The best offense is not cutting defense

Posted By Dov Zakheim Share

By Dov Zakheim

Recent reports that the Obama administration is planning a 10 percent cut of the defense budget are troubling. The administration has disappointed its left-wing supporters by appointing centrists, and, heaven forefend, Republicans. And this proposed cut looks more like a sop to the so-called progressive wing of the Democratic party than anything else. 

While economists might debate whether adding to the defense budget would help stimulate the economy, cutting that budget will clearly result in lost jobs. The reason for this outcome is straightforward: personnel pay and benefits cannot be reduced. Maintaining a ready force involves training, exercises, and operations not directly related to Iraq, Afghanistan and one or two other locales (these will be funded by the supplemental). Cuts in operations and maintenance will lead to a "hollow military." The last time that happened, Ronald Reagan rode the issue of national defense to the presidency. If personnel and operations cannot be reduced, however, all that is left are the acquisition and military construction accounts. Cutting back on either set of accounts will result in job losses.

As Bob Kagan correctly pointed out yesterday, cutting the defense budget may frighten allies. If American defense cuts include the F-35 fighter, the administration will most certainly alienate its closest allies, virtually all of whom have contributed to, or intend to acquire, the new aircraft. Moreover, budget cuts will give the allies yet another excuse to contribute even less to their own defenses, much less to our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Will our adversaries be emboldened? They will certainly recognize that we are stretched thin militarily. And they may well recall that the Carter budget cuts of the late 1970s correlated with some of our most difficult challenges in post-war foreign relations, as we stood by helplessly while Iran took American hostages and the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.

What about foreign assistance? Here I think Kagan may have overstated Congressional Republican clout. There will certainly be grumbling, but it is far from clear that the Republicans will be able to do much more. Filibuster a foreign assistance bill, and alienate Israel and Egypt? I somehow doubt the Republicans could pull off that one.

Ultimately, however, what is $50 billion when the administration is about to expend nearly a trillion dollars -- financed, no doubt, to a large extent by China - on an economic stimulus package? Historically, broad-brush cuts, like the current proposed 10 percent reduction, reflect a meat axe approach rather than a carefully reasoned policy.

 
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BRETT

10:17 PM ET

February 4, 2009

Finally, a poster who

Finally, a poster who realizes some of the consequences of a broad defense cut. This is something that Stephen Walt, for all his intelligence, doesn't seem to grasp.

 

WOLFBOY

2:18 AM ET

February 5, 2009

You are misinformed

Obama is not proposing a cut.

I trust you will post a correction.

 

DRLAKE

12:52 PM ET

February 5, 2009

Better logic, please...

Assuming it was actually a defense cut (it isn't, as wolfboy noted) it still should happen. Defense spending is an extremely inefficient way to generate jobs, so the economic stimulus value is minimal. Most of the major procurement programs are oriented toward buying weapons we simply don't need, the technological spillover from defense research is much less than in the past (it frequently goes the other way, these days), and there is little long-term return on the investment. The same money put into infrastructure, education, or healthcare would yield far more economic return, and would have the added advantage of actually addressing a need.

As for frightening our allies, give me a break. We spend about as much on defense as every other state combined. If they are so terrified by the US delaying buying weapons that we really don't need, they can step up their own military spending and reap all those stimulus benefits you seem to think will result.

Finally, our enemies. Most of them may as well be armed with sticks and rocks given our military superiority. We face no real conventional threats for the next couple of decades, and the spending that is being cut will not meaningfully protect us from WMDs or terrorism.

There are really no good reasons not to cut much of the current procurement budget.

 

BRETT

4:42 PM ET

February 5, 2009

Most of the major procurement

Most of the major procurement programs are oriented toward buying weapons we simply don't need,

This is not true. Take the F-22, for example. We need it because the F-16s and F-15s that are supposed to guarantee American military superiority for "decades to come" are more than 20 years old, and aging quickly. Several Russian fighters, such as the latest Sukhois, can go head-to-head with those fighters - and those can be sold worldwide.

