Look, I'm an Egyptian and I don't like Islamists any more than you do - but from what I see locally the Brotherhood has calmed down by a substantial amount in comparison to the last couple of decades. It's very difficult to call them extremists anymore, Islamists certainly but far more moderate than what it used to be.

Maybe a reason why Mr. Inboden hasn't mentioned the Brotherhood extensively is, to do so would force himself to acknowledge that at the moment, it's the only noteworthy challenger to a Mubarak-controlled Egypt, a fact the US and West are finding extremely uncomfortable. I'm not saying it's either a good or a bad solution, I'm saying the Brotherhood is the only political party that looks even remotely organized enough to mount a serious campaign come election time - despite the lack of a dominating figurehead personality in charge.

Baradei certainly won't be the Muslim Brotherhood's figurehead, and since there's no other major party to speak of he'll run as an independent - assuming he's allowed to do so in the first place, although I can't imagine why Mubarak would give him a shot like that without the US outright forcing him into it.

And hey, what's the worst that can happen? Maybe I'm completely wrong and this is an intricate Brotherhood plot to make them look more moderate and pleasant till they actually win an election, at which time they revert back to their well-hidden 'Death to the Great Satan' approach to government or something. What's to stop this cycle from just going around again and having the Brotherhood pressured to democratic elections and so on and so forth?

I already commented the worst that can happen is an 'Iran' to the West of the Arabian peninsula. In a region already renowned for instability and excessive bloodletting it would be the height of irresponsibility for well intentioned Westerners to advocate a 'democratic fix' of openly contested elections that would bring such an undemocratic and extreme party to power. One of the first casualties would be the Egypt/Israel Peace Agreement. The potential for a resumption of conflict closure of the Suez canal....The scenarios are too easily predicable and terrible to contemplate. Not least of all among the people who would suffer most is Egyptian people, as Islamic law is ruthlessly enforced and all opposition crushed.

As I said a democracy isn't a one day exercise of an election. It is about institutions that guarantee a liberal society. I use liberal in the classical sense as relating to respect for fundamentals of equality, individuals, individual rights. I do not mean Egypt would be a Western Society.

On my major point of Mr. Inboden completely failing to address the issue of Muslim Brotherhood I think we are on the same page. If there were an open and fair election the Brotherhood would win. They are the most disciplined and well organized party. No one can advance democracy while simultaneously advocating for inclusion of the most undemocratic parties.

Baradei maybe popular in the west and in intellectual upwardly mobile circles of Egypt. I am skeptical that he is that well known a figure among the masses of Egypt much less that they support him. The reality is in Egypt you need a loyal party behind you to enforce and accomplish anything on the ground. I don't think Baradei has that sort of capability no matter how popular he is.

I agree the Muslim Brotherhood has quieted down somewhat since the last round of violence, crackdowns on leadership etc., however I see that as tactical stance not a sign of moderation or maturity on their part. They are extremely idealogical and worse that ideology for them is largely theological 'God's will' and it is not subject to be revisited or modified. It is no accident that all of the most violent Jihadist groups are people who started in the Brotherhood. Al Quaeda was essentially originally Egypt's Islamic Jihad, who were originally in the Brotherhood, who fled in advance of arrest or after release from Jail that reorganized in Afghanistan. Most prominent of them being Ayman al-Zawahiri. What many people don't realize is that the core of Al Quaeda's 'upper management' and network, as opposed to the numerous franchises, are Egypt's Islamic Jihad and other violent wings of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood who fled Egypt and found refuge in Europe or elsewhere. Another prominent member is Omar Abdel-Rahman, the blind Egyptian cleric that organised the cell that bombed the World Trade Centre in 1993.

These are not nice people and the worst that can happen is really really awful.

You and I make a few good points, Chrome. And all of them are potentially valid, maybe one of us would be wrong but whoever's going to call the shots on this whole mess will have to consider both of our perspectives.

I am very aware that the possibility of the Brotherhood's current moderate-ish stance being a tactic is very real, but even if it is it'll be dangerous to either ignore or show hostility to them. The US didn't use enough diplomacy with Hamas and at the same time advocated fair elections, and look where that got Gaza. Ignoring the Muslim Brotherhood's existence, or treating it as an extremist organization while pressing for elections would be exactly the same mistake as in Gaza.

