Tuesday, January 27, 2009 - 7:27 PM
By Kori Schake
Gary Schaub has an op-ed in today's New York Times on the disparity between State and Defense. Here's the heart of it:
Not surprisingly, the State Department has trouble pulling its weight — and the Defense Department fills the void....
General Petraeus oversees Central Command — America’s military presence in the Middle East — and has assembled a task force to develop a strategy for the area that stretches from Egypt to Pakistan. This task force will not develop a traditional military strategy with a focus on offensive and defensive operations. Centcom will aim to help nations in the region govern effectively, build their economies and provide security to their people. It will also try to communicate America’s foreign policy intentions clearly.
Regional commanders oversee policy in their regions because no one else can. They have staffs of thousands, forces numbering in the tens of thousands and vast financial resources. These generals tower over civilians who share responsibility for securing American interests abroad: ambassadors, regional desk officers and assistant secretaries of state.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates recognizes the imbalance and has called for increasing the State Department’s budget. But this is a long-term proposition. As he rebuilds his team in a new administration, Mr. Gates should see to it that every command has civilian officials to work alongside their military counterparts.
Building civilian posts into military headquarters will aggravate rather than solve the problem of the discrepancy between our military and diplomatic capacity. No civilian is ever going to be promoted to CENTCOM commander, and that tells you all you need to know about why Schaub’s proposed solution is inadequate. Civilians will provide diplomatic input to the military decisions, and that’s a good thing, but it shouldn’t be confused for developing an integrated politico-economic-military strategy or having the respective departments take responsibility for their slices and apportion resources to its execution.
CENTCOM’s strategy for U.S. relations with countries in its military area of responsibility deserves no more credence than a historian with expertise on Pakistan would deserve in crafting a military strategy. I mean no disrespect to General Petraeus and his team, just that it’s not their area of expertise, and it’s unfair of the U.S. government to thrust them into the work of setting priorities that are fundamentally political or diplomatic in nature.
What is needed is a wholesale rethinking of how we organize, train, and equip our diplomats and how we connect them to the President’s priorities. Does anyone really think we have enough diplomats for the people-intensive tasks of winning the war of ideas? How about advancing democracy? Strengthening civil society? Showing people in societies threatened by globalization the power of America’s creed of opportunity and self-reliance? There are more than 200 cities in the world with populations over a million people that have no U.S. diplomatic representation at all.
Beyond the baseline numbers, we don’t train our diplomats in anything except languages. In the course of a military career, a top officer spends about seven years being educated for the expanded responsibilities their subsequent jobs entail –- that’s in addition to the training for their current job that is part and parcel of their routine work. A comparably senior diplomat will have had less than a year. That our diplomats are as admirably capable as they are is a tribute to their individual excellence.
The State Department didn’t teach them to swim; they threw them in the water and promoted the ones who didn’t drown. Requiring virtuoso individuals to make the system work in an average way is a sub-optimal (and often disastrous) way to structure an institution. Bureaucracies are supposed to support and enable better performance, not inhibit it.
I've worked in both Defense and State, and the difference money makes on the culture just screams out at you. The State Department feels itself lucky to send people to the National War College –- they’ve been living on small budgets for such a long time they can’t even envision a world in which our country has a National Diplomatic University that teaches statecraft and our military pleads for admission to gain that essential education. State’s culture is one of doing the best you can with inadequate resources.
While Congress is frequently vilified for stinginess toward the State Department, they mostly meddle in foreign assistance accounts, not the baseline budget. The White House almost always gets the money requested in the President’s budget. The President should ask for money, and lots of it, to bring our non-military national security departments up to the standard our military performs at.
We need diplomats who are the peers of their military counterparts, not their subordinates.
I've worked for State for the past ten years, and couldn't agree more with nearly everything said here. It's not exactly true that State officers get no training outside of language - officers are required to take one-week leadership courses at each career level, and there are countless courses available on subjects ranging from "Promoting U.S. Wines Abroad" (a two-hour seminar) to Political Tradecraft (3 weeks), Oil and Gas Industry (3 days), Arms Control (3 days), etc. But overall, I very much agree that in comparison to military officers, the training offered to Foreign Service Officers is lame at best. The Foreign Service has no culture of continuous learning and training like the military. This must change.
Sadly, State has nothing similar to CENTCOM's plans to develop a task force to "help nations in the region govern effectively, build their economies and provide security to their people. It will also try to communicate America’s foreign policy intentions clearly." Each regional bureau within State should have such an office, but creating something like this would take years and is far beyond the current resources available at State.
