Even before Hugo Chavez revealed he is battling cancer, his political star was on the wane in Latin America. More and more, voters in the region have simply realized that class warfare, polarization, and centralization of power are not prescriptions for economic growth and political stability. (As a case in point, Peruvian President Ollanta Humala, a one-time Chavez acolyte, couldn't run away fast enough from the Venezuelan leader during his recent successful campaign - even if he had no qualms about taking Chavez's cash.)

Still, the fading appeal of the Chavista model is of cold comfort to those still suffering under radical populist rule elsewhere in the region. Specifically, in Ecuador, Rafael Correa continues to trample democratic institutions, although regrettably nowhere to be found is any expression of concern by the Obama administration.

In late July, in a "trial" that lasted less than a day, a cowed Ecuadorean judge sentenced prominent newspaper columnist Emilio Palacio and three of the directors of his newspaper, El Universo, to three years in prison and fined them $40 million for publishing a column critical of Correa last February.

The defendants said they will appeal -- but so did Correa. He says he wants the full $80 million in damages he requested when he filed his defamation suit.

"We're making history, my friends, we won't retreat," he said after the verdict. "There's no room for magnanimity in the face of such miserable humanity."

Even as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and every major international media defense organization denounced the verdict, nary a word of concern has been expressed by the Obama administration.

Intimidating the media and using the judicial system to quash freedom of freedom expression are hallmarks of Chavismo, ones that Correa has embraced with relish. He has sued, fined, and seized control of numerous outlets since his rise to power in 2007. Where the government once owned one media outlet, under Correa it now controls 19 television and radio stations and newspapers.

Read on

Reasonable people can disagree about what military action, if any, the United States should take on Libya. But if we are going to have a reasonable debate, we will need to avoid some sloppy thinking. Here are three especially sloppy notions that are beginning to appear in the national conversation:

Whatever we do, it mustn't be "unilateral" like the Iraq invasion. The Iraq invasion may or may not have been wise, but it sure wasn't "unilateral." As Pete Wehner reminds us, this "unilateral" action involved contributions from "the United Kingdom, Italy, Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Spain, Poland, Denmark, Hungary, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Romania, the Netherlands, Norway, El Salvador, and 17 other countries that committed troops to Iraq." If the Obama administration ever does find itself intervening militarily in Libya, it will be hard-pressed to match the multilateralism of that "unilateral" action.

Defenders of military action must answer tough questions but defenders of military inaction don't need to. Doves are right to raise tough questions about any proposed military action in the Libyan crisis. But many similar tough questions need to be asked about the policy of inaction. The Obama administration has already taken sides in the Libyan civil war, is it willing to see "its side" lose? Is there a scale of humanitarian disaster that is intolerable and, if so, what is it and what will the United States do if that point is reached? With Obama's own top intelligence officer predicting that Qaddafi will prevail absent military efforts to shore up the rebels, what is the plan to deal with post-rebellion Libya? 

Military action makes us morally responsible but military inaction allows us to avoid moral responsibility. Many defenders of military inaction reach their point of view by way of a skewed cost-benefit calculation that assumes the worst about military action and assumes the best about inaction. Every untoward development that happens or is speculated to happen after military intervention is blamed on the intervener, but every untoward development that happens in the absence of military intervention is left out of the calculus entirely. Thus ideologues who bemoan American "militarism" count up all of the casualties in wars the U.S. intervened in and utterly disregard all of the casualties in conflicts the U.S. let fester without acting.

Let me be clear, more rigorous analysis might still yield a conclusion against U.S. intervening militarily. There has been rigorous debate right here amongst the Shadow Government contributors (see here vs. here). In particular, I find Kori Schake's warning about President Obama's obvious reluctance to intervene to be a wise cautionary. As Rumsfeld might put it, one goes to war with the commander-in-chief one has and so doubt about Obama's resolve on this matter is a reasonable factor to weigh in the balance. But if we do opt for military inaction, it had better be the result of a tough-minded assessment of the costs and benefits of all of the alternatives and not simply the sloppy embrace of inertia.

The sanctions which have been placed on Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi, his family members, and his senior officials are strong. They include asset freezes, travel bans, and threats of criminal prosecution. All of which add up to a powerful signal to the Libyan regime that the war it is waging on its own people is illegitimate and unacceptable, and to the Libyan people that our sympathy is with them and we will act to prevent their national assets from being pillaged. The world is now a considerably less inviting place for Libyan officials, who have been known to carouse in the capitals of Europe, the Caribbean, and elsewhere.

But therein a problem lies. The strategy followed thus far by the United States and its allies may persuade many Libyan officials that there is no future in following Qaddafi and therefore, defection to the opposition or negotiating an exit from Libya altogether is the most sensible course of action. But for others, especially those closest to Qaddafi, the sanctions and threats of international prosecution, combined with the advance of opposition forces, may convince them that they have little choice but to hunker down in Tripoli and Sirte and fight.

