Wednesday, March 16, 2011 - 11:56 AM

I have been cautious about predicting the longer-term strategic implications of the massive earthquakes and tsunami that hit Japan on March 11. To begin with, years ago I lived for a summer in the part of Japan that has born the brunt of this disaster, interviewing farmers and politicians for a column I struggled to write each week in Japanese for the local Iwate Nippo Newspaper. The images of death and destruction, especially to the beautiful Sanriku Coast, have been heartbreaking for me to watch. A second reason for caution is the lesson many of us learned trying to anticipate the longer-term impact of the December 2004 Asian Tsunami. Most of us in government at the time expected that the civil war in Sri Lanka would end because the tsunami had destroyed the Tamil Tigers' fleet and coastal bases, but that the insurgency in Aceh, Indonesia would grow worse because the tsunami had destroyed the Indonesian Army's bases and lines of supply. The exact opposite occurred -- the Sri Lankan civil war dragged violently on for five more years, but Indonesian President Susilu Bambang Yudyuhono managed to sign a peace agreement with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) within six months of the disaster. A final reason for caution is that the scope of the disaster is not yet clear -- particularly at the Fukushima nuclear power plant, where a few dozen engineers bravely remain to cool the reactor cores.
Yet as Japanese scholars and citizens themselves begin considering the future -- and as American rating agencies and pundits hit a drumbeat of negative and often ill-informed predictions -- it seems both appropriate and necessary to at least frame the possibilities of what comes next for Japan.
The first thing that can be said about the disaster is that it has highlighted both the traditional strengths and the adaptability of Japanese society. The world press has marveled at the stoic resolve and orderliness of the Japanese public as they queue for hours for scarce supplies without breaking the rules or complaining. This is precisely the national character that allowed Japan to rebound from even greater disasters such as the Edo fire of 1657, the Kanto earthquake of 1923, and the aftermath of the Pacific War's end in 1945, when the Emperor announced that the Japanese people would have to "endure the unendurable"... and they did. The response has also highlighted the adaptability of Japan. After studying shortcomings in the response to the 1995 Kobe Earthquake, the Japanese government strengthened coordination with the Self-Defense Forces and created crisis management centers across central and local government. This preparation has saved countless lives, even as the government struggles on multiple fronts because of the scale of the disaster. Even more impressive has been the activism of Japanese civil society and especially of Japanese youth; frequently dismissed in recent press analysis as self-obsessed "herbivores," they have mobilized spontaneously through Facebook and other social media and have been shown carrying elderly citizens to high ground on their backs.
The disaster will likely have at least some impact on Japanese security and foreign policy. The government's poor response to the 1995 Kobe earthquake was seized upon by national security realists to argue for changes in emergency legislation and greater acceptance of the Self Defense Forces as an instrument of national power. Fiscal realities may keep defense spending below 1 percent of GDP, but the disaster will reinforce calls to remove impediments to the SDF's rules of engagement and for greater interoperability with the United States (Operation "Tomodachi" -- the relief effort by the 50,000 U.S. personnel in Japan -- is the largest joint and combined operation between the United States and Japan ever). Japan's relations with China and Russia, which were abysmal before the crisis, may thaw somewhat now. Beijing's 15-man rescue team could take some of the edge off of the Sino-Japanese tensions -- 86 percent of Japanese said in recent polls that they do not trust China -- though the root cause of the tensions, PLA operations around Japan, are unlikely to change. Putin's decision to set aside differences over the Northern Territories for now in order to help a "good neighbor" may have a more lasting effect, since the root causes of friction between Tokyo and Moscow were always more political than structural or strategic. Finally, many Japanese friends are telling me that the world's outpouring of support and assistance is reminding average citizens in Japan how important it is for Japan to also make its own "international contributions" in terms of ODA and security. Of course, this impulse will be in competition with the understandable desire to focus on reconstruction at home over the coming years.
Japanese economic production will definitely recover from the disaster. The damage estimates are generally well above US $150 billion, and Japanese business surveys are expecting a big hit on manufacturing output over the coming months. However, the economy is still expected to grow overall in JFY 2011 (April 2011-March 2012) once corporations adjust their supply chains and reconstruction spending begins. Moody's Investors Service is warning that the huge financing needs may erode investor confidence in the country's ability to repay its debts, but this underestimates the likelihood that Japanese citizens will buy reconstruction bonds (over 90 percent of Japanese debt is already domestically held) and ignores the huge amounts of cash Japanese banks and corporations have been sitting on the past year. (Moody's also downgraded South Korea's sovereign debt rating when Roh Moo Hyun came to power in 2003on the dubious logic that relations with the United States would deteriorate.) However, even if production recovers, that still leaves the question of whether Japan will revitalize its basic economic growth strategy. Phil Levy rightly pointed out in his post that the Japanese political classes could become addicted again to Keynesian approaches to growing the economy. On the other hand, Prime Minister Kan had already begun to embrace measures that would unleash greater competition in the Japanese economy, including participation in the Trans Pacific Partnership free trade negotiations. That specific debate will probably be on hold for a few months, but the economic reformers behind it will seize on the reconstruction strategy to argue for even bolder measures to revitalize economic growth. Decisions about how to raise money for reconstruction -- for example, whether to include incentives for private equity and not just rely on debt -- will reveal the prevailing direction of the economic strategy debate in the coming months.
Numerous Japanese commentators had recently argued that the nation needed a shock to accelerate the kind of opening, reform and revitalization that Japan embraced after Commodore Perry's ships landed in Edo Bay on July 8, 1853 and the war ended in August, 1945. While no one could have anticipated or called for the enormity of the heart-wrenching human tragedy of March 11, the nation again finds itself at an important turning point. And history would strongly suggest that Japan will emerge stronger.
AFP/Getty Images
Tuesday, March 1, 2011 - 1:00 PM

