Friday, October 8, 2010 - 11:03 AM
Generalismo Franco is still dead. That SNL bit popped into my mind when I heard that General Jim Jones has resigned to be replaced by his deputy, Tom Donilon.
The connection was driven not by General Jones diffident style, although some disgruntled staffers did complain about a certain autocratic air (it goes, I suspect, with a 4-star resume). Rather, the Franco connection was driven by how long this move has been anticipated by beltway insiders. General Jones is leaving, still leaving. Only a few months into the administration's tenure, and General Jones seemed to be on the chopping block. He survived another 16 months, but they were exceptionally stormy months with some serious missteps by the National Security Advisor. Moreover, the most important thing done on his watch - the Afghan Strategy Review 2.0 of the Fall 2009 -- has played to decidedly mixed reviews, especially with the revelations of the recent Woodward book.
Indeed, the Woodward book seems to confirm what many suspected and what today's announcement makes official: that President Obama had more confidence in Jones's deputy than in Jones himself. Jones is a great patriot who has served his country honorably in a number of important posts. But he never seemed to master the most important part of the NSA job: cultivating a close working relationship with the boss. National security advisors who have that (or who cultivate that) succeed in the job. If underlings on your staff are viewed as being in the inner circle while you are not, then the job becomes impossibly difficult. Ironically, the Woodward book also confirms that Jones struggled with the aspect of the job that he seemed best equipped to handle: relations with the military.
Jones successor, Tom Donilon, starts with an advantage Jones never had: Everyone believes him to be a close intimate of the president and of other White House powerbrokers. He also is an unabashed partisan, thus strengthening the White House's ties with the constituency most disappointed in Obama's foreign policy: the Democratic base. He doesn't have the same apparent advantages on the civil-military front, and the strongest player in the administration on civil-military relations, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, reportedly has grave doubts about Donilon's suitability for the job. Whether Donilon can develop as strong a working relationship with Gates and with the senior brass as he has with President Obama and the political team will likely determine whether he is successful in his job.
For my part, I hope he is successful (full disclosure: Donilon and I have been members together of the Aspen Strategy Group, where he showed himself to be sharp-witted, tough, and a compelling critic of the Bush foreign policy). The Obama Team has a series of very daunting foreign policy challenges to handle, and some of them -- such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran - won't wait around for a leisurely transition in personnel.
All those close working relationships
Evidently, the prerequisite for success as National Security Advisor is to have close working relationships with everybody: the President, obviously, but also the uniformed services and the civilian department heads. And the Vice President's office -- which incidentally does not mean the NSA can be a doormat for the Vice President, any more. Also the rest of the White House staff, and the attendants in the White House mess.
Given that the Bush administration provided some instructive examples of how NSAs with all the advantages provided by close working relationships got walked over or bypassed on some fairly high-profile national security decisions, the advice provided here is interesting. It is also only marginally relevant, because more important that warm personal relationships are an NSA's clear understanding of what his job is. Is he there to coordinate policy, making sure that every agency or office that needs to have a hearing gets one on important issues? Or is he there as an instrument to impose the President's preferences on the rest of the administration?
Scowcroft and Powell had great success in the former role. Henry Kissinger is the clearest example of the latter. Kissinger, though, was sui generis, and the first President he served as NSA was uniquely sophisticated among modern American Presidents where foreign affairs were concerned. Gen. Jones evidently sought to be more of an honest broker, hearing people out and asking tough questions. President Obama wanted that, but clearly he also wanted the NSA's office to herd all the administration's cats in the direction of his own policy preferences.
That's what Donilon seems to have done up to now. It's probably what Obama wants him to do as NSA. The question I have is whether an NSA seen within the administration as speaking always for the President will encourage the same candor from other players in the policy process that Jones appears to have.
Wars are not won or loosed by generals but rather by " Law Determined by Providence " in advance of the battle. The general may bring military competence to the battlefield but if the war is inadvisable he is doomed to defeat. We in the USA have unrivaled military competence but little if any understanding of the LAW. It is said " There Is A Time to Every Purpose Under Heaven " . To know and understand this is the beginning of wisdom and the Law.
Shadow Government is a blog about U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration, written by experienced policy makers from the loyal opposition and curated by Peter D. Feaver and William Inboden.
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