To deal with this possibility that Qaddafi and his loyalists will use all of the force at their disposal before giving in, and that the violence in Libya may therefore get considerably worse, further international action is needed. The United States and EU should seek U.N. Security Council authorization for the imposition of a no-fly zone in Libya.

We have heard much from U.S. officials in recent days about the risks of imposing a no-fly zone, but inaction also has its consequences.

Read on

There is some confusion about the Obama administration's explanation for why they did not take a more forceful stand on Libya earlier in the crisis. The talking points delivered by Ben Rhodes, the White House official responsible for communications in the foreign policy arena, and relayed in Sunday's Washington Post emphasized administration concerns about the potential risk to American citizens. Whether or not the administration made the right call depends, I think, on which citizens they were seeking to protect.

Many critics read this as a general reference to all of the American expats living in Libya. If this were the case, as my friend and former colleague Pete Wehner outlines, the administration's position would be extraordinarily concessionary to Qaddafi and an ominous precedent for dealing with tyrants in the future. If the presence of any U.S. citizens in any country were enough to deter the United States from taking a clear stand, then the implications are deeply troubling. As Wehner argues, "The message sent to, and surely the message received by, despots around the world is this: If you want to neuter America, threaten to harm its citizens. Mr. Obama will bend like red-hot steel pulled from a furnace."

I read the administration's explanation a bit differently. I believe what they were primarily worried about was the safety of the embassy personnel. After all, there are doubtless still U.S. citizens in Libya today and yet the administration has taken fairly tough action on the economic sanctions front and has started to say the things that they were deterred from saying a week ago. Apparently, the U.S. embassy in Tripoli was uniquely vulnerable. According to the deputy Chief of Mission, the embassy lacked the customary security provided by U.S. Marines. With little or no protection from mob action, the embassy personnel were extraordinarily exposed. As bad as the situation in Libya is today, it would be far worse if Qaddafi had seized the embassy in an Iranian-hostage-type gambit. Perhaps the warnings that "certain kinds of messaging from the American government could endanger the security of American citizens..." were a veiled reference to threats directed at the U.S. embassy. Given Qaddafi's record of erratic behavior, I think an embassy hostage situation would have to be considered a realistic threat.

If the administration was simply worried about any potential harm to any American expat, then the critics' case is more compelling. U.S. citizens are everywhere and such a doctrine -- we will not speak out if U.S. citizens are in the country -- is not sustainable. Indeed, if that were the original motivation, the administration did not forbear for long and has put those expats at risk with the economic sanctions and talk of military options. 

More plausibly, the administration was delaying certain actions until the embassy personnel could be evacuated. That strikes me as a tough but defensible call under the circumstances. It is tough because it still involves making concessions to virtual hostage takers, nevertheless defensible, because those concessions were only a temporary tactic.

This does not mean that the administration has gotten everything right on Libya. I hope someone presses the administration to explain why the embassy was so vulnerable, and why steps were not taken earlier to evacuate the personnel and thus restore our leverage sooner. And if the administration really wants to prove its critics wrong, it must exercise leadership on the Libyan file from here on out and avoid contradictory messaging.

Up until now, I have been inclined to give the White House the benefit of the doubt for the Middle East message difficulties that they have been having. But they are stretching that doubt almost to the breaking point. Today's press briefing by White House Spokesman Jay Carney was excruciating. He clearly had nothing to say about Libya and was determined not to say it.

I am not expecting the White House spokesman to make policy from the podium, but I did expect the White House to be further ahead of the curve today than they were yesterday or the day before, thus giving Carney more material to work with. I can think of only two plausible explanations for the weak White House response thus far:

• Perhaps the Gaddafi regime is blocking the evacuation of U.S. citizens so as to intimidate the White House into making only muted statements -- and this intimidation is working (note to President Obama, this is closer to what real hostage-taking feels like).

• Or perhaps the administration is paralyzed with indecision because of debates between internal factions, some wanting a stronger Bush-like response and others wanting to stick with the Obama 2009 approach that guided the weak response to the Iranian post-election protests in June 2009.

Either explanation is plausible or perhaps both are in play. If the first explanation is the correct one, I think the White House's stance is understandable but exceedingly risky. Making concessions to virtual hostage-takers only makes sense as a temporary tactic in a larger strategy that quickly turns to a more forceful intervention. (By the way, if the hostage scenario is correct, the issue of U.N. authorization before military force is moot. It still may not make sense to escalate immediately to military action, but President Obama would have a substantially freer hand in terms of what options would be legitimate). If the second explanation is correct, this is an important test of the president's mettle. He needs to decide the matter and establish a clear policy ... and soon.