There is some confusion about the Obama administration's explanation for why they did not take a more forceful stand on Libya earlier in the crisis. The talking points delivered by Ben Rhodes, the White House official responsible for communications in the foreign policy arena, and relayed in Sunday's Washington Post emphasized administration concerns about the potential risk to American citizens. Whether or not the administration made the right call depends, I think, on which citizens they were seeking to protect.
Many critics read this as a general reference to all of the American expats living in Libya. If this were the case, as my friend and former colleague Pete Wehner outlines, the administration's position would be extraordinarily concessionary to Qaddafi and an ominous precedent for dealing with tyrants in the future. If the presence of any U.S. citizens in any country were enough to deter the United States from taking a clear stand, then the implications are deeply troubling. As Wehner argues, "The message sent to, and surely the message received by, despots around the world is this: If you want to neuter America, threaten to harm its citizens. Mr. Obama will bend like red-hot steel pulled from a furnace."
I read the administration's explanation a bit differently. I believe what they were primarily worried about was the safety of the embassy personnel. After all, there are doubtless still U.S. citizens in Libya today and yet the administration has taken fairly tough action on the economic sanctions front and has started to say the things that they were deterred from saying a week ago. Apparently, the U.S. embassy in Tripoli was uniquely vulnerable. According to the deputy Chief of Mission, the embassy lacked the customary security provided by U.S. Marines. With little or no protection from mob action, the embassy personnel were extraordinarily exposed. As bad as the situation in Libya is today, it would be far worse if Qaddafi had seized the embassy in an Iranian-hostage-type gambit. Perhaps the warnings that "certain kinds of messaging from the American government could endanger the security of American citizens..." were a veiled reference to threats directed at the U.S. embassy. Given Qaddafi's record of erratic behavior, I think an embassy hostage situation would have to be considered a realistic threat.
If the administration was simply worried about any potential harm to any American expat, then the critics' case is more compelling. U.S. citizens are everywhere and such a doctrine -- we will not speak out if U.S. citizens are in the country -- is not sustainable. Indeed, if that were the original motivation, the administration did not forbear for long and has put those expats at risk with the economic sanctions and talk of military options.
More plausibly, the administration was delaying certain actions until the embassy personnel could be evacuated. That strikes me as a tough but defensible call under the circumstances. It is tough because it still involves making concessions to virtual hostage takers, nevertheless defensible, because those concessions were only a temporary tactic.
This does not mean that the administration has gotten everything right on Libya. I hope someone presses the administration to explain why the embassy was so vulnerable, and why steps were not taken earlier to evacuate the personnel and thus restore our leverage sooner. And if the administration really wants to prove its critics wrong, it must exercise leadership on the Libyan file from here on out and avoid contradictory messaging.
JIM WATSON/AFP/Getty Images
Wednesday, February 23, 2011 - 6:16 PM

