Wednesday, July 1, 2009 - 3:27 PM
By Peter Feaver
The
Obama administration has just been Woodwarded, as in Bob Woodwarded. If
his Washington Post report is accurate, General Jones, the National Security Advisor committed a serious
civil-military relations mistake that could haunt the administration over the
coming year. Up until now the administration has been nearly
pitch-perfect on the issue of how to talk to the military about securing
military advice in high command decision making and how to talk about the
military advice they get. But this report, which seems
authoritative because it reads like a verbatim transcript of the meeting (is
Bob Woodward on the trip?), sounds a very discordant note.
The note came during a meeting General Jones had with U.S. military commanders
in Afghanistan. He was talking about the importance of the non-military
aspects of the strategy -- we can't win in Afghanistan by force of arms, and
that sort of thing. So far so good. Then there is this
extraordinary exchange, as reported by Bob Woodward:
During the briefing, [Marine Brigadier General] Nicholson had told Jones that he was "a little light," more than hinting that he could use more forces, probably thousands more. "We don't have enough force to go everywhere," Nicholson said.
But Jones recalled how Obama had initially decided to deploy additional forces this year. "At a table much like this," Jones said, referring to the polished wood table in the White House Situation Room, "the president's principals met and agreed to recommend 17,000 more troops for Afghanistan." The principals -- Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; Gates; Mullen; and the director of national intelligence, Dennis C. Blair -- made this recommendation in February during the first full month of the Obama administration. The president approved the deployments, which included Nicholson's Marines.
Soon after that, Jones said, the principals told the president, "oops," we need an additional 4,000 to help train the Afghan army.
"They then said, 'If you do all that, we think we can turn this around,' " Jones said, reminding the Marines here that the president had quickly approved and publicly announced the additional 4,000.
Now suppose you're the president, Jones told them, and the requests come into the White House for yet more force. How do you think Obama might look at this? Jones asked, casting his eyes around the colonels. How do you think he might feel?
Jones let the question hang in the air-conditioned, fluorescent-lighted room. Nicholson and the colonels said nothing.
Well, Jones went on, after all those additional troops, 17,000 plus 4,000 more, if there were new requests for force now, the president would quite likely have "a Whiskey Tango Foxtrot moment." Everyone in the room caught the phonetic reference to WTF -- which in the military and elsewhere means "What the [expletive]?"
Nicholson and his colonels -- all or nearly all veterans of Iraq -- seemed to blanch at the unambiguous message that this might be all the troops they were going to get."
There is nothing wrong from a civil-military relations point of view for
President Obama to decide that he is not going to approve any more troop
deployments to Afghanistan. That is absolutely within his rights as
commander-in-chief and, indeed, he alone has the political-military competence
to adjudicate across all of the risk trade-offs that such a decision would
entail. It is his right to make that call even if his judgment is wrong
about whether the new troops are in fact necessary to carry out the strategy.
The president has a right to be wrong about commander-in-chief decisions.
But it is wrong for him, or his senior staff, to tell (or signal, or hint, or
suggest to) the military that they, the military, should censor their advice
and judgments based on what they think the President ultimately will decide.
If it is the BGEN Nicolson's military judgment that he needs more troops
to execute the mission, he should -- no, he must -- convey that
information up his chain of command and the President must be made aware of
that piece of military advice. Nicolson's military judgment could be
superceded by a more senior military commander (say, General Petraeus) who may
have a bigger-picture military perspective. But a wise commander-in-chief
wants to at least know about the perspectives of the lower ranking officers.
And, above all, a wise commander-in-chief does not want the military hearing
from civilian presidential advisors (and in this context, retired General Jim
Jones is a civilian presidential advisor) that they should not be candid in
their advice lest it tick off the president or the secretary of defense.
If Woodward's (and others) earlier reporting on the Bush years is
accurate, the military got that impression, at least from Secretary Rumsfeld,
and this had a deleterious effect on civil-military relations and on
policymaking. In my judgment, the notion that President Bush did not want
to hear whether the battlefield commanders believed they needed more troops was
false; he did want to hear that advice and would have been appalled if one of
his advisors had told the military, "don't ask for this because it will make
the President angry."
According to Bob Woodward, that is exactly what happened recently in
Afghanistan. I expect the Obama team will have to go into some serious
damage control to deal with this story. If accurate, what is needed is an
unambiguous statement from the President himself: "Give me your candid military
advice, even or especially if you think the advice runs counter to what you
think I will decide. Let me make the decisions. I will not always
approve every request you send my way, but I will never approve of you trying
to hide bad news from me because you think it will make me mad."
If anything, I'd argue that Bush got too attached to what his top generals were saying. He kept following Casey's advice through 2005-2006, right up to the point of disaster.