But to confirm we're on the same page, looking around Cairo from my window right now if it were put to a vote, you'd probably see this as a result: Baradei winning the presidency by a narrow margin (bear in mind that Mubarak's son Gamal will garner a considerable amount of votes simply because many Egyptians fear the short-term consequences of the current status-quo being shaken down), with the Muslim Brotherhood drastically strengthening its hold on Parliament, if not gaining an outright majority. A prediction like that means the West must take the Brotherhood seriously come what may, and use Baradei to organize the reformist movement well enough to complement the Islamist presence in Egypt.

Because the Brotherhood can't simply be defeated on military grounds, and to shun them diplomatically only boosts their status among the extremists. The real battleground will be the hearts and minds of the Egyptian people, to sway them away from extremism. Only total freedom can allow this, but this is not going to be an overnight thing - in this you're absolutely correct.

Now onto Baradei. I disagree with you over his status in Egypt; he may not be popular (although from what I see among the middle class especially he very much is), but he's certainly known around these parts. However I am skeptical about one fact: despite all his talk of reform, and despite his international experience etc. I can't help but firmly believe that his most positive point by far is he's simply not Mubarak. That still is the biggest reason he has support from what I see.

Although in response to your comment, 'I don't think Baradei has that sort of capability no matter how popular he is', I kind of agree but then again, no one has that capability. I'm not talking about the current crop of Egyptian politicians, I mean reforming this country will take too much and too long for one person. Assume for a moment the next election is the first sign of a liberal democracy that will start on voting day and will last forever - even then, the first post-Mubarak will not succeed in cleaning this country up completely. The one after him just might be able to, but my money's on the third. But Baradei certainly's the best man at the moment to get things started - I just hope he means what he says (and again I assume he will run at all, though it's a good bet he will).

Lastly, I know I've been ignoring the Israel factor. It's just that that's going to bring up a whole new discussion, and this post is way too long as it is (sorry about that :)). But the extremely abridged version is this: as long as that conflict isn't worked out, Egyptian politicians will have to use it to gain favor to make up for any domestic failures. The Brotherhood will do so obviously, and in a predictable way, but so will Baradei - he can't afford to look like a US stooge to his people, even if he isn't.

'A middle class in Egypt is very different from what middle class means in the west a reference to a broad demographic whereas in Egypt it is much more of a limited urban demographic. '

You know Egypt well, it seems. It is true, it's very difficult to classify middle-class here. Even though they work to maintain their comfortable lifestyle (and frequently have to scrape to do so), to well over half the population they're considered more than just well-off.

I have to agree with Chrome about the 'laundry list' as he/she puts it, Mr. Inboden. While it looks like a solid and simple plan to get things moving in Egypt, there's one small problem: it probably won't work.

"First, restore -- better yet, increase -- funding for beleaguered democracy and human rights activists, and do not let the Egyptian government decide who receives the grants."

This, to put it bluntly, is a very unwise move. Deciding which Egyptians recieve grants looks exactly like what it is: meddling. You may not think so, nor may even the US Government, but the Egyptian state media certainly will. The population may be utterly fed up with Mubarak's regime and may even look to the States to help promote democracy, but that doesn't mean they trust the US near enough to interfere with domestic politics. And who exactly does the US want to receive this funding? Baradei and his Opposition? They wouldn't dare accept it unless the Brotherhood gets in on it too - fact of life, as long as Mubarak is in power Baradei and the Brotherhood are on the same side. Nothing even indicates yet that they'll fall out with each other afterwards. If something should cause a rift between those two sides, you'll have to choose again between rival factions in Egypt - both of which you've funded. Guess how the Egyptians will react to any US intervention then - I hope the US has learned its lessons after Saddam and Osama.

"Second ... transform economic development programs so that funding helps support urban Egyptian entrepreneurs and access to capital for growing small and medium size enterprises."

Actually you just might be on to something there. The best way to promote a free and democratic nation is to help ensure that no one is too busy worrying about basic economic needs - it's actually the reason Mubarak's managed to keep himself in power so far, by keeping the populace too busy running after a livelihood to pose a serious challenge for him. And true, some will say that this is meddling too - well, it is, but it looks a lot better politically. Plus you're raising standards of living for a lot of people - they can forgive a lot if that happens. Only problem is you certainly have to deal with the Government to do it, and I doubt they'll approve. Even if they do there's a lot of red tape that can be exploited to trap funds in the ruling beaurocracy and ensure that the economic development never really comes to life.

