The Obama administration is already gearing up its push for Senate ratification of the recently signed New START agreement between the United States and Russia, with hearings that began yesterday and a vote possible by the end of the year. As senior administration officials make their case around town at various think tanks and before Congress, they need to do a better job of refining their message to make sure it stands up to scrutiny.

In a speech last week at the Atlantic Council, undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher stated three times that the New START agreement "does not constrain U.S. missile defense programs." Despite the repetition, Tauscher's claim, like that of other Administration officials, is simply not accurate.

Article V, Section 3 of the text states: "Each Party shall not convert and shall not use ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) launchers and SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors therein. Each Party further shall not convert and shall not use launchers of missile defense interceptors for placement of ICBMs and SLBMs therein. This provision shall not apply to ICBM launchers that were converted prior to signature of this Treaty for placement of missile defense interceptors therein." This section makes clear that the treaty does indeed constrain one possible way for the U.S. to develop missile defense capabilities. This may not be the way the current administration envisions developing its missile defense system, but that isn't what Tauscher claimed. (A White House fact sheet issued March 26 is more accurate in stating, "The Treaty does not contain any constraints on testing, development or deployment of current or planned U.S. missile defense programs..." [emphasis added].)

Conversion of offensive ICBMs has been done in the past: there are five Minuteman III ICBMs at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California that were converted into defensive interceptors. These have been grandfathered into the treaty in the section noted above, but additional conversion of launchers into interceptors, which is arguably the fastest way to develop such a defensive capability should an urgent need arise, is now forbidden under this new agreement. That constrains our missile defense programs, plain and simple.

Then there is the problem of the unilateral statement issued by the Russian side on missile defense. Released the same day as the full agreed-upon text in Prague April 8, this statement clearly says that the treaty "can operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively." This statement, Obama administration officials are quick to point out, is not legally binding and will not constrain U.S. missile defense programs. Russian officials have a different take.

Before and after the April 8 signing, senior Russian officials have been touting that statement and warning that further moves by the U.S. in developing missile defense systems in Europe would cause serious problems for Moscow. Are Russian leaders bluffing or would they actually follow through and withdraw from the new treaty if the U.S. moved forward on missile defense? Is the purpose to force the Obama administration to choose between missile defense and keeping Russia on board with New START? Is the administration prepared to move forward with missile defense in Europe and risk having Russia withdraw from New START? These are the key questions for senators to ask during the ratification process.

A Russian withdrawal from New START would be a big blow to Obama's reset policy with Moscow. It would also damage his efforts to hold up the treaty as the model for the rest of the world to follow as part of his fanciful goal to make the world free from nuclear weapons. But the reality is that, with or without the treaty, Russia's nuclear arsenal is in serious decline, with the life of many warheads expiring. Russia's warhead and delivery vehicle numbers are already largely within the limits of the new treaty, whereas it is the U.S. that would have to reduce significantly its nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles.

Thus, Russia needs this treaty more than does the United States in order to lock in parity between the two sides. And yet from the outset of negotiations with the Russians, Obama and his administration came across as much too eager to get a treaty signed with Russia. If they want it ratified, they'd be wise to make sure their talking points stand up to scrutiny and prepare to answer the question of New START versus missile defense. 

JOE KLAMAR/AFP/Getty Images

 
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SCOTT MONJE

1:54 PM ET

May 1, 2010

A fascinating argument

(1) The Russians want the treaty more than the United States does. Therefore, (2) the Russians will coerce the United States by threatening to walk out on it.

 

JOECIRINCIONE

2:30 PM ET

May 1, 2010

Fanning Paranoia

There is room for serious discussion over the merits of the treaty. This posting, however, simply re-circulates stale partisan talking points.

Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger took the more serious approach on Thursday when he strongly endorsed ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee along with former Secretary of Defense William Perry.

Secretary Schlesinger said, “It is obligatory for the US to ratify this treaty."

While acknowledging that this treaty and all treaties have shortcomings, he also agreed with Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), who said that, “failure to ratify New START is detrimental to U.S. influence over other countries' non-proliferation policies.”

Schlesinger concluded that although missile defense is mentioned in the treaty preamble, “the treaty does not limit U.S. missile defense in a serious way.”

This is also the conclusion of General Patrick O’Reilly, head of the US Missile Defense Agency, who testified, “Relative to the recently expired START Treaty, the New START Treaty actually reduces constraints on the development of the missile defense program.”

Dr. Schlesinger made several other statements that the author might note. While he acknowledged that there is less verification in this treaty than in START I, which was signed in 1991, he argued that, “all in all, verification possibilities are still adequate.”

In response to a question from Sen. Johnny Isakson (R-GA), both Schlesinger and Perry agreed that New START had to be ratified as a precursor for dealing with the issue of tactical nuclear weapons, where the Russians have a significant advantage.

He also endorsed the Obama administration’s new nuclear weapons budget for Fiscal Year 2011 when he said, "the add-on for next year looks to be significant."

 

JOECIRINCIONE

2:38 PM ET

May 1, 2010

It Is NOT Better to Convert Silos to Interceptors

One more thing. The author is just flat out wrong when he asserts that it is better to convert existing ICBM silos for interceptors.

Here is the testimony of the director of the Missile Defense Agency, Lieutenant General Patrick O’Reilly:

“The New START Treaty has no constraints on current and future components of the BMDS development or deployment.

