Human Rights

By Kori Schake

The Iraqi Parliament has passed a law that will allow elections to proceed in January, and on terms that will make Iraqi politicians more accountable to Iraqi voters and foster continued stabilization of the Iraqi political landscape. This is a huge step forward in the democratization of Iraq; what a pity our own government sees it largely in terms of facilitating our withdrawal from the country.

The United Nations had said last Thursday was the deadline for a law to be passed if elections were to remain on schedule. Many Iraq watchers feared once the deadline had been breached, no law would be forthcoming and elections indefinitely postponed. Some even argued Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was seeking to derail an election law to remain in power in a "soft coup."  But the Parliament acted and Faraj al-Haidari, the head of Iraq's Independent High Electoral Commission, has now confirmed to the Associated Press that the election will be held within a week of the original Jan. 16 date (the Constitution requires only that national elections be held in January).

Two thorny issues required solutions before the law could be passed: how to account for changing demographics in Kirkuk, and whether voters would cast ballots for parties or individuals. Both came to solutions that strengthen democracy in Iraq.

Kirkuk is a northern city from which Kurdish residents were purged during Saddam Hussein's rule. They have returned in large numbers since. Kurdish leaders explain the influx as displaced people returning to their homes.  Others, especially local Turkmen and Arabs, suspect Kurds are "creating facts on the ground" for an eventual claim on Kirkuk's oil, should they secede from Iraq. There has not been a census to establish voter roles, increasing suspicions. But Iraqi legislators found a principled compromise: Kirkuk will be treated just like all other places, with a review only in the event of a large voter increase. There will be no seats assigned to sectarian communities (a proposition that had figured prominently in the negotiations). Both Kurds and Arabs are claiming victory, which has to be a good sign.

Many successful democracies have "closed list" elections, where voters cast their ballots for a political party rather than a candidate. Germany, for example, has a two ballot system, the first for an individual candidate, the second for a party to which additional seats will be allotted. But in countries with ethnic or sectarian divides, such as Iraq, this structure of voting deepens divisions rather than encouraging candidates to broaden their political appeal.

The Iraqi Parliament chose open lists so voters choose candidates rather than parties. Significant credit for this outcome goes to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, Iraq's central religious figure, who supported this tighter accountability. His beneficial shaping of the Iraqi political landscape from its margins stands in stark contrast to the dictatorship of Ayatollahs in Iran. Iraqi voters can decide whether party standard bearers merit office, weakening parties and rewarding good governance at the local level. An open list will likely extend the time of government formation, but it is crucial in helping Iraq's nascent democracy get beyond sectarian voting blocs an into a more fluid and policy-based governing coalition.

When I was in Iraq a few weeks ago, it was striking how proud Iraqis are to have held free and fair elections, especially the Jan. 2009 provincial elections in which incumbents were tossed out in large numbers. Nearly all mention the contrast to Iran's elections last summer and Afghanistan's this fall. Passage of the election law and the positive political dynamic that has Iraqis opting in to political wrangling as the means of addressing their disputes bodes very well for Iraq's future.

What is less clear is whether the Obama administration understands the value of a long-term strategic partnership with a democratic Iraq that will be the lodestar of representative government in the Middle East. On the basis statements made by the president and Ambassador Hill, I believe they do not. Instead of playing the end game of our military presence in Iraq in ways that stabilize Iraq and make us a valuable long-term partner, the administration seems only to see the value of getting out of Iraq.

President Obama said, "This agreement advances the political progress that can bring lasting peace and unity to Iraq and allow for the orderly and responsible transition of American combat troops out of Iraq by next September." Ambassador Hill went even further in emphasizing the importance of the election law for our timetable. "What is important is that with the election law, we are very much on schedule for the drawdown," Hill said. This denigrates the importance of Iraq's achievement for Iraqis.

Emphasizing the president's timeline for drawdown does not stabilize Iraq's political landscape. It was important for Iraqis that we meet our obligations in the Security Agreement President Bush signed in 2008. Withdrawing from the cities last June confirmed for Iraqis we respect their sovereignty and abide by our obligations to them. But the bombings of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry in August, and the bombings of the Iraqi Interior and Justice Ministries in October have given many Iraqis pause to reconsider whether their security forces can handle the threats the enemies of a successful Iraq pose. Now is a time to reassure Iraqis we will support them as they want to be supported, and will be a partner in their long term success.

The September 2010 end of combat operations is an American deadline, committed to by President Obama but not obligated in any agreement with Iraqis. Conditions in Iraq should be the basis for determining the pace of our drawdown, but the president's comments today reinforce yet again his is a timeline not a conditions-based withdrawal. In a delicate political season for Iraqis, our government should be reinforcing Iraq's success, not subordinating it to the president's political convenience.

AHMAD AL-RUBAYE/AFP/Getty Images

By Michael Green

Surprises?

The biggest (most pleasant) surprise on Asia has been the Obama administration's willingness to use pressure on North Korea. After campaigning on a promise to meet with the leaders of nations like North Korea without conditions, the Obama White House has turned out to be quite hard line vis-à-vis Pyongyang.

