Vice President Biden's closed-door pep rally with congressional Democrats has come in for some well-deserved criticism for the way the participants demonized political opponents with vicious labels.

But I just read something that makes me wonder whether the real news from the pep rally got lost by the distraction of the rhetorical fireworks. According to Joshua Green at the Atlantic, Vice President Biden effectively told Rep. Barney Frank not to put much stock in the media coverage about negotiations between Iraq and the United States over a longer-term American presence in Iraq. Here is how Frank relayed the conversation to the reporter:

One other big story from [the caucus meeting] today, Biden was at the caucus, and I said I was upset about Afghanistan and Iraq. So Jack Lew says, "Well, we're winding them down." I said, "What do you mean, you're winding them down? I read Panetta saying that he's begging the Iraqis to ask us to stay." At which point Biden asserted himself and said -- there's clearly been a dispute between them within the administration -- "Wait a minute, I'm in charge of that negotiation, not Panetta, and we have given the Iraqis a deadline to ask us, and it is tomorrow, and they can't possibly meet it because of all these things they would have to do. So we are definitely pulling out of Iraq at the end of the year." That was very good news for me. That's a big deal. I said, "Yeah, but what if they ask you for an extension?" He said, "We are getting out. Tomorrow, it's over."

By late Tuesday, the Iraqis did sort of meet the deadline, so Biden's claim that "it's over" may have been premature. Hence, this report today in the Post: "U.S. officials on Wednesday welcomed Iraq's decision to negotiate with Washington on keeping some U.S. troops in the country into next year, seeing it as a move toward ending the months-long political stalemate that has complicated U.S. plans for a December withdrawal."

I find today's story far more comforting than the earlier account of the Biden-Frank exchange. The Post is describing an administration that is still committed to negotiating a relationship with Iraq that offers hope of preserving the fragile and hard-won strategic gains of the surge. The Biden-Frank exchange describes an administration that can only look at Iraq through the lens of an OMB balance sheet -- an administration that thinks "it's over." Perhaps Biden was simply indulging in more hyperbole of the "Republicans-are-terrorists" sort that the Democrats told themselves to soothe their feelings over the bruising debt fight. Or perhaps there was a garble between the reporter, Frank, and Biden. But someone with better access to the White House than I have should press the players in this story for clarification. And perhaps President Obama could identify who in the administration can speak authoritatively on Iraq and what they can authoritatively say about it.

The debt ceiling bill making its way through Congress will cut broad defense spending  by $350 billion across ten years. The broad definition encompasses homeland security, veterans affairs, and nuclear programs, in addition to straight DOD spending. Those accounts totalled $881 billion in fiscal year 2012. Defense Department spending on its own was roughly $670 billion (that includes both the baseline budget and war operations). Even if DOD can offload some of the cuts onto other national security departments, it is likely to face a reduction of roughly four percent in its total spending.  

Scoring of the spending cuts counts as savings a significant amount not spent in Iraq and Afghanistan. This financial windfall is the result of the president's policies to curtail our military operations in the wars -- going to zero military personnel in Iraq by the end of 2011, and refusing commanders in Afghanistan the troops they asked for to achieve the president's objectives. With these figures folded in, DOD will probably be faced with a real reduction in spending of between two and three percent -- in a budget that has more than doubled in the past decade. DOD will need to husband its resources carefully, but the roof won't fall in.  

In fact, the deal Republicans in Congress were able to make reduces DOD less than the president proposed in his April budget speech. The president's proposal would have made no dent in the deficit, yet still would have cut defense by more than the legislation in its first phase.

But it is the second phase of debt reduction that has the potential to be extraordinarily damaging to defense. If the bipartisan commission cannot reach agreement, it will trigger automatic across the board cuts of $1.2 trillion beginning in 2013. It would appear likely the bipartisan commission will, in fact, deadlock, in which case a 50-50 domestic and defense split would require DOD to cut spending an additional $600 billion. It would mean a 14 percent cut overall to defense spending. This DOD could not do without a major reconfiguration of forces and capabilities, and a major reduction in our actual fighting power.

And the structure of the bargain gives Democrats more in defense cuts (and therefore protection of domestic programs) if they refuse to compromise on the second tranche of cuts. As President Obama himself said, "The nice thing about the defense budget is it's so big, it's so huge, that, you know, a one percent reduction is the equivalent of the education budget … it's so big that you can make relatively modest changes to defense that end up giving you a lot of head room to fund things like basic research or student loans or things like that."

