Global News : Passport : Ricks : Drezner : Walt : Rothkopf : Lynch
The Cable : The AfPak Blog : Net Effect : Shadow Govt. : Madam Secretary : The Call
Why the U.S. should keep an eye on China's military
One topic that is likely to arise during President Obama's trip to Asia, if not in his meetings in Beijing, is the continuing modernization of the Chinese military. Asian leaders are privately, and increasingly publicly, concerned about China's growing military might and what they see as a failure of the United States to respond. This year's Australian defense white paper, for example, portrays a future in which China contests American primacy in Asia and beyond. When one of the United States' closest allies expresses such concerns, Washington should listen.
According to at least one high-ranking official, the United States has systematically underestimated the pace and scope of Chinese military modernization for years. On Oct. 21 in an interview with the Voice of America, the incoming Commander of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), Admiral Robert F. Willard, USN, told reporters that, "In the past decade or so, China has exceeded most of our intelligence estimates of their military capability and capacity, every year. ... They've grown at an unprecedented rate in those capabilities. And, they've developed some asymmetric capabilities that are concerning to the region, some anti-access capabilities and so on." Willard should know. Prior to becoming the USPACOM commander, he was in command of all U.S. naval forces in the Pacific; before that, he was Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
Willard's observation should be cause for concern, but is not a surprise. Intelligence organizations have a tendency to underestimate rising powers. As I discuss in my book, Uncovering Ways of War, U.S. Army and Navy intelligence in the period between the two world wars underestimated the growth of the Japanese military power not because of racial bias or ethnocentrism, but rather because of the very real tendency to look back on Japan's modest military capabilities and project them into the future. As a result, American intelligence organizations overlooked a number of areas where the Japanese military innovated, failures that cost the United States and its allies dearly in World War II.
I suspect that the same pathologies may be at work today regarding China. The People's Liberation Army of the 1980s and 1990s was hardly first-rate. In recent years, however, China has made real strides, including the testing of an anti-satellite weapon in July 2007 and the development of an anti-ship ballistic missile designed to attack U.S. carrier strike groups. Outside a small circle of cognoscenti, however, perceptions of Chinese military power have failed to keep pace with this reality.
If we are in danger of underestimating Chinese military power, China's leaders are in danger of overestimating it. Some portions of the Chinese military have not seen action since China's 1979 war with Vietnam; others have not seen combat since the Korean War. Although China is in the process of fielding increasingly capable weapons, the military effectiveness of the PLA is very much an open question.
The United States needs to do more to understand the Chinese military. The PLA intently studies the U.S. military; the U.S. military lacks a similar curiosity about them. That needs to change. It would be worthwhile, for example, to translate and make available to scholars a broader array of Chinese writings about military affairs. In addition, the U.S. military needs to devote greater attention to understanding the Chinese military, as well as the strategic and operational challenges it poses. Doing so will not, as some assert, preordain conflict with China. To the contrary, a better understanding of the Chinese military should help us avoid misperception and bolster deterrence. Such an effort should include our allies and friends in the region, who have their own perspectives and their own concerns with China's military expansion.
STR/AFP/Getty Images
Advertisement
FOREIGN POLICY is published by the Slate Group,
a division of Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC.
All contents ©2009 Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC. All rights reserved.
Shadow Government is a blog about U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration, written by experienced policy makers from the loyal opposition.
It seems to me that the PLA
It seems to me that the PLA does not really need to match the technological capability of American space, air and naval forces. If their goal is to neutralize American strategic power in the western Pacific then more modest technological systems deployed in large numbers could inflict sufficient damage to accomplish that goal.
Even without full-scale war the PLA could be capable of generating a sufficient quantity of reasonably effective attack assets to deter the deployment of American carrier battle groups from entering sea space within the range of the PLA’s base structure owing to the short range of F-18 attack aircraft. Our long-range cruise missile complement to fixed wing attack is not exactly a perfect substitute for our normal doctrine of mastery of the air over the battle space.
One also has to remember that we have a casualty intolerant American public who would come face to face with a PLA possessing much greater capability to absorb casualties if for no other reason than the state control of information. Consequently, U. S. Naval and military forces need to think through their doctrine in dealing with a hot war situation with the PLA with the soft as well as the hard factors in mind.
"Willard's observation should
"Willard's observation should be cause for concern, but is not a surprise. Intelligence organizations have a tendency to underestimate rising powers. As I discuss in my book, Uncovering Ways of War, U.S. Army and Navy intelligence in the period between the two world wars underestimated the growth of the Japanese military power not because of racial bias or ethnocentrism, but rather because of the very real tendency to look back on Japan's modest military capabilities and project them into the future. As a result, American intelligence organizations overlooked a number of areas where the Japanese military innovated, failures that cost the United States and its allies dearly in World War II."
