Posted By Jamie M. Fly Share

By Jamie M. Fly

The events of the past week pose a challenge to President Obama's vision of a world without nuclear weapons. Last week in Vienna, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) met to discuss Iran and Syria's continued stonewalling of IAEA investigations into illicit nuclear activities carried out by each country.

On November 16, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei submitted reports on both countries to the members of the Board. His report on Iran was perhaps the strongest IAEA report on Iran to date. It found that Iran violated its safeguards obligations by not reporting the existence of a covert enrichment facility near Qom. The report also noted that Iran continues to not cooperate with the IAEA's investigation into Iran's pre-2003 covert weaponization program. It was a damning final report from ElBaradei, who retired at the end of last week having spent much of his twelve years at the helm of the IAEA trying to cajole the Iranians into coming clean, often undermining U.S. and Western efforts to pressure in the process.

President Obama has relied heavily on ElBaradei to try to broker a deal to transfer a significant portion of Iran's stockpile of low enriched uranium out of Iran for processing into fuel for Iran's research reactor. Despite reportedly agreeing to a deal last month in Geneva, Iran has since backed away from the deal, reverting to its traditional negotiating tactics.

It had been almost four years since the Board of Governors passed a resolution condemning Iran's actions, even as Iran has flouted successive United Nations Security Council resolutions and stymied ElBaradei's IAEA. On Friday, the Board reacted to the recent revelation of Qom and Iran's continued stonewalling of the IAEA investigation by approving a resolution calling on Iran to suspend construction at Qom and expressing concern that Iran's recent actions as well as its failure to implement the Additional Protocol limit the IAEA's ability to verify that Iran's nuclear program is purely for peaceful purposes.

The Bush administration tried repeatedly to push the board to pass such a resolution last year as Iran's noncompliance became more and more egregious. Unfortunately, the administration backed down quickly (too quickly in my view), when it became clear that Russia and China did not support such an action. The fact that Russia and China supported last week's resolution is a positive sign, but there are already debates among experts about how strong the resolution was and whether it is tantamount to a second referral of the Iranian nuclear file to the United Nations Security Council. It is likely that the Obama administration agreed to water down the resolution to keep Russia and China on board. Russian and Chinese acquiescence in Vienna does not mean that they will support meaningful sanctions in New York early next year.

However, if Iran's initial reaction to Friday's resolution is any indication, Iran could be the Obama administration's greatest ally in getting China and Russia to support sanctions. A conservative Iranian member of parliament threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). On Sunday, President Ahmadinejad announced that Iran would build ten more uranium enrichment facilities. The second threat is likely just that, a threat. Iran lacks the capacity to build large scale enrichment facilities very quickly -- witness the fact that Qom was still not operational despite reportedly being under construction for years. The threat to withdraw from the NPT however, is more troublesome. If Iran were to do this, it could be a trigger for Israeli military action. If the IAEA is unable to verify the location of Iran's nuclear material, Obama administration officials may have to consider U.S. military action or risk diversion of nuclear material to covert facilities.

On Syria, the Board last week missed an opportunity to send a message to the Assad regime. ElBaradei's latest report makes clear that Syria has adopted the Iranian playbook on handling IAEA investigations. The report says that Syria has not responded to the IAEA's questions about its former covert nuclear reactor at Al Kibar even though some of its early answers contradict information that the IAEA has obtained from other sources. Syria has also refused to give the IAEA access to other facilities related to Al Kibar, claiming that these are sensitive military sites even though the IAEA has reminded Syria that under its safeguards agreement, this is not a reason to deny the IAEA access. In addition to unanswered questions about Al Kibar, the report raises new concerns about illicit activity at Syria's declared research reactor near Damascus.

Unlike Iran, Syria at the moment is experiencing a renaissance in its relations with the United States as well as Europe. This will have to change if the international community is serious about upholding the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The Board of Governors, which has largely been silent on the Syria nuclear issue, should have sent a strong message to Damascus that unless the Assad regime begins to share information, it will be subject to the same treatment as Iran (including eventual referral to the Security Council for further action).

The issue is not that Syria has an ongoing nuclear program (although it is difficult for the IAEA to verify this given Syria's lack of cooperation), but it is about the sanctity of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the message that needs to be sent to other countries thinking about shirking their commitments. The lesson cannot be that such countries will be slapped on the wrist but then quickly forgiven, only to receive increased trade and diplomatic relations from the United States and Europe.