The date of the automatic spending cuts is crucial, however: a new president will have the latitude to submit a budget that makes executive choices about spending rather than accepting a system-wide legislated reduction. President Obama has led from behind in the budget crisis; the president in 2013 could make more responsible choices.

The president of the United States makes almost unprecedented assertions of executive authority and launches a controversial war of choice* in the Middle East, targeting for regime change a dictator accused of committing atrocities against his own citizens, producing weapons of mass destruction, and sponsoring international terrorism. Amid the White House's promises of a quick victory, a compliant Congress initially goes along with the war, but months later disgruntlement sets in and Capitol Hill begins to raise concerns.

The preceding paragraph might sound like the standard left-wing critique of the Bush administration's Iraq War, of the type that was often written during the Bush years by any number of commentators. But observant readers no doubt realize that here it instead describes the Obama administration's ongoing war -- and yes, it is a war -- in Libya. These are strange times we are in. From the administration's strained interpretation of "hostilities" to contend that the War Powers Act does not apply, to last Friday's conflicting and conflicted votes in the House of Representatives, in which a bill to defund the war failed but a separate bill denying authorization of the war passed, few of our customary political categories apply. (For some expert yet accessible discussions of the legal issues involved, check out the indispensable Lawfare blog coedited by my Strauss Center colleague Bobby Chesney).

The administration sought to spin the House vote as a win because the measure to cut off war funding did not succeed. But as Josh Rogin notes, a majority of the House in fact opposes funding the war. And the power of the purse, as Peter Feaver has pointed out, is the indisputable tool granted by the constitution to Congress to express its will on matters of war-making -- and to bear the political consequences.

Read on

Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos met today with President Obama at the White House to end an impasse blocking adoption of a trade agreement first concluded in November of 2006. The Colombian government has agreed to rewrite parts of their labor law to U.S. specifications.

The resolution came after mounting calls for movement from Capitol Hill. House Republicans had been particularly vocal about the need to advance the pending Colombia and Panama agreements alongside the South Korean accord after years of delay. Of late, though, the calls had grown bipartisan. On Monday, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus (D-MT) and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry (D-MA) published a joint op-ed in the Wall Street Journal describing the Colombia pact as an important spur to employment:

Each day we fail to act costs American jobs and sales-and sends them elsewhere.

So, 1,091 days after the Bush administration submitted the Colombia FTA to Congress, the Obama administration has found a path to move forward. The plaudits for this move have been rolling in since it was announced yesterday. Not only does the Colombia FTA offer its own array of benefits, but the move has the potential to unblock U.S. trade policy more broadly. To lever the administration into action on the pending FTAs, Republicans had linked the passage of the Korean FTA, renewal of trade adjustment assistance programs, trade preference programs, and even confirmation of a new commerce secretary. It is not clear that all of the timing issues have been worked out between House Republicans and the White House, but the agreement with Colombia significantly enhances prospects for movement on a trade agenda this summer.

Lest there be excessive rejoicing, though, it is worth keeping in mind that passage of the three agreements would partially complete the trade agenda of 2007, and there was a cost to the dithering. The pending FTAs offered benefits in two important dimensions: access to the markets for American exporters and stronger diplomatic ties. On the economic front, this access was originally set to grant American businesses and farmers preferential access to the Korean and Colombian markets, ahead of global competitors. Now, there is a scramble just to keep U.S. exporters on an even footing. While the agreements were stymied by domestic political fights in the United States, our partner countries reached other agreements to open their markets to the world. A prime motivation for the mid-summer deadline on passing the Korea-U.S. FTA is the looming passage into force of Korea's FTA with the European Union.

On the diplomatic front, the FTAs were meant to send a signal of friendship and allegiance. While the partner countries certainly welcome passage now, that signal has been somewhat diminished by years of slapping them around through public criticism.

There is a pending, post-2007 trade agenda out there. The eternal but deeply-troubled global trade talks (the Doha Round) are in desperate need of American leadership. The WTO's director-general, Pascal Lamy, sounded the alarm to members last week:

Now is the time for all of you, and in particular those among you who bear the largest responsibility in the system, to reflect on the consequences of failure ... to think about the consequences of the non-Round to the multilateral trading system which we have so patiently built over the last 70 years. It is the time to think hard about multilateralism, which your leaders, yourselves and myself preach at every occasion. In politics, as in life, there is always a moment when intentions and reality face the test of truth. We are nearly there today.

