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Rumsfeld: Fair and Balanced
By Tom Mahnken
Journalists have produced many caricatures of Donald Rumsfeld, but no portraits. Until now, that is. Bradley Graham's By His Own Rules (PublicAffairs) offers a nuanced portrayal of the former defense secretary that is likely to serve as the definitive work for years to come. Those who dislike Rumsfeld will find plenty to stoke their anger; those who admire him much that is praiseworthy. Those few with an open mind will learn a great deal about the man, his gifts and his flaws.
The product of years of thorough research, Graham's book is journalism at its best. The anonymous "former senior defense official" makes a few appearances in the book's eight hundred pages, but as a rule he cites his sources by name, and everything contained in quotation marks is a direct quote. He presents the story, but ultimately gives the reader the opportunity to make his own judgments.
By His Own Rules busts many of the stereotypes of Rumsfeld. My top three:
- Rumsfeld the Micromanager. Well, sometimes. By His
Own Rules paints a complex picture of Rumsfeld as the head of the Defense
Department. His probing, sometimes
abrasive style have been chronicled elsewhere. The book shows Rumsfeld playing an active, sometimes hyperactive, role
in examining and revising processes, including those that had traditionally
been the purview of the military leadership, including senior officer
assignments and the deployment of forces.
But Graham also shows that on substance, Rumsfeld often deferred to
military leaders. On sensitive matters
such as contingency planning, he tended to work directly with combatant
commanders and exclude his own staff. Too often he deferred to military leaders when he should have questioned
them and scolded them when he should have held them accountable.
- Rumsfeld the Decisive. More often, Rumsfeld the ponderer. As Graham puts it, "Rumsfeld was at its best - and seemingly most comfortable - when he was questioning things. Decisions came harder." Although Rumsfeld made the transformation of the U.S. armed forces a top priority, he proved reluctant to cancel any major weapon systems. In the end, he only cancelled two: the Crusader artillery system and the Comanche helicopter. Rumsfeld's aides had to push hard to get him to cancel the Crusader, a heavy, expensive legacy of the Cold War that was the poster child for everything Rumsfeld opposed. And it was the Army that put the Comanche on the chopping block. Similarly, Graham reports that it was Rumsfeld's deputy, Gordon England, who pushed for a rapid response in the wake of Hurricaine Katrina, while Rumsfeld temporized.
- Rumsfeld the Neocon. No, Rumsfeld the traditional conservative. As Graham shows, Rumsfeld was, as Gerald Ford's Chief of Staff and Defense Secretary, and as George W. Bush's Defense Secretary, a conservative of the traditional variety. Rumsfeld was, for example, dubious of the proposition that the spread of democracy was a praiseworthy or feasible goal.
Graham's book also sheds light on a number of Rumsfeld's unheralded successes. For example, he led an effort to realign the U.S. armed forces' basing structure across the globe away from a structure optimized for the Cold War past in order to position the United States better to respond to current and future threats. And Rumsfeld, confronted with a war planning process that was cumbersome and unresponsive to strategic direction, championed the Adaptive Planning Initiative, which has led to plans that are developed more rapidly, feature more options, and benefit from greater guidance from senior leaders.
History will render its verdict on Donald Rumsfeld's second tenure in the Pentagon, but By His Own Rules contains mountains of evidence for both the prosecution and the defense.






Quality of Generalship
Though no cheerleader for Donald Rumsfeld, I oftened wondered what kind of advice and the quality of the generalship the former SecDef delt with?
Though I don't characterize Rumsfeld as Adolf Hilter by any stretch of the imagination. Study suggests the German General Staff often recognized Hitler's talents far more than they later wanted to admit - hoping history would show they were never at fault.
More on the Generals
As military veteran I was somewhat puzzled and frustrated by the endless number of retired General/Flag Officers who criticized how Rumsfeld alledgely mistreated them or their colleagues. While I have no doubt that Rumsfeld was acerbic, harsh and scathing in his rebukes to his generals and admirals, I do not feel sorry these people. Why? First and foremost they have risen to very highest levels of military service and we have to expect that they have to have their collective act together and if they don't then a butt-chewing is in order; secondly, having senior civilians get after them comes with the turf and if they can't take it then they should find some other line of work; and finally, how many field grade and company grade officers have felt the sting of the acerbic, harsh, and scathing rebukes from these very same generals and admirals? I am sure quite a few.
I personally lay the blame for some (though not all)for the Iraq situation squarely on the shoulders of these generals and admirals. They spend their entire career, in theory anyway, studying the essence and nature of war. How they could miss the post-conflict aspect(after the fall of Baghdad) of Iraq is what needs to be examined as much as Rumsfeld is criticized for this aspect-and rightly so.
I do not feel sorry these
I do not feel sorry these people. Why? First and foremost they have risen to very highest levels of military service and we have to expect that they have to have their collective act together and if they don't then a butt-chewing is in order
It's a basic rule of civilian management that praise can and often should be done in front of interested witnesses, but butt-chewing should be done in private. If Rumsfseld followed that rule then these generals are doing themselves a disservice to take it public. If he didn't he can expect bad results -- managing top generals is a lot of ways like managing civilians.
Rumsfeld thought the US military was too slow to adapt. He had a point -- the faster the military can adapt, the shorter our OODA loop is compared to our enemies, the better off we are.
Rumsfeld has shown that it does not work particularly well to sit on top of the military bureaucracy and kick it to make it take initiative faster. Now we need a better way. I don't know how to do that.