Events in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and to a lesser extent Jordan have led both administration officials and the chattering classes to conclude that democracy is on the march in the Middle East. Having once again been caught by surprise by events overseas -- one wonders where our intelligence agencies have been hiding -- the Obama administration is now trying to push itself into the forefront of those seeking democratic change in the region.

Yet it was not democracy that led a young Tunisian to immolate himself and, apart from English-speaking educated intellectuals, it does not appear that democracy is what most people have been demonstrating about. Instead, what they are seeking, first and foremost, is economic opportunity unfettered by corruption and favoritism. Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire because he was prevented from earning a modest living. Three Egyptians have burned themselves because of lack of job opportunities. 

Secondly, Tunisians and Egyptian appear to be seeking responsive government, which is quite different from Western notions of democracy. In fact, it is arguable that they and other demonstrators in the Arab world would be quite comfortable living under a Chinese-style system, where there is a high and consistent level of economic growth and standards of living continue to rise. Would Tunisia have overthrown Ben Ali if its economy grew, as it had in the 1990s, and if the President's family curbed their greed? Would Mubarak be in the trouble he is now if he had a far greater percentage of the population benefitting from Egypt's economic growth?

It is noteworthy that for all the talk of upheavals in the Arab world, there has so far been little unrest in the traditional Gulf emirates or in Saudi Arabia. The rulers of the smaller Gulf States have long made it their policy to distribute wealth widely among their citizens. (Non-citizens don't count, of course. And if they made any trouble they would be deported.) Despite predictions of their imminent demise over the past two decades, the Saudis likewise have so far remained quiet. The al-Saud family recognized some ten years ago that it needed to spread more wealth to ensure the support of its increasingly younger population; so far so good.

Even Bahrain, which might have been expected to be the scene of riots, given the secondary status of the majority Sh'ia population, has not witnessed any major demonstrations. Again, most of the Bahraini Sh'ia appear to recognize that a stable Bahrain means more wealth for them too -- even if they do not achieve economic parity with the dominant Sunnis. They also know that Saudi tanks are not far from the causeway that links their state to its much larger and more powerful neighbor, and that those tanks would be quick to cross into the island kingdom if the ruling family came under siege.

Read on

Faithful readers of Shadow Government know that there are good reasons to be wary about China's strength (as explained here and here).

But this short report in today's Washington Post reminds us that there are also ample signs of China's weakness. And there can be many ways in which a weak China could be just as vexing as a strong one.

The Post reports that state censors interrupted the Obama-Hu news conference and substituted a black screen for Hu's response to questions from a reporter about China's human rights record. Hu's response was hardly revelatory, though he did acknowledge that China's record was not perfect and that more progress needed to be made -- a statement so banal that it could be said about every country, indeed President Obama has said much the same thing about the United States.

A regime that will not allow its own leader's banal public remarks to be broadcast at home is a regime that is so insecure it doubts its own legitimacy. Remember, these are remarks that were playing live to the entire world, yet Chinese propagandists were apparently afraid to let their own public hear them.

So while signs of Chinese growing strength should not be ignored, neither should we ignore signs of lingering, and perhaps deepening, weakness. Indeed, the two can combine to pose special challenges for U.S. foreign policy, producing the very bellicose hypernationalism and overconfident adventurism that we have seen in the past year.

WILL INBODEN

As the end of the year approaches, along with it comes the ritual end of year evaluations as well as New Year's resolutions. In that spirit, several Shadow Government contributors here offer our thoughts on the Obama administration's foreign policies -- specifically:

1. Advice for the administration in the new year,

2. Suggestions on what policies are working and should be continued, and

3. Suggestions on what policies aren't working and should be consigned to the archives.

Advice: Seize the initiative. This is not about a specific policy but an overall posture. Two years since President Obama's election, the question of an "Obama Doctrine" remains elusive, as the administration's national security policy has mostly been reactive, focused on managing current challenges and crises. This inbox by itself is a substantial challenge to be sure, and one which the administration is handling with varying degrees of success (e.g. decently well with Iran and North Korea, with mixed results with Afghanistan and Iraq, and less well with Pakistan and Israel/Palestinian issues). Missing thus far, however, has been an overarching strategic framework. Hence my advice that the White House seize the initiative for its next two years, and develop a strategic doctrine or at least proactively take advantage of creating some new foreign policy opportunities. Implications for seizing the initiative include:

• Don't acquiesce in predictions of U.S. decline. The world needs responsible global leadership, and there remains no better candidate than the United States.
• Establish principles, alliances, and institutions that will endure beyond this presidency.
• Take the long view. Ignore annual global popularity surveys, and instead ask a question that President Bush told us to consider while on his NSC staff: "What policies should I adopt now as president that my successor's successor will look back on with gratitude?"

