Wednesday, January 28, 2009 - 3:32 PM
By Dov Zakheim
Picking up on what Kori wrote yesterday, most combatant commands do have civilians operating at senior levels, and some actually have civilian deputies-- e.g. AFRICOM. In addition to political advisors, most commands now have senior advisors from USAID.
The problem is not merely one of money, however, though I do not minimize the State Department's lack of funding to implement the authorities it possesses. State is a terribly-run organization; whether Jack Lew can bring some order to an agency that undervalues management is an open question. In addition, State's culture undervalues the importance of cooperating with the military. Diplomats serving as political advisors to the military, or POLADS, are often exceedingly talented people, but they are invariably in their terminal posting before retirement. If State really valued the relationship with combatant commanders, it would promote POLADS to meaningful follow-on jobs.
Finally, if State needs more money, it must have both the moxie to duel with OMB, which historically has treated the agency miserably, and to maintain a powerful legislative affairs office to coax money out of the Congress. State has not fared well on either count.
State now has an historic opportunity -- not because Hillary Clinton is there, but because Bob Gates has chosen to remain at DOD. Gates is the ultimate team player: He has actually argued for an increase in State's budget. With the Secretary of Defense buttressing the Secretary of State's traditional plea for more funds, the Department should be able to do better in the budget wars.
But first State must radically change its own culture. U.S. diplomats need to recognize that they must get serious about managing their agency properly. They must give priority to deploying their best personnel for "smart power" jobs. And they must devote the time, energy and effort to ply their wares as much on Capitol Hill and in the Executive Office Buildings as they do when they serve the nation overseas. In other words, for the Department of State, "smart power" begins at home.
So it is State's failure for ineffective cooperation with Defense? Does this pendulum not swing viciously in both directions?
State is still, unfortunately, dominated by policy wonks who have little time for and understanding of management issues. Hillary Clinton is off to a good start in correcting this with the appointment of Jack Lew, but the trick will be in maintaining a new focus on management issues. What usually happens is State will get religion in terms of hiring, fighting for resources and focusing on management for a few years and then lose interest as top level focus moves elsewhere.
Much of this is because of State's nearly instinctive fear of Congress. It's easier for State employees in Washington to meet with Chinese and Russian diplomats than it is to meet with Hill staffers and Members of Congress - the Legislative Affairs Bureau's only goal sometimes seems to be preventing any meaningful contact between State and Congress. Instead, they should be dragging State employees over the Congress in an effort to build better relations between the two.
As for POLADS, I agree that POLADS should be better rewarded, but State also needs to drastically increase the number of mid-level details to DoD so that State officers can better get to know DoD and its culture earlier in their careers.
Creating a pipeline for State to receive DOD talent
Slightly off the topic, but is there serious consideration about creating a pipeline that would take retiring active duty military officers who have many of the nation-building skills needed by State--as well as the relevant management experience, and oftentimes language and cultural expertise--and be able to transition them into the Department of State? After years of promises, the civilian response corps that was supposed to be able to step up to the plate has what, a few dozen people assigned to it?
I will happily stand corrected--but right now an officer or NCO with relevant experience still goes through the same bureaucratic hiring process that ends up taking months.
If I recall, at least in the 19th century, the British had provisions to transition overseas active duty officers into their Colonial Service.
Otherwise, no matter even if Secretary Gates can help Secretary Clinton get budget increases--without cadres now, then the military remains the default "go-to" option.
Shadow Government is a blog about U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration, written by experienced policy makers from the loyal opposition and curated by Peter D. Feaver and William Inboden.
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