Friday, June 26, 2009 - 6:17 PM
By Peter Feaver
With all the excitement further east, it is almost possible to forget that the coming week will be a momentous one for Iraq. Almost possible, but not quite, because tragically, Iraq still generates more than its fair share of newsworthy events.
June 30th is the deadline for U.S. combat troops to leave urban areas. The deadline was contained in the Status of Forces Agreement (SoFA) that the outgoing Bush administration negotiated and that the incoming Obama administration embraced back in March. Obama squeezed it with such a tight embrace, in fact, that at the time I worried that this early deadline of June 30th might be a "read my lips pledge" that would haunt him later.
Early reports that General Odierno felt the deadline should slip a bit gave way to more recent reports that he was comfortable meeting the deadline. This reassured me somewhat, until I re-read this assessment by Stephen Biddle. He offers a sober assessment of a number of ways the Iraq project could unravel, and a grim reminder that, as bad as Iraq has been, there are many ways that it could become much worse if we misplay our hand.
And in fact, Biddle intimates that the United States may very well be in the process of misplaying its hand by hewing too rigidly to the SoFA withdrawal schedule. The money quote: "The most effective option for prevention [of renewed violence in Iraq] is to go slow in drawing down the U.S. military presence in Iraq." Biddle recognizes that slowing the withdrawal would impose costs -- strain on the armed forces and, perhaps a greater hurdle, political embarrassment for Obama and for the Maliki government. But he reminds us that letting the positive trajectory in Iraq reverse imposes great costs, too, and thus concludes: "On balance, paying the cost of a slower withdrawal, while expensive, may ultimately be the cheaper approach."
I have a lot of respect for Biddle -- he made some of the most trenchant critiques of the Bush Iraq policy back in the day, and so I went to some lengths to ensure that President Bush heard his critique firsthand. But I also respect General Odierno, and consider him to be an unlikely candidate for naïve optimism about whether the Iraqis can handle the consequences of meeting the June 30th deadline.
I also know that it would be a mistake to overreact to the expected surge in enemy attacks which we are seeing now. Such surges were expected (and sometimes seen) around every previous major Iraqi milestone such as an election, referendum, or anniversary. Those attacks feel particularly jarring now for two reasons: first, the baseline violence is far calmer than it was before other such anniversaries, so the uptick is more dramatic; and second, at previous critical junctures, Coalition and Iraqi forces conducted mini-surges of their own to preempt the violence, but now the catalyzing event is a withdrawal (or more precisely, a repositioning) of combat power, thus making those preemptive tactics more difficult.
These attacks may simply be what Secretary Clinton has called "a signal that the rejectionists fear Iraq is going in the right direction." This sounds eerily like the much-derided claim by Vice President Cheney that similar attacks back in 2006 were a sign of "desperation" on the part of terrorists. It may have been a sign of desperation, but, at least in 2006, the terrorists were able to use them to seize the initiative. We must hope that they are not able to do that again today.
Starting this week, the parade of critical junctures in Iraq will accelerate. If the Iraqis go ahead with plans to put the SoFA to a national referendum, the parade could become a stampede. When even skeptical war critics like Fareed Zakaria are penning articles about "Victory in Iraq" that read almost like a Bush valedictory speech on the topic, the opportunity for a decent outcome in Iraq seems tantalizingly close. I hope we are not jeopardizing that outcome with a premature withdrawal.
There really isn't a comment attached to that question. I'd simply like to know why Feaver thinks that his commentary today would not be just as relevant a year from now, or two, or five, if the Obama administration chose now to put off withdrawal of American forces until the risk that Iraqis might start killing each other again was acceptably low.
Watching C-Span: the House just passed the carbon tax bill, and the skies opened up about 30 seconds later and it's pouring. Don't worry my laptop isn't solar powered, though I guess lithium ion batteries are about to get a lot more expensive.
Iraq:
I recognize entirely why Maliki is pursuing this strategy, he is in an election year, was able to substantially increase his power with the success of the Law and Order coalition in the provincial elections and he obviously feels that in a few years if it all really hits the fan he can count on support from his neighbor to the east. My understanding of the SOFA was that it allowed for the execution of training missions and the provision of other technical support, simply that combat forces were going to be removed from cities. This is what we finally agreed to after the painful and sometimes embarrassing wrangling of last summer/fall. Now we are reportedly agreeing to "keep a low profile" for the first few days after the pullout to increase the Iraqi public perception that we've left, and in our attempt to show that we are yielding fully to the agreement are unfortunately providing an impression that Maliki dictates our involvement via his tone and public pronouncements.
Has any other national reconciliation or rebuilding process proceeded in this fashion in recent memory? Do those who advocate No Fly Zones in Darfur or more blue helmets in Mogadishu understand the human cost being wagered here on this gamble? Is cutting the cord as a strategy to force accountability and reconciliation the preferred approach to any of these trendier crises? Why not actually keep the attention on Iraq, a country from which we removed a third of its sovereignty 17-18 years ago and from which we are hoping to not return.
Biddle is right to hit upon Ninawa province as critical here. The reason the terrorists have maintained a grip here is because of the refusal of the Arabs and Kurds to compromise, and since January things have not gone well with Al-Hadba (predictably) taking a hard line in seating the provincial council, appointing leadership, etc. The competing orders in 2008 from Maliki and Talabani over IA division leadership in Mosul and the attempted cycling in of divisions based on ethnic makeup serve as other reminders that with these core issues: Article 140/Kirkuk, hydrocarbons law and the overall issue of regionalism (stunted in the south for now w/ ISCI & Fadhila failures), things are going to get worse before they get better. I want to get into the situation in Ninawa more but must run, good for Biddle for mentioning. Ending on this obvious thought:
We are blamed for all the of the bloodshed in Iraq in many quarters of the world, but the outrage has faded. If things go wrong that blame comes back to us in what could be some historically tragic ways.
