Wednesday, April 20, 2011 - 1:02 PM

The Washington Post has a fascinating story about the search for the successor to General Petraeus. Greg Jaffe reports that the Obama Administration will likely bypass Petraeus's well-regarded deputy, Lt. Gen. David Rodriguez, for the also well-regarded Lt. Gen. John Allen.
The good news is that this late in the game, there are now several battle-proven commanders to choose from. While Rodriguez may be very good -- General McChrystal is said to have called him the "best commander I have ever known" -- the alternative may also be very good.
Choosing the commander is one of the most important decisions President Obama and Secretary of Defense Gates will make (or Gates's successor will make -- and choosing that person could even be a more important presidential decision). Obama must have confidence in whomever he chooses and so it is appropriate to pick the one he trusts the most, even if that means passing up someone who looks very strong to others.
That said, I was deeply disturbed by the rationale for the choice offered in the story. Here is how Jaffe put it:
The decision to bypass Rodriguez for the top job reflects a determination among senior Pentagon officials that the war needs a commander who can make the case for the increasingly unpopular conflict to Congress, the news media and skeptics in the White House."
That has the ring of truth to it, and that is precisely why I find it so disturbing. To be sure, making the case for an unpopular conflict to Congress and the news media is an important part of the commander's job. This was one of General Petraeus's strongest suits. His demonstrated capacity in this area is one of the reasons the Iraq surge turned out as well as it did.
But should it be the commander's job to make the case for the war to his skeptical superiors in the White House? After all, he is executing their war, the war that their President (our President) said was a "necessary war." Would a story like this even make sense in other policy domains: "HHS Looking to Pick a Health Czar Who Can Persuade the White House that Obamacare is Worth the Cost?"
For that matter, shouldn't the White House bear the largest load for making the case for Afghanistan to skeptics in Congress, the news media and, by extension, the American people? I understand that the White House cannot do it alone and that a media-savvy battlefield commander is a vital asset. By late in the Bush tenure, White House credibility with Congress, the media, and even, to a certain extent, with the American people, had so eroded that the Administration over-relied on commanders like Petraeus and General Odierno to do public outreach. But this was after years of strenuous effort by President Bush. Petraeus may have had to fight a two-front war, combatting both insurgents in Iraq and skeptics back home. But at least he had no doubt whatsoever that President Bush had his back.
Where has been the comparable effort from President Obama? Does Petraeus believe Obama has his back now? If Obama believes the war is important enough for him to send America's sons and daughters (and Moms and Dads) in harms way, then it is his job, as Commander-in-Chief, to make the case for the increasingly unpopular conflict to Congress, the news media and above all to skeptics in the White House. This last constituency is the easiest one to persuade: one Oval Office meeting should do it because every single one of them serves at the pleasure of the President.
Perhaps Jaffe has garbled the story, but I doubt it. He is a very careful and well-sourced reporter. It is all-too-plausible that the Pentagon believes the new war commander has to have the chops to persuade Congress, the media, and the White House all on his own.
Perhaps the Pentagon believes this in error. Let's hope so, because if Jaffe's sources are correctly gauging the lay of the land inside the administration, we are in very deep trouble. I do not know of very many successful military ventures where the president was as uncommitted as this president appears to be.
I suppose I can understand why Peter Feaver of all people might have trouble with the difference between a President having someone's back and a President draping himself all over someone's back to support himself.
George W. Bush worked hard to wreck his administration's credibility with the American public. It took years of strenuous effort on his part, as Feaver says. I'm sure that he did support the Iraq commander he called on, several years too late, to salvage the war effort Bush and his associates in the White House had done so much to run into the ground. In practical terms, though, the support went more the other way, because Gen. Petraeus was able to convey to Congress and the public that he knew what he was doing. This was something Bush and his associates could not do.
Of course, the effort made to salvage something of Bush's Iraq disaster was effort that could not be made in Afghanistan, contributing to the deteriorating situation in that country that Bush dumped on his successor. Bush didn't have our military commanders' in Afghanistan backs as much as he showed them his, not just during the Iraq surge period but for many years previously.
That's beside the point of the low, dishonest commentary here, as is the idea the Petraeus himself (the former CentCom commander and the most influential general in the Army) might have preferred a former general from the Iraq war to Gen. Rodriquez. And, for that matter, the content of Jaffe's article, which makes clear that Gen. Rodriquez has a reputation as a fine combat commander and a poor communicator -- not just to Congressional and other Washington audiences, but to most audiences outside the military.