We face no real conventional threats for the next couple of decades

I'm sure several other powers through out history thought the same way. It didn't help them, and in this case, simply assuming the above is idiotic, since several of our adversaries are re-arming in ways designed to counter that military superiority. As I mentioned on Dr.Walt's blog, the Chinese have been doing research into submarines (which would allow them to interdict US carrier groups in Southeast Asian seas), cyber-warfare, and ASAT (since the US military is heavily dependent on our network of satellites for everything from targeting bombs to communications).

There are really no good reasons not to cut much of the current procurement budget.

In other words, you simply assume that we'll maintain our conventional military superiority for the foreseable future, and thus see it as acceptable to . . . cut the funding that makes it possible for us to have conventional military superiority for the foreseable future. I'll leave you to figure out the problem with that kind of thinking.

 

DRLAKE

8:26 PM ET

February 5, 2009

There is no need to continue

There is no need to continue acquisition of the F-22 in its current incarnation. It is classic Pentagon "bloat-ware" that has severe performance issues. For example, according to Aviation Week and Space Technology Raptors are not deployed in Iraq because there is too much radio interference. So, you can't deploy a war plane in a war zone? WTF? The article further goes on to note that US warship radar in the Chesapeake Bay overloads the plane's electronic surveillance system. Hmm, radar causing problems won't be much of an issue in a war zone, will it? With these issues, it sure isn't a very good replacement for F-15s and F-16s, is it? Hell, even the Pentagon and the SecDef don't want it, preferring to buy more F-16s and F-18s to fulfill current needs while moving toward the F-35. Only the fighter jocks in the Air Force want it, and that's because of its flight characteristics rather than its utility on the battlefield.

On your second point, how, exactly, would upgrading our conventional capabilities improve our ability to deal with adversaries who are focusing on ways to get around our conventional superiority? None of the major procurement programs at issue will help us against ASAT weapons or Cyberwarfare. Upgrading ASW capabilities might make sense, but most of the weapons we're talking about won't help us deal with the threats we're facing.

Your hypothesis seems to be that since you don't know what threats we might face in the future, we need to build all the weapons we can. That's a great way to piss away a lot of resources that can be better expended on threats that are actually probable.

 

BRETT

10:57 PM ET

February 6, 2009

For example, according to

For example, according to Aviation Week and Space Technology Raptors are not deployed in Iraq because there is too much radio interference. So, you can't deploy a war plane in a war zone? WTF? The article further goes on to note that US warship radar in the Chesapeake Bay overloads the plane's electronic surveillance system. Hmm, radar causing problems won't be much of an issue in a war zone, will it? With these issues, it sure isn't a very good replacement for F-15s and F-16s, is it?

That's not exactly the case, as you can grasp if you read the article in question. A few points:

1. This isn't specific to the F-22. As the article points out, this has been screwing both with radio in general (as is the point of jamming) and with a lot of the UAVs as well. You've basically got intense jamming and further traffic on radio frequencies (which, as the article points out, are being used by a lot of the same forces), none of which necessarily applies to all potential battle fields or represents an inherent problem with the F-22.

2. The F-22 can actually be fine-tuned to avoid this kind of problem. As it points out in this part:

Those with insight into the program say the problem is not in the F-22's capabilities, but that they've not yet tested the Raptor in such a dense environment and codified the necessary concept of operations and tactics . However, they point out that the aircraft's entire electronic surveillance capabilities can be fine-tuned during mission planning. "They can filter in the frequencies they don't want to work, eliminate those that are being jammed, specify scan rates and frequencies and how often they hop between them," says one specialist. "You can exquisitely tailor each mission."

3. A lot of this problem comes from command-and-control issues - the jamming is coming from countless US and allied patrols using jammers (along with aircraft) to counter IEDs, and they hadn't set up a good protocol to deal with this type of thing.

