India

By Daniel Blumenthal

Before President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao released their joint statement, Obama's Asia trip was underwhelming. But after the statement, Obama's foray into Asia went from empty to harmful.

Before Obama arrived in China, the trip's policy successes were minimal at best. He showed up to a major trade forum, APEC, with no trade policy. If, as Evan Feigenbaum has said, the "business of Asia is business," without a trade policy Obama is putting America out of business in the world's most economically dynamic region. And then he was stiffed by Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama's outright rejection of the American proposal for a high-level dialogue to resolve basing issues on Okinawa. Not exactly a sterling performance by the new team.

But then came the joint statement after talks with President Hu. Two items in the statement struck me: one about Taiwan, the other in regard to India.

On Taiwan, the statement says:

The two countries reiterated that the fundamental principle of respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity is at the core of the three U.S.-China joint communiqués which guide U.S.-China relations. Neither side supports any attempts by any force to undermine this principle. The two sides agreed that respecting each other's core interests is extremely important to ensure steady progress in U.S.-China relations.

The three communiqués do indeed mention respect for territorial integrity. But it is highly arguable that "respect for ... sovereignty and territorial integrity" represent the "core" of the understandings that led to Sino-American rapprochement. The Taiwan issue was treated more delicately by earlier American statesmen. Their basic idea was that we would acknowledge, without accepting, the position that Taiwan is part of China. We would continue strong, unofficial diplomatic ties with the island and we would provide for its security through the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). We thus found a way to normalize relations with China without letting China have its way with Taiwan. Both sides of the Strait have prospered since the U.S. rapprochement with China and the signing into law of the TRA and relations have been more or less peaceful.

Now consider the situation across the Strait today. China has built a military capable of destroying the island if America does not assist Taiwan. Though obligated by law, the Obama administration has not sold a single weapon system to Taiwan. There is in fact no U.S.-Taiwan agenda under the Obama administration. It is even more dangerous, then, to stress the parts of the Sino-American normalization documents that most appeal to China. Of course China wants us to reiterate that our respect for "territorial integrity" and "sovereignty" is at the core of the three communiqués. Beijing wants us to accept its argument that Taiwan is part of China and that we should respect their sovereignty over the island. Obama has thus far done so through deed. With the joint statement he comes closer to officially accepting the Chinese claim of sovereignty.

On India, the joint statement says: 

The two sides welcomed all efforts conducive to peace, stability and development in South Asia. They support the efforts of Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight terrorism, maintain domestic stability and achieve sustainable economic and social development, and support the improvement and growth of relations between India and Pakistan. The two sides are ready to strengthen communication, dialogue and cooperation on issues related to South Asia and work together to promote peace, stability and development in that region.

Here, President Obama broke new ground in ways harmful to both American and Indian interests. India and Japan are the two countries within Asia that can check China's desired dominance. For now, China has less to worry about with Japan as the Hatayoma government sorts through its foreign policies. But India is a different matter. It stood firm against China's pressure when the Dalai Lama visited Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian territory claimed by China. Delhi was sending two messages. First, do not interfere in India's internal affairs; the Dalai Lama is free to visit anywhere in India. Second, Arunachal Pradesh is India's territory. China had been putting military pressure on the border region but the Indians did not back down. Delhi is also standing firm in its maritime competition with China in the Indian Ocean. The Indian Navy will not allow China to build a sphere of influence in that maritime region.

Beijing's India strategy is to tie it down in South Asia to stop it from breaking out as a major power. The strategy has three basic pillars. First, Beijing has supported Pakistan's nuclear and conventional military programs. Second, China wants an acknowledged sphere of influence in South Asia. And third, Beijing wants to resurrect the so called "hyphenated" approach to India. It thus needs the United States to again think of India as part of an India-Pakistan problem, rather than as an emerging great power.

During the Bush and Clinton administrations, Delhi and Washington negotiated an arrangement that acknowledged Delhi's global role and increasing influence. This arrangement is of mutual benefit. Pakistan matters less to India as Delhi expands its strategic horizons. As Pakistan's importance to India lessons, so will Indian-Pakistani tensions. But as India frees itself from the weight of its Pakistan problem it has greater maneuverability to increase its influence in East Asia. China is threatened by that.