No, the emphasis of this post is on resolve and commitment, from a key member of the team that showed so much of both that it screwed up Iraq and screwed up Afghanistan. One may well wonder why Peter Feaver thinks his former chief lost his credibility on matters of war and peace, but Feaver himself still has some.
I get the impression folks missed Prof Feaver's point - mainly that the civil-military relationship in a Democratic State is out of balance when the military is bearing the responsibility for "selling" the war to Congress AND the White House.
It is reasonable to expect the President to hear and to be given advice from his generals - he is the Commander in Chief and in that role, I can imagine generals attempting to "sell" a course of action to him. However - it isn't the generals who take the country to war - it is the President and as such, it should be the President and his office who make the case for the war - including perhaps the OSD.
General officers should be prepared to give a report on the war to Congress, but again - it isn't their job to "sell" or "defend" it to them. The civil-military relationship must be carefully managed in a democratic state that both desires military power and a civilian led military. If you start expecting (and selecting) commanders on their ability to sell a course of action to Congress I have to ask what your end-game is? Is it to create a military organization that can bypass the President and go straight to Congress to get what it wants?
Finally - I have to wonder at the ability of an individual to make a case if they have to first open it with a cheap shot. It is clearly an attempt to lower the rigor of the debate. Prof. Feaver here isn't addressing the merits of the war, he is addressing the civil-military relationship in the context of the war. Being involved in the decision to go to war doesn't reduce his authority in this topic.
...but that wasn't the point with which I opened my post upthread. It was the point with which I ended it.
I began by pointing out that the Bush administration relied heavily on Gen. Petraeus to "sell" its Iraq policy to Congress -- out of necessity, because by that time President Bush and his associates had screwed up the war so badly, for so long, that President Bush had no credibility left. One of those associates is now claiming, with reference to the Afghan war Bush left to drift while he was preoccupied with Iraq, that President Obama is so short of resolve and commitment that the uniformed military thought it had to have an Afghan commander who could sell the President's policy not only to Congress, but to the President's White House staff.
I imagine that questions of civil-military relations could arise if the military were doing this because it feared President Obama might decide to change his policy, and wanted to preempt him. If the President himself wanted to use a military commander to somehow circumvent civilian advisers he felt he could not control himself, different questions would arise. But let's not spend too much time in the world of fantasy here. The argument to which I was responding began with an assumption in accord with the policy preferences of its author. It was unsourced, save with a secondhand anonymous quotation; it ignored other explanations for Gen. Rodriquez not being chosen for the Afghan command.
And, yes, it was commentary by a member of the team that created the mess with which Obama is forced to deal on the manner in which he is dealing with it. Certainly this objection may be met with criticism that making it "lower[s] the rigor of the debate." Tough.
Rusk, Bundy and the other officials whose mistakes helped produce the disaster in Vietnam had the personal grace to withdraw from public commentary on the foreign policy of the administration forced to deal with the fruit of their work. If Peter Feaver and his associates lack that quality, they can expect to have their record thrown in their faces into the indefinite future.
Are you interested in honest debate or in forcing anyone tied to the Bush adminstration out of public life and/or hoping to discredit anyone tied to President Bush?
I'm curious - why do you feel it's your mission to throw his record in his face? If you hate the guy so much, why take the time to read his stuff? Just ignore it. If he truly has lost all credibility you can expect he'll just fade away because no one will read what he writes and to be honest, by commenting on his articles you actually are working against that goal.
Finally - you say:
"Rusk, Bundy and the other officials whose mistakes helped produce the disaster in Vietnam had the personal grace to withdraw from public commentary on the foreign policy of the administration forced to deal with the fruit of their work."
Ask yourself if you truly believe they would have so graciously withdrawn if there had been a blog they could post on? My guess is they wouldn't have - further, I imagine once the current adminstration is replaced in 2 or 6 years, the folks there will retire to blogs and the like to continue to talk about their policy preferences.
Shadow Government is a blog about U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration, written by experienced policy makers from the loyal opposition and curated by Peter D. Feaver and William Inboden.
Read More
(4)
HIDE COMMENTS LOGIN OR REGISTER REPORT ABUSE