Then there are the Bush-launched, Obama-embraced talks to expand the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). A number of the participants in those talks are earnestly shooting for a conclusion this November, when the United States hosts the APEC meetings in Hawaii. This seems implausible, since the administration has not yet broached the question of trade negotiating authority for those talks with the Congress. And if labor and human rights issues with Colombia stirred controversy, wait until we start discussing Vietnam, a TPP participant.

The biggest question surrounding this week's breakthrough on the Colombia FTA is where it leaves relations between the White House and the American labor movement, which has been the most outspoken opponent of recent trade agreements. The administration made some inroads with labor through its reworking of the Korea-U.S. FTA at the end of last year. That won the support of the United Auto Workers, though that support did not extend beyond Korea. The AFL-CIO has remained opposed to all of the pending FTAs. Yesterday, it released a statement:

We are deeply disappointed that the Obama administration has signaled that it will move forward to submit the proposed U.S.-Colombia Trade Agreement to Congress for a vote in the near future ... on the basis of the information provided to us at this time, we remain strongly opposed to the Colombia trade agreement.

It remains to be seen whether this opposition will be vigorous or muted. The Obama administration will also need to decide whether, on trade issues, it has now cast its lot with a coalition of pro-trade Republicans and internationalist Democrats, or whether it has pushed its labor allies as far as it dares.

Those are questions for another day, though. Today, Presidents Obama and Santos had cause to celebrate.

International Relations theorist Charles Glaser has joined a growing chorus calling for the abandonment of Taiwan. His take on why we should abandon the island is tucked into his "nuanced version of realism" argued on the pages of Foreign Affairs. As do most "abandon Taiwan" arguments, he begins with a "realist" argument for why war between the United States and China is unlikely. Why? Because besides Taiwan, Sino-U.S. interests are compatible.

Parting company with other "pessimistic" realists who believe that "power transitions" -- the historic condition of a rising power challenging the existing hegemon -- more often than not lead to war, Glaser believes that this time it is different. The security dilemma (in pursuing our security we take steps which decrease their security which leads them to take steps which decrease our security, a process that can end in conflict) in the Sino-U.S. case. The task for Beijing and Washington (but mostly Washington) is to trust that each country just wants security, not domination. 

For example, the United States should not fear China's nuclear build-up because of Beijing's limited ability to strike the U.S. homeland. According to this logic, the United States should forego temptations to increase its own nuclear arsenal in response to China's own increases. All China is doing is increasing its security with a second strike capability. In turn, China should not fear U.S. conventional capabilities because most are resident across the Pacific.

But ultimately, the argument goes, it is up to the United States and not China, to make adjustments to its security posture and not exaggerate threats that China poses. The United States is safe because China will never have the means to destroy its deterrent.

Glaser concedes that this theory overlooks the fact that U.S. security alliances could seem threatening to China. Here we get to the nub of his argument. The United States must ask itself how important its security alliances are. Unlike "Neo-isolationists," Glaser, an advocate of "selective engagement," believes that the alliances with South Korea and Japan are important. And the United States could defend those alliances without creating a debilitating arms race if it provides just enough conventional deterrence, plus the threat of nuclear retaliation should those countries come under attack.  

To Glaser, Taiwan is different. China's belief that Taiwan is part of it is non-negotiable, and Beijing and Washington have very different views of what constitutes the status quo across the Strait. The Taiwan dispute has no diplomatic solution and the risks of nuclear war are getting too high, particularly with China's advancing second strike capability. His answer is for the United States to make the necessary "adjustments" and abandon Taiwan.

He acknowledges potential critics who may say appeasement usually whets the appetite of the appeased. But, says Glaser, not all adversaries are Hitler, and China has limited territorial goals. Even if China has more expansive territorial claims, the United States can remediate any military imbalance through a greater conventional presence.

In the end, the real danger is a self-fulfilling prophesy, a failure by the United States to realize that its basic goals are compatible with China's. Glaser fears that this is already happening -- the United States is taking a much more competitive military stance because its ability to operate along China's periphery is in danger. According to Glaser, this dilemma has two solutions. The first is for Washington to realize that U.S. interests are changing -- Taiwan is not really vital. And second, the United States should forego the kind of nuclear superiority that could counter China's second strike capability. Problem solved.

This is a fairly conventional international theory argument about the relative stability of Sino-American relations. Glaser is essentially taking a side in an old debate. His innovation is the abandonment of Taiwan, a necessary step to decrease the security dilemma and reveal China's truly limited aims.

