Is Obama's missile defense bargain Yalta all over again?

Posted By Steve Biegun Tuesday, March 3, 2009 - 7:41 PM Share

By Steve Biegun

Yesterday, a Russian newspaper leaked the contents of a February letter sent from President Obama to President Medvedev of Russia in which a trade was offered: The United States would abandon its deployment of a NATO missile defense site and radar placement in Poland and the Czech Republic respectively if Iran's nuclear weapons program were ended. Since the entire purpose of the NATO missile defense system in Central Europe, as conceived by the Bush administration and approved by the full NATO Alliance, is to counter a rapidly advancing Iranian nuclear and missile threat, this grand bargain looks on its face to be eminently reasonable. We will see. But depending on the fine print of this agreement, it could also turn out to be a second coming of Yalta -- a sell-out of America's eastern European allies of epic proportions.

In today's Washington Post and New York Times stories, there are differences in how the "bargain" is described by the State Department, the Defense Department, and the White House letter. State appears to suggest that the missile defense deployment will be abandoned if the Russian government cooperates on ending the Iranian nuclear weapons program. Undersecretary of State Bill Burns is quoted as saying, "If, through strong diplomacy with Russia and our other partners, we can reduce or eliminate that threat, it obviously shapes the way at which we look at missile defense." Secretary of Defense Gates is quoted as suggesting that deployment of the missile defense system should be halted "if there is no Iranian missile program." And in yet a third construct, the Times today describes the Obama letter as saying, "the United States would not need to proceed with the interceptor system, which has been vehemently opposed by Russia since it was proposed by the Bush administration, if Iran halted any efforts to build nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles" (all emphasis mine). These are important differences. Let's hope the New York Times has it right (for once).

In understanding the U.S.-Russian "bargain," the actual text of the Obama letter and the intentions of the Obama administration are ultimately more important than the descriptions in today's papers. But as the words and intentions become clearer, one should consider the following choices that are likely still being debated inside the U.S. government, and will ultimately prove the worth of this initiative:

1. Halt deployment of the NATO missile defense if the Russian government is more cooperative in international diplomatic efforts to suspend Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons (e.g. Russian support for additional sanctions, slowing cooperation on Russian-Iranian civilian nuclear energy projects, etc);

2. Halt deployment of the NATO missile defense if the Russian government is more cooperative in international diplomatic efforts with the result being to end Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons;

3. Halt deployment of the NATO missile defense if the Russian government fully joins a successful effort to verifiably end Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile programs; or

4. Suspend deployment of the NATO missile defense if the Russian government fully joins a successful effort to verifiably end Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile programs.

Choice 4 is the only outcome that should be accepted by the United States and its allies in NATO. 

From a scan of today's newspapers, one gets the sense that this issue may not yet be fully decided within the Obama administration. The coming debate is hugely consequential. It will determine whether the Russian government must simply cooperate in diplomatic efforts to put off the deployment of the NATO missile defense, or if that cooperation must produce an end to Iran's efforts. Likewise, decisions must be made whether to accept a suspension or to demand a verifiable end of the Iranian nuclear and missile programs -- and, for that matter, whether the focus of the policy is even to achieve an end to Iranian nuclear programs or missile programs or both. These decisions will shape how the United States defends the North Atlantic area (the territory of NATO), how U.S. relations with Poland and the Czech Republic develop (already under some strain according to reporting yesterday), and how the United States responds to Russian irredentism in central and eastern Europe.

If the United States trades off the defense of its own interests in Europe and the security of its NATO allies for anything less than an end to the Iranian nuclear and missile programs, the harmful consequences would go well beyond the direct threat those Iranian programs pose. First, the United States will strengthen Russian resolve to pursue irredentist claims in Central and Eastern Europe. The Russian government's opposition to the NATO missile defense has never really been about Russia's security.  The small number of interceptors NATO intends to deploy makes it completely useless in defending against a Russian nuclear strike. In fact, the Russian government is simply enraged that its former satellites in Central and Eastern Europe have the temerity to cooperate with NATO in the deployment of defensive capabilities of any kind on their sovereign territory -- a decision that is not Russia's to make.