Sounds a little disturbing, but the military also shouldn't say "we need this many troops and we'll turn it around" then proceed to make no progress at all and request further troops. They shouldn't make promises they can't keep (if Jones' characterization of their advice is accurate), just as they shouldn't be silenced.
I think Dr. Feaver's argument on civil-military relations is pretty much correct. And he (along with many others) certainly would be right to blast President Obama or any president for even suggesting either directly or indirectly that military commanders should censor the advice they give up the chain of command. However, I'm not sure that is what happened here. Much depends on what else was said in this meeting and the overall tenor and tone of not only Jones's remarks but also the response of the officers in the room. Also, for the part that really troubled Dr. Fearver we don't know what Jones exactly said as we only get Woodward's summary. Dr. Feaver's analysis seems to read quite a bit into this situation. After reading Woodward's article multiple times I don't see what Dr. Feaver sees here.
This may in fact be much to-do about nothing. Commanders are always asking for more footprint, and as commander-in-chief, President Obama has already kicked-in an additional 4 grand's worth over the initial 17,000 as pointed-out (and rest assured, they'll be a few more support personnel not counted).
Jim isn't signaling these commanders without prior knowledge of the SecDef, CENTCOM, or his boss back in the oval office. He's just reminding them of what used to be known on their fitness reports as young (Marine) officers: "economy in management."
The key thing to remember Mr. Feaver is it may well be this administration doesn't want to find itself bogged-down, having committed itself entirely, nor do they want to convey to the Afghan, that America is going to become an occupier (something SecDef Gates has concern over). We are up against General Time - and time is also an enemy.
Jim Jones, as National Security Advisor may in fact be a suit, but everyone's well aware of his background, and hearing it first hand from him may in fact be what was desired.
My bet is if there is an opening that a reinforcement des troupes might be able to exploit - they'll be made available.
I think White house is already been aware of the affairs in the Senate.Al Franken, comedian, political commentator, and Saturday Night Live alumnus, has come to the end of the intense battle over whether or not he won election to the U.S. Senate from his home state of Minnesota. The Minnesota Supreme Court declared Franken the winner of the race, after it was contested by incumbent Norm Coleman that the election wasn't conclusive. It isn't known if Coleman intends to appeal the decision to federal courts, which could tie up the seat in the Senate for longer, but Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty has declared that he will back the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision, whatever it is, and Coleman will need a lot more fast cash to appeal his loss to Al Franken further.
Woodward doesn't put this sort of thing out there unless somebody with an agenda is feeding it to him.
It has to be considered in the context of the emails Steve Clemons has been getting from his sources indicating "knives getting longer" for Jones on the part of the liberal interventionist faction in the administration.
Peter,
Your comments are spot on, but the fault is not all Jones’—and I’m not implying that that is your opinion. I sat through many briefs to congressional delegations during visits to Camp Fallujah. Several times visiting congressmen/women would ask the inevitable question: Do you have enough forces to do what you need to do? Without hesitation, the commanding generals would parrot the party line. When pressed for their professional opinions concerning the matter, CGs would not state what every major and lieutenant colonel in the room knew: we needed more troops. Some would sit silent for twenty or thirty seconds before answering, which spoke volumes. They were more worried about giving an answer they thought SECDEF wanted to hear rather than giving what was obviously the right answer. Therefore, we continued to play a futile game of whack-a-mole with the insurgents for the first few years of OIF.
What disappoints me about Woodward’s account, if true, is the silence of the senior leaders in the room following Jones’ questions (even if rhetorical). BGen Nicholson and his staff either failed to do the detailed staff work required to determine the right number of forces to accomplish their mission, or they lacked the spine and intelligence to properly state their case. If they had the courage of their convictions, they should have been willing to put their ranks on the line for such an important issue…apparently they didn’t feel it was that important.
Mr. Feaver, I agree with the main point that the President's staff should never silence the men on the ground. However, I think you're take needs more nuance. The full Woodward article indicates that the attempted silencing may not have been successful in this instance. After reading your article, I went on to read Woodward's article. In it, I found this quote, just a few lines down from where you ended the excerpt:
"We don't need more U.S. forces," Nicholson finally told Jones. "We need more Afghan forces." It is a complaint Jones heard repeatedly. Jones and other officials said Afghanistan, and particularly its president, Hamid Karzai, have not mobilized sufficiently for their own war.
Now, one might argue that Nicholson was just telling Jones what he thought Jones wanted to hear, but it is also possible that despite Jones's words, Nicholson did make his true opinion known.
Good story, very compelling and to the point. I'm wondering though if this is par for the course for the new administration, or if it's merely a slip-up/ misinterpretation.
I voted for Obama, and mostly approve of his work thus far, but if this is how they handle things then paint me unimpressed.
Shadow Government is a blog about U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration, written by experienced policy makers from the loyal opposition and curated by Peter D. Feaver and William Inboden.
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