Posted By José R. Cárdenas Share

In the Al Pacino epic Scarface, about Miami's violent cocaine culture of the 1980s, the drug kingpin is seen as a Bolivian ensconced in a luxurious mountain villa with a handful of Bolivian generals in his pocket. It was of a piece with the times. (Bolivian dictator General Luis García Meza Tejada would later be sentenced to 30 years in jail for drug trafficking.)

However, through the 1990s and 2000s, successive Bolivian governments worked with the United States to cripple the drug cartels operating there, so much so that the notion of a South American narco-general seemingly had been dumped into the historical dustbin.

Well, thanks to Venezuela's Hugo Chavez and Bolivia's Evo Morales, the South American narco-general appears to be rising again from the ash heap. Last week, a federal judge in Miami sentenced the former head of Bolivia's elite counternarcotics unit, General René Sanabria, to 14 years in prison for arranging protection for a shipment of some 140 kilos of cocaine from Bolivia to the United States. He was captured in June in Panama in a DEA sting and reportedly controlled a network of some 40 dirty cops.

Such is the outcome of Morales's decision in 2008 to expel the DEA from Bolivia, one of the largest cocaine producers in the world. Morales, a coca grower union leader, said the DEA's presence was an offense to the country's "dignity." Since then, the production and trafficking of cocaine has skyrocketed, with drug traffickers from Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and elsewhere seizing the opportunity to expand operations in Bolivia.

This month, the State Department again cited the Morales government as having "failed demonstrably" to adhere to their obligations under international agreements to combat narcotics trafficking.

Lumped in with Bolivia and Burma as countries that have also failed demonstrably is Venezuela, where Morales benefactor Hugo Chavez relies on his own share of narco-generals to maintain power. Earlier this month, the Treasury Department added another of Venezuela's most powerful generals, Cliver Alcalá, to its kingpin list, where he joins two others designated in 2008, the Commander-in-Chief of the Venezuelan military, General Henry Rangel Silva, and the Chief of Military Intelligence, General Hugo Carvajal. (The Treasury designation means any assets the individuals have in U.S. accounts are frozen and U.S. citizens are barred from doing business with them.)

All three are charged with aiding and abetting the activities of drug-running guerrillas in neighboring Colombia and all three were named by captured Venezuelan drug kingpin Walid Makled as having been on his payroll and facilitated his drug trafficking operations. (Unfortunately, the Obama administration failed to pursue Makled's extradition from Colombia, and he was sent back to Venezuela.)

U.S. law enforcement agencies -- particularly the DEA -- deserve great credit for following these investigatory leads wherever they have gone, considering the Obama administration's preference to avoid confrontations with Hugo Chavez and his regional acolytes. For a variety of important reasons the U.S. government needs to keep pushing for more designations and indictments, not the least of which is to send an unmistakable signal that this regional backsliding on the counternarcotics front is a growing concern.

For example, in Venezuela's case, Makled claimed he had videos and other documentary evidence implicating some 40 Venezuelan generals in his illicit activities. In Bolivia, opposition members believe the Sanabria case is only the "tip of the iceberg."

The Venezuela cases in particular deserve close attention, since narco-generals like Rangel Silva and Carvajal will work to spoil any democratic transition if Chavez's health should fail him, since their protected status could not be guaranteed in a post-Chavez Venezuela. They may be presently out of the reach of the U.S. law enforcement, but the continued "naming and shaming" of the narco-generals and, even better, their indictments by the U.S. government will make them less able to carry out their nefarious crimes.

AIZAR RALDES/AFP/Getty Images

 

DANILOB

6:28 PM ET

October 6, 2011

No evidence presented

There is no evidence that the expulsion of the DEA has harmed anything besides US intelligence and covert operations in Bolivia.

Calderon cites no statistics or sources for his claim that “production and trafficking of cocaine has skyrocketed.” In fact, the official decertification memo to the President from the Secretary of State states (page 5) that Bolivia’s performance in targeting and dismantling foreign drug trafficker organizations has increased marginally in recent years. This achievement is through Bolivia’s efforts and cooperation with neighboring countries, most notably Brazil.” But that doesn’t matter, they go on to say, because the DEA is no longer present.

Venezuela unlike Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, is not a “source country,” but a drug transit area. The memo acknowledges official Venezuelan statistics showing 63 tons of drug seized in 2010, without mentioning that this was an apples-to-apples increase over the 54 tons seized in 2009. You could say omission ins consistent with the inherent logic of the memo, since the Secretary basically says, “we choose not to believe them,” because the DEA is not present.

Another non sequitur: the memo claims that the improvement in Bolivian counternarcotics capabilities “have not been able to compete with the rising drug trends that have brought Bolivia back to high coca cultivation and cocaine production levels.” Then, in the next sentence, Secretary Clinton says that “the 2010 United States Government coca cultivation estimate for Bolivia of 34,500 hectares was slightly _lower_ [emphasis added] than the 2009 estimate of 35,000 hectares.” Similar UN statistics show an increase of 3.8 percent, from 30,900 to 31,100 hectares.

This is skyrocketing?

Looking at Bolivia in comparison to the other two Andean coca growing nations makes this characterization and framing even more suspect. In absolute numbers, Peru and Colombia both devote twice as much area to coca cultivation, 57,000 and 61,200 hectares, respectively, according to the UNODC.

The official US actions and designations Calderon cites should be taken with the appropriate level of skepticism, given the statistical contradictions cited above, and the thorough politicization of the “decertification” process. The political nature of the decertification process is a product and illustration of the official practice of ignoring drug-trafficking by paramilitary surrogates and allies down through the decades such as the KMT Chinese, the South Vietnamese Air Force, Miami Cubans, the Nicaraguan Contras, Afghani mujahideen, Kosovo Liberation Army, and paramilitaries allied with the Colombian state (Alfred McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 2003).

Conversely, inconvenient governments in China, Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Bolivia have been labeled as narco-regimes, in the style illustrated by Mr. Calderon.

 

ZONIA KLIMAS

7:47 PM ET

October 19, 2011

Now that is something better.

Now that is something better. The return of a strong init is certainly no loss to the U.S. the point always lies in the utilization.

LPNTrainingPrograms
Medical_ Assistant_Certification

 

Shadow Government is a blog about U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration, written by experienced policy makers from the loyal opposition and curated by Peter D. Feaver and William Inboden.

Read More