Posted By Paul Miller Share

In response to my last post about why realists should support nation building, some readers responded with a curious argument: Afghanistan (they believe) is failing, therefore nation building is impossible. Set aside the fact that this is does not respond to my argument -- which was not about Afghanistan and did not argue that nation building is easy, only that it can serve our interests when done right -- it strikes me as a lazy argument to condemn nation building on the basis of a single example. I call this the Somalia Fallacy.

According to the Somalia Fallacy, the failure of the U.N.'s effort to rebuild Somalia in the 1990s proves that all nation building interventions are doomed to fail. It is the favored argument of pundits who want to argue against overseas interventions. Fareed Zakaria gave perfect expression to the Somalia Fallacy in a Washington Post column in July. "The trouble with trying to fix failed states is that it implicates the United States in a vast nation building effort in countries where the odds of success are low and the risk of unintended consequences is very high. Consider Somalia..." Zakaria then retells the recent history of that unfortunate state, and concludes "Somalia highlights the complexity of almost every approach to failed states."

Well, no, it doesn't. Somalia is not a useful historical analogy from which to generalize about failed states (and neither is Afghanistan). To make a useful generalization, you'd want to start with a typical failed state, or, better yet, several of them. Somalia is not a typical failed state: it is an extreme outlier. It has been the most completely failed state on earth for almost two decades. On top of that, the U.N. mission in Somalia in the early 1990s was not a typical U.N. intervention: it was a singularly, uniquely inept one. Deploy an inept U.N. mission to the most failed state and you have the recipe for a famous catastrophe, not have a blueprint for how all interventions are doomed to play out.

Most armed interventions deployed to improve a failed state's government capabilities -- whether you call it nation building or something else -- do not have to contend with Somalian levels of anarchy. The United States and the United Nations have learned by watching the big failures (in Angola and Liberia as much as Somalia), and operate with a measure of greater sophistication. The track record has actually improved since the early 1990s. The failures have been big, public, and humiliating, but the United States and the United Nations have also racked up better outcomes in Namibia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, East Timor, Liberia (the second time around), Sierra Leone (which came back from the brink of failure), and possibly Burundi.

Few of those countries are fully rebuilt, modern, stable, liberal democracies. Most are not particularly nice places to live. But the international interventions changed their trajectories. They are better off now than they were at the nadir of their respective wars and failures. That makes a real difference in human lives and is usually good enough to secure whatever interests led us to intervene in the first place.

There is still the obvious question: how do you do nation building in a country, like Afghanistan, that looks a lot more like Somalia, Liberia, and Angola than Bosnia, Nicaragua, or Mozambique? The Somalia analogy doesn't work as a parable for nation building generally, but does it apply to Afghanistan? That is an excellent question for a future post -- but let me start by noting that poverty and violence are only half of the equation. The size, strategy, and mandate of the intervention are the other half. While the circumstances of state failure in Afghanistan look like Somalia, the design of the intervention (130,000 troops, more than $50 billion in aid, a decade of effort) looks more like Bosnia, on steroids. That's an interesting and largely unprecedented mix. More on that later.

The broader point, Afghanistan aside, is that liberals, paleoconservatives, and others are writing a version of history that says failed states cannot be fixed; nation building always fails; and we should reduce our ambitions. Somalia, Vietnam, and a handful of other cases are duly trotted out to serve as talking points. The argument provides convenient cover for our desire to see an end to the wars and to avoid shouldering uncomfortable responsibilities. But it does not have the virtue of being true.

Getty Images

 

JAYDEE001

5:22 PM ET

September 29, 2010

"During the 2000 campaign,

"During the 2000 campaign, George W. Bush argued against nation building and foreign military entanglements. In the second presidential debate, he said: "I'm not so sure the role of the United States is to go around the world and say, 'This is the way it's got to be.'"

The United States is currently involved in nation building in Iraq on a scale unseen since the years immediately following World War II.

During the 2000 election, Mr. Bush called for U.S. troops to be withdrawn from the NATO peacekeeping mission in the Balkans. His administration now cites such missions as an example of how America must 'stay the course.'"