I found this interesting, but a little simplistic. I'm sure the author knows more than me, and more of an expert myself, but all things considered, it seems to work less well. It seems far more likely that it was a combination of underestimation and ethnocentrism; perhaps if Japan had been a White power, America would have been more likely to notice its military innovation. So isn't it perfectly feasible that the author is correct in saying that American underestimation occurred due to historical weakness, but that race and ethnic factors were still there?
It seems a little like saying "Hitler lost the war not because of American and British bombing and war aid, but because of the fight on the Eastern front." In fact, all three contributed to the collapse of the Nazi military. The Soviet effort, even if it was the main thrust against Germany, was helped by the industrial collapse precipitated by US/UK industrial bombing and Anti-sub warfare/naval convoys to murmansk.
In other words, political and historical phenomena rarely have one distinct cause, and tend to have a number of contributing factors. It seems that the current underestimation of Chinese forces may be coming as much from our friendly relationship with the Chinese state, and the fact that the Chinese state has avoided a belligerent attitude. It threatens Taiwan, but little else. Japan was a highly belligerent state in a way that the PRC simply isn't, and it's amazing that the US military never considered the Japanese cabilities while it was conquering half of Asia.
Also, can critical analysis of Chinese capabilities be pursued without leading to the kind of dangerous militarism and paranoia that beset Soviet-American relations? Can we critically analyze their capabilities without blowing them out of proportion, and using them to justify collosal arms expenditures?
It seems a little like saying
It seems a little like saying "Hitler lost the war not because of American and British bombing and war aid, but because of the fight on the Eastern front."
In all likelihood RAF and USAAF bombing could not have won the war independent of the Wehrmacht’s defeat on the eastern front. However, it is possible that the Red Army could have defeated the Wehrmacht by itself without western allied bombing.
One has to remember that the Wehrmacht went on the strategic defensive in Russia in the summer of 1943 long before the allied bombing campaign began to measure any sort of success over Germany. In fact German war production increased prodigiously while the Wehrmacht was in full-scale retreat back to the frontiers of Germany.
In retrospect it seems that the key western allied contribution in NW Europe was not so much the defeat of German forces but occupying large portions of Western Europe before the arrival of the Soviet onslaught. Who knows where the Red Army would have halted had not British and American forces arrived there first? And for that fact alone we should be thankful.
What I was saying, more
What I was saying, more specifically, was that Allied bombing certainly quickened the Soviet victory. Stalin himself knew this, it's why he asked for an Allied landing. Stalin's focus was on preserving his power, and I think he saw a quick victory as more beneficial to that than occupying all of Continental Europe from Portugal to the Urals.
In other words, yes, the Soviet victory was the primary cause, but there were secondary causes that had a drastic impact on the nature of the final outcome. It could have taken another year or two to win, who knows? Millions of more dead Russians, millions fewer to work their factories after the war, fewer resources to deal with the collossal economic devastation of his own state.
Likewise, perhaps the author of the initial article is correct that historical Japanese weakness was the primary cause, but that racism was still an important secondary cause that made the ultimate outcome even worse or irreversible.
After reading your reply I
After reading your reply I certainly don’t see any real tangible difference in opinion concerning relative Soviet and western allied contribution towards the defeat of the Wehrmacht.
However, concerning Japan, I think the United States did have a somewhat flawed technical and operational perspective of Japanese power, particularly naval power. But I am also of the opinion that very early on in the more important realm of grand strategy American planners realized that there was a vast disparity in our economic resources and industrial potential versus Japan. That advantage plus the factor of space insured that Japan was incapable of becoming a true strategic threat to the western hemisphere. This allowed the more realistic strategy of ‘Europe first’ to emerge in governing the deployment of our resources. No matter what defeats Japan could have inflicted upon the western allies the gross disparity in capability to ‘wage war’ made the issue one of little doubt.
I have to agree with you on
I have to agree with you on the point that American industry and population simply outnumbered Japanese by a vast degree. However, at least some Japanese planners took this into account and were seeking a very quick negotiated peace, similar to their war in 1904 with Russia. In other circumstances they might have gotten it.
A point to make on this is
A point to make on this is that a future where China "contests American primacy in Asia and beyond" is not necessarily one where China 'comes into conflict with America in Asia and beyond'. Also I have not seen this lack of interest in the Chinese military that the writer states. I am neither a soldier nor intimately linked with leading military thought, but I have seen a number of books and articles being written on China (though I have to say that a number of them are downright ludicrous in what China is suggested to be capable of). What I fear is that instead of having no study made of Chinese capabilities, we instead have skewed and politicized studies that only increase fear.
On the point about experience, I have to admit that I use it myself in discussions about China's military. However, at risk of undermining my own point, robotics might be a conceivable way out of that. A robot simply needs the testing, programming, and probably some amount of control from a human to go out and fight.