It's worth pointing out, too, that the main person focused on in the article - General Keys - still thinks quite highly of the plane, but just isn't sure that it would be appropriate for use in this particular setting, particularly when, as the article points out -

the fighter is optimized for cruise missile defense and long-range offensive and defensive air-to-air combat.

As for your other points -

Hell, even the Pentagon and the SecDef don't want it, preferring to buy more F-16s and F-18s to fulfill current needs while moving toward the F-35.

This is because Gates is part of the school of thought that thinks that since the US as is will have a conventional military superiority for years to come (and will have nukes, for which he's a big pusher for the Reliable Replacement Warhead), the biggest threats to the US will come from "failed states" and so forth. As such, he's been very critical of virtually all the high-end weapons development programs, accusing them of focusing on some far-off threat and not helping with the present situation, and has targeted almost all of them. The F-35 is an exception, because A)the Navy, Airforce, and presumably Marines would be completely up in arms if he canceled it, and B)the F-35 is a joint project with several other nations, all of whom would be extremely pissed off if the US backed off from it.

I disagree with him on this, as I've pointed out in other posts on the Foreign Policy blogs. I think he is focusing too much on the near present at the expense of maintaining conventional military strength in the future, particularly since these projects take years to develop and produce (we've been working on the F-22s since the early 1990s, and just managed to get some produced in the past few years - no thanks to Congress, which kept cutting the production order, requiring time to re-tool and raising the unit cost). I believe that history shows that betting on conventional military strength is the best bet in the long-run, particularly since you can re-train a conventional army to do unconventional strategies like COIN, but the reverse isn't really true in most cases.

On your second point, how, exactly, would upgrading our conventional capabilities improve our ability to deal with adversaries who are focusing on ways to get around our conventional superiority?

I apologize; I should have been clearer. The states that are doing this (particularly China) are also working on their conventional military capabilities, and that particular argument on my part was part of a greater point about why I think Gates is wrong - there are examples of potential conventional competitors that we will have to deal with.

Plus, I think he understates how important it is to have the best equipment and forces. The first Gulf War probably would have been a lot bloodier and more complicated for us if we hadn't had the ultramodern army due to all the weapons programs undertaken in the late 1970s/early 1980s.

 

J THOMAS

6:02 AM ET

February 7, 2009

Bret, we've discussed this before

Take the F-22, for example. We need it because the F-16s and F-15s that are supposed to guarantee American military superiority for "decades to come" are more than 20 years old, and aging quickly. Several Russian fighters, such as the latest Sukhois, can go head-to-head with those fighters - and those can be sold worldwide.

Bret, we've discussed this before and come to no agreement.

Why do you assume that we will continue for any length of time to find high-performance warplanes affordable?

Why do you assume that they can be cost-effective in a military theater where we can expect fuel limitations to be increasingly important?

It isn't worth continuing the F-22 if it will be useful for another 5 years. You're projecting at least another 20 years for them, aren't you? How can you possibly have the chutzpah, the hubris, to think you can look 20 years ahead at the evolution of military strategy given the continuing changes in technology, resources, finance, and possibly climate?

It's possible that the F-22 (and the aircraft carrier) might continue to be worth its maintenance more than 5 years ahead. But how can you possibly be so confident that it will happen that you'd bet the large sums of money required?

As I mentioned on Dr.Walt's blog, the Chinese have been doing research into submarines (which would allow them to interdict US carrier groups in Southeast Asian seas), cyber-warfare, and ASAT (since the US military is heavily dependent on our network of satellites for everything from targeting bombs to communications).

Yes. It's absurd that we depend on a satellite network that we can't rebuild as fast as any combination of enemies can remove it. We need to think of it as a convenience that we can't depend on, and concentrate on practicing war-fighting without it.