Thus, China won a diplomatic victory by getting Washington to agree to "cooperate" on issues of peace and development in South Asia. If China and America work together on South Asian issues, such as peace between India and Pakistan, then China is the great power while India is simply another South Asian country that needs help from others to solve its problems. With the joint statement, Obama officially accorded India junior status in Asia.

We should not be surprised by China's positions. What is surprising -- and extremely problematic -- is that on these key issues Obama is acquiescing in them.

FREDERIC J. BROWN/AFP/Getty Images

By Will Inboden

Surprise?

If one year ago on Election Day someone would have told me that the same President Obama whose campaign promised to repair America's global image would spend his first year in office visibly rejecting human rights and democracy promotion, I would not have believed it. Though I and many others have commented on this previously, it still ranks as the biggest surprise (and biggest disappointment) of his foreign policy thus far. Especially since America's historic commitment to human rights and democracy promotion has been one of its greatest soft power assets and sources of global goodwill.

Praiseworthy?

One thing worthy of praise is the administration's emerging Africa policy. President Obama's speech in Ghana was an admirable call for improved governance, reduced corruption, growth through enterprise, and African responsibility for Africa's future -- and it could not have been delivered by a more effective messenger.

Constructive Criticism?

One growing worry is the Obama administration's shaky relations with the Great Powers which -- whether from poor personal chemistry or divergent interests -- could significantly hinder U.S. leverage going forward on several fronts. U.S.-Japan relations are near their worst in a generation (though the Obama administration was dealt a tough hand with the DPJ's election victory). The chill between Sarkozy and Obama is also hurting U.S. relations with France. Russia has thus far offered no significant reciprocal gestures for the U.S. capitulation on missile defense. Obama enjoys little chemistry with Gordon Brown (though to be fair, few leaders do) and has signaled indifference towards the U.S.-UK Special Relationship. U.S.-Germany ties are strong but will soon be tested by Germany's economic relationship with Iran. The Obama administration's China policy is too focused on financing U.S. debt while not pressing China to play a more constructive role on North Korea and Iran's nuclear weapons programs. And while the administration is atoning for its early neglect of India by hosting Prime Minister Singh soon for a state visit, the U.S.-India relationship will need consistent and high level attention in order to reach its potential -- attention that it is not clear the White House will maintain, especially if doing so incurs China's displeasure.  

MICHEL EULER/AFP/Getty Images

By Dan Twining

The Indian elections beginning today will be the largest organized activity in human history (always true of Indian elections given the country's growing population). As many as 714 million eligible voters will be marking ballots for a new Indian parliament that will convene in June. The scale of this election is staggering: There are close to 1 million polling stations, 6 million deployed security personnel, and over 1,000 registered parties whose candidates are contesting 543 parliamentary constituencies.

Given democracy's roots in the ancient Greek republic, with its limited franchise and miniscule population, a national election on this scale is historic. It is also normal and unsurprising. It is hard to imagine how else India could be governed, given its scope and diversity (as opposed to its equally big northern neighbor, where 90 percent of the population is Han Chinese).

The history of Indian elections shows that prediction is a fool's game; Indian voters have constantly surprised pollsters, politicians, and pundits alike, and they may well do so again this time around. With that in mind, here are a few markers by which to make sense of this election and what to expect from it.

National vs. regional parties

India's pan-national Congress party has been in secular decline. Since 2004 it has governed India with just over a quarter of seats in Parliament thanks to alliances with smaller regional parties. The other national party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), is polling at or below this threshold. This means that for either party to govern will require alliances with regional parties, with varying and diverse agendas and a focus on leveraging their roles as kingmakers.

One way to predict whether Congress or the BJP will govern is to assess the prospects of their likely coalition partners. At the moment, the BJP's regional allies look to be in more trouble than those of Congress. But Congress bears the burden of incumbency: The BJP was predicted to win the elections in 2004 but lost power in part because of voters' desire for change, a pattern that recurred in state elections last November. And despite the impeccable pedigree of its prime minister, the Congress-led government has utterly failed to implement further economic reform, calling into question its governing credentials.