America and India's Allys Against Communist China
China Is becoming a strong power and is playing its cards right at the moment keep a low profile and playing the peace care once they have a force to reckon with and a stable self sufficent econmy they will push there way around Asia and other areas, America should see this as a time to balance the powers in Asian by Using India another emerging power as an Ally and start a new dawn
Sauder TV Stands
It doubtful that India or any
It doubtful that India or any other country desires to be ‘used’ by the United States for its own purposes. India has its own definition of what constitutes its national interests and may not include acting the role of client state to the USA.
A doubtful expansion
I find that worrying and fearing a Chinese military expansion is a baseless fear conjured up by war-mongers and uninformed individuals. This does not mean I believe the US should not understand and study the PLA but we should look into the capabilities of an equally beneficial use in global security with a special focus in the waterways of Southeast Asia (specifically the Malacca and Singapore Straights). If closer economic and political ties are to be made, less fears of an unfounded Chinese expansion should be limited for a much more promising and real global interest of trade security and world peace. An interest both Washington and Beijing seek.
It is the basic function of a
It is the basic function of a nations armed forces to analyze and contingency plan around other nations military and naval 'capabilities' not theorize about their 'intentions'. Neither you or I can have the slightest capability to fully fathom the intentions of Beijing so there is little use trying.
Excellent Points
The author makes a couple of very good comments concerning the history and development of the PLA:
"the United States has systematically underestimated the pace and scope of Chinese military modernization for years."
Very true, as the focus in the mid-1980s was the Soviet Bloc and with the fall of communism, the greater shift to the Middle East, it was still all too easy to dismiss China as a non-player. It's amazing how situations can change when no one is paying attention.
"The United States needs to do more to understand the Chinese military."
This is so fundamental to basic understanding and a crucial missing piece. One cannot look at the PLA through western eyes and expect to understand the philosphies, doctrines and goals that the Chinese are developing and implementing. As China strives to understand the West, it is imperative to look at their military force through their views and adjust our policies accordingly.
Mr. Mahnken
As I discuss in my book, Uncovering Ways of War, U.S. Army and Navy intelligence in the period between the two world wars underestimated the growth of the Japanese military power not because of racial bias or ethnocentrism, but rather because of the very real tendency to look back on Japan's modest military capabilities and project them into the future. As a result, American intelligence organizations overlooked a number of areas where the Japanese military innovated, failures that cost the United States and its allies dearly in World War II.
XXX
Your book actually waxes ambiguous on this point, and just because an author revises what he wrote doesn't change the text on the page. Part of the intelligence failures were due to Japanese secrecy that inhibited the attache system; some, one imagines, would have been projected onto established powers. Here I think of Japanese surface warfare, which admittedly did not take into account technological innovation, compared with (say) German tactical air war, which did not mirror image well with USAAC (strategic bombing) doctrine. Other innovations (amphibious warfare and/or tropical warfare) were "simply beyond the capabilities of US intelligence," despite the front-row seat the 4th Marines had at Shanghai. The US military devoted considerable attention to "developing] a cadre of intelligence specialists" devoted to Japan. In sum, your book is unclear on how much intelligence failures related to Japan stem from projecting (non-racial) stereotypes onto a rising (as opposed to an established) power.
China's Military doctrine
I do not purport to be an expert on China or its military. However, it was not so long ago that significant information was disseminated to the effect that the PLA's war fighting plans were based on challenging the US and possibly engaging in a first strike. It is all very well for the West to deal with the PRC in a diplomatic and responsible manner but the US was caught out at Pearl Harbor. The basic question is: does the US have the capacity to monitor the Chinese military and to discern whether the war fighting doctrine still applies and if so, what should be a proportionate response?
As for the comments about World War II, it appears to have escaped the attention of your commentators that until Hitler attacked Russia, the Soviets believed the pact between them was genuine and sacrosanct. All contemporary accounts indicate that Stalin ignored excellent intelligence from his military (itself gutted by internal purges and mass killing) and had a great deal of difficulty in believing that the Germans had actually attacked.
The Western Allies could have won the war without Soviet assistance but it would have taken a lot longer and cost many more lives. The Germans were in possession of plans for the construction of dirty nuclear weapons and while there was no danger of them fabricating an atom bomb, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that they were well aware of the dangers of radioactive material and how it could be used in a very basic form with a TNT trigger. In other words, the Germans had the know-how and the means to do what we must fear Islamic fundamentalist terrorists are planning.
The main thing to remember is Santayana's dictum that those who fail to heed the lessons of history are doomed to repeat them. We must operate on the proposition that sooner or later, the PRC will try to take Taiwan and what will America do in that case?