What might seizing the initiative look like in practice? For specific policy ideas, perhaps a new alliance of democracies in Asia, or a new global free trade initiative, or reinvigorated transatlantic partnerships, or a new strategic outreach in a neglected region such as Latin America or Africa (including an American partnership with the likely new state in southern Sudan, as Andrew Natsios has suggested), or establishing a robust strategic framework for winning the war of ideas against jihadist ideology.

Continue: Rediscovery of the freedom agenda. After its initial woeful neglect of democracy and human rights promotion, earlier this year the Obama administration rediscovered -- rhetorically at least -- the importance of supporting freedom around the world. The White House should build on this, particularly with specific policies and with new resources. As events in just the past few weeks have shown, in places like Belarus, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, and China, the demands of citizens for their liberty remain embattled and in need of America support.

Drop: The "reset" with Russia. Now that New START has passed the Senate, and thus completes the centerpiece of the administration's "reset" policy, it is time for a new, realistic look at Russia -- which necessarily means a delete of the reset framework. The original reset framework assumed that U.S.-Russia relations could be put on a sustained positive trajectory based on shared interests and reciprocal good will. But as Bob Kagan wrote earlier this week, "relations with Moscow are about to grow more challenging," as serious issues including Russia's ongoing occupation of Georgia, growing corruption and internal repression, and cynical ambivalence on Iran remain. Defense Secretary Robert Gates's reported description of Russia got it right: "An oligarchy run by the security services." Taking a fresh look at the United States' Russia policy should include strengthening U.S. support for beleaguered Russian reformers, reaffirming U.S. commitments to our allies and partners in Russia's border regions, and jettisoning unrealistic assumptions about shared interests. Ironically, such a reduction in expectations might well enable better cooperation in the areas where our interests do align.

PETER FEAVER

Advice: Be as committed to seeing Iraq and Afghanistan through to success as the President was in pursuing health care "reform." President Obama secured his place in history with the passage of Obamacare. Whether it comes to be seen as a positive legacy like Social Security, or as an overreach and folly like Prohibition, it will always be seen as historic and as the president's own. This was a policy war of choice, not of necessity. There were needful aspects of health care reform, but most of them fell out of the bill or got swamped by far more expensive and consequential optional items. Elections have consequences, and in this case it empowered Obama to doggedly pursue what he considered to be the right thing -- and he showed he was willing to pay a huge electoral price, if necessary.

It is time for him to engage in a policy war of necessity, building a political coalition in support of prevailing in Iraq and Afghanistan. His policy moves in the next two years will likely prove decisive in determining whether U.S. forces leave in success or defeat. Until now, President Obama has not made war leadership a central priority of his administration, and he has devoted very little effort at all to the crucial task of mobilizing political/public support. It is time, past time, to devote the political capital to this effort.

Continue: President Obama and his team proved quite adept in passing New START. To be sure the treaty itself was only of secondary importance for national security. Indeed, the side deals on force modernization and missile defense wrung out of the administration by skeptical senators will likely prove far more consequential in the long run than the modest treaty provisions. Yet the orchestration of lobbying, arm-twisting, bipartisan outreaching, principled deal-making, and even somewhat hyperbolic policy-shilling -- all of that amounted to an impressive effort culminating in what surely is the administration's greatest national security accomplishment to date. If the administration devotes a similar effort to forging bipartisan support for the various wars under its command (see point above), it will be an even more impressive national security accomplishment.

Drop: The silly campaign boasting that "America is back" in Asia. The boast was always a bit absurd but it quickly became an embarrassment when President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had to skip regional meetings and postpone long-planned trips to attend to domestic political priorities. The boast also reflected a needless defensiveness on the administration's part. The United States has pursued a common bipartisan grand strategy in Asia for over a decade now, with President George W. Bush building on President Bill Clinton's initial efforts regarding China, India, and Japan, and now President Obama building on Bush's initiatives. Rather than pretend to be offering a bold departure, why not make a virtue out of the truth and note that there are some areas where mainstream Democrats and mainstream Republicans can agree, and one of them is Asia? Both sides recognize that the United States is an Asia-Pacific power and the world will be a better place if the United States remains vitally engaged in this region. No need to pretend that the United States ever left, because it didn't and it won't.

PHIL LEVY

Advice: From a trade perspective, it is remarkable to think how little has been accomplished in the first two years of the Obama presidency. When he took office, President Obama inherited an agenda that included stalled global trade talks (the Doha round of World Trade Organization negotiations), three already-negotiated free trade agreements (South Korea, Colombia, and Panama), and a troubled trade relationship with China. Across all of these items, the only achievement approaching progress was the revision to the Korean free trade agreement, and that came at the very end of 2010. The revision left Ford and the United Auto Workers happier, but came at the expense of other sectors, such as pork producers.

Better late than never, but there were costs to the lost time. Free trade agreements that promised U.S. producers at least a period of privileged access to a trading partner's market are now just offering the prospect of equal access, since our jilted partners went and negotiated agreements with other countries while the United States dallied. Frustration was already high with the lagging global trade talks; it has since mounted. What's more, the repeated empty promises of the G-20 nations to conclude the Doha round undermined that group's credibility.