Read on

Secretary of Defense Gates is right. It would be a tragic irony if, having come this far in Iraq, the United States faltered and failed to fund adequately the next phase of the mission. Even with adequate funding, the mission will be hard enough.

Congress is right to take a hard look at the Iraq situation. The security needs in Iraq exceed anything the U.S. State Department ever has dealt with in the past. The current plan, which will shift the burden almost entirely from the Department of Defense to State, is distinctly inferior to the original plan, which envisioned a renegotiation of the Status of Forces agreement to allow a modest U.S. military presence as a stabilizing factor. The administration fumbled the original plan and while Gates hints at the possibility of reviving it at the eleventh hour, it may be too late. The current plan relying on the U.S. State Department to do more than it ever has done before is a barely satisfactory Plan B. But it is manifestly superior to Plan C, which involves walking away from Iraq entirely and hoping for the best. I believe once Congress has looked at and thought about the situation carefully, it must conclude that funding the State Department plan is the only responsible course of action available at this point.

I understand the frustration of people who believe the Iraq war was a mistake from the start, but I do not understand their desire to compound what they believe to be one error with strategic blunders of comparable proportions: abandoning Iraq or failing to provide the resources necessary to keep Iraq on a successful trajectory.

Foreign aid is once again under fire. Every so often a few politicians -- usually Republicans -- get up in arms about our government's gift of large amounts of money to other countries. Equally often, media stories appear detailing how ineffective aid supposedly is. The picture emerges that foreign aid is unnecessary, ineffective, and wasteful.

For example, the Republican Study Committee (RSC) released a proposal last week to cut the budget for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) by $1.39 billion as part of a broader package of deficit-reduction proposals. (Hat tip to our friends at The Cable for their post on the subject.) There were similar rumblings after the Republican takeover in 1994. Republicans seem to have an inborn suspicion -- usually dormant, but one that fitfully flares up once per decade -- that aid is just a handout from rich countries to poor ones to help the former ease their consciences.

Or take the lengthy Wall Street Journal story last week that declares, "A massive U.S. aid program that has made Pakistan the world's second-largest recipient of American economic and development assistance is facing serious challenges, people involved in the effort say. The ambitious civilian-aid program is intended in part to bolster support for the U.S. in the volatile and strategically vital nation. But a host of problems on the ground are hampering the initiative." Despite billions of aid, the United States remains unpopular in Pakistan; thus, the article implies, aid is ineffective.

These criticisms of foreign aid rest on faulty notions of what aid is and what it is supposed to accomplish. There are two views of aid reflected here, neither of which are helpful.

• National bribery. Some people think that the United States gives money to other countries to be popular. On this view, if the United States lavishes the Pakistanis with enough money, they will respect the United States. The problem is that if someone did this on an individual level, the United States would call it craven, insecure, and insulting -- which is probably how it is perceived by the Pakistanis. Aid as bribery doesn't work. Money can't buy me love -- not individually, and not between states.
• Charity. Others seem to think that the United States gives money out of the pure, unalloyed goodness of our hearts. Foreign aid is an extension of private goodness. Individually, we give money to the Salvation Army or World Vision so they can help our fellow man on the far side of the world. Foreign aid is functionally the same thing: the United States gives our tax dollars to USAID to do the same kind of charity work as NGOs. But why should the U.S. be charitable to someone in Nepal just because they live in an exotic country when there are Americans who need help? Additionally, there is no logical limit to how far the United States's charity could extend. The United States could bankrupt itself trying to save the world.

I propose a third view of foreign aid.

• Strategic investment. Foreign aid helps countries whose interests align with our own increase their capacities. The United States gives money to help select countries -- not the entire world -- improve specific abilities, like their ability to provide public security, defend their borders, or buy and sell goods.

The advantage of this view is that it is realistic. The United States can actually do this. The U.S. is not trying to change people's heart or minds, contrary to the bribery view. It is only trying to change their capacity. Additionally, this view helps the U.S. prioritize which countries should get aid, and what kind, contrary to the charity view. Giving billions to Tuvalu would be a commendable act of charity for the Salvation Army, but it would be folly for USAID because Tuvalu is not a strategic priority for the United States.

(I am not arguing that we should never be charitable. Rather, every possible foreign aid program is an act of charity. Charity by itself cannot help us decide which charitable programs to undertake. The United States either has to flip a coin to allocate our charity randomly, or consult our own interests to allocate it strategically.)