"Let me tell you what else I'm worried about: I'm worried about an opponent who uses nation building and the military in the same sentence. See, our view of the military is for our military to be properly prepared to fight and win war and, therefore, prevent war from happening in the first place." (also Geo. W. Bush)

I just had to quote that great seer and arch-hero of conservatives in the US, George W Bush. The fact is that attempts at nation-building have never been as successful as we would like them to be, especially when it involved doing so in the face of an on-going resistance/insurgency in a country divided along ethnic or religious lines.

The onging and ever-worsening mess in Afghanistan, and our inevitable future disappointment in Iraq - the war that never should have been - will do much to encourage a healthy desire to avoid senseless wars and (hopefully), in your words - to avoid shouldering uncomfortable responsibilities that come with them.

 

GABRIEL_H

5:45 PM ET

September 29, 2010

Trust

I believe that the Somalia-Afghanistan comparison is an apt one, and does not bode well for any of the countries involved (and, as usual, even worse for their citizenries). These two countries are not particularly similar socio-economically or culturally, but they both share one defining characteristic (at least when it comes to foreign-imposed nation building): a history of violent foreign intervention and a resulting mistrust of such interventions. Both countries swung East and West during the Cold War, and were treated as low-level pawns by both sides. The post-Cold War era has not given Somalis or Afghans a cause to improve their view of foreign powers.

Nation building is about forging long-term stability through effective and accepted institutions. This concept is not somehow unique to failed or impoverished states; every country in the world has had to "nation-build" at various points in its history. The glue that holds those institutions together is trust -- trust that promises will be kept, that rules will be followed, and that what's here today won't be gone tomorrow. The real question is not whether nations can be built in Somalia or Afghanistan, but rather who is in the position to do it. If the United States wants to be able to nation-build, they need to gain the trust of the population. And in that area, history is not on our side.

 

BSPAG

6:17 PM ET

September 29, 2010

Better outcomes?

I'm looking at your examples....
Nicaragua: like when we backed the Contras (who Human Rights Watch says committed war crimes) and mined their harbor? They sued us, the ICJ ruled in their favor.

Kosovo and Bosnia: which have more factions vying for control than when we intervened?

East Timor: are you talking about when we supported Suharto's invasion that killed 80,000-200,000 or when Australia took their oil?

El Salvador: Humans Rights Watch wrote:"Not only did the United States fail to press for improvements . . . but, in an effort to maintain backing for U.S. policy, it misrepresented the record of the Salvadoran government, and smeared critics who challenged that record. In so doing, the Administration needlessly polarized the debate in the United States, and did a grave injustice to the thousands of civilian victims of Government terror in El Salvador."

Still not convinced on nation building

 

PECHORIN

9:59 PM ET

September 29, 2010

Which comments were you reading?

First off, it's great that you're writing in response to comments. That kind of dialogue is one of the many reasons why FP is so great.

Some people may have said such a thing, but reading through the comments I don't see it, and it that claim clearly wasn't the primary content of most of the critiques that were made.

As the two posters above me say, no one here is suggesting that nation-building is always and everywhere a bad idea. It is absolutely a diplomatic tool that realists should be willing to deploy, and there have been past instances where it has been effective. You're also right to point out that there is a very real Somalia fallacy, and recent failures have so chastened some people that they are (wrongly) discarding nation-building entirely.

The problem is that, given our current entanglements, a defense of 'nation-building' is always going to be read in light of the Afghan question. When we talk about nation-building, in practice, we are actually talking about a specific nation. So the implication of any defense of nation-building is that it is a defense of the Afghan mission. Now, that's not what you intended, but the current policy conversation gives readers a grounds to take it that way.

I really think that if a person approaches the question from the very beginning, asking questions like "what are America's interests in Afghanistan" and "how do we protect those interests in the most efficient way" then nation-building, in this instance, is an indefensible choice. Which of course isn't to say that it will never be a useful strategy.

