Posted By Will Inboden Share

President Obama's West Point speech on Saturday provides a great example of the structural continuities in American foreign policy. As president and commander-in-chief, Obama now embraces and owns policies that he previously eschewed. For example, after running his campaign denouncing the Iraq War and doubting the surge, he is now essentially declaring Iraq a victory ("this is what success looks like: an Iraq that provides no safe-haven to terrorists; a democratic Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self-reliant.") After spending much of his first year in office downplaying if not ignoring democracy and human rights promotion, he is now making democracy and human rights promotion one of the four pillars of his national security strategy. After previously rhetorically distancing himself from American exceptionalism, he now says that a "fundamental part of our strategy is America's support for those universal rights that formed the creed of our founding."

In short, through a combination of the burdens and responsibilities of office, prevailing geopolitical realities, the deep cultural currents of U.S. foreign policy, the bureaucratic systems that reinforce those cultural currents, and the crucible of learning that takes place every day in the toughest job in the world, the President Obama of today acts and sounds considerably different than the one elected in November 2008. (John Hinderaker over at Powerline -- a site never hesitant to criticize the Obama administration -- makes a similar favorable observation about the speech and its essential continuity with U.S. foreign policy). This is not at all to say that his foreign policy is identical to that of his predecessors -- in important ways it does differ, and as I have written elsewhere, often not for the better -- but only to point out that truly profound structural changes in American foreign policy are very rare. And generally for good reason.

Some media coverage, such as Peter Baker's New York Times article, attempts to portray the speech as a "repudiation" or at least distancing from the Bush administration's grand strategy, and makes much of the fact that he did not emphasize "unilateral American power" or affirm "pre-emption" or "prevention." Baker is one of the very best, and best-sourced, White House correspondents around, so it may be that his article reflects some additional background conversations with Obama administration staff attempting to advance a particular message. But at least when it comes to the text of the speech, here I think Baker's article overshoots. 

For example, in the midst of discussing the importance of international cooperation, Obama described American leadership in "steering those currents in the direction of liberty and justice" -- in other words, a polite way of saying that American power and influence will continue to shape the international order. Or the fact that President Obama did not explicitly affirm the possibility of the preemptive use of force does not mean that his Administration actually rejects it. As historian John Gaddis has shown, since the days of John Quincy Adams (while Secretary of State to James Monroe), American presidents have reserved, and sometimes used, the right to take action against looming threats. Unless President Obama were to explicitly reject the possibility of ever using force in a preemptive or preventive manner to protect the nation (highly unlikely), it will remain an option within American national security doctrine. 

In his speech, President Obama also previewed his soon-to-be-released National Security Strategy, ostensibly built around the four pillars of connecting renewal at home with strength abroad, integrating diplomacy and development, building international cooperation and international institutions, and promoting human rights and democracy. As basic principles, these are sound. Whether they will amount to a coherent strategy (which needs to identify end goals, identify threats or obstacles to those goals, and explain how and why the tenets of the strategy will defeat those threats and overcome those obstacles) remains to be seen, once the NSS document itself is released.

Michael Nagle/Getty Images

 

SIR_MIXXALOT

4:54 PM ET

May 24, 2010

Why we are losing -- from the CIA

Michael Scheuer (ex-CIA head of the Osama desk) says:

http://non-intervention.com/284/the-cost-of-losing-wars-is-more-war/

The cost of losing wars is more war
By mike | Published: May 17, 2010

After meetings last week in Washington among President Obama, his generals, Secretary Clinton, and Afghan president Karzai, it is worth focusing on what it means for the United States to lose the Afghan and Iraq wars.

The meetings, we should be clear, were about Washington’s slow-motion return of power to the Taleban and its allies. Karzai knows Obama must withdraw most U.S. forces from Afghanistan to better his 2012 reelection chances and so wants to bring the Taleban into the government. Karzai is well-suited to the task; he once urged the U.S. to recognize the Taleban and agreed to be its UN ambassador. And the simple reality is that if Karzai wants to stay in a post-U.S. Afghanistan and hold a share of power he must move to the Taleban’ side.

While Karzai and his U.S. interlocutors met, Iraq had another shot of what seems a trend of steadily increasing sectarian violence. That spasm was a glimpse of what probably is on tap after U.S. forces depart. As we lose in Afghanistan, we also must recall the Iraq war is a disaster-producer that is far from spent. Even if he had WMD, Saddam was no threat to America when we invaded. Likewise, Saddam and Syria’s Bashir al-Asad were key if de facto U.S. allies in the war against the Islamists. Those fascist, secular regimes were the cork in the bottle’s neck; they kept the jihad in South Asia. When we popped the cork to destroy Saddam, we also fatally weakened Syria and so facilitated the Sunni jihad’s westward move into the Arab heartland, the Levant, and Gaza.