The Marshall Plan is a good model. The United States gave something like $25 billion (in today's dollars) per year to Western Europe after World War II. It was undoubtedly an act of charity. The money helped the Europeans rebuild their economies and saved tens of millions of people from poverty or even starvation. But it was also a strategic investment. Policymakers at the time worried about a return of the Great Depression following demobilization and the Marshall Plan helped Europe become a strong trading partner for the United States. Most importantly, U.S. officials feared the rise of Soviet power and hoped the Plan would bolster European governments' stability and prevent the spread of communism.

This view of foreign aid would help protect it from the kind of cuts the congressional Republicans are proposing. Aid is hard power. It is a weapon the United States uses to strengthen allies and, thus, ourselves. But this view would also help save it from the kind of limitless, grandiose visions Democrats sometimes seem to have for it. This is the sort of view that I hoped Secretary of State Clinton would incorporate in the recent Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. But despite the document's many strengths it did not seem to offer a framework for prioritizing among the Unites States' many foreign aid opportunities.

All senior agency heads in the U.S. government, as well as second, third, and fourth tier officials, try their hardest to inject at least a sentence into the State of the Union address. It is the shortcut for ensuring that their pet policy initiatives at least see the light of day, even if they are not brought to fruition. This year's address will be no different, and for those concerned about national security, what the president says, and what he does not say, will be of the utmost importance.

As senior DoD leaders are already pointing out, the upcoming fiscal year, FY 2012, marks an inflection point in defense spending. There have four such points since World War II: those after that war, Korea and Vietnam, marked the end of major conflict. The fourth, like the one anticipated for the next fiscal year, was the product of domestic economic pressures and growing deficits. How far the defense budget ultimately declines will very much depend on not only the budget levels predicted for FY 12, but for the following five years as well. The president should be cautious about specific budget targets beyond the upcoming fiscal year; a signal of further anticipated declines could send misleading signals to the United States' adversaries about the degree of her determination to confront them at any future time.

The president should, on the other hand, throw his weight behind key DoD initiatives, notably Tricare reform. Secretary of Defense Gates has made the strongest case for increasing Tricare charges; the president should back him up, and do so forcefully.

Read on

As regular readers of Shadow Government know, we here at the blog don't take an official "house position" on particular issues, but rather try to present thoughtful commentary from the vantage point of those who have served in foreign policy roles in a Republican administration. Often we will agree amongst ourselves on a particular issue, but just as often we might find disagreements among ourselves as well. Likewise, we might find ourselves disagreeing with a particular course of action or emphasis of the Obama administration -- and saying so -- but it is also not unusual to find posts from Shadow Government contributors agreeing with, and even applauding, a White House policy step. In short, national security policy does not always fall easily along party lines. Our foremost priorities at Shadow Government are to speak out on what we think is best for our country, and to do so in a constructive and civil manner. Civility doesn't preclude being hard-hitting at times, but it does mean focusing on the issues rather than maligning the opposing side. Not to mention being mindful that we might on occasion be wrong.

Two items from this past week prompted me to reflect on the possibilities of bipartisanship in foreign policy, and one of its correlates, civility. The first is this thoughtful post by David Shorr over at Democracy Arsenal on "More Ideas for a Constructive Foreign Policy Debate." Shorr relates some trenchant remarks from a recent conference he attended, in which Rich Williamson urged a bipartisan U.S. commitment to human rights promotion, and Bruce Jentleson offered some leavened insights on the sometimes contentious subject of the relationship between the United States' international reputation and policy leverage. Shorr concludes with an appeal for all parties to resist impugning motives and focus instead on problem-solving: "Here's the choice: we can keep arguing over whether the US needs to burnish its moral authority, or we can look at the dilemmas bedeviling our country's international challenges."

The second item is the announcement by Senator Joe Lieberman that he won't be seeking re-election in 2012. When it comes to national security policy, Senator Lieberman has for more than the past decade been one of the most visible exemplars of bipartisanship. Heir to a distinguished tradition of hawkish Democrats such as Scoop Jackson and Harry Truman, he will be missed for his personal decency as much as his independence of mind. I first came to appreciate Senator Lieberman when I worked on Capitol Hill in the 1990s, and he provided crucial bipartisan sponsorship -- and active support -- for the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act (known also and appropriately as the "Nickles-Lieberman" bill). As David Brooks points out today, the peculiar dynamics of politics often meant that Lieberman's conservative foreign policy stances actually abetted his liberal positions on domestic policy. I know very few people of either party who agree with him all of the time, but even fewer who don't appreciate his civility, goodwill, and patriotism.