1) The reason why Odierno has said that he is comfortable with the June deadline is that when he publicly talked about keeping combat troops in some cities like Mosul Maliki and other Iraqi leaders went off on him. He is now keeping his mouth shut as several bases will be maintained within large Iraqi cities, plus there will be thousand of trainers in those urban areas as well.
2) Biddle along with a host of other U.S. think tank writers on Iraq such as Ken Pollack, Michael O'Hanlon, Anthony Cordesman, John Nagl, et al. all share the same view about Iraq. The U.S. needs to be there for years, perhaps decades and are worried that the new administration will pull out and forget about Iraq. All of them have talked about slowing the withdrawal, the possible problems, etc. They basically don't want the U.S. to leave until ALL of Iraq's problems are solved, that goes from building up the armed forces, to tackling corruption, to making sure they can spend their budget, etc, etc, etc. It's basically a blank check argument.
3) The vote on the SOFA will not happen anytime soon. None of the leadership in Iraq wants it to happen. The parliament needs to pass a budget and law for it and then the Election Commission said it will need 2 months to prepare for the vote. None of this has happened. There is some talk of having the referendum at the same time as the Jan. 2010 parliamentary vote, but Iraq has never been able to hold anything on time. For more see: musingsoniraq.blogspot.com
Reconciliation between Sunni and Shia has not occurred.
Resolution of the status of Kurdistan and - most importantly, Kirkuk - has not occurred.
Millions remain internally and externally displaced.
In the absence of resolution of these issues, future instability and violence are virtually certain.
Mr. Feaver... I applaud you for your continuing coverage of Iraq's political developments, especially with the June 30 deadline fast approaching. Below is a new posting from my blog...http://depetris.wordpress.com.
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-Daniel R. DePetris
Iran’s election demonstrations continue on the streets of Tehran. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his Guardian Council reject the requests of Prime Minister Mousavi for a vote recount. President Obama sends the first American ambassador to Syria since 2005. Israel defies Washington by constructing new settlements in the occupied West Bank. The Palestinian power struggle between Hamas and Mahmoud Abbas reaches a violent scale. Pakistani security forces crack down on Taliban fighters in its Western Frontier.
Is there a story missing from these recent news headlines? This list seems to capture all of the important political and security developments within the Middle East: at least those worthwhile to U.S. interests and the world at large. On the surface, it appears that the major media outlooks are doing quite a superb job covering all of the unprecedented events that define global affairs in the 21st century. The fact that the Iranian opposition to Tehran’s clerical regime continues to take the lead in today’s newspapers is an example of how talented reporters have been in informing the general public (regardless of where they reside in the world). Right?
Wrong. There is in fact one noteworthy story that is vigorously being brushed aside by all sectors of the American establishment. Remember the war in Iraq…that mid-sized Arab country that was invaded by American and British forces in 2003? Does everyone recall the treacherous and bloody period of 2006-2007, when American troops were consistently being bombarded and ambushed by Sunni insurgents and Shia Militias throughout the country? If not, surely one has a good memory of the Iraqi conflict when the name David Petreaus comes up. After all, he was the man responsible for re-evaluating the U.S. mission and turning Iraq around from sectarian killings, assassinations, and suicide bombings. In fact, it can be argued that General Petreaus weakened and destroyed an Iraqi civil war that would have continued to wreak havoc on the nation’s citizens, infrastructure, and governance.
Now, in the year 2009, everything is quite on the streets of Baghdad. The influential Shia cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, is enforcing the truce between his forces and the Sunni population. Al’Qaeda in Iraq is virtually destroyed, thanks to the large-scale cooperation between American troops and Iraqi security forces. Sunni tribes and the Iraqi population are turning their trust away from insurgent organizations, instead pledging their loyalty to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his coalition government. Finally, a political reconciliation that was formerly nonexistent between Iraq’s three predominate ethnic groups (the Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds) is turning the corner for a hopeful future.
If all of these statements sound bleak, you are right on the money. Of course, I cannot blame anyone who firmly believes that these optimistic goals are being achieved in Iraq. The neglect by the American news media, as well as the diversion of resources to more “pressing problems” by the Obama administration will certainly give some Americans premature conclusions on the Iraq issue. Unfortunately, the past few days in Baghdad should help all of us discover the reality on the ground: bombings, killings, and the Iraqi insurgency are all festering throughout Iraq’s major cities.
At least 250 people have been killed in the last week, days before the U.S. Military plans to withdraw most of its soldiers from Iraq’s cities by the agreed-upon June 30, 2009 deadline. Although I understand that both the White House and the Defense Department wish to abide by this time-table, commonly referred to as the Status of Forces Agreement, these recent attacks should give the administration cause for concern. There is no denying the fact that violence in Iraq has decreased significantly over the past year, thanks to General Petraeus’ counterinsurgency doctrine. However, the attacks listed above prove that remnants of Al’Qaeda remain embedded in Northern Iraq. When combining this assertion with the potential resurgence of small-scale insurgent groups, a “civil war, part II” is all the more realistic. One can only question whether a significant U.S. troop withdrawal in the coming days will spell the end of Iraq’s moderately stable environment.
There was always discussion within policymaking circles that the Status of Forces negotiation between Washington and Prime Minister Maliki was rushed. Now, with Iraqi bloodshed rising to the levels of 2006 and 2007, and with an American drawdown imminent, it appears that this consideration is finally coming to fruition. Unfortunately, you would not know it by reading today’s articles.
Shadow Government is a blog about U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration, written by experienced policy makers from the loyal opposition and curated by Peter D. Feaver and William Inboden.
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