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It hasn't been 8 years of drift in Afghanistan
By John Hannah
In today's Wall Street Journal, Bret Stephens rises to the defense of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Toward the article's close, Stephens writes that:
It would be ... useful if some of Mr. Karzai's more acerbic Western critics could ask themselves why matters went abruptly south in Afghanistan after several years in which they had gone swimmingly well under Mr. Karzai. ... The answer has a lot less to do with Mr. Karzai's performance than with NATO.
Stephens's basic point is worth bearing in mind. Ever since last year's presidential campaign, there's been an unfortunate tendency to assess America's Afghan campaign as one long, steady downward spiral to disaster. "Eight years of drift," according to Obama administration officials seeking to explain their lengthy deliberations over strategy and troop numbers. But, as Stephens suggests, the reality is a good deal more complex. The fact is that, after a period of genuine progress following the Taliban's removal in late 2001, the situation in Afghanistan only began to deteriorate markedly between 2005 and 2006. Suicide attacks quintupled that year. Remotely detonated bombs more than doubled. Insurgent attacks nearly tripled. And the trends have steadily worsened every year since. The question is why? What changed in that time period that might help account for the sharp decline in America's war fortunes?
I certainly don't have an exhaustive answer, but I do have a
few ideas that merit consideration:
1. Zalmay Khalilzad left
Afghanistan
Khalilzad served as President Bush's special envoy for
Afghanistan from the country's liberation in 2001 until 2003. In 2003, he
became U.S. ambassador. Khalilzad had an extraordinary relationship with
Karzai, spending hours alone with him on a daily basis -- mentoring, advising,
reassuring, hectoring (the latter only in private). The relationship
allowed Khalilzad to succeed, far more often than not, in getting Karzai to do
the right thing. Karzai had enormous confidence in Khalilzad -- and, more
importantly, in the unflinching U.S. support that was manifested in Khalilzad's
role.
Khalizad
left Afghanistan in the summer of 2005. Since then, no other U.S.
official has come close to replicating his relationship with Karzai. On
the contrary, we've seen an ever-widening breach of trust and confidence
between Karzai and the United States, bottoming out this spring when the Obama
administration let it be known that it was "desperately searching"
for an alternative to Karzai. Causal lines are always hard to draw, but
it's difficult not to discern a significant connection between the end of
Khalilzad's tenure in Kabul and the mounting frustrations with Karzai's
performance in Washington. At a minimum, this suggests that now that Karzai's
second term is a done deal, the Obama administration needs urgently to find a
way to rebuild its badly tattered relationship with him. Can that be
done with the people currently in charge of Afghan policy? That's a tough
question, but it needs to be asked.
2. NATO assumed overall
command for the Afghan mission from the United States.
Most importantly, NATO took over operations in southern Afghanistan, the heart of the Taliban insurgency, in mid-2006. Karzai and the Afghans fretted throughout 2005 about the planned handover to NATO, urging the U.S. not to follow through. Despite repeated assurances from Washington, the Afghans palpably feared that the transition to NATO reflected the start of America's ultimate withdrawal from Afghanistan. Psychologically, this perception of declining U.S. commitment almost certainly had the dual effect of dangerously demoralizing the Afghan government and people (resulting in counter-productive hedging behavior), while emboldening the Taliban.
Similarly, the Pakistani government -- believing the United States to be once again headed for the Afghan exits -- was encouraged even further in its double game of maintaining an "option" for returning a friendly Taliban to power in Kabul.
Militarily, the shift to NATO, particularly in the south, undeniably resulted in a significant loss of combat effectiveness on perhaps the war's most important front. While America's British, Dutch, and Canadian allies fought valiantly in Helmand and Kandahar provinces, they were no match -- frequently by their own admission -- for the extraordinary fighting skills of their U.S. counterparts. With only some exaggeration, a senior Afghan official once told President Bush that 800 U.S. troops had generated a greater sense of security and well-being among the population in Helmand than 8,000 NATO forces.
Finally, at an administrative level, putting the
26-member alliance in charge made a hash of command and control in the Afghan
theater, undermining severely the unity of military and civilian effort that is
essential to successful warfare, especially counter-insurgency operations.
Whatever the merits of ramping up NATO's role -- e.g., the importance of
multilateralism; the need to divert greater U.S. attention and resources to the
deteriorating situation in Iraq -- the benefits, in retrospect, have not been
worth the costs in terms of advancing U.S. war aims. Since late 2008, the
United States has been engaged in a delicate effort to re-balance the
relationship between America and NATO, and to once again take ownership of the
Afghan war in a much more aggressive way. The Obama administration's
decisions on increasing troop numbers, as well as changes that have already
been made in command and control arrangements in Afghanistan, are a crucial
part of that essential return to full-blown U.S. leadership of the war effort.
