McKiernan may become the General Shinseki of Afghanistan

Posted By Kori Schake Wednesday, May 13, 2009 - 7:25 PM Share

By Kori Schake

The Obama Administration has just relieved the commander of the war in Afghanistan, General McKiernan. He had been in command for 11 months, during which time he agitated for more troops and greater unity of effort within the administration and among the allies. They have nominated to replace him the director of Admiral Mullen's Joint Staff, Lieutenant General McChrystal, plus the Secretary Gates' senior military assistant, Lieutenant General Rodriguez.

At Monday's press conference, Gates and Mullen were at a loss to explain the cause for McKiernan's relief. They would (both) say only platitudes about "with the new strategy, with the new team across the board, I felt it was very important for new leadership." When pointedly asked what McKiernan had failed to accomplish or what needed to be done differently than McKiernan envisioned, Gates and Mullen provided no substantive explanation. In interviews last week, Jim Jones, the National Security Advisor, listed among his accomplishments having pressed the Department of Defense to reduce their force requirements for Afghanistan.  

An administration has the right to shop for military leadership that they find congenial -- someone whose approach they feel comfortable with, who has the ability to provide military advice effectively given the personalities and policies of the administration. To Gates and Mullen's credit, they have chosen a serious-minded and accomplished replacement in McChrystal. 

But whatever McKiernan's shortcomings, the quality of military leadership pales by comparison to the other shortfalls in the administration's strategy: a common approach with the Karzai government to the use of military force; inadequate vision and resourcing for the essential non-military tools (diplomats and judicial advisors and agricultural experts and economists); and an unrealistic timeline on which Afghan political leaders, soldiers, and police can provide for themselves. A new military commander cannot solve these problems, and the Afghanistan war cannot be won without solving them.

The danger for the administration in having relieved McKiernan will come if their Afghanistan strategy does not produce the desired results on the expedited timeline the administration has committed itself to. McKiernan is on record as having asked for at least 10,000 more troops than the administration provided, and given his military judgment that the political objectives military force has been enlisted to help achieve would take a decade. If Afghanistan does not turn, the Obama administration will have just created this war's Eric Shinseki.

EXPLORE:AFGHANISTAN
 

AFLOGGIE

6:44 PM ET

May 14, 2009

You Need to Sweat the "Small" Stuff

The devil will be in the details of the implementation of the "new" strategy in Afghanistan. Gen McChrystal is a hard-charging, dynamic innovator (I know from my days on the JS with him); but, he's hostage to the other, vital, use of the levers of power that remain to be fully defined, let alone executed. Besides military success in Afghanistan, the "civilian surge" side of the strategy is essential to stabilizing the Afghan government, to say nothing of the progress (or not) Pakistan makes in reducing Taliban influence, particularly in the border regions.

 

MARCOS EL MALO

2:47 AM ET

May 17, 2009

How are they comparable?

Shinseki retired on schedule. He wasn't forced out. He was dumped on and disparaged by Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz before the invasion. As Army Chief of Staff, Shineseki testified before Congress that several hundred thousand troops would be necessary for occupation, and that drew the wrath of Rumsfeld.

By contrast, McKiernan has served for the past 11 months as Commanding General in Afghanistan, a war already in progress. His forecasts for the conflict have been gloomy.

History might prove that removing McKiernan is a mistake. But to call him "Afghanistan's first Shinseki" is ignoring the facts. It makes for a cute blog post or even a catch phrase, but it you're not offering anything of substance. Let me know when you want to be taken seriously.

 

DDAGORA

2:12 PM ET

May 19, 2009

Leading an organization

The comparison you attempt to make between the relief of McKiernan and the issues surrounding the retirement of Shinseki aren't relevant and if you were interested in providing an honest assessment of the issues you would admit their situations couldn't be more different.

In fact, in January you wrote in your blog, "...Second, under Secretary Rumsfeld, the Bush administration created a leadership climate in which military officers were punished for giving unwelcome military advice. Officers that raised concerns about either the substance or the process were ruthlessly marginalized. General Shinseki is an interesting case in point: He wasn't shoved out as Chief of Staff of the Army for his Congressional testimony on the force requirements for Iraq; his retirement had been announced by the Office of the Secretary of Defense six months previously. No, Shinseki was sidelined as early as the summer of 2000 for objecting to the Quadrennial Defense Review process that advocated significant cuts to the Army..."

General McKiernan did indeed ask for more troops to address some of the problems we face in Afghanistan but he was not relieved for that request. And General McKiernan was making what most observers would call honest attempts to implement the Adminstration's new strategy (which he contributed to and you approved of) and lead his organization out of a chaotic phase of conflict. Unfortunately it appears with the increase in violence in Afghanistan that after 11 months his efforts were not sufficient.

President Obama and SECDEF must choose officers for command billets who they believe will strive to achieve security and stability in Afghanistan and at the same time possess the capability of building momentum towards those goals through a disciplined application of COIN principles. McKiernan may have been a good commander but his capabilities were not a match for the challenges in Afghanistan. The President and SECDEF evidently believe at this point McChrystal's capabilities are necessary to achieve success and hopefully, his capabilities will be sufficient to do so.

Your McKiernan-Shinseki comparison is found greatly wanting and indicates, as Phil Zelikow might say, some frothy, superficial thinking.

 

Shadow Government is a blog about U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration, written by experienced policy makers from the loyal opposition and curated by Peter D. Feaver and William Inboden.

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