By Peter Feaver

I am still thinking about President Obama coming to terms with being commander in chief. The roll-out of his decision on Afghan Strategy Review 2.0 will tell us a great deal about whether he is embracing the role or still struggling with it.

After a clumsily run review process, there are finally some hopeful signs in this regard. For starters, he has evidently opted for a high profile roll-out, a prime time Address to the Nation on a day (Tuesday) that will give him maximum attention, rather than throwing a press release over the transom on the margins of Black Friday, as he has done with other difficult presidential decisions. Moreover his team will follow up with long-delayed testimony from General McChrystal, the very person skeptical audiences will want to hear from to validate whether the new strategy has good prospects for success (General Petraeus should also testify and I expect he will). But -- and this is yet another good sign -- the Obama Team also seems to be indicating that they will demand that the other cabinet officials shoulder the load of explaining the war to the American people and to Congress. After nearly 8 months of relative absence, it is high time the administration took seriously its obligation to explain the war and mobilize public and political support for it.

All in all, some hopeful tea leaves. So how will we know whether Obama really is rising to the occasion and embracing his inner commander in chief?   

Here would be some signs that he has embraced the role:

  • His follow-through on messaging is sustained and vigorous (and matched by a similar on-message effort by the senior White House staff and cabinet-level officials).
  • He reaches out to Republicans, thanking them for their commitment to the war effort and promising to work with them. (If he really wants to show self-confidence, he might even say some kind words about President Bush and his courage as a war-time leader, but it is perhaps unreasonable to expect such a transcendently classy gesture at this stage.)
  • He and his team describe the Afghan effort as a war to be won.
  • He and his team sketch a vision of "success" in terms of achievable objectives. Any discussion of an "exit strategy" is similarly framed in terms of mission success.  
  • He and his team describe the American (and allied) troops who are fighting as heroes who are fighting to defend our freedoms against malevolent enemies that really do seek to do us harm.  
  • He thanks our troops as well as our allies, including our Afghan allies, for the sacrifices they are making and he promises them that on his watch he will do everything necessary to see that those sacrifices will be redeemed by seeing the war through to a successful conclusion.
  • He levels with the American people about the costly road ahead, but explains why alternatives would be even costlier.

And here would be some signs that he is still struggling:

  • The generals end up shouldering a disproportionate amount of the PR and congressional outreach load.
  • He ignores Republicans and complains about how all of these problems are the fault of you-know-who and "8 years of drift."
  • He and his team describe the Afghan effort as a burden to be ended.
  • He and his team avoid words like success, victory, and win, replacing them with "exit strategy," "ending," and "withdrawal."  Success/victory/winning is defined as "U.S. troops leave."
  • He and his team describe American and allied troops as victims, and he describes Afghanistan as a place where people have been killing each other for years (or decades, or centuries) and so there really are no good guys or bad guys in this fight.
  • He thanks the troops but makes no promises that he will see the mission through to success. Instead, he simply promises them that a grateful nation will give them and their families a lavish array of veterans benefits once they come home.
  • He tells Americans that they can have security on the cheap, and, in fact, they will be safer and more secure if only they leave Afghanistan as soon as possible.

President Bush was not a perfect communicator in chief when it came to explaining the war on terror. But one thing that I suspect every American, even or perhaps especially those who opposed him, understood: Bush believed that the wars he was leading were worth winning and he was willing to sacrifice the things that were his to sacrifice (things like political and public popularity) so that America could prevail in them. In other words: He embraced his unexpected role as commander in chief and ranked that above his other assignments.

We will soon see if President Obama does, too.

P.S.: I don't care if he uses the word "success" or "victory" or "win" -- those terms are synonymous to me and I don't put much credence in the cottage industry that counts the number of times "victory" is mentioned vice "success" -- there is, however, a profound difference between success/victory and merely "ending the war."

MANPREET ROMANA/AFP/Getty Images

 

ZATHRAS

5:37 PM ET

November 25, 2009

The Bush Bubble, Still Intact

I confess that I come to this subject with some long and firmly held views. I always thought, for example, that George Bush was a small man unworthy of the Presidency. One may imagine what I thought of his son.

I thought the younger Bush believed the Afghanistan and Iraq wars were worth starting, were worth winning as long as it seemed easy to do so, and afterward were worth spinning to the American public and handing off to his successor many years after they were launched with a great show of resolve and "commander-in-chiefness" of the kind that Mr. Feaver commends to President Obama here. I'm sure Bush firmly believes that the spectacular mistakes and chronic underresourcing of both wars, and particularly of the war in Afghanistan, were things that just happened and are in no way his fault or the fault of anyone he knows.