" Third, senior U.S. officials -- especially President Obama and Secretary Clinton -- should consistently and publicly support the principles of religious freedom, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and open electoral competition in Egypt. "

Well I thought they were already doing that. So was Bush, as I recall. The question is, is Obama actualy going to practice what he preaches? It will be very difficult to do that while Egyptians are suspicious of double-standards on the US' part - and while people like Mubarak are in charge and the Palestine/Israel issue remains it will be virtually impossible to change their minds. The bottom line is many Egyptians sense the West, and particularly the US, throw phrases like 'freedom of religion' around when it is in their benefit to do so. This will put the US in a very dangerous position after the next election - if the Muslim Brotherhood should gain power, which will probably happen to some degree at least if Mubarak is ousted, then America may not like it but under its own principles it will have to accept it. To do that would risk helping Egypt turn into an extremist haven as BurningChrome fears; to not accept it would even more likely do the same.

My thanks to posters on this thread for an interesting and useful discussion.

From the standpoint of American policy, it seems to me that Egypt has to be considered a problem that will remain one for some time to come. Policy steps in the areas Will Inboden addresses should not, therefore, be considered as means to "solve" Egypt's democracy deficit. Baradei shouldn't be thought of in this way either; in the best case (from his point of view), he'd come to power at the head of a state almost all of whose employees have spent their whole careers under Mubarak -- and the best case doesn't seem all that likely.

Speaking again from the American point of view, we should remember that in one important sense the worst case has already happened. Egypt, the largest of the Arab states and heir to one of the oldest civilizations on earth, is the natural leader of the Arab world. That leadership can be accepted or rejected, and there is no law that says it has to be a positive thing -- but as Mubarak has endured for year after year in Cairo we have seen the alternative. Egypt's leadership has atrophied, and that has increased the influence of Saudi Arabia's backward, insular culture. Notwithstanding the Saudi government's good relations with Washington, this is not a healthy thing for the United States or for the region. It won't change as long as Mubarak defines government in Egypt.

Chrome, when I said 'freedom of religion' I meant some Egyptians are skeptical of all those phrases, including 'freedom of expression' etc., when the West uses them publicly.

Since we're on the subject though, Egypt has slowly been becoming more Islamist in society anyway; the regime didn't start it but it doesn't seem to make any significant moves to fight it either. So far, society embracing more backward 'Islamic' values (apostrophes because some of these ideas floating around are just plain stupid, whatever religion you are) has played into the Government's favor thus far - people tend to leave to Allah what they should be doing themselves, ie pushing for freedom through demonstrations, boycotts, raising public awareness etc.

Actually Zathras, this in part is due to Saudi Arabia, whether the latter meant it or not. This is cause a large number of Egyptians, especially professionals like doctors and engineers, tend to emigrate to Saudi for at least a while to make some money and then return. Those who do come back have a tendency to pick up a little religion on the way, and I'm convinced this is purely a socioeconomic thing; to an Egyptian, Saudi may seem biased, backward, hypocritical in domestic and foreign policy, but the Egyptian will get paid well there, receive good housing and health coverage - whereas in Egypt, he knows, even the best jobs for professionals pays a laughingly low salary. Sooner or later, the Egyptian starts to think that maybe the religion has something to do with Saudi Arabia's success (the oil, in that case, is there by the grace of Allah), and slowly begins to adopt what he thinks are Islamic and/or Saudi principles. If there's one thing I've learned here it's to be careful when giving a poor man religion; that's the one area where he's likely to get creative.

I'm not too sure about the Coptic Christians' agenda in all this, or indeed if they have any (the thing is while they're a minority, that still counts to a few million - 4 or 5, ballpark guess). What I do know is they have no love for Mubarak either - even now, the Government has a tendency to eventually give them rights that they're entitled to, but not without a whole lot of heartache first. And these days in particular Christian/Muslim tensions are on the rise in rural areas. So I'm sure they're supportive of the Opposition, but I highly doubt they trust it to do what Mubarak has so far refused to: integrate them as full citizens in practical terms. Plus as long as the Brotherhood has a say in matters Copts are going to stay quite tense.

Iceberg: Curious way of putting it, but there is some truth to your post. It's true, Egypt for the moment has lost much of its prestige and status within the Middle East. It very much used to be true, Zathras, but not at the moment. So even if we advocate democracy in our streets, even get that democratic election we're screaming for, I still highly doubt the rest of the Middle East will follow suit. A strong political player can afford to play on both sides of a conflict and remain neutral to maintain his leadership; if a weak player tried to do the same, he would just be called a fencesitter. That's what's been happening to Egypt for at least the last decade - maybe even since the Yom Kippur / 6 October War of 1973. Any shred of respect Egypt had with its neighbours has almost evaporated completely after that barrier on the Gaza border was set up - you know the diplomatic scene is grim here when Mubarak makes such a risky move and still considers it the lesser of two evils.