You acknowledge that conditions in Afghanistan are very bad, and a source of skepticism. But you imply that, given the resources being devoted to the project, Afghanistan may have more of a shot than it's being given credit for. You may be correct, but I think it's really irrelevant. The cost of doing so remains much too high when weighed against America's vital interests.

 

ZATHRAS

3:10 AM ET

September 30, 2010

Comments or e-mails?

As Pechorin points out upthread, the argument Miller is responding to here was not made at all in most of the comments posted in response to his last discussion of nation building. It was offered only implicitly in any of them, and that is being generous.

Maybe he got some e-mails, and is responding to those. I don't care to play gotcha. However, Miller might have done better to make clear at the start that he was offering an abstract defense of nation building as a concept -- and beyond that, nothing of direct or immediate relevance to the nation building projects in which the United States military is most directly engaged.

The way Miller was introduced left the impression that he was offering a defense of nation building in Afghanistan.

 

NICOLAS19

8:28 AM ET

September 30, 2010

still not the point

It might be interesting to discuss nation building per se, but you completely miss the point.
The real question is not whether the nation-building theory is a good one, but rather if its viable for the US to pursue it. You have admitted the reality that it's not working in Afghanistan. After 9 years of ever-increasing revolt it would be hard to argue for the contrary.
In that case, this discussion appears to have another meaning: is the US doing any good by pursuing an ultimately noble goal that it can't achieve? The answer this time has to be negative as well, as the merits of the goal are precluded by the ineffectiveness of realization, yet all the counters - costs in resources, attention and most importantly, civilian lives - are clearly present.

 

ITONLYSTANDSTOREASON

6:25 PM ET

September 30, 2010

You're not wrong, but you're not right either

Nation building takes time.

My entirely provisional rule of thumb for deep social change is that it takes two generations - one to make the change, and one to grow up thinking of it as the new normal.

On that basis, any assessment of success or failure in Afghanistan is premature.

It doesn't mean that we would have to be fighting the Taliban largely on our own for two generations. It's a risk, yes, and the biggest immediate obstacle. Overcoming it probably depends on reaching an agreement with Pakistan's military and ISI on our common interests in Afghanistan.

The other timeline here is our 9 years in Afghanistan. It's simply wrong to use it as an indicator of our ability to succeed at nation-building because we ignored nation building for the first 8 years.

 

NICOLAS19

8:37 AM ET

October 1, 2010

we're talking about different things

Nation building only works where the nation is willing to cooperate. They will cooperate if it becomes apparent to them that they want to be part of and will be included in the nation being built. It seems that the population in Afghanistan doesn't want to be part of the new Afghanistan the US is building. From the Afghan point of view, it doesn't matter how the US spent its 9 years tenure, as their "nation building" in no better than their occupation (which still continues).

 

NICOLAS19

8:21 AM ET

October 1, 2010

secondly

"reaching an agreement with Pakistan on common interest" - read: carve up the county like Russia, Prussia and Austria did with Poland? How would the Afghans like their future if its being written by two of their enemies?

 

EDEY

8:37 AM ET

September 30, 2010

Focus

It's my understanding that in order to succeed with nation building in failed states, the intervening force need to focus in particular on two main aspects: cultural relativism and grass rot education. This will then, in time, generate a snowball-effect which eventually can stabilize and democratize the country.

But since the situation in these particular countries is extremely sensitive, one simply cannot ignore to fight the issue of poverty in order to give the belligerents another option to the war.

 

RRBISME

7:18 PM ET

September 30, 2010

Distracted

I think we have to ask ourselves how successful can we be in a nation building program in Afghanistan when there so many outside influences working against us. And ask ourselves are we here to eradicate the Taliban or rebuild one of the worst countries on the planet in regards to even the most basic of technologies. Lastly can we nation build with an American concept when the country when finished will be ruled under Sharia law. Since the rise of Islam and it's attempt to suede world politics can democracy and Sharia law coexist?

The future will be an interesting read for sure, it's to bad the book will be published in American blood.

