Earlier this month, U.S. manufacturer Boeing, the European
Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS), and a consortium of Russia's Antonov
and its partner U.S. Aerospace submitted bids to build the Pentagon's new air
refueling tanker to replace the venerable Boeing KC-135, in service now for
five decades. The contract would be for
179 airplanes, worth about $35 billion initially.
Replacement was slated to begin almost a decade ago when a
procurement scandal got in the way, reportedly involving senior Air Force
officials and Boeing. Then, an on-again,
off-again bidding process and changes in specifications blocked the selection
of competing designs.
Despite its poor record in managing the process, the Air
Force still needs to be in the pilot's seat and make a decision based on
forecast needs. However, it should not
wait too long.
So-called "flying gas stations" make it possible for a
variety of military aircraft to make long oceanic flights without hop scotching
from island to island. When some
countries deny landing privileges, they enable overflights. And, they help fighters to stay up longer
with heavier weapon loads instead of having to carry extra fuel.
With unmanned drones doing some of the close air support
work of traditional fighter planes, it now makes sense to evaluate how many
tankers the Air Force will need to refuel manned combat as well as peacetime
cargo and training flights. This may be
a good reason to stretch the buy over a number of years and reassess usefulness
as missions change.
Yet dragging out the initial decision risks not having
enough tankers to meet wartime requirements and it delays acquisition of modern
capabilities such as being able to refuel two receiver aircrafts at once or
evade certain kinds of threats. Moreover,
operating 50-year-old planes -- or older -- is really flying without a map,
because you don't know what will break.
At the moment, the two most competitive options are the
American-made Boeing 767 and the EADS/Airbus 330, both off-the shelf
designs. The Airbus is bigger and
carries about 23 percent more fuel. The
767 uses less space on the ground and takes off in a shorter distance, a
critical factor at some of the airfields from which tankers must operate. Other
considerations include how easily these planes can be serviced by aircrews
alone if they land where there is little more than an airstrip and a fuel pit,
or how well they can operate in some combat environments like nuclear war.
A bone of contention and potential delay is a World Trade
Organization ruling that European subsidies gave EADS an unfair advantage in
developing the 330, making it less expensive than it otherwise might be. Some in Congress want the Pentagon to take
that into account. The WTO ruling is
subject to appeal and may be countered by charges that Boeing may have received
subsidies as well. Assembly of either
design would take place in the United States and lawmakers from districts in
play are now part of a public debate.
When I was a tanker pilot back in the late 1970s, the Boeing
Company brought a demonstrator plane to our base. It was the commercial version of our KC-135
(Boeing 707-720) fitted with huge new turbofan engines, double the power of the
old ones. Whereas our lumbering,
underpowered jets used most of the runway on takeoff, the fully loaded
demonstrator was barely halfway down when it seemed to leap into the sky. The Boeing reps bragged that similarly
refurbished KC-135s could fly into the 21st century -- perhaps even
to 2010.
In a timely fashion, the Air Force modified the fleet, thus
buying extra time and capability. But in
case you haven't looked at the calendar, we're halfway through 2010. And
despite some claims that the 135 could fly until 2040, the fleet will soon be
needing lots of specially manufactured parts to remain airworthy.
To be sure, the number one priority here is for the Air
Force to carefully evaluate its future aerial refueling needs and see which
offering more closely matches its criteria. Number two, Congress and the Obama administration should decide fairly
quickly whether subsidies should be a factor in awarding contracts to defense
firms. If the process is tied up another decade in bungled bids and trade
squabbles, options for maintaining combat readiness in this crucial area may be
unaffordable or unpalatable.
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