State had a mid-level entry program for FSOs for a few years, but the program was widely seen as a failure and didn't last long. In large part it failed because the idea that every career FSO - from Bill Burns and Dan Fried on down started at the bottom and worked their way up - is very ingrained into the Foreign Service culture, and forms a real bond between FSOs. The mid-level entry program short circuited this culture.

As for bringing former military officers into the civil service where they could better specialize on areas of expertise and interest (easier for civil servants because they're not required to change jobs every 2-3 years like FSOs) could and should work much better. The real problem with the civil service is that the civil service personnel system seems specifically designed to squander the talents and ambitions of its best people. Civil servants often find it incredibly difficult to move up, and promotion prospects for civil servants at State are fairly limited in most (but not all) bureaus.

1. Do you know any diplomat who doesn't think the Foreign Service of today means, "more dangerous, more lonely, and less glamorous?" Every diplomat I know understands it, including that poor 24-year-old in Botswana.

2. This statement, "no military officer worth a damn would retire after a decade or so in uniform to stamp visas in Botswana with 24-year-olds" is an insult not just the fine men and women who serve in remoteplaces to protect our borders, but to the hundreds of former military FSO's who are "worth a damn" and serve their country where they're needed.

This post is a blot on Shadow Gov't's reputation.

Full disclosure: I'm currently a Foreign Service Officer, fresh off my first tour at a two year assignment in the Middle East and preparing for another two year assignment in South East Asia.

You're absolutely correct when you point out that there is real institutional opposition to any shake-up of the current incentive system, just as there would be in any entrenched bureaucracy. I'm curious, what sort of changes would you recommend? How would you like to see State structured? How do you envision it getting from the current structure to the way you would like it to be?

As an aside, I think that, at least in the younger generation that you reference, we are very much aware as a body that the life of a Foreign Service Officer is plenty dangerous and lonely, and not at all glamorous.

Sorry about the double post.

FSOs on visa lines put in heroic hours to safeguard borders and represent the US as best as possible in all corners of the earth. Military officers would be wise to transition over because of, rather than despite, that opportunity.

And with 20,000+ applicants a year, the FS is not hurting for new recruits with all sorts of experience -- military or otherwise. Veterans get a generous preference on the examination score.

I agree with the previous poster -- folks entering the FS for the past 10 years (at least) know it is what it is. Pinstriped cookie pushers are the exception rather than the rule, hard-working diplomats in tougher conditions are norm.

I'll add a comment from the opposite end of the other posts - an active duty Colonel who is a Middle Eastern foreign area officer.

A sprinkling of former military officers at DOS would significantly enhance State's effectiveness to operate in a contemporary interagency environment. Operating at this level requires significant skills in planning and execution. Anyone who has planning experience with DOS can attest to the fact that it is not a foreign service cultural strength. Planning is a military strength that is part of our DNA that DOS can benefit from. Another fact is that military officers receive far more professional education and have greater opportunities for higher education than foreign service officers - there is simply more slack in the military system to allow officers to engage in personal and professional development. Former military officers who have spent their careers honing leadership skills would also serve to raise the quality of the leadership environment at State. Case in point - many of my FSO colleagues speak fondly of the days when Colin Powell was at the helm.

With all due respect to current DOS culture, starting at the bottom in the visa office would be a misuse of the talents of military officers who have ten or more years of experience.

That said - State really needs to do an assessment of the contemporary operating environment to ascertain what skill sets they require to operate effectively in it and hire those that fill the bill. I suspect that the assessment would indicate it needs the skills that retiring military officers possess.

""smart power" -- which really requires creating an entirely new set of assumptions and expectations about what life today as a diplomat will be (hint: more dangerous, more lonely, and less glamorous)"

Wow. Tough words coming from a guy who's only known academia and speechwriting. I don't remember seeing you on the visa line in Botswana or on the PRTs in Anbar. Glamorous, huh? You must have been reminiscing about your cocktail parties in DC to think that life in the FS is all glamour. For most FSOs that image is as remote as Hollywood.