The ineffectiveness of the G-20 was also revealed in the sad Seoul summit, in which China and Germany objected to any global rebalancing plan that pushed past platitudes. The Obama administration -- Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner in particular -- deserves credit for putting forth a credible approach; it just didn't seem to gain traction. As with trade liberalization, the administration might have been more credible had it led by example. In trade, it called for a new WTO agreement while condoning "Buy America" protectionism and showing that it would not spend the political capital to push through existing agreements. In international finance, it called for global rebalancing while dramatically increasing spending, creating a significant new entitlement program through its health care plans, and relegating any plans for fiscal restraint to a separate deficit commission (as opposed to using its own Office of Management and Budget).

So what happens when you defer serious action on the international economic front for a couple of years? Institutions (in this case the WTO) deteriorate, problems (resurgent global imbalances) fester and grow, and resolutions to address these issues soon may be undercut by new crises that demand attention.

Looking ahead to the rest of Obama's term, my top candidate for major distracting crisis to come is the bubbling debt trouble in Europe. The leaders of the Euro nations have been working furiously to address problems as they pop up in Greece, then Ireland, then Portugal, with Spain and Belgium starting to simmer. But all of their remedies have done little more than buy time and, in some cases, allow the problems to grow. There are fundamental inconsistencies ripping the euro apart. When that happens, it will not simply be a matter of having to deal with currency exchange at the borders; it will likely involve a significant banking crisis. Those, it turns out, can be nasty.

Read on

Further to Will Tobey's excellent post below, the last thing that the Obama administration wanted to deal with during Thanksgiving week is another crisis with North Korea. The administration's policy thus far of "strategic patience" has rightly avoided the past traps of rewarding the DPRK's bad behavior and broken agreements with further concessions. But the Kim regime's latest round of belligerence -- including artillery attacks on civilian populations in South Korea and ominous advances in its uranium enrichment program -- show the limits of strategic patience alone in the face of an adversary willing to escalate its provocations to dangerous levels that cannot be ignored.

In the short term there are no good options on the table, only a difficult set of choices as the White House seeks to avert war on the Korean peninsula while dissuading the DPRK from further aggression and reassuring U.S. allies in the region, especially South Korea and Japan. The announcement of joint military exercises with the South Koreans is a good start, but more will need to be done. Just what that "more" entails is the hard part. As my former NSC colleague and Korea expert Victor Cha said in the Washington Post yesterday, "in many ways this is our worst nightmare… the administration has really got its work cut out for it."

Will Tobey is correct that beyond the tactical challenges of this current flare-up, the administration should develop a long-term North Korea strategy that includes seeking the end of the Kim dynasty dictatorship. Such a strategy will entail many components. One pillar it needs to include, especially for a peaceful change in North Korea, is human rights promotion. In the midst of the current policy stalemate, a pivot by the U.S. towards a renewed focus on the plight of the North Korean people and the illegitimacy of the Kim regime could provide a strategic game-changer.

The regime's greatest vulnerability is its appalling barbarity and decades-long torment of its own citizens. It also represents an area of potentially overwhelming international consensus. With the unfortunate exception of the cynical Chinese government, virtually no global power supports North Korea's mistreatment of its people.

What might be done? There are many possible steps; here are just a few:

• Escalate the "reputational sanctions" targeting the regime's illicit activities, such as international financial institutions that hold the ill-gotten gains of the regime's henchmen, including the Kim family. And follow through vigorously on implementation and enforcement. Few things got Kim Jong Il's attention like $25 million of his personal fortune being frozen in Banco Delta Asia's accounts in 2005. Condition the lifting of the sanctions on a dramatic improvement in human rights, such as the closure of the regime's prison camps and release of all prisoners of conscience.

• President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and other senior U.S. officials should hold visible meetings with North Korean defectors, dissidents, and survivors of its prison camps. And encourage other world leaders to do the same.

• Substantially increase financial support for independent broadcasting into North Korea (via radio, TV, and Internet), step up countermeasures to override the regime's jamming, and even explore ways to get uncensored radios and televisions into the hands of more North Korean people.
• Press for a U.N. Security Council debate on applying the "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine to North Korea for "crimes against humanity," and the application of Principle Three on intervention by the international community. With the possibility of further famines caused by state malevolence, on top of the regime's ongoing depredations, such a debate would at a minimum draw global attention to conditions in North Korea, and might even lead to multilateral action.
• Include Special Envoy for North Korea Human Rights Bob King at the table in any possible future resumption of negotiations involving North Korea (whether six-party talks or bilateral). This will make clear that America's priority concerns are not just the DPRK's nuclear weapons but also its treatment of its people.
• Direct the intelligence community to increase its collection efforts on human rights conditions within North Korea. Most of what the U.S. government knows in this area comes from the intrepid work of human rights NGOs and defectors. Much more could be learned if the intelligence community devoted resources to mapping the locations and activity patterns of prison camps, monitoring the DPRK's internal repression system, and identifying possible dissident activity.