There are reports coming out of North Korea again that they are suffering from a severe shortfall in food supplies. North Korean emissaries have gone on a multi-national tour asking foreign governments to resume food assistance programs to feed their malnourished population.
This is not a new scenario for North Korea. The regime has continually struggled to feed its people since the famine of the mid 1990s when over one million lost their lives.
What is more shocking is the effect the many years of living on less than 1,700 calories a day have had on the general population. I saw this first hand in a Pyongyang park in 2008 where some elderly people were quietly harvesting grass so they could supplement a meal. Those in the NGO community with access to remote areas of the country have confirmed many in North Korea suffer from malnutrition and infection. In many cases, people outside of the capital are on the brink of starvation.
Today, a North Korean child can expect to be up to 7 inches shorter than his/her South Korean counterpart and 20 pounds lighter by adulthood.
A recent Washington Post article stated that the North Korean request has "put the United States and other Western countries in the uncomfortable position of having to decide whether to ignore the pleas of a starving country or pump food into a corrupt distribution system that often gives food to those who need it least."
Not if the policy makers in Washington use the agreement reached in 2008, which remedied past problems of the regime diverting humanitarian food shipments to the military or for black market revenues.
IAN TIMBERLAKE/AFP/Getty Images
Friday, February 18, 2011 - 1:59 PM

Secretary of Defense Gates is right. It would be a tragic irony if, having come this far in Iraq, the United States faltered and failed to fund adequately the next phase of the mission. Even with adequate funding, the mission will be hard enough.
Congress is right to take a hard look at the Iraq situation. The security needs in Iraq exceed anything the U.S. State Department ever has dealt with in the past. The current plan, which will shift the burden almost entirely from the Department of Defense to State, is distinctly inferior to the original plan, which envisioned a renegotiation of the Status of Forces agreement to allow a modest U.S. military presence as a stabilizing factor. The administration fumbled the original plan and while Gates hints at the possibility of reviving it at the eleventh hour, it may be too late. The current plan relying on the U.S. State Department to do more than it ever has done before is a barely satisfactory Plan B. But it is manifestly superior to Plan C, which involves walking away from Iraq entirely and hoping for the best. I believe once Congress has looked at and thought about the situation carefully, it must conclude that funding the State Department plan is the only responsible course of action available at this point.
I understand the frustration of people who believe the Iraq war was a mistake from the start, but I do not understand their desire to compound what they believe to be one error with strategic blunders of comparable proportions: abandoning Iraq or failing to provide the resources necessary to keep Iraq on a successful trajectory.
Rod Lamkey Jr/Getty Images
Wednesday, February 2, 2011 - 11:47 AM

It is right and natural that we devote a great deal of time deliberating about the foreign policy and other implications of the events unfolding in Egypt. For Egypt, these events constitute a national crisis; for the United States, a foreign-policy crisis. But for many individuals, these events also represent a personal crisis. These include first and foremost Egyptians themselves, of course, who amid jubilation and trepidation about the future of their country must also grapple with rapidly rising food prices, various shortages, looting, and a complete standstill in tourist spending. But the crisis has also affected Americans who live and work in Egypt or tourists who have found themselves unexpectedly stranded there.
While we debate the intentions of President Mubarak, the attitude of the military, and the likely place of various groups and figures in a successor government, many in Cairo worry about
sounds of gunfire outside their windows and reports of looters in their neighborhoods. Their friends and relatives inside and outside Egypt struggle to get information on their safety and whereabouts, frustrated by the interruption of email, mobile phones, and other means of communication.
Looking after the welfare of Americans abroad -- particularly during a crisis -- is one of the core missions of the State Department and a foremost responsibility of U.S. diplomats stationed overseas. U.S. diplomats are rarely noticed, much less celebrated, but their service and sacrifices deserve the American people's recognition.
When a crisis such as this erupts, the local U.S. Embassy will scramble to understand and report to Washington on events and offer its advice on U.S. policy. But it will also initiate a massive effort to account for and care for American citizens, both those who wish to leave and those who remain behind. Right now at the Cairo airport, our Foreign Service officers and other U.S. personnel are putting in days-long shifts to assist Americans who want to leave Egypt. The same officers who are responding to Washington's demands for analysis of opposition figures and the latest reports on protests in Tahrir Square are also comforting weary travelers, serving them food and water, and packing them on to evacuation flights.
Among those the officers have seen off are their own families, whom the State Department yesterday ordered to depart Egypt. The farewells are hasty -- families must leave quickly once the order is given -- and sometimes do not take place at all if the employee is needed elsewhere. The families do not know when they will be able to return, if at all, and must make accommodations for housing and schools on the fly. When their families are long gone, the officers stay on to perform vital work to advance U.S. national security.
The experience of the officers in Cairo is hardly unique -- many diplomats are stationed at embassies and consulates overseas where conditions do not permit their families to
accompany them. Alongside other civilians and of course members of the military, they make daily sacrifices to serve their country. Few Americans are actually aware of what they do, and fewer still will ever have need to call upon their help. But they are there when Americans require, and for Americans stranded in Egypt, that is a deep relief.
ELVIS BARUKCIC/AFP/Getty Images
Friday, July 9, 2010 - 4:53 PM