How President Obama handles these two issues in the coming months will say much about how serious he is about his supposed goal of ridding the world of nuclear weapons. As Obama said in his April speech in Prague after North Korea violated several United Nations Security Council Resolutions by conducting a missile test, "Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean something."

Last week's IAEA Board resolution on Iran was a start, but there is much work to be done before he can turn this rhetoric into reality.

JOE KLAMAR/AFP/Getty Images

 
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DEPETRIS@WORDPRESS.COM

6:53 PM ET

November 30, 2009

The NPT is useless

Iran and Syria's unwillingness to fully disclose nuclear information shows just how powerless the NPT has become. At the end of the day, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is only a piece of paper that nations sign to align themselves with the rest of the international community. While there are binding elements to the treaty, the constant division of the IAEA and the inefficiency of the U.N. makes enforcement extremely difficult. If there was any substance to the NPT, Iran and Syria would have already declassified their uranium enrichment capabilities, for fear of isolation and economic punishment. They have not cooperated because they simply have nothing to fear. The world has not exactly backed up the nuclear treaty when warranted (India and Pakistan in the late 1990's is an example).

The NPT is also very lax on the transport of nuclear knowledge and equipment. The Treaty seems to focus the bulk of its wording on preventing states from acquiring an aggressive program. What this fails to do is keep nuclear-sellers in check. North Korea has been thumbing its nose at the international community for the past decade, transferring nuclear technology to other rogue states. While this is not yet confirmed, there is every reason to believe that North Korea aided Syria on the Al-Kibar plant; only exposing the weaknesses of the current nonproliferation system.

It does not help President Obama's declaration of a nuclear-free world when the main agreement on the issue is riddled with flaws. As long as individual countries are allowed to control their arsenals- rather than international organizations- I see no way that nuclear transparency can occur.

http://depetris.wordpress.com

 

SAINT MICHAEL TRAVELER

4:41 AM ET

December 1, 2009

Nuclear Fuel: NPT and Non-Nuclear Weapon States

The efforts to monopolize nuclear fuel production started in 1978, when the Nuclear Suppliers Group tried to impose restrictions on the right of developing countries to enrich their own uranium, a right. Since Article IV of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ensures access to peaceful uses of nuclear technology for non-nuclear weapon states, the technology for uranium enrichment must be permitted to all states under the current nonproliferation regime. Countries like Iran therefore, are permitted to develop their own enrichment technology for peaceful nuclear energy production. Iran has argued for an international nuclear fuel consortium to operate Iranian nuclear enrichment. Iranians assert that this international cooperative arrangement and IAEA oversight together will eliminate USA fear that Iran is attempting to use the technology to develop nuclear weapon.

The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) is a USA initiative that offers an international control over production of nuclear fuel and disposal of the associated nuclear wastes. GNEP-initiative monopolizes nuclear fuel production and waste management infrastructure.

Global Nuclear Power Infrastructure (GNPI) is a Russian initiative.
The Angarsk Electrolyzing and Chemical Combine, a plant created to enrich uranium for the Soviet nuclear program is located in Angarsk in southeastern Siberia, Russia. The international uranium enrichment center" (IUEC) in Angarsk objective is to provide a guaranteed supply of uranium fuel for countries which do not enrich uranium themselves, Iran, India and others. Russia will retain exclusive control of all sensitive enrichment technology.

All these initiatives, both GNEP and GNPI have one thing in common, monopolizing production of nuclear fuel. Any nation who would have nuclear reactor but can not control the supplier of nuclear fuel is not an independent nation. The case of Iran and Russia as supplier of the fuel demonstrates my argument. The Iranian problem for receiving from Russia fuel for Bushehr - Iran Nuclear Reactor was greatly co-opted by the United States forcing Iran to initiate her own fuel production.

Let us set an example for Iran. Let us enforce NPT starting with those who already have the dreaded nuclear bomb. Here is my take on the problem and how to solve it:

The national security is the driving force for Iran. If security is good for Israel, then, it is also good for Turks, Persians and Arabs.

Soviet Union had to develop the nuclear bomb because USA had already developed nuclear bomb and we (President Truman) were making sure the Russians knew it. India, China and Pakistan developed the nuclear bomb because the other nations, i.e. India and China, Pakistan and India, used the bomb as deterrence against the other. Israel developed the bomb because of her fear of the Arabs; Iran was a friend and collaborator of Israel at the time. Now, Israel demands that she must be the only nation in the region to have the nuclear bomb.