A Third Front?

If regional parties do too well, India faces the prospect of a government led not by one of the national parties but by a coalition of regional parties. In one scenario, such a coalition would enjoy the support of Congress or the BJP. In a more interesting scenario, such a coalition would exclude either national party.

The primary pretender to lead what is called a Third Front in the second scenario is Kumari Mayawati, Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh (population: 185 million), and a Dalit outcaste whose ascendancy would be revolutionary in a political system where upper-caste, Western-educated elites have dominated. Interestingly, India's foreign policy would likely not change much in such a scenario given the strength of the bureaucracy. But the impact on the Indian economy could be significant -- and negative -- if a Mayawati-led government pursued a populist agenda of extending government affirmative-action programs into the private sector.

Rural vs. urban India and the question of economic reform

India's economy has grown at an average annual rate of 9 percent since 2004, a growth rate that produces dramatic social change. Indeed, The Economist and other observers judge the Indian middle class to be as large as the population of the entire United States. Redistricting also makes this national election the first in which India's expanding urban population will punch its weight electorally. The BJP's modernizers have attempted to redefine the party's identity away from an exclusive Hindu nationalism toward one that emphasizes economic reform and competence, appealing to the urban middle class that values these qualities. In some respects, Congress has moved in the opposite direction, putting in place extensive rural welfare schemes and showering money on Indian farmers.

This is astute, because 65 percent of Indian voters still live in rural areas. It was rural voters that turned the BJP out of office in 2004 in a backlash against its "India Shining" campaign: How can India rise as a world power when it has more people living in absolute poverty than all of Sub-Saharan Africa? On the other hand, widespread, rapid economic growth premised on aggressive liberalization and infrastructure development is more likely than government welfare schemes to pull rural India out of poverty.

Security

Beyond pocketbook issues and local concerns, security threats -- Indians are the world's leading victims of terrorism -- could impact the elections. Conventional wisdom that the 11/26 Mumbai terrorist attack would benefit the BJP's harder line on security was upended when multiple state elections held only days later saw the BJP underperform and Congress do rather well. On relations with Pakistan, the hard-line BJP can claim a Nixon-to-China quality: it was the last BJP prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who launched Indo-Pakistani rapprochement at a groundbreaking summit in Lahore in 1999, and it was current BJP leader L.K. Advani who recently was savaged within his party for going back to Lahore to praise the vision for peace of Pakistan's founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah.

In its favor, the current Congress government made important progress in back-channel negotiations with Islamabad before the Mumbai attacks, which emanated from Pakistan, and has shown remarkable restraint thereafter. But militant attacks across the Line of Control in Kashmir have tripled this spring, and cities like Mumbai and Delhi are braced for election-season terrorism. The Naxalite insurgency that afflicts vast tracts of the Indian heartland, identified by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as the country's gravest national security challenge, could also affect the vote: Only yesterday, insurgents conducted a "triple strike" in Jharkhand and Bihar that Indian's Home Minister described as an attempt to disrupt the elections. Which political party can best claim to boost Indians' prosperity while strengthening their security against these dangers?

What's not on the table 

As important as what Indian political candidates are running on is what they aren't. U.S.-India relations are not an election issue, reflecting the widespread consensus among all but the far left of the political spectrum that a cooperative relationship of equals with the United States can only benefit a rising India. Polling shows that the civilian-nuclear deal was popular even in rural Indian villages -- not because farmers understood the technical details but because partnering with the United States to make India more prosperous and powerful is inherently attractive at all levels of society.

Nor is Islamic extremism a compelling election issue in the sense that radical Islamist parties are contesting the elections on platforms of sharia law and anti-Westernism/anti-modernism of the kind that impact elections in countries like Pakistan and Indonesia. Such parties are absent from the Indian election outside Jammu and Kashmir, and there, Islamists either boycott elections -- or lose them.

Nonetheless, big issues are at stake in India's elections. A weak coalition government will find it hard to move on economic reform, potentially condemning the Indian poor to another generation of grinding rural entrapment and constraining India's great power rise. A government of ideologically and politically diverse parties will find it hard to define an agenda that makes India an active leader in international politics -- rather than a country that remains, in some respects, insular and unwilling or unable to assume international responsibilities on issues like climate change.

