparently that is what China is doing.

If our strategy is to respond to a Chinese attack on an ally with massive conventional strikes on the mainland, we better have the nuclear arsenal we need to deter a nuclear response.

In short, China has every incentive to add to its arsenal. And, without a nuclear, conventional, or missile defense answer, our allies must be growing nervous. According to a State Department report cited by my colleagues Tom Donnelly and David Trachtenburg, "[t]here is clear evidence in diplomatic channels that U.S. assurances to include the nuclear umbrella have been, and continue to be, the single most important reason many allies have foresworn nuclear weapons."

The bipartisan success of this decade's long strategic policy is undeniable. South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Australia are all quite capable of acquiring nuclear weapons but chose (sometimes with U.S. prodding) not to do so. Now South Korea and Japan have at least two reasons to reconsider-North Korea is a nuclear weapons state and China may be a growing one. Taiwan is less confident that it will get the conventional arms it needs from the U.S., and we would do well to remember that it sought nuclear weapons when it was previously abandoned by the U.S.  

And Australia? While the administration's decision to place Marines in Darwin is a move in the right direction, it stands to be undercut by the problems described above. With the fraying credibility of a U.S. nuclear or overbearing conventional capability, an Australia hosting Marines may come to look like a juicier target for Chinese defense planners. In terms of deterrence, the question may cease to be whether we will trade Taipei for Los Angeles. Instead allies may ask, why host U.S. troops if Washington does not have a credible extended deterrent? The next question will be, if North Korea and China have nuclear weapons, why not us?

Global Zero may quickly turn to Global Many.

Getty Images

 

WOLFBOY

11:05 PM ET

November 29, 2011

Deeply unpersuasive

What is the basis for asserting that limitations on US and Russian arsenals will tempt China to expand its arsenal? One would generally expect causation to work the other way.

and "Global Zero"? I don't understand how a proposal for China -- among others -- to freeze its stockpile and then enter into agreements to reduce weapons will lead to rapid growth in the Chinese arsenal.

Are you really claiming that China would grow its arsenal less if the US increased its conventional forces and (along with Russia) declined to reduce its nuclear forces?

Even within the New START limits, the US will retain a significantly larger and more deliverable nuclear arsenal than China, and the ability to devastate that (or any) country and cause hundreds of millions of deaths.

 

ROBERTONLEY

11:30 PM ET

November 29, 2011

Disconcerting Dialogue

While there is no doubt such worst-case scenarios must be contemplated in Washington, I would hope that sincere dialogue about nuclear proliferation transpires between the highest levels of the American and Chinese militaries.

The U.S. and China should agree on a workable, mutual deterrent policy, and then should be discussing how best to stop the threat of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, particularly with respect to Iran. This is the far greater threat.

Operating on the basis of how the U.S. could best annihilate China with conventional weapons is counter-intuitive to the promotion of peace. Does anyone really think China would target U.S. Marines in Australia?

I understand that the U.S. and China are superpower rivals and are likely to bicker over every single global issue throughout the next century. But is there any reason to believe that either country will have to resort to nuclear war against each other to resolve their differences? Sheer economics should rule out even the remote possibility of such a horrifying scenario.

I believe a better strategy would seek out ways to partner with the Chinese to ensure stable access to energy supplies globally, based on a mutual peace pact. Just as China's government publicly seeks a "peaceful rise", so too the United States should seek "peaceful coexistence" with China's emergence as a superpower.

China and the United States are far too intertwined to waste intellectual resources on how we would obliterate each other militarily. It's 2011, people.

 

MITTAL

12:52 AM ET

November 30, 2011

let all just indulge Blumemthal's NEOCON fantasy

don't be silly & logical,

Blumenthal rather indulge in doomsday fantasy come what may,

NEOCON solution is very simple, just spend trillion dollars add more to budget deficit and build extensive conventional capability and beef up nuclear arsenal.

He would be willing to have these deadly forces build to be financed by China loan.

China morons!!

 

MITTAL

12:52 AM ET

November 30, 2011

let all just indulge Blumemthal's NEOCON fantasy

don't be silly & logical,

Blumenthal rather indulge in doomsday fantasy come what may,

NEOCON solution is very simple, just spend trillion dollars add more to budget deficit and build extensive conventional capability and beef up nuclear arsenal.

He would be willing to have these deadly forces build to be financed by China loan.

China morons!!

 

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2:00 AM ET

November 30, 2011

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UBOAT53

4:38 PM ET

November 30, 2011

Logical?

Conservative logic on defense issues always seems to make very basic mistakes in assumptions to me. Of course, the far leftist "all join hands and sing kumbayah" model is quite ridiculous on its face, but the flaws in the far conservative (and let's be honest, that's what this critique is) are a bit more subtle.

Mainly, I'd like to see this question answered. If you (the author) were in charge of the Chinese government, would a rapidly militarizing US make you more or less likely to want to grow your own military faster?

If your answer is less, I suggest you get your head examined. There is no reason to imagine that the Chinese line of thinking on defense issues is any different than our own (greater external threats = greater defense buildup). This proposal, then, is a recipe for endless spending on far more defense than should be necessary.

The US currently possesses the most powerful conventional military on Earth by a wide margin. Nation building aside, there is no force in history as capable of blowing things up as the US Army, Navy, and Air Force. Given this favorable position, taking risks in the service of our national defense is largely unnecessary.

The most sensible posture for the US right now is patient watchfulness. We have more allies, and more powerful allies, than the Chinese do even in their own backyard, so defense of our position is a victory. Let the Chinese military eat them out of house and home, we should focus our resources on economic growth instead.

As we showed in WW1 and WW2, a strong economy can be quickly transitioned into a powerful military force. The opposite does not hold true.

 

STRYKERCAVSCOUT

2:06 AM ET

December 6, 2011

Here's my thing

China is, without question, building it's own missile defense system. Why wouldn't you if you were them? Imagine the strategic value in being the first to negate one of the great powers nuclear arsenals? Especially given that these arsenals are pretty friggin' old.

This whole debate is silly - China will expand its nuclear (and conventional) arsenal to whatever point it takes to have an edge over the United States or until it concludes it is large enough to make war with the United States too costly for the US to contemplate in a serious way.

We need to build a conventional, nuclear, and nuclear defense arsenal that matches our goals and objectives. If we intend to secure Japan and everyone else in Asia, then we have to have a large arsenal and probably need to build some kind of NMD/BMD system that reduces the number of expensive nuclear weapons (and delivery systems) we have to have.

If we want to retrench, to leave the area to its own devices, then we don't need to build anything more than enough to make the costs of agressing against us too high for China to reasonably contemplate - we don't need to worry about "winning" so much as doing enough damage as to prevent China from really winning. But we're fools if we think Japan is going to be ok with that - they'll build their own nukes and probably re-arm.

Regardless - we need to figure out what the heck we want before we decide what kind of military to have. If what we build doesn't match our objectives, we virtually guarantee a bad outcome.

 

Shadow Government is a blog about U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration, written by experienced policy makers from the loyal opposition and curated by Peter D. Feaver and William Inboden.

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