Finally, don't expect help from China. Beijing ostensibly shares an interest with the U.S. in curtailing the nuclear adventurism of its most problematic client state, and has on occasion (though not consistently) been helpful in restraining Pyongyang. But when it comes to the regime itself, China's interests diverge from the United States', at least insofar as Beijing has made the short-sighted calculation to keep propping up the Kim dynasty as a buffer state on its border. The United States should leave the short-sightedness to the Chinese. A more visionary long-term strategy for the United States should include concrete steps to support the North Korean people in ending the tyranny that afflicts them.

Awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo should remind the world of two things about China: one pessimistic, one optimistic. The former: The Chinese Communist Party is accustomed to controlling all politics at home and has not loosened its grip on political debate one iota. The latter: Liu is one Chinese of many who are fighting for, indeed risking their lives for, democratic change in China.

Consider the party's behavior. First it tried to bully the Nobel committee into abandoning its consideration of Liu. Then, it engaged in its familiar threatening and bullying rhetoric even after the deed was done. The party's propaganda and internal control apparatus removed any mention of Liu's victory in China's media. Then it announced that Sino-Norwegian ties would be damaged, notwithstanding the fact that the government in Oslo has nothing to do with the Nobel committee's decisions. This is a ruling party that seems not to understand that the rest of the world does not work in accordance with the party's precepts. Note to observers of China: In China there is no such thing as an independent civil body. So Beijing assumes that other governments can, with a wave of a hand (or the shake of an iron fist), stop political activity considered objectionable by a ruling government.

All the nongovernmental organizations we hear about operating in China, while doing great work, can be shut down at the whim of a Communist Party leader. China assumes the same about other countries. It wants to conduct its relations with others through official government channels and get others to pretend that the Communist Party is China. Liu's case is proof positive that nothing can be further from the truth. There are many Chinese who want nothing to do with the party, in fact, who are working toward its demise. The mistake we often make is to limit our engagement with China to the party and therefore ignore the many Chinese who desperately disagree with their government and want another direction for their country. Unfortunately, the party still dominates. This leads to the type of behavior we have seen recently from China in the South China Sea and with Japan, where it expects others to bend to the party's will. Accustomed to getting its way at home, the party is left befuddled when it cannot do so abroad, hence the empty threats aimed at the Norwegian government. Ironically for China, these histrionics amplify the case of Liu and attract more attention. Now the world can read not only about Liu's accomplishments, but also witness China's very bizarre reaction.

That leads to the good news. While the party remains dominant, there are many Liu's within China working for change. If they do not like China's authoritarian ways at home, chances are they do not like China's authoritarian ways abroad (ignoring international law in the South China Sea, forcing Japan to abandon its own legal procedures in the case of captain Zhan Qixiong). They are the hope for a truly peaceful rise for China. While most governments ignore them -- it is obviously easier to deal with the party and avoid the tension that engagement with China's democrats would bring -- the Nobel committee has not. Perhaps other democracies, like our own, will begin to take the Liu's of China and what they stand for more seriously and conduct an engagement policy that engages all of China.

Channeling former White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emmanuel and his famous quip, Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa is seizing the country's latest crisis as an opportunity to consolidate his power with the aim of ramming through a radical reform agenda over the objections of his domestic opposition. Displaying an uncanny instinct for outmaneuvering his rivals -- reminiscent of his fellow radical populists Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales -- Correa quickly turned around what began as a police protest against cuts in benefits into high drama designed to discredit the democratic opposition and drum up international support for his regime. Citing no evidence, Correa quickly deemed the police strike (an inexcusable abdication of professional responsibility) as a "coup attempt" by the opposition and fanned the flames of crisis and instability by traveling to police headquarters to confront police, tearing off his tie, and challenging them to "kill me" where he stood.

While Thursday's events were no doubt exploited by sundry opportunists trying to turn up the heat on President Correa, the president's own inflammatory rhetoric and actions only made things worse. Like Chavez and Morales, Correa has a predilection for unilateral action, belittling his opponents, and creating crisis atmospheres. In recent days, after his proposed economic reforms lost the support of his own party, Correa threatened to dissolve Congress and rule by decree until new elections were held.

After Thursday's crisis had passed, Correa showed every indication of pressing his advantage. "I'm not going to negotiate absolutely anything," he said, adding, "Nothing will be forgiven and nothing will be forgotten." Central Bank President Diego Borja further tipped the government's hand by asserting, "This gives us much more energy to deepen changes. Now we can really move the citizens' revolution forward on all fronts."