A Congress-led government in which Manmohan Singh serves only as a placeholder leader until the ascendance to the prime ministership of Rahul Gandhi, scion of India's first family, will reinforce the dynastic quality of Indian political life. A BJP-led government in which the party's sectarian warriors rather than its economic modernizers hold the upper hand could foment communal discord within Indian society in ways that artificially and ahistorically divide its Hindu and Muslim communities, creating an opening for radicalization and sectarian violence.

Amid all this uncertainty, however, one thing in clear: When the votes are counted on May 16, not only Indians will be watching; the world will be too.

By Dan Twining

Today is the 50^th anniversary of the Lhasa uprising. Much of the associated commentary suggests that Tibet is, at most, an internal human rights issue in China, albeit one that impacts China's foreign relations with Western democracies who care about the plight of the Tibetan people. Indeed, the Dalai Lama's admission that Tibet is part of China, and that he seeks true autonomy rather than actual independence for his people, reaffirm this view. There is also, however, an external dimension to the Tibetan crisis, one that implicates core national security interests of nuclear-armed great powers.

This is the role Tibet's dispensation plays in the conflict between China and India. Indian strategist C. Raja Mohan puts it bluntly: "When there is relative tranquility in Tibet, India and China have reasonably good relations. When Sino-Tibetan tensions rise, India's relationship with China heads south." Although not widely recognized in the West, the nexus of Tibet and the unresolved border conflict between China and India ranks with the Taiwan Strait and Korean peninsula among Asia's leading flashpoints.

Contrary to Chinese propaganda, Tibet was not traditionally a part of China. Over the centuries, relations between China and Tibet were characterized by varying degrees of association spanning the spectrum from sovereignty to suzerainty to independence. The People's Liberation Army invaded Tibet in the middle of the last century precisely because Tibetans did not consent to Beijing's rule.

For its part, prior to Indian independence, then-British India vigorously supported Tibetan autonomy and sponsored the Himalayan kingdoms of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, and Ladakh to create an expansive geographic buffer between China and the subcontinent. John Garver's excellent history of Sino-Indian rivalry contains useful maps depicting a rump China and an expansive Indian subcontinent separated by a vast, autonomous Tibet, demonstrating how far apart were India and China geographically until Chinese unification by the Communist Party several years after Indian independence gave them a common border.

That common border has since been a source of conflict. As is well known, India and China went to war over their territorial dispute in 1962, ending the era of what Indian Prime Minister Nehru called "Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai" ("Indians and Chinese are brothers"). What is less well known in the West is that China, while subsequently resolving 17 of its 18 outstanding land border disputes with neighboring countries, has kept the territorial conflict with India alive, at times appearing to inflame the issue as a source of leverage over New Delhi.

Over the past two years, Chinese officials have publicly asserted Chinese claims to the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which some Chinese military advisors and strategists refer to as "Southern Tibet." Chinese forces have periodically engaged in small-scale cross-border encroachments, destroying Indian military bunkers and patrol bases in Ladakh and Sikkim.

At the same time, China has been systematically constructing road and rail networks across the Tibetan plateau in ways that tilt the balance of forces along the contested frontier in China's favor; India has responded with infrastructure projects of its own, including roads and air fields, to enable military reinforcement of its border regions, but has failed to keep pace with its northern neighbor. China has also positioned large numbers of military and security forces on the Tibetan plateau, mainly with an eye on suppressing popular unrest. But the possibility of using them to "teach India a lesson" (as in 1962) remains.

Indian pundits note that public reminders from Beijing of China's decisive victory over India in the 1962 war have spiked over the past year, sending what Indians believe is a clear signal to New Delhi at a time of rising tensions. Combined with China's reported deployment in Tibet of nuclear missiles targeting India, officials in New Delhi feel increasingly alarmed in the face of Chinese provocation.  In striking statements little noted in the West, both Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and respected former National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra recently warned China against any attempt to seize Indian-held territory along their contested border.