3. America's failure
to hold Pakistan to account for its support of the Taliban became fully
manifested.
I vividly recall that from 2003 onward, Zal Khalilzad repeatedly tried to warn U.S. officials about the need for a strategy that would aggressively counter Pakistani efforts to resurrect the defeated Taliban. President Karzai and his security advisors harped constantly on the same issue. Yet it was all to no avail. Special Afghan pleading, some officials complained. The Musharraf government is already under enough pressure assisting our efforts to kill and capture al Qaeda operatives, others said. Whatever the excuses, far, far too little was done. As a result, by 2005-2006 the Taliban, as a serious insurgent force, began coming back with a vengeance. Even then, Washington was slow to respond in developing a serious policy to address Pakistan's double-dealing. Not until 2007-2008 did talk get serious about dramatically expanding operations to target Taliban leaders and disrupt their operations in Pakistan. It was only at this point that the United States began putting together a comprehensive diplomatic, economic, and military plan designed to pressure and empower the Pakistani government to act seriously against the Taliban monster it had encouraged along the Afghan border. To its great credit, the Obama administration has expanded and fully resourced this effort with Pakistan in ways that, at long last, are beginning to show signs of tentative progress.
There are, no doubt, a host of other causes that contributed to the war's downward spiral. But the larger point is that the United States did enjoy a significant period after the Taliban's downfall when real progress was being made. The causes of that success and why things began going badly need to be studied closely. The bottom line is that the deterioration of recent years was not inevitable. Rather, it resulted from real shifts -- and failures -- of policy, many of which are subject to U.S. control, influence and correction.
It's, of course, true that the costs the U.S. may need to
endure now in correcting past mistakes will almost certainly be higher than if
we'd gotten it right the first time. But not nearly as high as the costs
of allowing the Taliban to return to power, allied with al Qaeda, with its
sights firmly set on taking over a nuclear-armed Pakistan.
David McNew/Getty Images
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YGTFSM
Karzai's a great guy, everything is NATOs fault, and if we only had your neocon buddy Zalmay back in place all would be well.
This article illustrates why Foreign Policy is such a joke.
Jeff Huber
8YoD
If I were trying to discredit a narrative based on the idea that American policy in Afghanistan amounted to eight years of drift, I don't think I would start by describing a more complex reality of, well, eight years of drift.
The 8YoD theory is based primarily on the idea that the Bush administration, in the rhetoric of last year's campaign, "took its eye off the ball" after the Taliban government in Kabul fell and left Afghanistan underresourced and neglected while it pursued its adventure in Iraq. It appears that even Mr. Hannah thinks this is basically what happened. He doesn't mention the Afghan doubts about America's commitment that might have been raised when US intelligence personnel started leaving Afghanistan in 2002 because they were need for the forthcoming Iraq campaign. Nor does he say why the well-respected Amb. Khalilizad was removed from his position in Kabul -- it was because he was needed to take over as Ambassador to Iraq. NATO was given more authority in Afghanistan, wisely or not, because the United States had no choice. It had no choice because the war of choice in Iraq left no American forces to spare for Afghanistan.
The Taliban, humiliated by its ouster in 2001 and despised by most Afghan people, took years to recover its ability to make trouble. Recover it the Taliban did, though. The idea here seems to be to reject a phrase -- 8YoD -- that has become shorthand for American critics of the last administration's policy in Afghanistan and to obscure the degree to which the Afghan war effort was crippled by the massive diversion of resources and attention to Iraq, while otherwise conceding that the details of policy during the 8YoD contributed greatly to the mess the Bush administration dumped on its successor. Concede the argument, but avoid the blame. Not exactly a hero's approach to foreign policy, that.
You gatta be kidding
The only ward that we hate the most as Afghan is “puppet”. So, Zalmi Khali is really famous in our community (Afghan community) as US puppet employee. A few days before some people were gathered in conference in order to endorse Zalmi, but when people came out of the show almost everyone condemn the conference.
The witer mentioned once former US president was told by someone that 800 hundreds US troops can be much more effective than 8000 NATO troops in Helmand. Even though I never heard of it but for the sake of argument I would agree. But now the scene has been changed if that were told, so that was then which we (Afghan) had a good picture of US with us from the Jihad time supporting Mujahideen against Soviet Union. Now we (Afghan) believe we Afghan are terribly desecrated by US and its allies that we never ever forgive or forget.
