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Why Does the U.S. Get All the Tornadoes?
Posted By Peter Feaver
Friday, June 24, 2011 - 10:50 AM
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Because of a day in air travel purgatory, I have been unable to comment on President Barack Obama's Afghanistan decision and his rare prime-time address on war. With the "benefit" of an additional day of musing and reading other people's commentary, I have three somewhat contradictory takes. First, it seems clear that he is putting the country on an extraordinarily risky course, one that could jeopardize much of the gains achieved by his West Point surge. Second, he has not presented to the country a sound strategic rationale for why he is doing it this way, leaving the obvious alternative -- that this decision was driven by his electoral interests rather than the best national security interests of the country -- a more plausible explanation than it should otherwise be. But third, at least from the parochial perspective of civil-military relations theory, Obama is within his rights to make the decision in the way that he did, and so far, the senior military have behaved in an exemplary fashion.
The first point has been made well by my Shadow Gov colleague, Kori Schake. As was the case with his West Point surge, the president has hobbled the kinetic leg of his strategy with the self-inflicted diplomatic/political wound of signaling lack of resolve. As a result, not only will the coalition have fewer forces than the generals believe they require to implement the overall strategy effectively -- probably much fewer, as our allies respond to the dog whistle "retreat" sounding from the president's decision and accelerate their rush to the exits -- but those forces will be facing an enemy that has good reason to believe that time is on its side. The military brass report that the new course just might work, but it will be a very close run thing.
The second point has also been made by others. Since the military logic of the move is so weak, one naturally looks for some other explanation, such as a political angle. The president's decision to interrupt next summer's fighting season makes no military sense whatsoever; better to let the troops finish the fighting season and come home in the late fall or winter. But that would be after the election. So far as I have been able to determine, that is the only explanation of the timeline that makes sense, but I am open to hearing a convincing counterargument. I am very reluctant to charge a president with elevating domestic political interests over national security ones because I remember how unfairly Democrats made that charge against President George W. Bush -- and that was on a much more flimsy evidentiary basis. Yet, when I look for a more compelling alternative explanation, I can't find one. Certainly not in the speech, which, as Dov Zakheim pointed out, was strategically incoherent. Given how rarely he has spoken about Afghanistan, it is unfortunate that he squandered this rhetorical moment.
Yet there is one aspect of the decision that is legitimate and one that may even warrant praise. The legitimate aspect is that, notwithstanding a torrent of leaks, the decision-making process seems to have conformed more or less to democratic civil-military norms. The military presented a range of options, including options that it did not want to execute; it would have been inappropriate of Gen. David Petraeus to tie Obama's hands by only providing a narrow range of options, minor variants of the military's preferred plan. He didn't do so; instead, he and the rest of the military leadership have saluted and are obeying, and such professionalism is very definitely worthy of praise. To be sure, the military gave its best personal judgment as to the risks inherent in those plans. Obama was fully aware of the military's judgment, and the public, through Congress, is also aware of that judgment. But it is the president's job to balance the risks of battlefield failure against other risks. The military gets to say this is a high-risk plan. The president gets to say that he will accept this risk and impose it on them.
Accept it and impose it he did. That has important political consequences. Before, one could say that he merely chose General Stanley McChrystal and General Petraeus's strategy. Now it is unmistakably President Obama's strategy. It is his war. But he will be ordering others to fight his war, which brings me to one bit of unfinished civil-military business.
While the media attention has been focused on the troops that are leaving Afghanistan in the coming months, I have been thinking of the troops that will remain. They are locked in the fight of their lives, and they (or at least their commanders) probably paid more attention to the president's speech than did most other Americans. Did the president give them a convincing rationale for continuing to risk their lives? Did he convince them that the stakes were worth it, that the prospects for lasting success good enough? Do they believe that their commander in chief is as committed to the war effort as he is asking them to be? Only when those answers are answered satisfactorily will Obama have fulfilled the dictates of democratic civil-military theory.
Even then, however, he still may be wrong on the strategic aspects of his decision. From a civil-military perspective, the president has the right to be wrong. He might well be wrong this time, and if so, that may be evident to all by next fall. In that case, democratic theory points to the duty of others: the voters.
FP.COM has ignored the only real reason the US is in Afghanistan, and the primary focus of all political and military decisions: The Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline. This project, financed by the multinational Asian Development Bank, protected by the US military, is for the sole purpose of moving gas owned by Chevron's Union Oil subsidiary.
That project is not going forward because it has to go through areas controlled by the Taliban, including ones in Pakistan where the Coalition cannot do anything about it. There are no US companies involved at this time, so it is more likely to get built by China after the Taliban takes over again, in the highly unlikely event that it ever does get built. Even if it were to be built, no construction related contracts have been signed, even for preliminary survey and engineering, so it is a safe bet that the earliest it could be operation is 2020.