Thus, the Obama administration’s decision, with Republican support, is to lose in Afghanistan and Iraq. This means monumental victories for the Islamists led or inspired by Osama bin Laden. Since the Afghan mujahedin beat the Soviets in 1989, only bin Laden consistently has predicted that Islamists would have an easier time defeating the second superpower. He has argued U.S. leaders are soft, risk averse, impatient, and unwilling to use the full measure of U.S. military power. With twin U.S. defeats, bin Laden will be proven correct and many Muslims will join the jihad; as Osama said on another occasion, people follow the strong horse.

More important, the defeats will enhance bin Laden’s status as the unchallenged and prescient leader of Sunni militancy. Many of his Islamist peers damned the 9/11 attacks, claiming they would bring the U.S. military down on the Islamist movement, set it back for decades, and perhaps annihilate it entirely. And many in the U.S. corps of Islamist experts used the same line; Fawaz Gerges’s book The Far Enemy, for example, spoke for many by maintaining the 9/11 attacks and ensuing U.S. military response would make bin Laden yesterday’s news.

Today, however, we are seeing bin Laden’s peers proved wrong and most of America’s Islamist experts exposed as wishful thinkers. After 9/11, bin Laden’s response to criticism was not combative but soothing and patient. He simply said: Wait, the Americans have no stomach for insurgency, cannot stand casualties, and will lose interest if there is no quick victory. Indeed, 9/11 worked like a charm for al-Qaeda. The raids got a U.S. army on the ground in Afghanistan – an event bin Laden labored for since 1997 – and earned an enormous if unexpected bonus by allowing the pro-Israel ideologues around Mr. Bush to start the Iraq war.

By March, 2003, then, bin Laden had caused Washington to deploy two U.S. armies to Muslim lands where they are being treated by largely non-al-Qaeda insurgents to the kind of attrition that beat the Red Army. Democratic and Republican leaders now say America tried the military option and it failed. This is an absurd notion. The killing power of the U.S. military is unimaginable; we have barely scratched its surface in either war. It is more accurate to say U.S. leaders are eager to intervene and start wars, but for 50 years have refused fully to use the military Americans paid for because they fear public condemnation from the media, human-rights groups, and the so-called international community if they seek victory.

In the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, the Bush and Obama administrations have never been serious about winning; and each has been supported by the party out of power. They have, for example, sent inadequate numbers of troops; put them under rules of engagement that make them targets not killers; and caused our soldier-children to die so Mrs. Muhammad can vote in rigged Afghan and Iraqi elections. In short, our interventionist leaders are happy to pay for their democracy-building ambitions with the lives of America’s young and the nation’s financial solvency.

So, it is time to leave Iraq and Afghanistan, but we must face facts. The price of military intervention is always exactly the same; if you do not irrefutably win, you will surely irrefutably lose. After 9/11, Afghanistan was a mandatory target for a short, decisive punitive military expedition; Iraq was a fool’s errand from the start. We will lose in each place because we are unwilling to win, but no one should believe withdrawal without victory will bring peace. Most wars should never be started, but once a Great Power starts one it must not be lost, especially to a weaker enemy. Losing emboldens the enemy, and today the emboldened enemy is a growing number of the world’s 1.4 billion Muslims.

Our bipartisan leadership’s fatal combination of interventionism and defeatism have created an Islamist foe more dangerous today than on 9/11. More remarkable, it has made Osama bin Laden appear a master strategist, one who, it increasingly appears, is on the verge of bringing his emboldened jihadis to the cities and streets of the United States.

 

DRAGONLADY

7:16 PM ET

May 25, 2010

He's talking to West Point

I thought his speech struck Jeffersonian themes and was consistent with past traditions of US foreign policy. The problem as Meade pointed out in a Jan article is that as Jeffersonians want to scale back commitments and seek out cooperation, is whether other countries will cooperate, or seek to shape their own agendas without the US. We seemed to have seen that with Brazil and Turkey in the Iran nuclear fuel swap.

Of course Obama is going to distance himself from any talk of moral equivalence--he's talking to West Point cadets. But his previous statements contradict this one speech.

One thing I also noted in the speech was never once did Obama say when unilateral measures may be necessary if the international community fails. Not once.

 

LITTLEMANTATE

2:58 PM ET

May 27, 2010

A status quo we can believe in

Anybody who believed Obama was actually going to change American foreign policy was a fool who never listened to what the man had to say.

The post WW2 American system- militarist corporatism masked by pious platitudes- is not going anywhere unless the Chinese or Russians develop a backbone and start making moves against the dollar. The minute the dollar is no longer the world reserve currency all these little DC-based games stop.

Obama's speech was long on fluff, short on specifics, and ignored unpleasant realities. It was, in other words, presidential.

 

Shadow Government is a blog about U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration, written by experienced policy makers from the loyal opposition and curated by Peter D. Feaver and William Inboden.

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