Do you even know what a typical A-100 look like since the days of Powell? You'd be surprise to know that there's a good number of new FS officers who are coming from the military. If you really know anything and have good contacts in State, ask them. The truth isn't what you imagine in your head from working as a Seventh Floor lackey.

The problem with hoping that military officers can change the State Dept culture is that it assumes people can change culture within organizations. They may be able to do so in smaller less rigid institutions, but State is like any other large gov't bureaucracy. It molds people, people don't mold it. It's just as presumptuous to assume that an invasion of FSOs to fill the thinning ranks of mid-level military officers will change the military culture.

From experience, the former military officers at State after a few years start to think, act, and have the same view on the world and their organization as non-military FSOs. The solution lies somewhere else.

The previous poster hit the nail on the head--which was why I posted the question which Chris then expanded upon.

Because it will end up be long let me note that this is my personal opinion ...

So, if

1) the State Department is expected to play the lead role in nation-building efforts in a variety of failed and failing states--if that is now one of the core missions of DOS alongside diplomacy--and

2) the U.S. needs people now, not in ten or fifteen years--

Then it begs the question--where are these people going to come from?

I don't think Chris was denigrating the efforts of existing DOS personnel and FSOs who are out on the front lines. Nor am I suggesting that military officers are going to ride in on a white horse to "save" the State Department.

The problem as every study and report has noted is that there are not enough people with training, experience and a willingness to go on these missions to staff them. This is what the CPA Inspector General's audit report 04-002 concluded. There is Anthony W. Whitehouse's “Enlarging the Cadre of Deployable Federal Civilians for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,” [U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project (March 2006)] which also pointed to a civilian deficit.

Henry Enscher wrote that controversial essay in the March 2006 Foreign Service Journal where he said either DOS deploys people--with directed assignments if necessary--or you'd have to go to contractors. And the contractors will hire the retiring military personnel and the bill for DOS will be much higher.

We've had ideas in the past of creating a separate nation-building and reconstruction agency--and the Europeans did this when the EU created its European Reconstruction Agency. But if DOD doesn't want these missions and DOS wants the funding and missions, where are the people going to ocme from? And do we want to create, as I speculated, a pipeline so that someone with 20 years of experience doesn't get sent to the starting line?

The Project for National Security Reform, many of whose participants are moving into positions in the new administration, calls for the creation of a cadre of "National Security Professionals" who could move from agency to agency as needed. Is that a solution?

Columbia University discussed some of these issues at a 2007 Saltzman Forum--at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/siwps/images/newsletter7/SIWPS7new.html .

This is a discussion that needs to keep happening, unless the U.S. decides it is giving up on nation-building altogether--or we want to subcontract it out to our allies.

It seems to me you're talking about bringing experienced people into State and immediately putting their talents to use. This is the core issue and you're only halfway to a decent solution. Your stop along the way to fan inter agency rivalries is pointless because the heart of the argument you're making isn't simply that "military officers should be allowed to move laterally" it's that "experienced people should be allowed to move laterally" into State.

Any pipeline that would allow that lateral movement shouldn't be available for Military Officers exclusively. There's a wide variety of work to be done, and a great variety of experiences that can meaningfully contribute to accomplishing the tasks at hand. The argument that a military officer with ten years of experience doesn't want to "start at the beginning" applies to highly skilled people from a number of professions whose experiences could be immensely useful at State - the 15 year director of an NGO, the 10 year producer at a major market tv/radio show, an academic with 12 years experience at a policy think tank. If any of these people want to serve, I would agree that, at a time when all of America's expertise is needed, they shouldn't have to start at the bottom. It sounds like you're talking about a separate highly rigorous hiring system (one more reliant on work experience) for mid-level FSO's. I would think that's a solution that could please both sides.

Ule99, I think you are right that this is the long-term goal, "It seems to me you're talking about bringing experienced people into State and immediately putting their talents to use." And one might argue not only to State, but a variety of bureaucracies--this is an ongoing and sometimes contentious debate among teachers and school systems as well.