Not familiar with this but stands to reason this is one of several interests Petraeus and Company have been babysitting. Where have serious media been during this war? More interested in Obama's campaign speeches, antics of wayward politicos and any story that provides the opportunity to mention sex. FP is a cut above most journalistic endeavors, but even their staff have been reluctant to put Gen. Petraeus in a serious hot seat. He has learned to speak in sound bites, and media have failed to press him to get beyond his studied, unctuous, self-created, meticulous exterior.
April 2008 - Representatives of Pakistan, India and Afghanistan signed a framework deal in Islamabad yesterday to buy natural gas from Turkmenistan
http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article153168.ece
TAPI project will be the new Silk Route
http://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/article946191.ece
Ah c'mon man. There are much better reasons than that. Try no bid construction and security contracts, military industrial profits, destablizing neighboring nations to provide job security for those fore mentioned folks. Also, there are the side benefits of starting a war before an election, and the good old patriot act so our ummm...controllers, err...um... our watchers, hmmmm how bout "protectors" can make sure their agenda, oh, I mean our freedom is ensured through spying on our own people (which I used to think was illegal) and intimidation by snatching citizens, oh I mean "terrorists" in the middle of the night because they hold dissenting opinions. Really, keeping America strung out on post peak oil and bleeding the middle class with ever increasing prices to consolidate power is only a piece of the whole puzzle, when you put the last piece in it is a picture of slavery.
Pakistani-American perfidy of Afghanistan
Previous US ambassador Anne Patterson to Pakistan, wrote in a secret review in 2009 that ‘Pakistan's Army and ISI are covertly SPONSORING four militant groups - Haqqani‘s HQN, Mullah Omar‘s QST, Al Qaeda and LeT - and will not abandon them for any amount of US money‘, as diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks show.
Ambassador Patterson had NO reason to mislead her own State Department and U. S. government.
And there is NO reason why Pakistani Army and ISI will stop supporting their proxies fighting war against US/NATO troops in Afghanistan from their safe shelters in Pakistan at this point when U. S. is ready to leave. Ambassador Patterson has clearly told us that much.
At this stage in the game after the death of Osama bin Laden and ten long years of war, as far as the US is concerned, the war on terror is over; feeble clarifications by the State Department, that the larger war on Al Qaeda shall continue, are inconsequential. Pakistan knows that by skillfully holding out till now, it is close to getting its proxy regime in place in Kabul. Pakistani and American interests, both short-term and medium-term, converge at this point; a broke and tired America can not afford to look at long-term interests, not at this moment.
And thereby hangs a tale — of Pakistani and American perfidy. The US has been, and shall always remain mindful of the “paranoia of Pakistan”; Islamabad’s sensitivities, its faux victimhood, will always take precedence over Afghanistan in Washington.
Obama administration is already asking Pakistan to provide access to Afghan Taliban leaders safely ensconced under Pakistani ISI/Army's protection. A facade of Vietnam-style peace deal as dictated by Pakistan will be reached with Afghan Taliban leaders chosen by Pakistan. US will begin its drawdown and finally exit the theater of a war it is desperate not to be seen as having lost, not so much to the Taliban and Al Qaeda as to the wily Generals of Rawalpindi who have proved to be smarter than the Americans.
That facade of peace will crumble within few years after the departure of US troops and Pakistan will bring Afghanistan under its suzerainty with reimposition of Taliban rule just as it did in 1996 while Uncle Sam will helplessly look the other way.
you forget that while history rhymes it doesn't repeat, so your analogies are not entirely apt. Pakistan will find out that we will not allow the billions spent in Afghanistan to be written off with a helpless shrug like the falling Soviets. we had very little at stake in 1996. one way or another, America will be guaranteeing a minimally acceptable Afghan government for the next decade and probably longer.
the Vietnam question is sharper, but there was a rabidly conflicted home front in that war. in Afghanistan we are now in Petreus's unwinnable quagmire but the public knows that we were attacked out of there. we will reduce the heavy ground presence slowly but surely while continuing to hammer diehards in both countries until the Pakistani generals recognize that we will not accept an unambiguous loss. end result: Biden wins
While history may not repeat, America's budget and political realities will force US to look the other way while Pakistan reengineers Taliban take over after the departure of US troops.
Spending additional billions will be considered 'throwing good money after bad' when politicians will follow the public opinion in refusing to get involved again in Afghanistan after Pakistan-engineered Taliban takeover.
Obama, in his speech on Afghanistan, never mentioned the most important factor in our continued presence in that "graveyard of empires" -- The Narcosaurus.
It is something never openly discussed in Wall Street bank board rooms or the network news rooms of the mainstream media.
Certainly never before the American people.
But it is one of the central driving factors of our imperial foreign policy with the Third World, and has been for decades.
Last week we observed the 40th anniversary of the beginning of Richard Nixon's War on Drugs upon the American people.
