George Mitchell's job in the Middle East

Posted By Michael Singh Monday, January 26, 2009 - 11:43 PM Share

By Michael Singh

While the U.S. focuses on the latest twists and turns in the financial crisis, the Middle East is focused on the upcoming visit of newly-appointed special envoy Sen. George Mitchell to the region. While best known internationally for his role in Northern Ireland peacemaking, Sen. Mitchell is most closely associated in the Middle East with his 2001 Mitchell Report, which contained recommendations for ending the violence then consuming Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, and resuming peace negotiations.

Sen. Mitchell’s immediate aim will be to shore up the shaky ceasefire in Gaza.  This will mean devising an effective approach to combating the smuggling of arms into Gaza, and establishing a regime under which the border crossings into Gaza can open to humanitarian and commercial traffic.  If done well, these measures can accomplish a threefold aim -– providing relief for the people of Gaza and southern Israel; weakening Hamas by preventing its rearmament and maintaining its isolation; and strengthening the Palestinian Authority (PA).

Perhaps as importantly, success in accomplishing these steps in Gaza can also serve as a model of practical, ad hoc, multilateral cooperation to advance peace based on shared interests. Because any future Palestinian state is likely to be relatively weak, anchoring that state and its peace commitments within a larger regional context is crucial. This will require an appeal to the same sort of shared interests at play in the Gaza conflict -– whether countering the potential threat of a hegemonic Iran, or preventing the growth of state-within-a-state groups that threaten governments across the region. Sen. Mitchell can cite these interests in extolling Arab leaders to support the PA diplomatically and financially, reach out to Israel, and begin a serious discussion about how a Palestinian state will be integrated into the economic and security architecture of the region.

While this sort of regional cooperation by itself will not bring peace, it can certainly speed that peace along and make it more sustainable once it is achieved.

EXPLORE:MIDDLE EAST, ISRAEL/PALESTINE, OBAMA ADMINISTRATION, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
 
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BRETT

4:36 AM ET

January 27, 2009

How do you plan to strengthen

How do you plan to strengthen Fatah? They're already taking considerable flack from their own population in the West Bank, and they have almost no presence in Gaza (Hamas is busy wiping out the last remnants). That means that you have to do one of the following:

1.Wipe out Hamas completely in the West Bank. Israel proved unable to do this, assuming that was ever their goal in the first place.

2. Arm and convince Fatah into re-invading Gaza to remove Hamas. I'd be very interested to see how Fatah would pull this off without looking like a shill for Israel, and how Fatah would even get their people over to Gaza to do it.

3. Undermine Hamas by making Fatah look good. In other words, let Fatah do a good job governing the West Bank, and eventually the Palestinians in Gaza will look upon them fondly because of their results. Aside from the fact that Fatah hasn't been able to do this, the only way it will ever look like a real good thing is if Israel starts retracting the settlements and removes the internal controls (i.e. checkpoints) inside the West Bank.

Because any future Palestinian state is likely to be relatively weak, anchoring that state and its peace commitments within a larger regional context is crucial.

I seriously doubt that the Palestinians will ever agree to be a completely disarmed state sitting next door to a state whose population contains a major faction who wants the territory Palestine would be sitting on. That's political suicide in that particular neighborhood.

 

SDEMETRI

3:36 PM ET

January 27, 2009

Hamas in some form must be included in negotiations

The cease fire negotiated with Hamas in June 2008 held virtually intact for 4-5 months. Rocket and mortar fire all but completely stopped and Israel's defense forces reported that those few weapons fired into Israel more likely came from extremist Fatah elements and not Hamas. This is significant as it can and should be taken that Hamas is capable of negotiating and maintaining the terms of the negotiation. Disputes abound over who broke the cease fire first, but it seems apparent the blockade of Gaza was not lessened much, and at least 6 Palestinians were killed by Israel forces prior to rocket attacks starting again in earnest.

In 2007 Hamas and Fatah attempted a unity government which was willing to negotiate a long term -- 20, 30, 40 year -- truce, but the effort was rejected. A lack of immediate recognition of Israel, and the stubborn refusal to negotiate in good faith with Hamas apparently scuttled an outcome that would promote less violence.

These might be viewed as two examples of positions offered Israel in which violence against Israeli civilians would be greatly lessened and potentially secured long term. Demands to recognize Israel should not be deliberately laid down as a stumbling block to a cessation of violence.

The weak support Fatah now has as a result of this offensive certainly makes it likely most Palestinians will consider any negotiations conducted by Fatah/PA with Israel and the US envoy on their behalf unrepresentative of their wishes.

Hamas will at some point HAVE to be included in the process. If they are to be cajoled into giving up their militancy, they must be brought to the table. Hold your friends close, but your enemies closer.

 

Shadow Government is a blog about U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration, written by experienced policy makers from the loyal opposition and curated by Peter D. Feaver and William Inboden.

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