I'm not trying to fan interagency rivalries and why I am talking about military officers at this time? Because we have a specific context: a secretary of defense who says he wants to give up certain missions and is prepared to give up funding and a secretary of state who says she wants these missions and wants to grow her department to meet these needs. So that does raise the question about where the growing number of military officers with nation-building expertise ought to go in the next several years.

The question that I initially posed to Chris--and which I haven't seen answered--is what should happen to an 05 or 06 officer. What is the equivalent FSO rank to an 05/06? And is the argument that a retired 06 should or should not be able to move over to the FS at an equivalent rank? In my Washington Realist post, I noted that the British colonial service took officers at their rank and gave them an equivalent colonial service rank--if I've read the 1834 handbook correctly.

By the way, the debate here reminds me of the ongoing debate in the Army between Gentile and Nagl. If you think that the future is irregular warfare and counterinsurgency or whether the Army needs to be ready to fight large-scale conventional wars. Is State's mission primarily diplomacy or nation-building? If the answer in DOD and DOS is both, then how do you balance, how do you recruit and how do you promote?

The problem is that the U.S. doesn't have a colonial service lie the British did. DOD rebuilt Japan and Germany and did a fine job, but if we've decided nation building should be a substantial part of State's work in the future, perhaps what we need is a sixth cone (mirroring USIA's merge that created the public diplomacy cone). That would allow State to do a one-time mass hiring to bring in those skills (which are very different from the skills required for the other five cones). On the other hand, if Iraq and Afghanistan are the exception rather than the rule, then former professionals should have to join in the bottom like every one else. Managing bilateral relationships is a skill like any other, and just as diplomats wouldn't be too successful in leading a combat brigade, I suspect many a professional would have a hard time learning the intricacies of day-to-day diplomacy.

I linked to this post at http://www.thehegemonist.com/2009/01/interesting-debate.html

Some really good posts here...

I'd like to respond to MissAllson's post. The "militarization of diplomacy" is not something that individual ex-military officers who get hired by State generate. The "militarization" comes from the worldview and policies of the administration in office. Military folks are all too aware of the limitations and costs inherent to the application of force. Often, we are the ones urging caution WRT using force. If you recall, Colin Powell was the "dove" in the lead-up to OIF and Condi, as the NSA, was banging the war drum. As well, it was GEN Shelton as the Chairmen of the Joint Staff who modulated the Clinton administration's desire to use force and prompted Madelaine Albright to express out of frustration - what good is having a military if you can't use it (or words to that effect).

I think the discussion really needs to mature from defending current State organizational culture to one where we look at its future roles and missions and ensuring it has sufficient resources. As other folks have pointed out, if DOS is going to get the nation-building mission, we need to create the capability and capacity in the near term. Ule99 makes a good point that a wide net should be cast to get the most qualified personnel.

Nikolas - you are spot-on.

State has an office dedicated to reconstruction and stabilization:

http://www.state.gov/s/crs/

Having worked for State for 10 years, I would say that adding another cone to the Foreign Service wouldn't be the way to go to get this office/capacity up and running as well as it should. Instead, the office should be fully funded to allow a hiring surge, with a mix of Foreign Service and Civil Service staff.

I agree 100% with ule99 that State needs to look for not just former military officers, but the full range of government, NGO and private sector experts who can bring expertise and experience in the full range of areas needed for reconstruction and stabilization of failing or post-conflict states. Just because DOD was given responsibility for so many jobs in Iraq and Afghanistan doesn't mean that the military is the best place to find experts in many of these fields such as election assistance, agricultural sector reform, health, etc.

Ramping up an office quickly is much easier with civil service officers and contractors than with FSOs, because FSO positions need to be advertised far in advance to allow for officers to bid on positions during the regular bidding cycle. Also, bringing people into the Foreign Service with a specific expertise in hopes that they will specialize in the field has a lot of drawbacks - for one, all Foreign Service Officers are required to do at least one year of consular work abroad, and almost all FSOs do their first two tours (a total of 4 years) overseas before being allowed to come back to Washington. The ideal is to have an office with both FSOs and civil servants, because this allows the civil servants to be brought in specifically for their expertise, and they will become the office's repository of experience. Having a number of foreign service positions in the same office allows FSOs to bring their particular backgrounds and regional expertise to the office, as well as allows them to gain experience in the reconstruction and stabilization sector that they can then apply elsewhere when they move on to another position in two-three years.