I find it heartening that the chinese are focusing a lot of their thought on how to keep our carriers away. Those submarines aren't good for much else. The way I see it, they're playin Go and not Texas H*ldem. They don't want a nuclear war. They don't even want to invade taiwan and shell the whole place while they capture it. They want a negotiated settlement, where taiwan comes back to them willingly and the USA doesn't object.

So can we protect our carriers from the best the chinese can do? I don't think anybody knows, but anecdotal evidence suggests no.

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?t=94929
http://www.defensetech.org/archives/002969.html

So if it's true that our surface ships are not defensible, we lose a whole lot of ability to project power. But that doesn't give somebody else the ability to project power. China becomes a strong regional power and so do we. It isn't the end of the world.

 

BRETT

6:20 AM ET

February 7, 2009

Why do you assume that we

Why do you assume that we will continue for any length of time to find high-performance warplanes affordable?

I'm not as pessimistic as you about oil scarcity in the future, and in any case, as I've mentioned before, if we absolutely had to have the petrol, we could get it out of shale. It wouldn't be profitable, or efficient, but you could get the oil you needed.

You're projecting at least another 20 years for them, aren't you? How can you possibly have the chutzpah, the hubris, to think you can look 20 years ahead at the evolution of military strategy given the continuing changes in technology, resources, finance, and possibly climate?

It's a best-guess estimate on how things will turn out. Obviously, Technology X could come around and make this all irrelevant (one possible variant of this, at least from what I've heard, would be if compact, solid-state lasers became possible and cost-effective).

But how can you possibly be so confident that it will happen that you'd bet the large sums of money required?

I don't see the need for a good air-superiority aircraft disappearing in the next 20 years.

We need to think of it as a convenience that we can't depend on, and concentrate on practicing war-fighting without it.

That's probably impossible, seeing as most of our communication network depends on it (along with bomb targeting in many cases, although that's not as vitally dependent on the satellites). Better to focus on defending the satellites from ASAT weaponry, as well as coming up with plans to launch replacement satellites if the existing ones get shot down.

 

J THOMAS

7:14 AM ET

February 7, 2009

"You're projecting at least

"You're projecting at least another 20 years for them, aren't you? How can you possibly have the chutzpah, the hubris, to think you can look 20 years ahead at the evolution of military strategy given the continuing changes in technology, resources, finance, and possibly climate?"

It's a best-guess estimate on how things will turn out. Obviously, Technology X could come around and make this all irrelevant (one possible variant of this, at least from what I've heard, would be if compact, solid-state lasers became possible and cost-effective).

I say we desperately need to speed up our development cycle. The current military hardware-upgrade cycle is just plain too slow.

Speeding things up would probably involve, in part, robot assembly lines that could be reprogrammed fairly quickly, and design systems that are themselves designed to fit the limitations of the assembly lines.

Simplify the designs themselves, and aim for a one-month turnaround between submitting a design and getting a prototype that fits the design.

If we can get a quick enough design cycle we won't have to argue about what we'll need 20 years from now. We can build it and test it and put it into production sooner.

 

BRETT

7:52 AM ET

February 7, 2009

Is that actually possible?

Is that actually possible? You would need an enormous amount of standardization in vehicle design, plus you need all the components that go into the vehicles. That's what usually kills a lot of time in production - you have to not only set up the production line for the vehicle in question, but you have to locate all the components that go into that vehicle, and they themselves can take a while to produce.

 

J THOMAS

4:09 AM ET

February 8, 2009

Is that actually possible?If

Is that actually possible?

If we can't shorten that OODA loop, then what?

We need to make it possible.

You would need an enormous amount of standardization in vehicle design, plus you need all the components that go into the vehicles.

Yes. Drastic simplification. Try to arrange for single parts that meet multiple needs.

I remember an old story like that. The army had multiple kinds of mortar shells -- proximity, near-surface, impact, delayed, etc . The inventory system needed to deliver all kinds to each platoon that needed them. They made a single mortar with a dial to choose any of four types, and the increased cost for the fuse was outbalanced by the reduced logistic complexity.