This is so long and those
This is so long and those years brought the greatest damages on Afghanistan. Well, I am just hoping that this gap between countries will stop. However, all is not lost, and there are other options. For instance, the American Recovery Capital loan program through the Small Business Administration, or an unpaid furlough (though they must be done legally) can prevent a layoff and maybe provide a little debt relief.
Afghan Drift
Mr.Hannah has over-simplified the cumulative policy mistakes of U.S & NATO.
1.Afghan drift started with U.S invasion of Iraq.
2.Karzai was never an effective leader, as his writ never ran beyond Kabul.
3. Pakistan army under Musharraf played a deft double game - actively supporting Afghan Taliban yet danced with Bush. They also never stopped the logistical, medical & arms support to Taliban.
4. U.S & NATO forces missed golden opportunity to improve the lives of Afghans from 2002 - 2005, in the safe areas of the country namely North & Western Afghanistan. Marked improvement in those areas would have acted as a catalyst for restive S. Afghanistan.
5. Least U.S could have done was to effectively seal the eastern border of Afghanistan with Pakistan, Taliban influx from East is now threatening the entire security of Kabul & North & western Afghanistan.
Now a civil war like situation exists and no body trusts any one in Afghanistan.
When in doubt blame......................
That's typical when in doubt 'former advisers'=term used loosely, Blame everyone but yourselves
Nice try
In other words, it wasn't 8 years of drift in Afghanistan that led to the current mess, it was 8 years of drift in Afghanistan that led to the current mess.
1) Zalmay Khalilzad left Afghanistan for the more difficult occupation, Iraq. Drift.
2) The Bush administration begged NATO to take the Afghan tar baby off their hands. Drift.
3) The Bush administration supported Musharraf to the end, just as it did warlords in Afghanistan. In their calculation, strongmen are easier to deal with. The Taliban took advantage of the ensuing lack of attention to the Pashto region. Drift.
What a bad joke
The author is an idiot. What went wrong was Iraq and pure incompetence by Bush/Chenney. Trying to shift the blame to any other is a lie.
The graveyard of empires strikes again
John Hannah makes a lot of nice rationalizations, but other posters have demonstrated that Afghanistan is just another Bush fubar. But unfortunately, the nature of Afghanistan is also one of the major reasons for our collective failure there.
When you have a "nation" made up of a loose collective of warlords, it is a quick fix to show a display of military force from outside to establish a level of dominance there. However, unless an occupying country is willing to commit a stupendous level of military and non-military resources, the situation will inevitably backpedal to a state of anarchy once again.
Hannah mentions how wonderful the relation between Karzai and the American ambassador was, but it's clear that Karzai could only govern if he was totally a colonial puppet. And America was never prepared to treat Afghanistan as a full-fledged colony. And because of the ethnic mix of battling warlords, any increase in a military footprint inevitably leads to an increase in resistance to the occupying forces.
Why can't the United States figure out that the best policy is to abandon Afghanistan? If we did so, we would be imposing a substantial burden on both Pakistan and Iran. Pakistan would be happy to see us go from an area that they consider their domain. And we could concentrate our efforts on bucking up the civil structures of Pakistan, which is a real threat to American security, unlike Pakistan.
Behind the Obama consideration of options in Afghanistan is the fear of looking weak and the political backlash of that on US domestic issues. Doesn't that remind you of Vietnam?
About that "colony" thing...
Are you sure we can't do it? A withdrawal from Iraq seems to be in the cards; if that occurs, can't we depose Karzai in favor of a provisional government administered by someone like Rory Stewart, with Western officials down to the provincial level or lower and mixed Western and native-Afghan troops? A serious commitment of this sort could turn out well, and might even manage to prove sustainable in tax revenues.
As far as fighting the Taliban, there are books on that. In a nutshell: clear the insurgents under arms, win the hearts of the people, drive off the insurgents who remained concealed in the population, and arm the people to hold off future incursions, in that order. Economic development will also be possible, and a good thing; remember, as the article points out, this is a part of the world that hasn't known coherent, decent government since Bactria. (In fairness, there were a few times when Indian -- Rajput? -- rulers held Afghanistan, and I think the Timurids weren't as bad as we would assume them to be based on their founder, but you get the idea.)
A serious colonial program would create an alternative to a withdrawal that would leave Afghanistan to sink back into chaos and brutality, and would put it, and probably at least half of Pakistan, at the mercies of Iran and China -- once they managed to end the chaos themselves, if they could.