Correa continues to maintain high approval numbers and last year became the first Ecuadorean president to win two terms in office. But as Chavez has shown, bombast and confrontation may work for a time as a governing strategy, but eventually people tire of the rancor as their concerns return to bread-and-butter issues that impact their daily lives, like the economy and crime. Correa would be wise to recognize that, and the underlying tensions in his country, and adjust his style accordingly. As for outside observers, they should be wary of falling into the populists' trap where every presidential action is ipso facto deemed legitimate, and the actions of the democratic opposition to defend their rights are just as readily discredited.

Reports of a Saudi diplomat seeking asylum in the United States because his government learned that he was gay and had a relationship with a Jewish woman highlights the vast cultural gap and the uneasy partnership that exists between Washington and Riyadh. Since the onset of the Cold War, and, more recently, in the seemingly endless war on terrorism (or whatever euphemism is employed for the conflict with Islamic extremists), the United States has consistently given higher priority to its national security and economic interests than to the human rights and freedoms that it holds dear. This policy, which, with a few periodic exceptions, has been bipartisan for over a half century, invariably outrages those on the Left, who in any event have little sympathy for U.S. security or economic policies.

Most policymakers recognize the dilemma they face: yet, like Winston Churchill, who hated Communists but was prepared to ally himself with Stalin to defeat Hitler, they accept that circumstances will dictate whether, and for how long, one must, in Churchill's famous term, "sleep with the devil." In the case of the Saudi diplomat, however, it is not merely a matter of deciding whether to accommodate an ally whose domestic laws differ so radically from ours. For Saudi Arabia is not at all unique in legislating against homosexuality.

Ali Ahmad Asseri, first secretary of the Saudi consulate in Los Angeles, certainly must have been aware that his liaisons not only would terminate his career, but could cost him his life. Yet Saudi Arabia is not the only state that punishes homosexuality with death; six others do as well, including not only Muslim partners involved in the conflict against Islamic extremists, such as Yemen, Mauretania and the United Arab Emirates, but also Nigeria, with its almost evenly mixed Muslim-Christian population. Moreover, it was not until 1872 that South Carolina became the last state of the Union to abolish the death penalty for sodomy, and sodomy laws remained on the books of many states until 2002.

Uganda's legislature debated the death penalty for homosexuals as recently as last year; that country already has in its books a penalty of up to 14 years imprisonment for homosexual activity. Indeed, approximately 65 other states still have some punishment for homosexuality. Whatever one thinks of its policies, Riyadh is within its rights to demand the return of its diplomat; it is only doing what over 70 other countries would do.

Washington therefore faces an extremely serious dilemma. If it sends Asseri home, and he is killed, there will be outrage, not only in the United States but especially in Western Europe. On the other hand, if it grants him asylum, it will be opening the door for diplomats representing the majority of the world's states who may declare themselves gay and then seek asylum in America. That may not be a precedent that the United States wishes to set for itself, especially in light of the strong feelings over an issue that continues to divide the American electorate.

An Iranian diplomat serving in Finland has just applied for political asylum in that country, while Norway recently granted political asylum to one of his colleagues serving in Oslo. Iran is hardly an ally of either state, however. Moreover, homosexuality does not appear to have been the issue in either case, nor is it in any event as politically charged in Scandinavia as it is in the United States.

Riyadh might yet be willing to turn a blind eye to its errant diplomat and allow him to seek asylum elsewhere; it would be interesting to see which, if any, Western European state would be prepared to take him. Alternately, Washington could reach an understanding with Saudi Arabia that Mr. Asseri will be sent home to be imprisoned without harsh treatment, rather than put to death. That may not be an ideal solution, but at least the man's life would be spared.

Nevertheless, because homosexuality is such a controversial issue, nothing Washington does will satisfy everyone. On the other hand, it should be recalled that even many on the Left chose to remain silent and continued to advocate for aid to Uganda even as it debated the death penalty for gays. If Washington is indeed to pursue a mutlilateralist national security policy, it cannot expect its allies to share all or even some of its values. Those who reject unilateralism may therefore have to swallow hard, and, as they did a year ago over Uganda, gnash their teeth in silence should the United States and Saudi Arabia reach a less-than-perfect accommodation to determine Asseri's fate.

After rumors that the Obama administration might back down in the face of Chinese pressure, the Pentagon confirmed on July 14 that the United States and the Republic of Korea would in fact go ahead with joint naval exercises off both coasts of the Korean peninsula in response to North Korea's March 26 sinking of the South Korean Navy corvette Cheonan. Time will tell, but this could be the moment that Barack Obama finally found his inner realist when it comes to China strategy. 