That's what usually kills a lot of time in production - you have to not only set up the production line for the vehicle in question, but you have to locate all the components that go into that vehicle, and they themselves can take a while to produce.

That needn't be such an issue for prototypes, you only need a few of each type and you can stockpile them or scrounge for them.

Our military equipment is way too complicated. We need far too much repair and maintenance work on it, which reduces the percentage of guys we can actually field.

Also we tend to think of it as capital equipment when really it behaves more like supplies. I run into that in a lot of circumstances. Like computers -- for years people thought of their computers as these expensive things that were supposed to last. But a computer that's 3 years old is obsolescent. Computers are like office supplies except you don't replace them every month but every couple of years.

Is that actually possible?

We need to head in that direction. Likely before we reach anything like my ideal we'd run into competing goals that also must be satisficed. But we're way too slow now. Smaller quicker design projects, for modules that can go on multiple platforms. Try to design standard interfaces so that for example many vehicles can use the same powerplant, and new powerplants can also go into those same many vehicles. Common parts wherever it works to.

I don't know what organizational changes would be needed to make it possible. More emphasis on the military creating the specs rather than contractors marketing radical new designs. I don't know how to make that happen, or the other needed changes I don't even know about.

 

J THOMAS

7:19 AM ET

February 7, 2009

"We need to think of

"We need to think of [satellite communication] as a convenience that we can't depend on, and concentrate on practicing war-fighting without it."

That's probably impossible, seeing as most of our communication network depends on it (along with bomb targeting in many cases, although that's not as vitally dependent on the satellites).

We didn't have any satellites at all until 1957. Every military in the world got by without them until just recently, in living memory.

Find ways to do adequate communication without them. Or find ways to fight your wars without that communication.

Or be ready to put up new satellites faster than the enemies can shoot them down, keep them immune from cyber attacks, and oh yes have enough ready to launch and enough launchers that the enemies run out of weapons to attack them faster than you run out of new satellites.

Lots of the world's militaries get by without any satellite communication at all. Why is it impossible for us?

 

BRETT

7:55 AM ET

February 7, 2009

We didn't have any satellites

We didn't have any satellites at all until 1957. Every military in the world got by without them until just recently, in living memory.

Yes, but that was when radio was the main form of communication, and you didn't have thinks like global command-and-control electronic networks beyond the above. Working without satellites would be seriously going back down to a much more basic level - I question whether you could actually run one of the military's worldwide networks that way.

Or be ready to put up new satellites faster than the enemies can shoot them down, keep them immune from cyber attacks, and oh yes have enough ready to launch and enough launchers that the enemies run out of weapons to attack them faster than you run out of new satellites.

I don't think it is as difficult as you are portraying it.

 

J THOMAS

1:58 AM ET

February 8, 2009

"We didn't have any

"We didn't have any satellites at all until 1957. Every military in the world got by without them until just recently, in living memory."

Yes, but that was when radio was the main form of communication, and you didn't have thinks like global command-and-control electronic networks beyond the above. Working without satellites would be seriously going back down to a much more basic level - I question whether you could actually run one of the military's worldwide networks that way.

If there's a real possibility that we can't keep the satellites up, then we need to plan how to run our wars without our military's worldwide networks. This is indisputible.

"Or be ready to put up new satellites faster than the enemies can shoot them down, keep them immune from cyber attacks, and oh yes have enough ready to launch and enough launchers that the enemies run out of weapons to attack them faster than you run out of new satellites."

I don't think it is as difficult as you are portraying it.

That would be fine. If we can keep the satellites running at a reasonable price, then that attack on our current worldwide networks will fail and we'll be OK except perhaps for the other attacks.

But if there's a reasonable possibility that the networks will fail then we need backup approaches that we train with and test.

 

Shadow Government is a blog about U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration, written by experienced policy makers from the loyal opposition and curated by Peter D. Feaver and William Inboden.

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