 

MARTY MARTEL

8:38 PM ET

September 30, 2010

US intentionally ignores main reason behind Afghan failure

Part of the reason that Paul Miller is missing in failure of nation building in Afghanistan is that pundits like Paul Miller, US government and news media intentionally continue to ignore Taliban’s Pakistani connections in fueling and sustaining Afghan insurgency as reported by Matt Waldman in ‘The sun in the sky‘ on 6/13/10, corroborated by WikiLeaks leaks on 7/25/10 and then further corroborated by Chris Alexander, Canadian ambassador to Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005 and Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan from 2005 until 2009 in his article on 7/30/10 titled ‘The huge scale of Pakistan‘s complicity‘.

Karzai also told a news conference in Kabul on 7/29/2010 after WikiLeaks leaks, “The time has come for our international allies to know that the war against terrorism is not in Afghanistan’s homes and villages. But rather this war is in the sanctuaries, funding centers and training places of terrorism which are in Pakistan. Our international allies have the ability to destroy these Pakistani sanctuaries, but the question is why they are not doing it?“

Even Afghanistan’s national security advisor Rangin Dadfar Spanta has asked the same question in a Washington Post article on 8/23/2010: “While we are losing dozens of men and women to terrorist attacks every day, the terrorists’ main mentor (Pakistan) continues to receive billions of dollars in aid and assistance. How is this fundamental contradiction justified? Despite facing a growing domestic terror threat, Pakistan “continues to provide sanctuary and support to the Quetta Shura, the Haqqani network, the Hekmatyar group and Al Qaeda. Dismantling the terrorist infrastructure “requires confronting the state of Pakistan that still sees terrorism as a strategic asset and foreign policy tool”.

Poor Karzai’s call to his Western allies ‘to destroy Islamist militant sanctuaries in neighboring Pakistan’ is falling on deaf ears in Washington where powers to be are hell bent on sacrificing Afghanistan to mollycoddle Pakistan.

 

BRET

8:12 PM ET

October 1, 2010

Nation building only works when an external threat is present

In my opinion, nation-building will only work when an external threat is present. For example, both Japan and Germany were the victims of possible foreign aggression from the USSR and China after WWII. As a result, citizens and officials were more willing to work with the US officials and reform their governments and policies. However, when the US has entered countries like Vietnam, Haiti, and Afghanistan where no external threat is present, and internal matters are disrupted, then attracting support from the indigenous people will be difficult.

 

LIL HOBSBAWM

6:12 AM ET

October 9, 2010

The Antinomies of Nation-Building in the Era of the Market-State

You are missing a fundamental point.

In the west itself, modernity is now about dismantling welfare systems, increasing inequality, and subsidizing corporate profits. I think you would
agree, no? Other notions once associated with say "western democracy"
social justice, economic fairness, peace, all of which would, one
would think, enfranchise Afghans, have been relegated to the past in
the name of progress, neo-liberal style.

Even if the United States or Nato, or anyone else for that matter had
unlimited blood and treasure to dump into a "nation-buliding project,"
what would it look like in the era of the Market State?

Since the days of Thatcher & Regan, there has been nothing but a
concerted effort to privatize the state. Even if the military were
able to win over enough people through sheer force, then what? The era
in which we find ourselves today is not the same that existed when say
the British ran India, or countries activity promoted
"nation-building" say though a full-employment schemes as was the case
in New Zealand. The ideology that society is a collection of
individuals, has undermined any chance for nation-building.

My gut feeling is that even if we "stay the course," user pay services
all be it schools or privatized health care in Afghanistan isn't going
to win hearts and minds. Even just hypothetically, the idea that
American might fund such services abroad, all the while America is
crumbling away at home seems also like a missed opportunity to win
hearts and minds.

You honestly think it would be in the American national interest to under write university education or socialized health care abroad all the while 48 million Americans live in poverty?

 

Shadow Government is a blog about U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration, written by experienced policy makers from the loyal opposition and curated by Peter D. Feaver and William Inboden.

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