Second, the United States and its NATO allies have a mutual interest and responsibility to maintain the defensive capabilities of the North Atlantic area. This is at the core of the NATO Treaty. If the Iranian nuclear and missile threat is allowed to develop unchecked, and if the United States, through its geographic location and its own missile defense capabilities, remains largely impervious to the threat, NATO will see a perceptible decoupling of transatlantic security interests that all NATO members have understood as a weakening of the alliance's ability and resolve to provide for a common defense.  As for the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic, which have taken great political risks at home to support the NATO missile defense deployment, if the United States pulls the plug on missile defense simply to produce more cooperative Russian behavior, but with no requirements for what must be achieved, it will send a signal loud and clear that central and eastern Europe are trade bait -- a sort of Yalta II, if you will. 

The NATO missile defense was not conceived as a reaction to uncooperative Russian diplomacy. It is intended to respond to a growing alarm among NATO members regarding Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. If Iran's weapons programs are halted, it is a fully supportable policy by the Obama administration to suspend the missile defense deployments. To settle for anything less is folly.

EXPLORE:IRAN, OBAMA ADMINISTRATION, RUSSIA, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
 

BRETT

8:26 PM ET

March 3, 2009

The Russian government's

The Russian government's opposition to the NATO missile defense has never really been about Russia's security. The small number of interceptors NATO intends to deploy makes it completely useless in defending against a Russian nuclear strike. In fact, the Russian government is simply enraged that its former satellites in Central and Eastern Europe have the temerity to cooperate with NATO in the deployment of defensive capabilities of any kind on their sovereign territory -- a decision that is not Russia's to make.

This is nonsense. The Russians (rightly) fear that a missile defense system in Eastern Europe could be aimed against them, particularly since once you have the basic apparatus up (the radar and launching systems), you could easily scale up the system by adding hundreds of interceptors. Certainly the Poles haven't been coy about mentioning that it could be used against Russian missiles.

Furthermore, Russian opposition to the missile defense in Europe is actually driven more by a defense decision on their part. In the 1990s and 2000s, facing major budgetary constraints, Russia chose to upgrade its ICBM capabilities for its strategic arsenal, letting its submarine fleet degrade (although they are trying to fix that now). Unfortunately, as they were doing this, the US started seriously testing missile defense that countered the Russian missiles. The Russians knew that the system would work, and knew that they were faced with the waste of billions of dollars in obsolete nuclear delivery systems. Instead of dealing with this, they've decided to obstruct missile defense as much as possible, while trying to get drawdowns in overall nuclear arsenals.

Frankly, Russia would have protested the system even if it had been located in the UK and Germany. It only has little to do with Eastern Europe and its former orbit within Soviet influence; Russia grudgingly accepted the inclusion of the Eastern European and Baltic States in NATO in the 1990s, and continues to do so.

Rather, Russia is mainly pissed with NATO because the US tried to expand it into states that were formerly republics within the Soviet Union itself, which had been a "red line" for them during the whole process.

 

JT1928

1:13 AM ET

March 4, 2009

Why should Russia accept this deal?

Assuming the NYT and others are accurately reporting the contents of the letter (and that's a big if), it seems that the administration's proposal has not been well thought out as Russia has little to gain by accepting this offer. If it accepts the proposed linkage between deployment of the European Site and progress in Iran's ballistic missile/nuclear programs, the argument that the system threatens Russia's deterrent would be undercut, and it would be hard for Putin/Medvedev to make that claim that Russian opposition is not motivated by sphere of influence concerns.

Brett,
The U.S. has never tested its interceptors against advanced Russian-like targets, i.e, with MIRVs and complex countermeasures. In fact, many critics argue that the system has been insufficiently tested and in its current form, would have trouble destroying a rudimentary North Korean or Iranian ICBM. Perhaps with enough funding, a decade of research and the deployment of spaced based interceptors, we can engage effectively engage a handful of Russian missiles, but until that happens, the U.S. will never have sufficient confidence in MD to change its nuclear policy/posture towards Russia.

 

BRETT

10:07 PM ET

March 4, 2009

The U.S. has never tested its

The U.S. has never tested its interceptors against advanced Russian-like targets, i.e, with MIRVs and complex countermeasures.

They've tested varieties of ABM designed to hit the MIRV bus before it discharges its warheads. There are missiles that can discharge the MIRVs before the US system hits them, but they tend to be rather short-ranged - more a threat to Europe than the US.

n fact, many critics argue that the system has been insufficiently tested and in its current form, would have trouble destroying a rudimentary North Korean or Iranian ICBM.

That's questionable. They've had some fairly successful tests, particularly with the sea-based AEGIS system - but yes, ABM in the US is a work in progress and far from perfect at this point. It's a goal.

 

KRENKEL

9:25 AM ET

March 4, 2009

NATO missile defense?

