Posted By Stephen Johnson Share

Pundits have had a feeding frenzy over the fact that President Obama chose to replace Admiral Dennis Blair with another soldier, General James Clapper, as director of national intelligence (DNI). But that's a minor point compared to the unfinished business of intelligence reform and the question of presidential interest.

Blair was reportedly sacked for a blunt "take charge" attitude didn't fit the coordinating role envisioned for the DNI when it was created in 2004. He clashed with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Leon Panetta over authority to name station chiefs overseas, deliver the president's daily intelligence brief, and other matters such as training.

Such conflicts are likely when a new bureaucracy is created to assume some of the functions of an existing one without broad systemic adjustments. Funny it didn't happen sooner, except Blair's two predecessors, John Negroponte and Admiral John "Mike" McConnell worked fairly diplomatically with the leaders of the16 civilian and military agencies that make up the intelligence community. And, they had the backing of the president who appointed them. Still, Gen. Clapper will be the fourth DNI in 5 years.  

So, it's fair to ask whether creating the DNI post was the right move. In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, policymakers and security experts wanted to know what caused America's intelligence failures. The 9/11 Commission concluded the CIA Director had too much on his plate. He had to run his own shop, brief the president, and coordinate programs among all the other agencies across government.  

The Commission proposed splitting off the briefing and coordinating roles. Congress agreed.  The DNI became the president's chief intelligence advisor, retaining authority over policies and budgets, and monitoring intelligence community performance, particularly on issues that involve sharing across agencies. The DNI also began supervising counterterrorism programs in the subordinate National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), another function once performed by the CIA.  

All this took place against the backdrop of 1990s-era CIA budget cutbacks and operational restraints that drove away talent and prevented information sharing between foreign affairs agencies and domestic law enforcement. Over the last decade, Congress has restored some of the resources needed for the CIA to recover lost capabilities. However, one wonders if more timely CIA reforms and stronger leadership could have avoided the need to create another layer in the national security bureaucracy.   

Like the old Director of Central Intelligence, the DNI has an internal shop to protect.  With some 1,500 employees, it is nowhere near the size of the CIA (about 20,000), or Pentagon agencies that consume 70 percent of the intelligence budget. Yet, if the CIA director couldn't wear three hats and see the big picture, how can the Director of National Intelligence with similar responsibilities do much better?  

Other reforms have slipped by the wayside. Both the 9/11 Commission and Congressional Research Service reports have highlighted the erratic nature of Congressional oversight.  Fragmented jurisdictions in House and Senate committees still foil efforts to strategically balance resources and hamper cooperative working relations among agencies. Temporary committee assignments that contribute to member turnover limit the development of committee subject matter expertise. So far, Congress has made minimal efforts to address these concerns.  

If General Clapper is the capable, knowledgeable public servant and facilitator that his resume suggests, the fact that he will be another soldier in a supposedly civilian position should not cloud his confirmation prospects. Yet for him to succeed, the president must make him a trusted member of his national security team and take an interest in the unfinished business of intelligence reform. It's hard to know how much faith President Obama ever placed in Admiral Blair, or whether he cared much about how the intelligence system worked.   

But he should care now. The DNI and staff could benefit from some structural streamlining to ensure impartiality in overseeing intelligence community programs -- which probably means shedding some operational aspects of the Office of the DNI and the NCTC to other agencies.Without needlessly duplicating existing capabilities, the DNI should be able to advise the president to ensure that our nation's varied intelligence services are properly chartered, resourced, and mutually supportive. Congress can help by modernizing its oversight as well.

SAUL LOEB/AFP/Getty Images

 

LAVBO0321

8:46 PM ET

June 13, 2010

The Most Important Job Seems to be again the most negleted

We have appointed a military leader due to the fact that most of our Intelligence Community (IC) is military. And it needs strong organizational leadership abilities. Blair's firing (sudden resignation) was a mistake. If being blunt is not within the scope of this position or it comes across as being to harsh to the sensitivities of this administration, then too bad. Any mistakes made by the Office of Director of National Intelligence, should be absorbed, learned from and incorporated in new protocols. This zero defect mentality is what led us to 9/11 in the first place (in part).

While a lot of people would like the DNI to be a coordination function, it is actually only part of the job. The DNI is the leader of the IC. And it was a position long over due. The Director of Central Intelligence (DNI) was too big of a responsibility to also run the entire IC. As history has sadly demonstrated. The DNI has a great opportunity to strengthen our IC.

If we really want to fix our IC, we need to seriously look at fixing Counterintelligence. While Washington is in the 'Intelligence Must be Reformed' cycle our adversaries are steeling us blind.