From the beginning, the Obama administration has had a schizophrenic view of China's growing power and influence. On the one hand, realists in the administration continued the prevailing "Armitage-Nye" strategy (named after former Bush administration Deputy Secretary of State Rich Armitage and former Clinton Defense official Joe Nye) of engaging China while maintaining a favorable balance of power in the region through tighter relations with U.S. allies. Consistent with that strategy, Obama made a point of inviting Japanese Premier Taro Aso for the first bilateral summit in the Oval Office and Secretary of State Clinton made Japan her first overseas stop last March.   

At the same time, however, other senior members of the Obama administration argued that balance-of-power logic was inimical to the kind of accommodation the United States would have to make towards China in order to deal with new transnational challenges such as climate change. They argued in a formula that undermined the realists' approach that no major international challenge could be resolved without China's cooperation -- a message that was internalized in Beijing as meaning that China had earned a veto on all major international issues from the Obama administration. When Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao issued a joint statement last November in Beijing, the two leaders acknowledged each others' "core interests." Since then, the Chinese side has steadily expanded the list of Chinese "core interests" to include U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and suzerainty over the South China Sea while yielding virtually nothing in terms of military transparency, human rights or curbing North Korea's nuclear program. 

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The roll-out of President Obama's National Security Strategy tries to frame the strategy as a repudiation of his predecessor's. But the reality is that the new strategy is best characterized as "Bush Lite", a slightly watered down but basically plausible remake of President Bush's National Security Strategy. If you only read the Obama Team's talking points, or only read the mainstream media coverage, which amounts to the same thing, this assessment may come as a big surprise. But if you actually read the Obama's NSS released today, and President Bush's most recent NSS released in 2006, the conclusion is pretty obvious.

• President Bush's NSS emphasized effective, action-oriented multilateralism to address the challenges of the day: to "strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends" and to "develop agendas for cooperative action with the other main centers of global power." Obama's NSS emphasizes "comprehensive engagement" built on the "cornerstone" of our traditional allies but expanding outwards to include "more effective partnerships with other key centers of influence."
• Bush's NSS emphasized that our national security did not rest solely on material factors (eg., the balance of military forces) but also on the strength and appeal of our moral values, especially America's commitment to defend and advance "human rights protected by democratic institutions." Obama's NSS makes the same point: "The United States rejects the false choice between the narrow pursuit of our interests and an endless campaign to impose our values."
• Bush's NSS recognized that international institutions were flawed but essential and thus needed to be reformed. Obama's NSS makes the exact same point: "we need to be clear-eyed about the strengths and shortcomings of international institutions that were developed to deal with the challenges of an earlier time and the shortage of political will that has at times stymied the enforcement of international norms. Yet it would be destructive to both American national security and global security if the United States used the emergence of new challenges and the shortcomings of the international system as a reason to walk away from it. Instead, we must focus American engagement on strengthening international institutions and galvanizing the collective action that can serve common interests..."
• Bush's NSS identified the most urgent threat to be the nexis of WMD proliferation (especially nuclear), terrorists, and state sponsors of terrorism. Obama's NSS makes the same determination, "there is no greater threat to the American people than weapons of mass destruction, particularly the danger posed by the pursuit of nuclear weapons by violent extremists and their proliferation to additional states."
• Bush recognized that the war on terror would require all elements of national power, from military to law enforcement to soft power, and Obama's NSS makes the same point.
• Obama's NSS even explicitly endorses America's prerogatives to use military force well before it is a last resort -- "While the use of force is sometimes necessary, we will exhaust other options before war whenever we can (emphasis added)" -- and unilaterally -- "The United States must reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend our nation and our interests." (emphasis added)

Perhaps the most striking continuity is in the recognition that America must lead. This was an important theme of Bush's NSS. Effective action depended on American leadership - "the international community is most engaged in such action when the United States leads." The conclusion of the 2006 NSS hammered home the point:

The challenges America faces are great, yet we have enormous power and influence to address those challenges. The times require an ambitious national security strategy, yet one recognizing the limits to what even a nation as powerful as the United States can achieve by itself. Our national security strategy is idealistic about goals, and realistic about means. There was a time when two oceans seemed to provide protection from problems in other lands, leaving America to lead by example alone. That time has long since passed. America cannot know peace, security, and prosperity by retreating from the world. America must lead by deed as well as by example."

Obama's NSS similarly emphasizes America's "global leadership" and "steering those currents [of international cooperation] in the direction of liberty and justice" and "shap[ing] and international order" because " global security depends upon strong and responsible American leadership." Leadership goes beyond seeing the world as it is and includes transforming the world according to America's interests and values or, as Obama puts it: "In the past, the United States has thrived when both our nation and our national security policy have adapted to shape change instead of being shaped by it." Even the extra focus on rebuilding America at home (what the NSS deems "renewal") is justified not merely as an end in itself (which it surely is) but also as a means to another end of expanding America's global influence. To those who hoped Obama would embrace American decline, this NSS should come as something of a shock.

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