Of course, it would be difficult to miss the obvious failure of Ambassador Chris Hill's conciliatory negotiating style at the end of the Bush administration -- let alone the fact that North Korea responded to President Obama's initial promises of engagement by detonating a second nuclear device. Still, in the case of North Korea the administration seems to have embraced the premise that there must be consequences for proliferators.

The administration has moved forward smartly with implementation of sanctions under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874 (unlike the Bush administration's decision not to implement UNSCR 1718 after the first nuclear test) and thus far the Special Envoy for North Korea has refused to sit down with the North Koreans until they first agree to return to the Six Party Talks. Even the visit of former President Clinton to Pyongyang was done with most of the administration holding its nose and limiting the mission to the humanitarian goal of bringing home two American journalists taken by the North. We will see how long this holds, but for now the administration looks pretty tough.

Praiseworthy?

The Obama administration deserves praise for its selection of an Asia team. There were more than 60 "advisors" on Asia to the Obama campaign (close to the total number of advisors for the entire world working with McCain). Most of these advisors were calling for wholesale changes in Asia policy, echoing the usual canards about the Bush administration's "unilateralism" and "militarism." But in the end, the top jobs in NSC, State and Defense were filled by non-partisan centrists and pragmatists who recognized the successes of the Bush administration's Asia strategy and wanted to tweak rather than redefine the U.S. approach to the region. Better yet, the top officials at State, NSC and DOD are associated with the successes of the Clinton administration's Asia policy, including the revitalization of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the successful negotiations to bring China into the WTO. The team is professional, knowledgeable and very reassuring to the region.

Constructive Criticism?

The administration deserves criticism on two fronts. The complete lack of a trade strategy leaves the United States without any tools to counter the growth of exclusive regional economic arrangements within Asia. This will become obvious when Obama travels to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in two weeks and calls for an open and inclusive architecture like his predecessors -- only his predecessors actually were bringing something to the table in terms of trade liberalizing agreements with Korea and other countries in the region. The second area of criticism would be the administration's willingness to pull punches on human rights and democracy. The president's decision not to meet the Dalai Lama in Washington in August (the first rebuff to the Tibetan Spiritual Leader by a U.S. President in recent memory) was particularly problematic.

Predictions?

The Obama administration will grow tired of China. Obama expanded the Bush administration's Strategic Economic Dialogue into a Strategic and Economic Dialogue and raised expectations of progress with Beijing on everything from climate change to Iran and North Korea. But in the wake of the financial crisis Beijing sees itself as externally stronger and internally more vulnerable. That is not a recipe for more cooperation with Washington. Chinese support for North Korea's economy is increasing in the wake of Pyongyang's nuclear test and China will be relying on coal for 80 percent of its energy no matter how well discussions of climate change cooperation go (and they are not going that well). Then there is the unyielding PLA position on the South China Sea, cyber-security and a host of other security problems that will vex the Obama administration's China policy over the coming years. Usually, new administrations come into power in Washington having talked themselves into a tense relationship with Beijing during the election campaign and then they adjust to a more centrist and stable relationship with China (true of Regan, Carter, Clinton and G.W. Bush). The Obama administration came in without having engaged in a contentious debate over China policy with McCain, but may now find itself under increasing pressure to be tough with Beijing.

Photo by Korean Central Television/Yonhap via Getty Images

By Dov Zakheim

Surprise?

I was surprised by the administration's deliberate downplaying of human rights issues. One might have expected a Democratic administration to emphasize such concerns rather than to pursue policies that are often ascribed to realist Republicans.

On the other hand, given the president's deliberate and sustained outreach to states with whom America's relations have been chilly at best, all of which have terrible human rights records, perhaps the decision not to mention those rights is not really surprising at all.

Mario Tama/Getty Images

By Will Inboden

Surprise?

If one year ago on Election Day someone would have told me that the same President Obama whose campaign promised to repair America's global image would spend his first year in office visibly rejecting human rights and democracy promotion, I would not have believed it. Though I and many others have commented on this previously, it still ranks as the biggest surprise (and biggest disappointment) of his foreign policy thus far. Especially since America's historic commitment to human rights and democracy promotion has been one of its greatest soft power assets and sources of global goodwill.

Praiseworthy?

One thing worthy of praise is the administration's emerging Africa policy. President Obama's speech in Ghana was an admirable call for improved governance, reduced corruption, growth through enterprise, and African responsibility for Africa's future -- and it could not have been delivered by a more effective messenger.

Constructive Criticism?