The idea that "stamping visas" is merely a form of serving time, a rite of passage for new FSOs crops up fairly often, sometimes even among actual FSOs (who should know better).

First, if all you're doing is "stamping" visas, then you're doing it wrong. Vice consuls and other visa adjudicators are expected to apply the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (as amended, and boy is it ever) and related regulations (found in the Foreign Affairs Manuals, the Foreign Affairs Handbook, scores of SOPs and tables, and hundreds of cables) in order to facilitate legitimate travel to the U.S. while serving as the first-line of border security.

So if you're doing it right, it's not exactly sleep-walking. This is serious business; nobody wants to import foreign criminals, terrorists, or even extra economic migrants; the U.S. domestic supply will suffice.

Second, while the visa functions (both non-immigrant and immigrant) probably account for 60-70 percent of consular jobs overseas, they aren't the sum total of consular work. While from the outside looking in, most foreigners would think of the visa function as being the most important part of consular section, from the U.S. perspective the American Citizen Services (ACS) function is much more important. Helping U.S. travelers and residents abroad is a State Department mission going back to the founding of our Republic.

Third, while entry-level FSOs may expect to serve at least one year (but I think two years is more likely) of their probationary period (typically two 2-year assignments abroad) doing consular work.

Those in other career tracks (political, economic, management, public diplomacy, & consular) will only return to consular work if they choose to bid on consular positions. That being said, a professional FSO needs to have a working knowledge of consular work, both visa and ACS, in order to effectively perform their jobs overseas.

Every U.S. diplomat will be the recipient of questions about visas and passports in the course of their assigned duties; except for the most senior of diplomats abroad, every FSO will take their turn as duty officer, where 90 percent of after-hours calls will be consular-related; and the senior-most diplomats will find themselves as the supervisors of consular managers, and be legally obligated to provide oversight of consular accountability and perform adjudication reviews. So having a clue is helpful in avoiding any career-killing mis-steps.

Fourth, the average age of a new FSO is 32 years old, the maximum age of a new FSO is in the late 50's; so the number of 24 year old vice consuls, fresh from grad school or university, is fairly small. Most are starting their second or even third careers, just like the hypothetical military officer with a decade in uniform behind him (or her).

(Thought experiment: how do you suppose the DoD would react to the suggestion that government employees with 10 years experience transfer in as majors and colonels? Would they embrace this bold, fresh new approach?)

Fifth (and last), prior government (including military) experience is accounted for in determining an entering FSOs initial class and step (similar to GS grades and steps). There's a formula whereby HR evaluates each entering FSO's level of formal education along with their years of professional-level experience. I'm reasonably certain that the hypothetical major (or lieutenant commander) with 10 years experience will get credit for all of those 10 years as being "professional-level." So I would expect them to enter in Class 4 (or "FP-o4"), the FS equivalent of a captain. And within five years to be Class 3 ("FS-03", the first of the three mid-grade ranks and equivalent to a major).

A fairly brief journeymanship of 3-5 years would put a military officer, starting in an entirely new commissioned service, back at a rank equivalent (or higher) than the one they held in their former career, with the potential to reach the "brass" they'd thought out of their reach.

I should also mention that a Veteran's Preference is factored into the FS selection process.

I encourage any U.S. military or naval person, commissioned or not, to at least look into the Foreign Service as your next career.

And to not limit that consideration solely to the generalist FSO fields. Someone with overseas experience managing people, programs, and resources might also be a fit for one of the Foreign Service Specialist fields.

I've quoted you and linked to you here: http://consul-at-arms2.blogspot.com/2009/02/re-is-military-invading-state.html

A great discusison with many good ideas, but I fear we know how this will turn out. There might be a bureaucratic structure on paper, but things won't really change. Hence, the optimistic title of an article that appeared at Entrepreneur.com last September:

"Nation-building: post-conflict reconstruction to remain a booming business."