Wednesday, October 13, 2010 - 2:28 PM

The New America Foundation convened a conference this week to showcase the work of Robert Pape, in the hopes that his policy prescriptions will be picked up as an alternative to our current strategy in Afghanistan. This would be a terrible idea.
Pape's research shows that the majority of suicide bomb attacks occur in places
occupied by U.S. military forces; from this he concludes that we should adopt a
strategy of "offshore balancing." By which he means to remove U.S.
forces and rely on military strikes into the countries, along with more
effective political and economic engagement. Neither the research nor the
prescriptions are sound bases for policy.
To say that attacks occur where U.S. forces are deployed is to say no more than
Willy Sutton, who robbed banks because "that's where the money is."
Pape's approach ignores the context in which deployment and stationing of U.S.
forces occurs. We send troops to advance our interests, protect our allies, and
contest the political and geographic space that groups like al Qaeda and the
Taliban are operating in. Of course the attacks will stop if we cede those
political objectives. But the troops are not the point, the political
objectives are the point.
The second important context Pape glosses over is that suicide attacks do not
occur wherever in the world U.S. troops are deployed. Troops stationed in
Germany, Japan, or South Korea are not at risk of suicide attacks from the
people of those countries. This is not just about U.S. troops, but also about
the societies we are operating in. It is about a radical and violent
interpretation of Islam that we are using military force to contest.
The policy prescriptions Pape advances are also problematic. An offshore
balancing approach means that we will not be engaged with military forces on
the ground, and yet what we have learned in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan
is that we achieve our objectives most fully when indigenous forces are
partnered with us and made able to take over the work of U.S. forces in the
fight. They have greater legitimacy, local knowledge, and make the outcome most
durable. That was the Bush administration's strategy in Iraq, and it is the purported
approach of the Obama administration in Afghanistan. Pape's policies have no
way to achieve that improvement in the capacity of partner forces.
An offshore balancing approach is also inherently retaliatory and has been
shown to increase the resistance of affected populations to supporting our
objectives. We threaten to use force from the safe confines of distance; that
use of force may have pinpoint accuracy but will often be less precise and
cause more civilian casualties than forces on the ground, which will again feed
into public attitudes about whether to support U.S. goals. Instead of working
with the people most affected and helping build their capacity to protect
themselves, offshore balancing does little to change the problem in positive
ways.
Except for the "improved" political and economic activity. How that
will be undertaken in a deteriorating security environment is mysterious.
Moreover, if we could do any better at the provision of political and economic
engagement, we'd already be doing that.
Convincing allies the U.S. will commit itself to fight unless we have troops
stationed where we expect the fight to occur has always been difficult. The
history of the Cold War is replete with transatlantic discussion of extended
deterrence: would the United States really send the boys back over if Germany were
attacked? Would the United States really use nuclear weapons when our own homeland would
be at risk of retaliation? It seems unlikely those concerns would be attenuated
in societies we are less politically and culturally similar to than we are to
Europeans.
In short, Robert Pape's "offshore balancing" approach would reduce
violence by giving our enemies what they want: our disengagement, the ability
to terrorize with impunity the people of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other
places where the battle of ideas about Muslim modernity is engaged.
Related: Why AirSea Battle? by Andrew F. Krepinevich
"With the spread of advanced military technologies and their exploitation by other militaries, especially China’s People’s Liberation Army and to a far lesser extent Iran’s military and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the US military’s ability to preserve military access to two key areas of vital interest, the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf, is being increasingly challenged. Currently there is little indication that China or Iran intend to alter their efforts to create 'nogo zones' in the maritime areas off their coasts. The United States is thus confronted with a strategic choice: to risk a loss of military access to areas vital to its security or to explore options for preserving access. Recently the United States Air Force and Navy agreed to address the issue by pursuing a new operational concept called AirSea Battle which appears designed to assess how US power-projection capabilities can be preserved in the face of these military challenges."
Related: The Navy - prepare for major war or stability ops?
Posted by Robert Haddick on Small Wars Journal October 13, 2010
"The CNA report (also summarized in the Proceedings article) discusses five future paths for the Navy as it faces a constrained budget and shrinking numbers:
1. 2-Hub Navy: The Navy focuses on high-end combat capability emphasizing forward presence, deterrence, sea control, and power projection in the Western Pacific and Persian Gulf. The Navy would sharply reduce its cooperative engagement operations with foreign partners and other “stability” missions.
2. 1+ Hub Navy: High-end combat capability in the Western Pacific plus low-end stability and cooperative engagement operations in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean area.
3. Shaping Navy: Focus on global stability operations and cooperative engagement with sharply reduced high-end combat capability.
4. Surge Navy: A powerful high-end Navy that could defeat any adversary but would operate close to home. Such a Navy would support an “offshore balancing” foreign policy and would end the Navy’s global forward presence.
The worst choice of all according to CNA would be a Navy that attempts to retain “full spectrum” capability. Without making hard choices about missions and geography, such a Navy would eventually be unable to accomplish any of its missions or maintain a credible global presence."
Shadow Government is a blog about U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration, written by experienced policy makers from the loyal opposition and curated by Peter D. Feaver and William Inboden.
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