I think that Bush -- who whatever his faults was very talented in the field of public opinion and electoral politics -- knew that popularity was not his to sacrifice by late 2006. By that point in his administration he was already unpopular and becoming more so. Bush may not have succeeded in communicating his political acumen to some of his associates in the foreign and national security fields; at any rate, outside the bubble the image of Bush as a courageous, self-sacrificing war leader was somewhat less widespread than Feaver appears to believe.

With respect to Obama, I agree that he needs to spread the burden of explaining the Afghan war effort. Indeed, his reluctance to step away from the spotlight himself and present subordinate officials as responsible for specific areas of policy has been one of the things about his Presidency to date most deserving of criticism. By the same token, I think it makes little sense for Obama to present the unpopular Afghan war to the American public as if it were an new initiative of his own design. We wouldn't be in the soup now, so long after the Taliban's overthrow in 2001, if someone had not screwed up badly in the interim.

Finally, I think success in government should be honored, and that failure in government should cost. There is something unseemly, even a little unmanly, about officials of the administration that dumped this mess on Obama fishing for praise as Feaver does here. It's not quite like bonuses being handed out on Wall Street to traders who helped create the financial panic last year, but that's only because no money is involved.

My advice to Republicans who want to support Obama on Afghanistan is to support Obama on Afghanistan. If they're hurt by suggestions that the mess there was their former chief's fault, well, tough. It was, and pain is just part of life. Failure in government should cost.

 

SURESH SHETH

7:05 PM ET

November 25, 2009

The plan for Afghanistan: Will Obama finally embrace

Poor President Obama has been left to clean up the Afghan mess neglected by former President Bush Jr. Try all he can, it is doubtful that Obama will succeed in stabilizing Afghanistan as long as Pakistan continues to shelter Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda safely ensconced in Quetta, provincial capital of Baluchistan.

As General McChrystal observed in his assessment to the President:
1. Most insurgent fighters in Afghanistan are directed by a small number of Afghan senior leaders based in Pakistan that work through an alternative political infrastructure in Afghanistan.
2. The Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) based in Quetta, the provincial capital of Baluchistan, is the No. 1 threat to US/NATO mission in Afghanistan. At the operational level, the Quetta Shura conducts a formal campaign review each winter, after which Mullah Mohammed Omar (Afghan Taliban Chief) announces his guidance and intent for the coming year.
3. Afghanistan's insurgency is clearly supported from Pakistan. Senior leaders of the major Afghan insurgent groups are based in Pakistan, are linked with al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups, and are reportedly aided by some elements of Pakistan's lSI. Al Qaeda and associated movements (AQAM) based in Pakistan channel foreign fighters, suicide bombers, and technical assistance into Afghanistan, and offer ideological motivation, training, and financial support.

While mounting South Waziristan offensive, Pakistani establishment continues to deny the existence of Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) located in Baluchistan. Besides sheltering Haqqani’s group and Mullah Mohammed Omar’s Afghan Taliban, democratic government of Pakistan continues to sign peace deals with Pakistani Taliban groups like the ones led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Nazir, allowing them to continue to terrorize Afghanistan so long as those groups do not terrorize Pakistan.

Afterall Pakistan is sheltering these Afghan groups since 2001 for a reason - to reestablish Pakistan’s writ in Afghanistan as and when US leaves.

As long as US continues to coddle Pakistan and as long as US is unwilling to use its aid leverage to force Pakistan to crack down on not just select few in border areas but ALL Taliban/Al Qaeda factions within entire Pakistan, US mission has NO chance of succeeding in Afghanistan.

 

SAINTSIMON

12:39 PM ET

November 26, 2009

The question will be how much

The question will be how much wiggle room does he leave himself - how many declarations leave themselves open to substantially different interpretations of intent - how much of what is 'promised' is subject to contingencies - already we read in the Times this morning that he'll approximate McChrystal's troops request by relying on an unrealistic expectation of increased numbers from allies - that suggests to me an announcement on Tuesday potentially compromised by significant presence of smoke and mirrors.

But to even speculate with some optimism as you do here Feaver becomes in the end essentially [to conjure evil spectre of Sarah] the putting of lipstick on a pig - Obama took so long with this decision because ultimately he has no faith in it and he has no faith in it because it suggests a world view he cannot comfortably abide - this is a man who sees himself giving grand, idealistic speeches and cavalierly pushing for a Great Society Redux during the worst economic downturn in decades - but war? C'mon.

My guess is that what we'll see on Tuesday will be the result of a lot of arm twisting by Gates and Clinton and Obama thinking that after interminable deliberation he has finally managed to reason out an appropriate answer - but an intellectual construct that is not supported by belief, by a faith in one's purpose, will not hold up under pressure, will not endure. It won't - and I'm guessing the Taliban knows it - they've taken their measure of our 'Professor in Chief' and they ain't goin' nowhere.