State does have its own "in-house think tank" in the form of the Policy Planning Staff, but I have to admit that even after ten years at State I have little idea what the Policy Planning Staff (or S/P, as we call it at State) actually does. I've never once read or been asked to contribute to or clear on an S/P product, even though when I worked as a desk officer I had to submit practically everything I drafted, even the most mundane sets of talking points, to S/P for clearance.
My sincere hope is that the new administration will turn things around and begin to reverse the effects of years of neglect of State.
The core problem is that the State Department sees its role as negotiation & understanding their assigned nation & people. This is the source of great knowledge about how to deal with other nations on terms the nations themselves will more easily accept. The flip side (or downside to some) is that State often begins to be the advocate for their international counterparts instead of advocates for American interests. The complete reverse is true of the DoD: They're entire raison d'etre is to bend foreign nations to America's Will. If necessary, by destroying them. This "predisposition to coercion" is why they are far more suited to actions meant to CHANGE another country or culture (instead of UNDERSTANDING another country or culture). Generally speaking, it is much harder to change (i.e. coerce/destroy) than to listen to them & learn. This is a fundamental genetic difference between these cultures, perfectly understandable and necessary, and the source of the different resource levels.
Giving State a bigger budget would be a waste; their culture is incompatible with the purpose of the money: to change their assigned country, not defend it.
Is that really States function?
Staring in Disbelief I thought the role of a countries diplomatic core had a lot to do with explaining and defending country A's position to country B while at the same time making sure that A's policy makers were fully aware of B's view and positions.
If you are right and State thinks its job is to send out people to 'change their assigned countries' then the US's list of friends will continue to bleed countries into the list of enemies column. Obviously if the aim is to crush dissent by force of arms rather then coexistence then the current DoD/DoS balance makes perfect sense.
It's Not State's or Anyone Else's Role...
JJackson is right. It's not State's role to "change" societies, and it's naive and dangerous to think that we can change or transform other societies or systems of governance except at the very margins. Unfornately, too many people in the U.S. think we have the capacity or the responsibility to change or significantly influence other cultures or the way other countries function. We don't, and we can't.
Of course we need to stand up for human rights and promote democracy, but we need to be realistic as to what we can achieve.
JJackson: One of us misread my posting (I think it was you). I agree with you completely re: State's role: that's what I thought I said. I was not saying it was State's job to change other countries (quite the opposite). I was saying that it was the DoD's job, and that difference was the source of the budgetary differences that Mr. Schake was lamenting in his article.
Nor should you assume I am advocating that we go around stomping distasteful regimes willy-nilly (like Zimbabwe, for example, as good as that would feel in the short run). However, the occasional "crushing of dissent" is most beneficial to civilization when the dissenters are Slavers, Fascists, Nazis, Communists, Terrorists, and Mass Murderers.
Understanding Cannot Lead to Change?
Staring in Disbelief. It seems to me that there's a fundamental flaw in your argument. How can one hope to change something that one does not understand? Therefore the idea that the State Department's role of, as you say, "negotiation & understanding their assigned nation & people" is not key to the process of change - changing attitudes, changing perspectives, changing positions - seems a little strange.
By understanding local movements, local controversies, and how local arguments about the direction of a country play out between native NGO's, politicians, political groups, universities, academics, media members, you can influence these movements. Diplomacy (and thus the DoS) is ideally suited to this purpose as much as the DoD is suited to bashing heads, bombing, and building. I think the problem is one of resources and not culture or "the inherent nature of the State Department." The problem is that there aren't enough people or resources put to the problem of understanding and negotiation. Without them, as we see now, DoD's attempts to change are not working out so well because they don't even know what they're trying to change.
"How about advancing democracy? Strengthening civil society? Showing people in societies threatened by globalization the power of America’s creed of opportunity and self-reliance?"
America as Vatican City. I can't make up my mind whether to curse your insufferable arrogance or laugh. You're living in 1955.
The US is a nation among nations, and there are other republics in the world. They're not that impressed by us anymore, nor do they have reason to be. The diplomatic corps of a democracy should made of internationalists with a special fondness for their homeland not nativists with a degrees in foreign languages.
What a backwards M-F-ing country.
"How about advancing democracy? Strengthening civil society?"
The Saudi monarchy and Mubarak.
Pure genius.
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