 

ZATHRAS

9:37 PM ET

June 13, 2010

Yes and No

Steven Johnson's comment about Congressional oversight is correct: perhaps incomplete in noting that the amount of time Congressmen and Senators devote to oversight of Executive Branch activities generally is significantly less than it was a couple of decades ago, but correct in what it does say. Congress acted in a bipartisan way to move pieces of the national security puzzle around the board after 9/11, but did little to change how it operates itself. It still has too many elected officials with bits and pieces of oversight authority. Actually, of all the aspects of the intelligence and national security policymaking process, Congressional oversight was probably the one that changed least during the last ten years.

On the other hand, with respect to his main argument, Johnson begs the question. It's true that John Negroponte and Michael McConnell had more harmonious relationships with intelligence agency heads than Dennis Blair seems to have had, and obviously Blair had problems with the President he served that his predecessors did not. Getting along with everybody, though, is not the point of the DNI position.

Did any of these men, though, improve the intelligence community's performance by being DNI -- as opposed, say, to what someone like McConnell could have done if the intelligence reforms had never happened and McConnell had been named DCI instead of Porter Goss? OK, that's an unfair question, but the point is clear enough.

Five years after the reforms, the best we can say about the intelligence reforms that created the DNI is that they may not have made things worse, and might someday make things better. To an outsider, it looks as if the reforms created a major Executive Branch official, overseeing an additional layer of bureaucracy, with responsibility to coordinate but no authority to make this happen. That doesn't look like success to me.

 

DOUBTING THOMASOVICH

1:12 AM ET

June 14, 2010

It's not merely the position, but the persona

There is no perfect position or perfect set of authorities. The congress, and to a larger extent the American people, have no stomach for an all powerful intelligence czar. The idea gives us bigger chills than an attack by terrorists.

Nevertheless, you need someone who can lead. Clapper is more than capable enough to serve in that capacity. In ways that haven't been seen since George Tenet was the DCI, he can be the focal point of the president's intelligence apparatus. The previous DNIs were all good and patriotic men. But they were not as big a persona as George Tenet was. And despite his shortcomings, George filled the shoes better than those who have come after.

Blair, like McConnell before him, was a back room operator. The people saw very little of him. He didn't start out like Woolsey, but he ended up there. Unable to influence the President he worked for. You need a DNI who is tight with the President, highly visible with the workforce, and willing to use the bully pulpit to overcome the intransigence and uncooperativeness at sadly still permeates the community today.

Clapper is able to be that guy. Will he get the chance?

 

DLOVENEETSINGH

7:09 AM ET

June 14, 2010

you need someone who can

you need someone who can lead. Clapper is more than capable enough to serve in that capacity. Iwatch six-feet-under

 

JIM KING

11:52 AM ET

June 14, 2010

Leadership isn't the problem

The problem isn't poor leadership, it's the entire system. THERE ARE 16 AGENCIES!! Sixteen agencies that all compete with one another for funding, resources, and prominence. The country needs a complete streamlining of its intelligence system. You need an agency for each Intelligence discipline or "INT", one for SIGINT, one for HUMINT and so on, plus one more agency that turns the information brought in by the INTs into intelligence products (i.e. National Intelligence estimates, and other analysis). This analysis agency would oversee the "INT" agencies that feed it information and provide them with their collection requirements. The military intelligence agencies in each branch of service would not be a part of this change since they focus on tactical level intelligence but could still leverage assistance from any of the INT agencies. Doing this would cut the number of intelligence agencies roughly in half. It would give each agency a clear and defined charter of what their left and right limits are which would do away with most of the interagency rivalries that you see today. It would also prevent one agency from hiding intelligence from another because all the information would flow into the analysis agency.

 

BLTFP3

3:29 PM ET

June 16, 2010

Too many agencies

You don't need an agency for each INT. That's half the problem. We are still organized as we were 50 years ago - around sources of collection instead of issues. The existing agencies have overlapping collection capabilities, overlapping analytic capabilities, overlapping databases, (need I go on?).

All this succeeds in doing is pitting one set of analysts against another across multiple agencies. It also results in competing collection on identical targets.

And if you're going to mention 16 agencies, let's not forget the 6 different Cabinet secretaries that own those agencies, and the multiple Congressional committees that control their appropriations and authorizations. It's easy to blame the DNI or the ODNI, but Congress needs to take their share of the blame for having this kind of bureaucratic mess in the first place.

 

EARLY LIGHT

9:38 PM ET

June 14, 2010

Oversight Requires Honesty

And Congress will do no effective oversight until they get off the payroll of lobbyists, special interests, foreign powers and organized crime.

 

Shadow Government is a blog about U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration, written by experienced policy makers from the loyal opposition and curated by Peter D. Feaver and William Inboden.

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