 

PG1923

5:42 PM ET

November 26, 2009

The only thing I know for

The only thing I know for sure is that students at the University of Texas are already organizing an anti-war march for after the 1st of the year. I doubt if they will be the only ones. "Worse the Bush" is beginning to play. There appears to be a large number of people that really expected Obama to end the war in Iraq and not start one in Afghanistan. I know Bush started it but I get their point.

My point: I think there will be a lot of anti-war protest very quickly from people who feel betrayed by Obama. To them, this is a real deal breaker. My guess is there will be demonstrations when Obama goes to get his "peace prize". The anti-war movement is well organized and should be well funded and I get the feeling they really feel betrayed. It will start slow, but can build quickly with the Internet and a 24/7 world.

I think Obama has made the only decision he could after his moves in March. It's a "surge" and he's hoping it works in two or three years, and I think it has a good chance of getting us in a position to negotiate getting out.

The hard part might be explaining how and when we get out. Time tables generally don't work real well with war especially when you tell the bad guys. It has been my observation that Warlords really like corruption, and they really are the government of Afghanistan.

The last thing Obama or the Country needs is a divisive battle over war policy. I am sure that Obama will try to explain how his approach is different with all the accountability and deadlines he will be imposing on somebody. But at the end of the day, it's the body bags at Dover that count.

I never thought Obama, like Bush, would be hunkered down fighting his war, but it might happen. I sure hope not.

 

GOEDEL

8:06 PM ET

November 29, 2009

"Chauncey Gardiner" is 1st President, then CIC

Mr Feaver forgets that our thoughtful but narrowly informed, small-change President is first POTUS. His CIC role is only in time of war and only in relation to his armed forces. At last look, I have not seen a declaration of war; only a shirking of the responsibility by the mostly corrupted collection of corporate lackeys who occupy the Capitol.

The article seems to want Obama to get a fever to further unleash the unrecallable dogs of war. The problem with those dogs is they most often turn around and bite their presumptive and foolish master.

The generals and admirals love war. They especially need to prove themselves, having been whipped in southeast Asia after our last great invasions of foreign countries. They want to say: "See what we could have done if LBJ and RMN had not held us back!" Westmoreland, back then, killed millions of Asians and was disgruntled that he was held back from murdering more.

We learned nothing from Vietnam? Untrue! We learned how better to control the media, use "volunteers" and mercenaries, state secrecy and violations of our Constitution. Finally, we learned to put forward a compliant nincompoop with a slippery tongue as our Lackey-in-Chief.

 

GOEDEL

8:21 PM ET

November 29, 2009

An afterword

LBJ found his inner Commander-in-Chief when, frustrated, he shook his fist in anger at Ho Chi Minh, the inveterate Vietnamese rebel. Walter Lippman wrote in his column, "Those who begin by shaking their fists end by wringing their hands!"

That's exactly what happened. Lyndon Johnson left Washington a beaten man in 1969, either wringing his hands or burying his head between them. That is exactly what will happen to Barack Obama: back in ignominy to Chicago in 2013, only our country will be much the worse for the experience.

 

JAYDEE001

7:46 PM ET

November 30, 2009

HARD TO BELIEVE

I have seen a number of articles by individuals setting forth what they believe the President should say in this much awaited address about Afghanistan, some who believe we should retire from this war, and others who believe there is no substitute for winning. Here the author includes an apology for the previous administration, as if to say he'd respect Obama more if only Obama was more like Bush.
The opportunity for 'victory' or 'winning' or 'success' or whatever in this war was lost long ago. Osama bin Laden has already achieved his goal - he has us tied down in a costly military occupation of a country which has no government save a corrupt one, and no national character whatsoever - instead it is a tribal society made up of individual fiefdoms. We took the bait, and now we are hooked. The only smart move would be to cut our losses and focus future efforts on containing the terrorists. Warnings about the dangers of any alternative to military occupation are meaningless - we have never tried them.

 

WILDTHING

11:58 PM ET

November 30, 2009

CIA Proxy War Gone Rogue was designed to be quagmire!!

Being a true Commander-in-Chief who doesn't know when to pull out is a guaranteed preganancy of disaster. As was the Congress authorizing funds for stingers to terrorists in full light of day without the old standby of plausable deniability. To ask soldiers to sacrfice for a CIA operation with a mind of it's own is as bad as asking NATO to help cleanup for the CIA. There was no unprovoked attack on 9/11 and it all started with Carter & Brzezinski on 07/03/79.

 

Shadow Government is a blog about U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration, written by experienced policy makers from the loyal opposition and curated by Peter D. Feaver and William Inboden.

Read More