Congratulations to President Obama and his team for successfully concluding negotiations on the U.S.-South Korea free trade agreement (KORUS) on Friday. Republicans should applaud and support the president when he pursues such a market-friendly policy. So should Democrats, of course, but the early indications are that the agreement will face critics on the left. More on that anon. Herewith eight questions and answers about what just happened.

1) What changed in the agreement?
The original KORUS was signed in the summer of 2007, more than three years ago. Up until late last week, Obama and other critics had derided that accord as unsatisfactory. So what changed?

The headline revisions were in the auto sector. Ford, in particular, was upset about the obstacles it faced trying to sell into the Korean market while Korean producers like Hyundai enjoyed lucrative access to the U.S. market. In the revised agreement, Korea promises changes to emissions and safety restrictions that Ford argued were discriminatory. Tariff schedules were also reworked to slow market access for car producers on each side (i.e., less rapid liberalization).

Korea, in turn, will phase out its tariffs on U.S. pork exports more slowly than previously planned, will get more favorable visa treatment for workers coming to the United States, and will slow down changes to its patent system that U.S. pharmaceutical makers wanted.

2) Is it better than the first version of KORUS in 2007?
One agreement is indisputably better than another if it makes some groups better off and leaves no one worse off (that's "Pareto efficiency" for those who enjoy slinging econ jargon). This revision is not that. Ford is happier while pickup buyers and pork exporters are not. Weighing one group's interests against another's is a political calculation. The answer depends on who your friends are.

3) Was it worth the wait?
No. The bulk of the benefits of this agreement could have been had years ago and U.S. trade policy has been held hostage ever since.

Read on

Nearly five years ago, testifying alongside and in support of my former Pentagon colleague, then-Under Secretary of Defense David Chu, I pleaded with the House Armed Services Committee to do something, anything, about spiraling defense health care costs. At the time the Defense Health Program exceeded $40 billion, more than the entire defense budgets of most of our allies -- and of many of them combined. The program had more than doubled over the previous five years, spurred by two major Congressional decisions that took effect on Oct. 1, 2001, just as the war in Afghanistan was about to commence.

The first of these decisions was to create TRICARE for Life, a program to supplement Medicare benefits for military retirees; the second eliminated co-pays for active duty personnel. The Joint Chiefs had lobbied hard for both programs, arguing that it was imperative that military personnel and their families be fully cared for. Until Sept. 30, 2001, Medicare-eligible retirees were accepted only on a space-available basis at military treatment facilities. As a result, the plan was not that attractive to many military retirees. Overnight, however, TRICARE became one of America's top premium health insurance plans: TRICARE for Life meant that TRICARE was now the supplemental health insurer for all Medicare eligible retirees, and also covered costs that were not provided by Medicare.

But congressional action did not stop there. In Fiscal Year 2003, Congress expanded the TRICARE Prime Remote program, which covered military families that lived more than fifty miles, or an hour's drive, from the facility where the military member was stationed. Congress also expanded TRICARE eligibility for reserves, who were playing an increasingly arduous and critical role in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, by offering continuous benefits to those called to active duty since 9/11.

With pharmaceutical costs increasing more than five-fold over the past decade, with medical care outpacing inflation by four percent annually, and with co-pays remaining frozen at mid-1990s levels, more and more military members and their families have come to realize just what a good deal TRICARE really was. They have signed up accordingly, even as more people have become eligible for TRICARE coverage. On Oct. 1, 2001, there were 1.5 million persons eligible for TRICARE for Life; five years later that number was 1.8 million. Today it exceeds two million, and continues to climb. Spending on beneficiaries under the age of 65 has also grown: from 33 percent in 2006 to about 39 percent, or a ten percent increase projected, for the current fiscal year. Meanwhile the Congress, egged on by veterans' organizations, has absolutely refused to increase co-pays even by the minuscule rate of inflation nor to increase TRICARE's annual fees, which amount to only $460 for TRICARE Prime, the most popular insurance option that closely resembles an H.M.O.