Perhaps you are correct that
Perhaps you are correct that the Western Allies could have defeated Germany without the assistance of the Soviet Union it is impossible to say. However, if you believe that the ground forces of the Wehrmacht would at some point have to be defeated alone by British, Canadian and American divisions on the ground in order to win that victory then I think the issue would be very problematic.
From strictly military point of view and all things being equal (yes, I realize they never are) the performance of western allied divisions in combat was very mixed and certainly from the beginning of the war to the end rarely showed the tactical and operational articulation of the Wehrmacht or in fact of the Red Army once it had been taken to school by the Germans. Without the Russians taking the finish of the vast bulk of the German Army the western allies would have faced the whole of a military entity profoundly more professional, ruthless and proficient than themselves.
The western allies during the eleven-month campaign in NW Europe never once were able to successfully manage a single operational envelopment and yet they deployed the most mechanized forces in the world and faced probably no more than a thirty percent of the forces available to the Wehrmacht.
Also, it is difficult to envision western allied formations taking the horrific bloodletting that would have been necessary had they to face the full wrath of the Wehrmacht by themselves. The British and American public would never have stood for it. The casualties on Tarawa and Iwo Jima caused real shock and political controversy back in the US when revealed; yet by Eastern front measure these were mere skirmishes. No, I think we are very lucky that the badly beaten up Red Army fortuitously held literally at the gates of Moscow in the December of 1941.
I am not so certain that the
I am not so certain that the liberal democracies could have defeated Nazi Germany without the help of the Soviet Union. The Eastern front cost Germany millions of soldiers and wasted an incalculable amount of resources. It also forced the Germans to fight a war on two fronts, something that very few generals will willingly do for very good reasons. Also I doubt that Germany would have put much effort into 'dirty bombs'. Even if it wasn't nuclear weapon quality material, producing it would still be prohibitively expensive when compared to the casualties caused by chemical and biological weapons.
On Taiwan, for the time at least military conquest appears to be not in the plans. Though China has stated clearly that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, it is aware that this would have consequences. Part of China's charm for developing nations is that it has not gone out of its way to invade other nations to settle matters. Indeed, the last incident of that nature was in 1979. China was able to secure the return of Hong Kong without any bloodshed, and this probably is the desired model for Taiwan. Lastly, China doesn't need to invade. Given economic ties and signs of increased warmth I expect Taiwan to become semi-autonomous from China in twenty years time. Of course that doesn't answer the problem of hardliners in China deciding that China should be more aggressive or a decision in Taiwan to declare independence, but things of that nature are hard to predict and have no certainty.
Carry on
If the PLA is alleged to have 1.7 million in all branches of its armed forces than it's more like 2 mil or, given our lack of perspicacity, 2mil. True the efficacy of this man and machine power hasn't been tested in combat in ages. But with the same skill and determination China has employed to build its army and economy, its sheer brute military force should not be underestimated. If China has the capability it will not hesitate to prove it has the requisite ability.
No lack of interest
A google search on 'Chinese military power' reveals no lack of interest in China's military by a wide range of think-tanks, media outlets, and official, unclassified, U.S. government military institutions (the U.S. Naval War College has the Chinese Maritime Studies Institute, for example). The Pentagon annually publishes a report on the PLA, and SecDef Gates and other USG officials make regular, public comments on China's military.
While it is worth pressing China for greater transparency on its strategic goals and needs, it is important NOT to impose double standards which China will resent (think back to the US-UK-Japan 5-5-3 ratio on capital ships between the world wars). China is the only member of the UNSC P-5 that does NOT have an aircraft carrier; even India, Spain, and Thailand possess one each. Can the U.S. or anyone tell China it is not allowed to have one? If China has to conduct a non-combatant evacuation (NEO), is it not entitled to have the military capacity to do so?
The bottom line is that China feels entitled to test or obtain any military system that the U.S. or other "great powers" have tested or fielded (many of which it is still years away from developing). As we push China to show greater transparency, we must come up with better arguments as to why doing so is in China's interest. Above all, we must avoid the imposition of double-standards that will push China in the opposite direction.
Finally, as China watched the U.S. "double down" on its bet in Iraq, I think its leaders no longer harbor any illusions about the United States' willingness to take casualties in defense of its interests (something that the Chinese questioned by the end of the 1990s), while the costs to China's leaders of an ill-considered military venture can be seen in the fate of Argentina's junta after its defeat in the Falklands War.
China's Military
U.S will face mainly two types of threat from China:
1. An undeclared silent Cyber war by Chinese & their client states like N.Korea or even Pakistan. It will be mainly targeted at the technology being developed by military & space industries.
2. China will also be abetting regimes like Myanmar and Iran to keep U.S guessing as to what course they should adopt.
It is mainly Russia, India and Japan, who have to deeply worry about the PLA and China's naval expansion.