One growing worry is the Obama administration's shaky relations with the Great Powers which -- whether from poor personal chemistry or divergent interests -- could significantly hinder U.S. leverage going forward on several fronts. U.S.-Japan relations are near their worst in a generation (though the Obama administration was dealt a tough hand with the DPJ's election victory). The chill between Sarkozy and Obama is also hurting U.S. relations with France. Russia has thus far offered no significant reciprocal gestures for the U.S. capitulation on missile defense. Obama enjoys little chemistry with Gordon Brown (though to be fair, few leaders do) and has signaled indifference towards the U.S.-UK Special Relationship. U.S.-Germany ties are strong but will soon be tested by Germany's economic relationship with Iran. The Obama administration's China policy is too focused on financing U.S. debt while not pressing China to play a more constructive role on North Korea and Iran's nuclear weapons programs. And while the administration is atoning for its early neglect of India by hosting Prime Minister Singh soon for a state visit, the U.S.-India relationship will need consistent and high level attention in order to reach its potential -- attention that it is not clear the White House will maintain, especially if doing so incurs China's displeasure.  

MICHEL EULER/AFP/Getty Images

By Christian Brose

Going back to that Foreign Policy Initiative conference I mentioned earlier, I was particularly intrigued by the discussion of democracy promotion between Ken Wollack (president of the National Democratic Institute) and Elliott Abrams (formerly Bush's deputy national security advisor, now with the Council on Foreign Relations). Not surprisingly, they spent most of their time on whether the United States should promote democracy and less time on how to do it. But in the current debate, the two seem pretty linked: After the Bush administration, many people think we don't know how to promote democracy and thus question whether we should do it.

It's a tricky question. After all, democracy is not like, say, disease, where one output (medicine) is likely to achieve the desired outcome (health). There are so many contingent factors that go into democratization, and it's not clear which of these factors -- economic development, a rising middle class, anti-corruption programs, improvements in basic security and rule of law, outside support for democracy activists, external pressure on autocratic governments to reform, free elections, among other factors -- gets a country to democracy. And that's to say nothing about what influence and role an external actor like the United States can have on another country's democratization.

So how exactly do we promote democracy? I put this question to Elliott Abrams, and here is his response:

The United States is not without useful experience in helping foreign democracy activists, and helping governments that are trying to democratize. Some of the expertise resides in the National Endowment for Democracies and the two party institutes, the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute. Some resides in Foreign Service personnel who have served in posts where this was a major issue, and have seen what works and what does not. So the first part of an answer is to involve people who have worked on this on the ground, pragmatically. 

Sounds simple. But the State Department does not greatly value such expertise; it is most often not very "career-enhancing" because it often involves tangling with your ambassador or deputy chief of mission, your USAID mission director, and the local government. State most often pursues smooth relations with other countries, and pushing for democracy through backing local dissidents is not the path to that over-valued goal. We need less to discover, from scratch, what works, than to harness the knowledge that exists in various corners of the U.S. government. The failure to do this -- for example, at the Foreign Service Institute -- and teach it to Foreign Service  officers is scandalous.

It is hard to generalize about what does work. Societies are not like bodies, to use your analogy -- all fundamentally alike. In some situations, free elections are the best path forward, and our role is mostly pressure and activism to guarantee the integrity of elections. In other cases, there will not soon be elections, and all we can do is try to protect dissidents -- by meeting them, championing them, visiting them in prison, helping their families, advertising their situation. I do believe, as President Bush did, that elections are often transforming events (not least if they are stolen!) and should not be delayed until all conditions are ideal -- the sequentialist view. But there is no playbook that works in all situations; there is only the accrued experiences of success and failure. 

I would say that always and everywhere we should make our position clear, backing peaceful democracy activists (as Bush said in his Prague speech). I reject the view that we need to be silent about abuses, or very quiet about them -- the view that seemed widespread in the Obama Administration as it reacted to Iran after the June elections. Our comments about stolen elections, or the safety of jailed activists, or the trials of dissidents, are always helpful.

By Christian Brose

What's so puzzling about the news that the Obama administration is taking fire from human rights and democracy groups (and Will Inboden!) for slighting these issues is that it's an entirely self-inflicted wound. And this at a time when Obama and company are dealing with more than their fair share of problems not of their own making. What's more, they easily could have turned this entire issue to their advantage by following their own argument for engagement to its logical conclusion. Imagine if Obama (or Clinton) had said the following:

"When Ronald Reagan negotiated with the Soviet Union, he always had a multi-part agenda, and human rights was always on it. He pushed Soviet leaders to end their aggressive foreign policy in the same conversations that he urged them to unclench their grip on the oppressed peoples within their empire. Reagan wasn't afraid to talk, and he certainly wasn't afraid to talk about human rights and democracy. I'm not either. I'll engage with any leader if I believe it will advance our national interests, and where I disagree with how those leaders treat the people they govern, I'll use my personal engagement to push for change. I'll do so in public and in private, with non-democratic partners and autocratic adversaries. America's interests demand that we do business with all kinds of regimes, but we'll never check our values at their door as the cost of doing it. We can promote our security while also supporting our ideals. That goes for our treatment of people we detain on the battlefield and our engagement with governments that violate the basic rights of their citizens."

Would the administration agree with something like this and act on it? I'd assume so, but I can't say, and that's the problem. Instead of being on the offensive on issues that are the source of their greatest strength, the administration finds itself in the utterly bizarre and unenviable position of trying to convince its friends, let alone its critics, that President Barack Hussein Obama actually does care about human rights and democracy.