Civilian employers, as well as at least a half-dozen state governments, have also come to recognize what a great deal TRICARE offers their military retiree employees -- many of whom join private industry as soon as they retire from the military, some as young as age 38. Recognizing that they would be contributing to health care plans for as long as three decades, employers naturally encourage military retirees to sign up for TRICARE. Since TRICARE costs are generally so much more economical than what most employers' plans offer, it takes little encouragement to get retirees to sign up.

Veterans' organizations argue loudly that retirees deserve all they get; and in a sense that is true. But by expanding the number of those eligible for benefits and minimizing the cost to receive those benefits, Congress is short-changing other elements of the defense budget, whether operations -- including training, procurement or research and development programs, that are equally crucial for the troops. During the earlier part of this decade, many Democrats otherwise opposed to defense spending, supported health benefits; if procurement had to be reduced, that did not worry them. Republicans went along, despite pleas from Bush administration officials, and other analysts who recognized that defense health had evolved into nothing other than an entitlement program, akin to Social Security or Medicare. As a result, the long range prospects for meeting even shrunken defense requirements are gloomy, with budget deficits likely to eat away at the defense top line.

The secretary of defense has engaged the deficit commission on the defense health issue. And the joint chiefs have finally come to realize that health care is devouring the rest of the defense budget, and has been doing so for a decade. They too now concede that it is not too much to ask those on active duty to increase their co-pays by the minimal amount that an inflation-based increase would represent. Nor is it outrageous to ask that the family free for TRICARE Prime, be raised from its current minimal level.

It is time that the Congress, and the veterans' organizations that egg it on, take note of the other needs of those who are in active service today, and those who will serve tomorrow. A defense budget that does not begin to rein in defense health costs will overwhelm our ability to buy the guns of today, develop those of tomorrow and furnish the means to operate and maintain them. And that will do neither our troops nor our nation any good now or in the days to come.

There are a thousand stories in an election of this magnitude and perhaps ten thousand prisms through which to analyze it. Here is one of particular parochial interest to me: How did the candidates who had a distinctive voice on civil-military relations (one of my academic specialties) fare?

I counted seven such candidates, four of whom prevailed:

• Democrat Ike Skelton, the current House chair of the Armed Services Committee, lost his re-election race in Missouri's 4th district, as I have already posted. He was one of the most thoughtful members of Congress on civil-military issues, regardless of party. I did not always agree with him, but I always learned something from him.
• Charlie Rangel was re-elected in New York's 15th congressional district. He is better known in the media for his quotability and, of late, his ethical difficulties. But for those of us who follow civil-military relations closely, he is known as the most ardent supporter of reviving the military draft. In my view, his devotion to the draft was partly sincere and partly as a way of expressing opposition to President Bush's national security policies. But I am somewhat in his debt because his efforts directed a small but steady stream of reporters my way asking for comment on the impact of a draft on the so-called gap between the military and U.S. society, and on the propensity to use force.
• Democratic candidate for Senate Joe Sestak lost in Pennsylvania. This was one of the most closely watched races in the country. There were two civil-military angles. First, Sestak, a retired vice-admiral, was the highest ranking military officer in Congress and an important voice on defense issues in the Democratic Party. There are still a few defense-minded Senators left in the Democratic Party (Dianne Feinstein from California, Carl Levin from Michigan, Jack Reed from Rhode Island, and Jim Webb from Virginia, and some others), but there are fewer today than there were yesterday. Second, he wrote an interesting Ph.D. dissertation on civil-military relations and the U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet that I found very helpful when I was doing my own research. (Yes, it is possible to be this parochial while analyzing an election of such national significance. In fact, I can get even more parochial… keep reading).
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It's a bright morning for those of us who favor free trade. Just as fantasy football team owners may follow NFL games with their own peculiar rooting interests, trade aficionados watched certain of yesterday's election races with particular attention.

Depending on which fantasy trade lineup you used, the results fell just short of a clean sweep for trade. The New York Times fantasy team listed Senator-elect Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Senator Harry Reid (D-NV), and Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA) as trade skeptics and they all won. Arguably, though, there was a lot more going on in those races. The story was different for Times House players, however. Democrat Rep. Zack Space in Ohio tried to deploy the China card, and lost. In Colorado, Republican challenger Ryan Frazier tried to link incumbent Democrat Rep. Ed Perlmutter to shipping jobs to China and failed to oust him, despite the broader trend of the election.