Article V, Section 3 of the treaty prohibits the conversion of ICBM or SLBM launchers to missile defense launchers, and vice versa, while “grandfathering” the five former ICBM silos at Vandenberg AFB already converted for Ground Based Interceptors. MDA never had a plan to convert additional ICBM silos at Vandenberg and intends to hedge against increased BMDS requirements by completing construction of Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely.

Moreover, we determined that if more interceptors were to be added at Vandenberg AFB, it would be less expensive to build a new GBI missile field (which is not prohibited by the treaty). Regarding SLBM launchers, some time ago we examined the concept of launching missile defense interceptors from submarines and found it an unattractive and extremely expensive option.

As the committee knows, we have a very good and significantly growing capability for sea-based missile defense on Aegis-capable ships. Relative to the recently expired START Treaty, the New START Treaty actually reduces constraints on the development of the missile defense program.”

 

CRITICALTHINKER1000

8:32 PM ET

May 1, 2010

Frustration

Selective observation is what passes for erudition these days. Idiots like Palin have made willful ignorance a virtue.

Reason, logic and a command of the facts do not counter the dishonest arguments. Republicans are more interested in damaging the Obama presidency than doing what is right for the country. People who like to wrap themselves in the flag are displaying a spectacular lack of patriotism. Folks who like to thump bibles are more interested in getting an Evangelical into the White House than they are in fomenting peace.

Adding to this craziness is the faux noise from a bunch of angry and ignorant white people who decided that NOW is the time to get pissed off. Where the hell were these know-nothings when Bush gave almost a trillion dollars in tax breaks to the very wealthiest? Where were they when we invaded Iraq - which made about as much sense as invading Uruguay?

 

AMYFW

10:15 PM ET

May 1, 2010

This statement is not true:

"additional conversion of launchers into interceptors, which is arguably the fastest way to develop such a defensive capability should an urgent need arise,"

It would be far faster to dig a new hole in the ground ,install the infrastructure for the interceptor and then put in the interterceptor than to take out an old missile, take out all its supporting infrastructure, resize the silo, then put in the new supporting infrastructure for the interceptor, and then install the new missile. ICBMs and missile interceptors are not interchangeable in either size or supporting infrastructure. Its not a pop-out, pop-in proposition.

As for the issue of whether the Russian unilateral statement would chill the U.S. missile defense programs. NO. Have you read the U.S. unilateral statement? Have you read the Missile Defense Review? Have you read the FY2011 budget for missile defense? The U.S. commitment to missile defense runs strong and deep. This was not true in the 1990s, the last time the Russians issued such a threat. But, even then , the U.S. budget for missile defense grew throughout the decade and the programs expanded (while under the threat of Russian withdrawal from START I), and when the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty, Russia not only did not withdraw from START I, it continued to negotiate the Moscow Treaty. Moreover, the Soviet Union used the same negotiating tactic that Russia did this time. Both started with the absolute insistence that offenses and defenses be limited together, and both gave up on this link in the interest of getting limits on offenses. The U.S also took the same position in START and new START, absolutely refusing to link limits on offenses and defenses and expressing an interest in walking away from the negotiations to protect defenses (remember Rykavjvek?). So, if you actually knew anything about the history of this issue, you'd see that Russia's commitment to START and new START trumped its effort to limit missile defenses, and the U.S. commitment to missile defenses kept limits on defenses out of the treaties.

This is one of those cases where reality seriously undermines talking points, and repeating the talking points does not change the real history.

 

EFRAKER

12:58 AM ET

May 2, 2010

intercontinental kinetic interception is a joke

Tauscher is right - this doesn't constrain any U.S. missile defense programs, because no U.S. missile defense programs would be based on the hysterically unsuccessful, repeatedly-demonstrated failure of kinetic intercept technology. Science is wonderful, engineering accomplishes marvels - but with our intercept rate against /dumb/ ballistic projectiles after /decades/ of work, using this method to protect our nation against a swarm of evasive weapons is the plan of a fool.

All signs point to directed energy interception. Banning proven-ineffective technologies constrains only ineffective policies.

 

CRSITHIAN GARCIA

6:12 AM ET

May 2, 2010

Well, greetings from Colombia

Well, greetings from Colombia to every one reading my post...

I'd like to think what president Obama has done is what it's supposed to be done. Excelent article nontheless, but I think the stance the author is taking is baised.
One thing is clear, a nuclear attack fform any country to another is(not a ''could be'') a disaster for all countries, so perhaps the solution to any war could never be a n uclear attack.

Having such thought in mind, no country or nation would want to resort to such attack. Then why is it that president Obama's stance on this issue is receiving such critisiscm. I understand politics, but the world needs this kind of leaders to make our planet a better place.

Globalization, such a beatiful thing. What we need to start to do is to start thinking about our world as the only place, which we can call home. Home to all of us, living humans. Let that selfishness go away, we need politicians like this, who think about the human race as a whole and not just as separate states who only want to garther power, and my question is this: What for?...

Hasn't this policy already failed and are´'t first world countris suffering because of this? Let's all think about this issue

 

SIR_MIXXALOT

10:51 AM ET

May 4, 2010

Why the angst?

Who says that missile defense is worth all this angst? The bloody thing does not work. It has never been tested under anything resembling reality. eg. name one test that was done as a surprise? Why should we risk losing the START treaty for a paper defense? Stupid beyond belief.

 

Shadow Government is a blog about U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration, written by experienced policy makers from the loyal opposition and curated by Peter D. Feaver and William Inboden.

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