Surging border tensions may be related to worries in Beijing over the Dalai Lama's succession. Some of the holiest sites in Tibetan Buddhism, including the sacred monastery at Tawang, are in Indian-held territory. The Dalai Lama, who has been in poor health, has said that he would not feel obligated to nominate a successor from, or be reborn in, Tibet proper, raising the possibility that the next Dalai Lama could be named outside China -- in the Tibetan cultural belt that stretches across northern India into Bhutan and Nepal.

Some Indian strategists fear that China may act to preempt, or respond to, an announcement of the Dalai Lama's chosen successor in India - particularly in Tawang -- by deploying the People's Liberation Army to occupy contested territory along the Sino-Indian border, as occurred in 1962, creating a risk of military conflict between the now nuclear-armed Asian giants.

Although China enjoys the dominant military position in the Tibetan plateau, India still has cards to play. It hosts the Dalai Lama's government-in-exile in Dharamsala, enabling Tibet's representatives to keep their cause alive in the court of world opinion. And unlike Britain -- which last October withdrew its recognition of China's "suzerainty" (in favor of "sovereignty") over Tibet in a failed effort to placate Beijing, leading one scornful Singaporean commentator to note that China was "bringing Europe to its knees" -- India continues to recognize only Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, rather than full and consensual sovereignty. This creates the possibility that New Delhi could play a "Tibet card" in its relations with Beijing in the same way that China accuses the United States of playing a "Taiwan card" to keep it off balance.

What do Sino-Indian border tensions linked to the Tibetan cause mean for the United States?

First, the U.S. has a compelling interest in preventing conflict between one of its largest trading partners and its newfound strategic partner.

Second, historic U.S. support for the cause of human rights in Tibet, in addition to Washington's growing military ties with New Delhi, mean that the United States would find it difficult to be a neutral arbiter in such a conflict.

Third, India's continuing political and moral support for the Tibetan government-in-exile demonstrates that it shares with America a set of ideals in foreign policy, creating the basis for greater values-based cooperation between Washington and New Delhi - a prospect that has not gone unnoticed in Beijing.

Fourth, given China's development of military capabilities designed to threaten U.S. access to the Western Pacific and Southeast Asian waterways, Chinese pressure on U.S. friends including the Philippines and Vietnam to back down on claims to contested islets in the South China Sea, and Chinese harassment of the U.S. Navy in Asian waters, Washington has an important interest in making perfectly clear to Beijing that the use of force to resolve contested territorial claims or limit freedom of the seas is unacceptable -- and could upend rather than facilitate China's peaceful rise.

By Dan Twining

In 1998, President Clinton flew over Japan without stopping to spend nine days in China. This led to acute concern in Tokyo over "Japan passing" -- the belief that Washington was neglecting a key Asian ally in favor of the region's rising star, China. Is the same thing happening today -- not with Japan, destination of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's first overseas trip, but with India?

The construction of a strategic partnership with India was arguably President Bush's signal foreign policy accomplishment. Decades of estrangement between the world's largest democracies gave way to a strategic breakthrough akin to President Nixon's visit to China in 1972. Senior Bush administration officials believed that India could emerge as America's most important international partner over coming decades, given India's growing capabilities and a congruence of interests in defeating global terrorism, managing China's rise, sustaining an open global economy, and securing our common values. 

For its part, the government of Manmohan Singh literally put its survival on the line for the United States, subjecting itself to a confidence vote in parliament in order to move forward with the civil nuclear cooperation agreement. Few other countries -- including America's closest allies -- have passed such a test.

But signs of trouble in U.S.-India relations emerged early on Barack Obama's road to the White House. As a Senator, he offered a killer amendment to restrict nuclear fuel supply to India during consideration of the civilian-nuclear agreement, which the Bush administration and India's supporters in Congress had to work hard to defeat. 

During the presidential campaign, he revealed that he had asked Bill Clinton to consider serving as a special envoy for Kashmir in an Obama administration, alarming Indians in the way that Americans might be alarmed if the European Union offered to send a senior envoy to mediate between Mexico and the United States over the status of Texas. 