Steve Biegun, I'm wonderuíng about your emphasis on NATO. The missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic have never been NATO projects but only American ones. Because of that Obamas letter has no implications for NATO.

 

JASON SIGGER

2:16 PM ET

March 4, 2009

Or another idea...

Hey, here's a unique idea. Let European military forces defend Europe against Iranian missile attacks, and let Israel defend Israel. Certainly we pay both of them enough in foreign military aid. Unless you believe that Iran's undeveloped nuclear weapons capability threatens US cities, which it doesn't, we ought not be the world's protector against ballistic missile threats.

The whole purpose of the last Nuclear Posture Review was to acknowledge that we can in fact reduce our nuclear weapons stockpile because of the advances in conventional weapon systems that allows us to use conventional weapons in the place of nukes. If we want to deter Iran, we don't need the missile defense system. If Eastern Europe wants US forces in their countries as a tripwire against a resurgent Russia, we ought to be smart enough to say "no, there are better ways - diplomatic ways - to acheive the same method."

Unlike the past Bush administration, the Obama administration ought to see that not every "nail" needs a hit from a military-designed $600 hammer.

 

TYRTAIOS

9:00 PM ET

March 4, 2009

Statesmanship

Well Steve Biegun, it's called statesmanship. We also have a security problem with Afghanistan and our supply route comming out of the Port of Karachi in Pakistan. We're going to need Russian help with alternate/multiple supply line access. Just as they made their northern alliance available to us in toppeling the Taliban originally.

What's more important? Putting in an "iffy" missile defense shield against a non-threat, at the moment, from Iran, which Russia doesn't buy-off on (and rightfully so). Or getting some strategic assistance with the Afghan region and some cooperation on the issue of Iran - remember, thus far Russia hasn't sold it's most current anit-air systems to Tehran or Damascus for that matter. : - o

 

KRYPTONIAN9Z

10:07 PM ET

March 4, 2009

Leave them be

Russia and China are the big dogs in that neighborhood. They do not want a nuclear weapon armed Iran more than Europe or the US (and they say that from experience). Certainly the Iranians are smart enough to know launching anything against Europe or Israel would trigger the beginning of the end. Leave Iran be. There is no real threat at the moment. If there is, Russia and China will be the first to deal with it. We have nothing to worry about till it starts spilling over to Europe or Israel. The defense missile shield is a complete waste of money for now. Do we not have more important issues to worry about? If the world is so worried about Iran, it should be even more worried about Pakistan. The world should fear that Pakistan's civilian government days are numbered as extremists are taking away more and more of the country - and they already have nuclear weapons! Besides, if Obama starts opening dialog with Iran there can be at least some thaw in the situation.

 

BRETT

5:09 PM ET

March 5, 2009

If you nix it with a Missile

If you nix it with a Missile Defence Shield with a time-horizon of 20 years to neutralize Mutually Assured Destruction, then you are rewriting the rules of the game.

MAD was (and is) a myth. It was never US policy (or Russian policy for that matter); the US policy was to have a solid first- and second-strike capability throughout the Cold War. Moreover, we can only talk about MAD being some type of rules of the system because we got lucky; all it would take would have been one Able Archer-type situation going the other way, and we'd have at least a partial nuclear exchange. There were at least eight such close calls in the Cold War (that have been released).

Since its us who are rewriting the rules - its hypocritical or excessively dishonest and arrogant, to pretend like other countrys' legitimate interests are not even worthy of consideration.

The cat is already out of the bag on missile defense, since Israel, Russia, China, Japan, and the like are all looking into it. This is hardly a matter of the US "being arrogant"; both the US and Russia were researching this stuff since the 1960s, and the Russians have had various systems around Moscow over the years (like the A-35 system and its successor, the A-135).

Hell, the one time we did limit ABM in the 1972 Treaty, presumably in part to prevent nuclear escalation, it led to exactly that - as I've mentioned earlier, after the treaty was signed in 1972, the Soviets went from 2,000 warheads in 1972 to over 12,000 by 1990.

 

BRETT

8:13 PM ET

March 6, 2009

Do you figure that if the

Do you figure that if the treaty had allowed unlimited ABMs that the number of missiles would have gone down, or stayed the same, or increased less?

I actually think the growth in missiles would have been slower, since I believe that both sides would have put much more effort into other means of delivering nuclear warheads (like bombers in the US case, and SSBNs in the Soviet case).

 

Shadow Government is a blog about U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration, written by experienced policy makers from the loyal opposition and curated by Peter D. Feaver and William Inboden.

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