The results are even starker if you follow a Foreign Policy scorecard from late September. Max Strasser identified five races in the Midwest in which the trade critic played the "red-menace card" and linked his opponent to China trade. That particular Democrat fantasy team: Ohio Lt. Governor Lee Fisher (running for the Senate); Ohio Governor Ted Strickland (running to keep his job), U.S. Rep. Joe Sestak (running for the Senate in Pennsylvania); Lansing Mayor Virgil Bernero (Michigan gubernatorial candidate); and Illinois State Treasurer Alexi Giannoulias (running for the President Obama's old Senate seat). They were swept last night. 0 for 5.

In many of these races, one could quibble about how important the trade issue really was to the outcome. If there were a single race, though, in which trade emerged as the central issue, it was the race for the Senate in Ohio. Rob Portman, former U.S. Trade Representative, was blasted for his role in pursuing trade agreements and supporting open markets. Or, rather, I should say, 'Senator-elect' Portman was blasted; he won with over 57 percent of the vote, compared to Lee Fisher's 39.

Now that the final rounds of primaries are over and November midterm elections approach, many signs point to huge Republican gains in Congress. Seven weeks is still a long time in politics, so the GOP shouldn't pull a Leon Lett and start celebrating yet. But many independent analysts see a GOP takeover of the House of Representatives as likely, and a potential pick-up of seven or eight seats in the Senate. Such prospects are no doubt causing some serious heartburn in the Obama White House. However, here's a different thought: the Obama administration's national security team should actually welcome major GOP gains in Congress.

While the president's roles as commander-in-chief and diplomat-in-chief give the Executive Branch the lead responsibility on defense and foreign policy, Congress also plays essential parts, especially on spending allocations and scrutiny (in support or opposition) of White House policies. On some of the most important national security issues, a Republican Congress would probably be more supportive of the Obama administration's policies than the current Democratic majorities on the Hill.

Admittedly, foreign policy doesn't seem to be a major concern in the current electoral climate, which is focused on the moribund economy, a dubious health care bill, and the colossal budget deficit. This is certainly the case with the Tea Party movement, and as Peter Baker has described, the Tea Partiers aren't united by any particular foreign policy position.

Nevertheless, the 112th Congress will still have to address a number of national security concerns. If the GOP does take the House and make substantial Senate inroads, here's what it will likely mean for several key issues:

• Afghanistan: Republicans in Congress have generally been more supportive of the Obama administration's troop surge and ongoing deployment in Afghanistan than Democrats (and likewise with the continuing force presence in Iraq). As Afghanistan enters the crucible of the next several months, Congressional Republicans will bring much scrutiny of the administration's policy, but at the end of the day will be much more likely to support and -- crucially -- fund continuing military operations there.
• Iran: Judging by the overwhelming congressional vote in June for tighter economic sanctions on Iran, there is considerable bipartisan concern over Iran's nuclear weapons program and support for confronting it. Yet in the unfortunate but real chance that the sanctions regime fails and some type of military action becomes necessary, congressional Republicans will also be more likely than Democrats to support the administration.
• The Defense Budget: With exploding budget deficits posing a serious threat to the nation's short and long-term economic health, the next Congress will have no choice but to take a hard look and meaningful action on government spending. This will not spare the Pentagon budget, and Defense Secretary Robert Gates is already ahead of the curve in identifying spending cuts and program cancellations. But cutting fat is one thing; cutting muscle and bone is another. When faced with the need to trim the federal budget, congressional Democrats are more likely to prioritize cutting defense over trimming domestic programs. A GOP Congress would be more willing to make deeper cuts in domestic spending while aligning with Secretary Gates' priorities in maintaining a robust defense budget.
• Free Trade: The White House has given lip service, but taken little action, on pushing for congressional ratification of Free Trade Agreements negotiated and signed by the Bush administration with South Korea, Colombia, and Panama. This is partly because of the administration's anemic trade policy, and partly a bow to the political realities of Democratic opposition on the Hill. A GOP Congress would be much more receptive to ratifying these FTAs and supporting other free trade initiatives -- and see whether the administration is willing to translate its words into deeds.

On other national security issues -- terrorism, arms control, China, Russia, democracy and human rights -- a more Republican-leaning Congress would probably bring more scrutiny on certain Obama administration policies. But it is hard to foresee the Hill forcing any dramatic policy changes in those areas (with one wild card being the possible ratification of the New START treaty, which if not completed during this Congress could face renewed scrutiny from new GOP Senators, as Bob Joseph and Eric Edelman point out).

Still, all things considered, if Republicans win big in November, amid the gloomy faces at the White House, there should be a few surreptitious smiles from the national security team.