By coincidence, I happened to
read two stories back-to-back: the Iranian regime is apparently dangling offers
to help us in Afghanistan; and Secretary Robert Gates thinks the proliferation-related
sanctions are hurting
Iran more than expected. My reading them back-to-back may be a coincidence, but
I suspect the stories are related in a fundamental way.
David Ignatius notes one way the stories are related: Skeptics will argue
against grasping the Iranian dangle for fear that would "dilute the main focus
of Iran policy, which is stopping Tehran's pursuit of nuclear weapons." He
claims that similar fears derailed an earlier potentially fruitful collaboration
with Iran on Iraq in 2006, and he hopes the Obama administration won't make the
same "mistake." To bolster his case, he cites "hardliners" in Tehran who
exploited the abortive diplomatic maneuvers in 2006 to discredit the United
States as a negotiating partner.
But I don't find Ignatius's reasoning very persuasive because he avoids
addressing the most obvious connection. Perhaps Iran is dangling these offers
now precisely so as to disrupt the sanctions. Consider the similarities in the
pattern. The earlier Iranian dangle came when a) the situation in Iraq was
unraveling so U.S. local leverage was eroding but b) after a long period of
paralysis there was finally modest progress on the nuclear file with credible
threats of tighter sanctions on Iran and even rumors of more serious military
action. In such a climate, shifting the diplomatic focus from terrain where
Iranian leverage was weakening to terrain where it was strengthening made a lot
of sense -- for the Iranian regime.
The current Iranian dangle comes when a) the situation in Afghanistan is dodgy
(and probably some within the Obama camp even fear it is unraveling) but b)
after a long period of paralysis there is finally modest progress on the
nuclear file with increased sanctions inflicting noticeable pain on the Iranian
regime and even rumors of more serious military action. In such a climate,
shifting the diplomatic focus from terrain where Iranian leverage is weakening
to terrain where it is strengthening makes a lot of sense -- for the Iranian
regime.
It only makes sense to take up the Iranian dangle on Afghanistan if we can do
so without relaxing pressure on the nuclear file. If, as Ignatius and other
optimists assert, the Iranians are doing this out of a sincere desire to help
stabilize the situation in Afghanistan, we should be able to explore that
without relaxing nuclear-related sanctions. Indeed, the sanctions might even
improve our leverage leading to more fruitful cooperation. If Iranians set as
preconditions for talks on Afghanistan some sort of relaxation of the economic
pressure -- or if our allies on their own relax the economic pressure so as to
"help" negotiations on Afghanistan -- then the bargain is a bad one for U.S.
foreign policy.
There was a brief window when the Iranian regime actually was helpful on
Afghanistan -- during the early post-9/11 window when the Iranian regime was
afraid, with some justification, that the United States had an unchecked arsenal of
military options at its disposal and was in the mood to wield them. During that
period, many previously problematic regimes (Iran, Libya, Sudan) got "on side"
with the United States, albeit temporarily or provisionally in some cases. Once
the difficulties in Iraq undermined U.S. leverage, however, the incentives for
cooperation shifted and the Iranian regime returned to its more common pattern
of doing everything it could to frustrate U.S. foreign policy objectives in
every arena.
The best way to break that pattern is with smart diplomacy. Smart diplomacy begins
with a robust pressure track and builds other components -- direct talks, regional
talks, and other carrots -- on that foundation. So let's not take the
dangle on Afghanistan until we have locked in the sanctions and have corralled
all of our allies in that effort. Once we have, it would be worth exploring
other diplomatic avenues, but not before.
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