WHAT A LOAD OF ----
Apoligists for the former administration can make all the claims they want - the Iraq invasion and occupation was nothing more than a catastrophic mis-application of our resources, that has permanently abandonned almost any chance for a successful outcome in Afghanistan. After eight years of 'drift' (a nicer word, but not as accurate as gross malfeasance) the only way to victory in that country is to pay a much higher price in lives and treasure than this country can, or should be prepared to pay.
It can only be hoped that the current administration will be smarter. It can be hoped, but I would not bet on it.
On the last I have to decline
On the last I have to decline to agree. Though I am terrified of what would happen if Taliban-influenced groups in Pakistan should seize control of the land the missiles would be in, that actually has little to do with the Afghani groups. Though difficult to get rid of in their own territory, it was shown that they can't really expand into new areas unless the Pakistani military allows them to, and the idea that the Pakistani military or ISI would allow them control of land that a nuclear warhead is based in is laughable.
When speaking of Afghanistan, what happens in Pakistan is important but the reverse is not necessarily true. In this I think the author is making the mistake of thinking that the Taliban is one monolithic force, or even that all forces fighting the Afghan and Pakistan governments are part of the Taliban. In reality they're far more disunited than three minute descriptions on MSNBC or even the BBC would have you think.
I personally still support efforts to fight the insurgents when we can't convince them to change sides, but I don't see Pakistan's nuclear armament as one of those reasons.
The US begging bowl
The idea seems to be that Afghanistan should remain some sort of private Pentagon training ground, with admitted support from as many people as the US can persuade to join in the fun but strictly under the control of whatever general happens to be there this month. Hannah's superficial view of things comes complete with the novel idea that Australia, an ally in the Coalition since 2001, is a member of the North Atlantic treaty organization, all the way from the South Pacific.
One reality of Afghanistan today is that the US military simply can't staff the war, either as it's currently conducted or as it's hoped to be conducted in future by McChrystal and others whose optimism seems to be overpowering realistic understandings of the present situation. The US started recruiting foreign armies in 2001 and has never stopped since. Foreign states report that increasing forces early this year has been followed up by fresh US requests for more troops. The US military begging bowl seems to be on permanent display for this military campaign. A surprising number of foreign nations have dropped young citizens' lives into it.
Does Afghanistan the nation matter at all to Hannah and those who share his views? Probably not. The military game is all. Seven million Afghans were living on food aid in 2001. The 2009 figure: nine million. And Hannah does not recognize in one of the statistics he presents ("after a period of genuine progress following the Taliban's removal in late 2001, the situation in Afghanistan only began to deteriorate markedly between 2005 and 2006": hmm ... wasn't 2003 after the Pentagon stripped the force in Afghanistan to invade Iraq?) indicates a major US and Karzai failute. the Taliban were largely stripped of their military equipment and bases by US aerial bombing in 2001-2002 and needed time to re-equip. When they got ir, they struck back. Now they're continuing to do this with ever-increasing equipment and skill -- as Petraeus and McChrystal acknowledge.
I gather that Hannah would really really like Zalmay Khalilzad as US [president or at least secretary of defense, but I consider both events unlikely. And possibly the most surprising part of this astonishing piece is the claim that the Coalition partners in Afghanistan acknowledge that they can't match "the extraordinary fighting skills" of US military personnel there. On the contrary, most Coalition partners are proud of their fighting forces, and one noted (non-Danish) authority on such campaigns claims that the force most effective against the Taliban has been sent by Denmark.
Hannah's trumpeting about American fighting skills seems, in any case, to some degree irrelevant. One of those skills has been dropping 500lb bombs on Afghanistan, and Petraeus and McChrystal have both sharply reined in that particular fighting skill this year. Elsewhere in fp.com, we get unflattering images of just how good the current US fighting skills are out there. The soldiers and marines are indeed brave and skillful. There are just too many damn stories of command failures at several levels, and there have been too damn many misleading -- I'm being polite -- statements from military PIOs about what's going on there. If victory is to come in this campaign, misleading publicity isn't going to provide it. Or bring it one day closer.
Odd that the very people who
Odd that the very people who go on and on about the need to engage our allies, don't like to face what happens we do. NATO made a commitment and failed to follow through.
NATO is a failure because much of Western Europe has all but given up truly opposing islamists. They are cowardly.
Far too many Americans are also pathetic, lazy and clueless. Everything should be easy. There should never be a cost for anything (except if you're an evil rich person).
This generation never could have fought WWII.