"The US as has frequently been demonstrated has very little leverage over Egypt. In fact it is probably Egypt that has more leverage in the relationship as they can threaten to break it off."

Chrome, this is true on the surface. Egypt does have some leverage over Middle Eastern affairs and so on, but the US has leverage in one very important area: it keeps Egypt alive. Not the government, the country as a whole. Last time I checked, about 50% of our wheat is imported from the US. This is a massive point of control the US enjoys, not even regarding other economic and military assistance. I agree with you, Egypt's leader can theoretically break away from the US' sphere of influence and try to get cosier with another Western patron (and I believe that Egyptians still prefer to deal diplomatically with Europeans over Americans) - but that leader will have to survive the bread riots that will surely come once US ties are severed.

US will never use food sanctions against Egypt. It is a non starter, the US currently provides food aid to North Korea (and their army is given priority access), during the height of the Cold War the US was supplying wheat to the former Soviet Union. When Iran suffered a big Earthquake a few years back the US shipped food and medicine to the region. These are just a few examples off the top of my head I am sure others can provide other equally vivid examples. It isn't even a realistic hypothetical.

Egypt will listen and act affirmatively on US requests in direct proportion to how they perceive it doesn't contradict their own interests. That is why Egypt routinely ignores US requests for increased democracy, freedom of the press or anything that challenges Regime authority.

I didn't really comment on Egypt's influence regionally or across the wider Arab world. I don't think any of the Arab States are that inclined to interfere with each other, with the obvious exception of Syrian domination of Lebanon as it is sort of a unwritten law that they don't interfere in each others 'internal matters'. Hence the silence on Darfur or the civil war in Algeria.

They are very big on passive aggression in that they will say one thing in public or to each other pledging fidelity and co-operation etc. but then just drag their feet and do nothing or quietly sabotage an effort all the while pretending to go along with it.

The growing Islamization of Egypt is parallel to the rest of the Muslim world, and a wider trend towards greater religious fervour across the world. My opinion is it is in no small way driven by lack of education of the masses coupled with disillusion with their own governments. There is no small amount of naivety in that there is this persistent belief that religious figures are somehow immune from the temptations the rest of us feel. The masses think there will be less corruption and religious authorities are inherently more honest and just so will rule accordingly.

Swimforrest alludes to an interesting point that deserves more thought.

From the standpoint of civil society and economic development, democracy would have many advantages for a country like Egypt. Democracy, though, would involve lacing limits on the power of the state while developing other centers of economic and political power, or at least influence. The current government's reasons for resisting it are obvious, even if one leaves aside concerns about what Islamist groups might do without its current easy recourse to state suppression.

With respect to Egyptian leadership in the Arab world, though, this was at its peak under leaders who saw themselves as unquestioned leaders of a great nation, and acted that way. As I suggested upthread, that wasn't always a good thing for Egypt or the region; it helped entangle Egypt in a superpower rivalry that would better have been avoided, and of course it made the current Mubarak government possible. However, under both Nasser and Sadat Egypt stood for ideas that Arabs elsewhere had to account for. Mubarak stands for Mubarak. Wahhabism would exist anyway, to be sure, but except to the extent it threatens Mubarak and the Egyptian state, Egypt has offered little resistance.

Would this be more likely to change under an evolving Egyptian democracy, or under an authoritarian leader not in his 80s, who did not equate stasis with stability?

I agree, I just think that it is silly to argue about $20m v $45m or pretty much any other figure that the US could reasonably spend on democracy programs when you have $1.3b going for the military, and all that that implies for what is actually being paid for and for the message that it sends.

On the Egyptian comments Grant, you're absolutely on the mark. This is why the Brotherhood is going to have at least some power in the short term, not matter who's president.

With regards to the Dems and Reps, I guess it's standard political procedure; just keep pointing out the opposition's mistakes because there certainly will be quite a few. In a country like the US, which not only has a huge task in running its own 50 states but also fulfilling its gigantic foreign agenda, whoever's leading is sure to at least miss a few opporunities, if not make outright blunders. When Obama bides his time on an issue, the Republicans can say he's not doing anything about it. When he does make a decision, they can say he's doing it wrong. If it proves to be done right, they can say he's not doing it fast enough.

It's actually quite relevant in the Egypt issue, as I think you imply. State media here does use this to attack El Baradei - they're not saying he'll be a bad president, but they are saying he doesn't have any better alternatives to current state policies. What keeps people tense is there's no sure way to either prove or disprove that at the moment.