Candidate Obama also pledged, if elected, to push for U.S. ratification and global entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This issue, more than any other, divided the United States and India in the 1990s, especially when the United States and China -- which had helped sponsor Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs targeting India -- ganged up on India at the United Nations to press it to accept the test ban.

Following Obama's election, Indian officials lobbied hard to exclude India from inclusion in Richard Holbrooke's mandate as Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (first "and Kashmir," then "and related matters" were dropped from his notional title with Indian prodding). Senior officials in New Delhi worried that formally including India in Holbrooke's Afghanistan-Pakistan portfolio would lead to inevitable U.S. pressure on India (intensified by Holbrooke's talent as a negotiator) to make concessions to Pakistan even as elements of its security apparatus were judged to have been complicit in the 11/26 terrorist attacks in Mumbai.

India's worries were intensified when the new administration excluded India from its inaugural list of foreign policy partners and priorities, despite references to other Asian powers, including Pakistan, Afghanistan, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and China. And Indian diplomats were dumbfounded when Prime Minister Singh was not among the first two dozen world leaders to receive an introductory phone call from President Obama. Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Chinese President Hu Jintao, among others, did.

Secretary Clinton deserves enormous credit for making her inaugural official trip to Asia. But the original Policy Planning Staff transition memo suggesting such a visit included India along with Japan, South Korea, China, and Indonesia in its recommended itinerary. What happened?  No senior U.S. official can go everywhere, especially across the vast expanse of Eurasia. But skipping New Delhi only reinforced an Indian perception of U.S. coolness.

The Bush administration made a conceptual and bureaucratic breakthrough in considering India to be part of wider Asia, rather than relegating it to its tough neighborhood on the subcontinent. As Senior Director for East Asia at the NSC, Mike Green included India in his portfolio as part of a conscious strategy of making India a key player in East Asia's evolution. To his credit, the current Senior Director, Jeff Bader, reportedly has done the same thing, although, because he is a China specialist, Indian elites do not expect his equal attention.

So who will have the India account in the Obama administration? Arguably, in the ancien regime, Bush himself was India's biggest booster, which in turn led Secretary Rice to devote considerable time and energy to building the relationship, with day-to-day management by Undersecretary of State Nick Burns and then his successor, Bill Burns. In the current line-up, the president does not appear to hold a particular brief for India. Though her presidential candidacy enjoyed strong support from the Indian-American community, Secretary Clinton seems focused on East Asia. At a traveling press conference this week, her press secretary reportedly dismissed one reporter's inquiries with the declaration, "No questions about India." 

Does this mean that the Obama administration is putting India back into its subcontinental box? Undersecretary of State Bill Burns in theory still has the India account at State. But he has lost his office space in the Secretary's suite to Deputy Secretary Jacob Lew, and there are reports of early tussles with Holbrooke over seniority and access. Indeed, Holbrooke was the first senior American official to visit New Delhi. In addition to praising Indian restraint after the Mumbai attacks, he again called for India to reduce tensions with Pakistan.

The Obama administration is right to frame the problems of Pakistan and Afghanistan in their regional context. But India can be part of the solution rather than part of the problem. India has enormous equities in the construction of a democratic state in Afghanistan. It has contributed substantial development assistance, built infrastructure, and trained Afghan civil servants. New Delhi has long wanted to do more, but Washington's Pakistan-centric bureaucracy resisted. Given the growing challenge of getting Afghanistan right, it may be time to ask India to step up, in police training and other areas.

More generally, it's worth keeping in mind that the Bush administration's de-hyphenation of India and Pakistan policy, after decades of Pakistan-centricity in the U.S. approach to South Asia, created a range of new strategic possibilities -- including the most substantial progress ever made between India and Pakistan in back-channel negotiations over a Kashmir settlement. 

Today, victory in Afghanistan is critical, as is preventing Pakistan's Talibanization or economic collapse. But democratic India, destined to surpass China as the world's most populous country and to emerge as the world's third-largest economy within several decades, is the region's big strategic prize, an essential partner for the United States in promoting a more peaceful, prosperous, and liberal world. India's people also hold the United States in high regard. As the Obama administration finds its feet, it will want to invest in this potentially transformative relationship, even as it necessarily fights fires elsewhere in South Asia.