When will we observe the commencement of the covert War for Drugs, which has lasted over sixty years, and whose massive institutional corruption, money-laundering, and military interventions have fueled the military-industrial complex and the National Security State?
http://www.lewrockwell.com/blog/lewrw/archives/742...
Obligations of Democratic Civil-Military Relations Theory?
Pete,
You wrote:
Did the president give them a convincing rationale for continuing to risk their lives? Did he convince them that the stakes were worth it, that the prospects for lasting success good enough? Do they believe that their commander in chief is as committed to the war effort as he is asking them to be? Only when those answers are answered satisfactorily will Obama have fulfilled the dictates of democratic civil-military theory.
Although those things would be nice, are they necessary? The profession is not based on individual soldiers having to be convinced of the rationale for continuing to risk their lives at each and every turn. See Burk's chapter in Neilsen & Snider as well as your own work on the right to be wrong.
As for relative commitment, there clearly will always be an asymmetry between anyone who in a tactical situation must be committed to risk their lives under immediate duress and anyone at a comfortable remove from such a situation. This relative level of commitment must be inversely related to both the distance from the immediate situation as well as the scope of responsibility of those we are comparing.
Finally, where could one find the dictates of democratic civil-military relations theory? I've often been asked about the reciprocal obligations of civilian leaders to military officers -- usually when discussing Dick Kohn's work -- and although he hits those themes in his chapter in Neilsen & Burke and elsewhere, I've not seen a comprehensive list of such obligations or 'dictates' in the literature. Any suggestions?
Obligations of Democratic Civil-Military Relations Theory? 2
Perhaps I was too narrow and/or vague:
From Feaver's Armed Servants, pages 5-6.
"It follows that in a democracy the hierarchy of de jure authority favors civilians against the military.... civilian competence, in the general sense, extends even beyond their competence in a particular sense. That is, civilians are morally and politically competent to make the decisions even if they do not possess the relevant technical competence in the form of expertise. This is the core of the democratic alternative to Plato's philosopher king. Although the expert may possibly understand the issue better, the expert is not in a position to determine the value the people will attach to different issue outcomes.... Regardless of how superior the military view of a situation may be, the civilian view trumps it."
That establishes "the right to be wrong" in terms of democratic theory.
Feaver also wrote about the sacrifice issue on pages 8-9:
"The players have different moral and political competencies.... The military officer is promising to risk his life, or to order his comrades to risk their lives, to execute any policy decisions. The civilian actor is promising to answer to the electorate for the consequences of any policy decisions. The military officer is expected to obey even stupid orders, or to resign in favor of someone who will. The civilian is claiming the right to be wrong."
This gets at the moral basis for a military agent's request to understand what he is risking his life for, but not the basis for a response.
As Feaver wrote on page 69 with regard to having to explain or justify decisions to military agents, (in the context of principal-agent theory, which I will refer you to Feaver's book for a discussion of):
"Likewise, some information is private to the principal. For instance, the principal knows exactly how he judges various risks and how these judgments translate into preferences over outcomes. While the civilian principal may convey this information to the military agent in the form of orders, it is also possible that exogenous changes in nature ... will cause a shift in the preferences of the principal. The anticipated effect f these changes will certainly be hidden from the military agent, and may even be hidden from the principal himself."
So, there is no "dictate" to justify or explain decisions down the chain within theories of democratic civ-mil relations, just as there is not an obligation for an officer higher in the chain of command to explain his or her reasoning to those under his or her command.
Of course, there may be more literature out there that has changed Pete's view -- we all grow in our understanding and sophistication of the issues over time, after all -- and I'd like to read that, too.
A factor influencing the otherwise inexplicable timetable could be the question of having permanent military bases in Afghanistan, bases that would provide armed watchtowers close to China, Pakistan, and Iran, not to mention Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Maintaining such bases would, arguably justify the whole adventure. Last time I looked at this was February when the plan was supposedly waiting an OK from the Afghan parliament, not I imagine the easiest outfit to second guess. I don’t know how compelling it would be but putting progress on the bases one side with the domestic election the other might make the timetable less inexplicable.
I get that, but it is strategy while troop withdrawals are tactics. I may be completely wrong about the bases, there is very little around about the progress of ‘negotiations’, but clearly such bases would be a formidable asset. The issue is obviously highly contentious with hosts of interests ready to play both sides against the middle, and navigating through it must be like driving a truck of nitro on a mountain path. US troop presence/withdrawal would be a trump in any such game. Hence the apparent ambivalence of intentions?
Petraeus on McMasterism and the Right to be Wrong
Pete & company,
In case you missed it over on Tome Ricks' blog:
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/06/27/petraeus_the_troops_dont_get_to_quit_when_they_disagree_so_why_should_i
Shadow Government is a blog about U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration, written by experienced policy makers from the loyal opposition and curated by Peter D. Feaver and William Inboden.
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