Let us create a win-win situation for all of the nations in the Middle East. The nuclear disarmament must start somewhere, where to start? I suggest the following three steps to correct our failed foreign policy with respect to the Middle East:

1. Nuclear Fuel Cycle Iranian Consortium:
USA should join the Iranian nuclear fuel consortium. The other nation may include Japan, Germany, France, Russia and England to actively monitor the Iranian fuel cycle activity. IAEA has consistently asserted that the agency could not find any indications that Iran is diverting the fuel cycle for nuclear bomb development. Iran has asserted that their activities are limited to development of fuel for nuclear reactor.

2. Nuclear Shield:
An international nuclear shield for all nations in the Middle East, including Iran, Israel, Turkey and all the Arab nations in the region.

3. A nuclear- bomb-free Middle East:
This action will remove any pressure from Iran to develop nuclear bomb in the future for deterrence against nuclear bomb Israeli state.

Israel can not be the only nuclear bomb state in the Middle East. A nuclear bomb free Middle East will remove pressure from all the other nations, including Iran to develop nuclear bomb in the future for deterrence against Israeli’s nuclear bombs.

 

DEPETRIS@WORDPRESS.COM

5:44 AM ET

December 1, 2009

A little too simplistic?

Your solution to the Iranian nuclear dilemma might work if Tehran was only building its program for strategic purposes. But there is more to the entire debate other than countering Zionism; Iran is also striving to expand its own symbolic position in the Middle East. For years, the Islamic Republic has seen itself as a country that should be granted the respect of its neighbors in the region. It is not exactly a secret that Iran is displeased with today's status-quo...one largely controlled by pro-Western Arab Governments. Likewise, it is not exactly a secret that the Islamic Republic wants to change this arrangement through any and all means (i.e. becoming a nuclear power).

In addition, successive Iranian presidents- and the Supreme Leader himself- have always viewed themselves as superior compared to their Arab neighbors. With this reality in mind, acquiring a nuclear deterrent would only improve their chances for regional hegemony.

And what about the Islamic Republic's obsession with self-preservation? Well, a nuclear deterrent would certainly serve this issue as well, namely by making regime change costly, irrational, and destabilizing. Are we to truly expect Iran to denounce the nuclear option, considering all of the benefits it brings?

While distressing to the west, building nuclear weapons is actually quite logical for the Iranians.

When forming a solution, we should not quickly jump to the conclusion that Iran would forgo nuclear enrichment if Israel decided to renounce the bomb. This may get at part of the problem, but it neglects to address Iran's other motivation; transforming into the world's first Great Muslim Power.

P.S: There is no way that the IAEA can convince the Israelis to abandon their own nuclear deterrent. It has served them well in the past, and it will continue to serve them well into the foreseeable future. Hell, we cannot even persuade them to abandon settlement building in the West Bank.

http://depetris.wordpress.com

 

SAINT MICHAEL TRAVELER

4:21 PM ET

December 2, 2009

Nuclear Fuel: NPT and Non-Nuclear Weapon States

Response to A little too simplistic

You statement
"And what about the Islamic Republic's obsession with self-preservation? Well, a nuclear deterrent would certainly serve this issue as well, namely by making regime change costly, irrational, and destabilizing"
creates several questions.

It may be a fact that every nation would strive for self-preservation, Iran is not an exception. We must recall that Iranian people in 1979 took a baby step toward democracy and replaced a very strong autocratic monarchy with a representative system. Their style of democracy at this time may not be at par with those of USA. Like USA, dynamic Iranian population will add their own version of the Bill of Rights to their system. However, we must evaluate our own actions in retarding this evolution toward a better democracy. We have subversively tried to change the regime in Iran once more. We did it in 1953; it was a great mistake. We are still paying for our 1953 actions.

President Bush was not elected by the majority of the American people, nevertheless he became the president. We may not agree with the last election in Iran, we were planting a velvet revolution, but it did not work. I had evaluated some of the issues in USA Political Debate: Iran and the Election and US Foreign policy and the Iranian Progressives.
http://straveler-myamerica.blogspot.com/2009/07/us-foreign-policy-and-iranian.html
We must stay out of the internal affairs of Iran.

I agree with your assessment that we have had problem with Israel in spite of all the financial and military help we have given them over the last 50 years. Would we had placed the same kind of pressure on Israel that we have placed on Iran, we may have had a better success in resolving the Israel-Palestnine Issues (Jerusalem: Israel and Palestines
http://straveler-myamerica.blogspot.com/2009/11/one-state-solution-federal-state-of.html).

 

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Shadow Government is a blog about U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration, written by experienced policy makers from the loyal opposition and curated by Peter D. Feaver and William Inboden.

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