It seems Congress wants to throw more money at Haiti. In May, Senators John Kerry (D-MA) and Robert Corker (R-TN) introduced an act to supply $3.5 billion in additional recovery aid to follow-up on the January 12 earthquake. While the measure may stall -- it triples the figure the Obama administration promised -- a slightly reduced amount may survive in supplemental spending.
For good security and geopolitical reasons, it's in America's interest to help this close Caribbean neighbor. Yet, in lean times and with a hazy strategy as a guide, one might ask how more spending would do any good.
In fairness, Washington's emergency response has managed to feed and house the displaced. And plans to rebuild damaged infrastructure in smarter ways seem generally well conceived. It's the longer-term social and civic strategy that needs clarification.
U.S. policy (articulated mostly in speeches and press statements) and Haiti's own National Recovery and Development Plan don't say how further assistance will make Haiti any more self-sustaining than before the quake. Few details spell out how to lay a social foundation for prosperity and stability such as improving education and local governance in ways that might develop native talent and foster communitarian spirit.
Getty Images
Tuesday, June 15, 2010 - 5:11 PM

An Oval Office Address to the
Nation (OOAN -- to coin a new acronym) is a "big gun" presidential communication
tool -- perhaps only a special address to a joint session of Congress is bigger.
All administrations keep the OOAN powder dry for an emergency, but few
have husbanded it as carefully as has the Obama administration. This will be
the first Obama OOAN, but he has previously conducted at least three addresses
to a joint session of Congress, not counting the annual State of the Union
address.
With the president's polling numbers falling and domestic and international
problems mounting, the time is fairly ripe for Obama to deliver his first OOAN.
Fairly ripe, but not fully ripe, because the usual peg for an OOAN is
missing: either a) A recent tragedy or b) A recent
potentially pivotal development
in an ongoing challenge or c) an announcement of an abrupt change
of course. (Technically, this last one was not an OOAN because it came not
from the Oval but from the Library, so it was a LAN.)
By contrast, President Obama will deliver his OOAN: a) on day 57 of a slow
motion crisis, that b) has not just had an on-the-ground pivot (on the
contrary, the most recent development, a lightning
strike igniting a fire on a recovery vessel seems like an almost Biblical
piling-on of trouble), and c) apparently without any dramatic change of course
to announce.
I could be wrong about a dramatic policy announcement, of course, but I don't
think so because the pre-speech
spinning by White House advisors has emphasized how President Obama, simply by
virtue of giving his first address, can rhetorically deliver a pivot in the
story. He will apparently use the address to reinforce some old talking
points ("We have been on the job since Day One") that have not sold well and to
refocus attention on old energy proposals that have been stuck in Congress.
He will make news simply by giving the speech, but it seems unlikely that
the news will be about new policies that will produce a pivot in the Gulf or on
the shores.
All of this is domestic policy, of course, so why raise it in a blog devoted to
foreign policy? Several reasons:
For our country's sake, I hope tonight's OOAN does represent a pivot point in this crisis. Obama has famously risen to the occasion, especially when the occasion is a "big speech." By rolling out their long-saved big gun, the White House has indicated they think this is the President's biggest speech thus far, so he may once again deliver on his promise.
Alex Wong/Getty Images
Monday, May 3, 2010 - 11:15 AM

History does not repeat itself but it rhymes. I am
reminded of this cliché as I watch the Obama administration strive
mightily to build a rhetorical cordon to prevent the off-shore oil spill
from becoming their "Katrina Moment." The vigorous push-back was necessary
because the Obama administration's early reaction to the oil spill was uneven
-- as was the Bush administration's early reaction to Katrina -- and even pro-administration
media outlets were forced
to admit as much.
There is never a good time politically for an environmental disaster of this
scope, but the timing is especially delicate for the administration. Not only
does it come just a few weeks after the president made a much-ballyhooed
compromise to allow off-shore drilling -- a move that dismayed this leftwing
base -- but it is also comes in the same news cycle as two other bad stories:
another near-miss attempted terrorist strike on U.S. soil and the visit to
American soil of the Iranian troublemaker President Ahmadinejad. With all of
this toxicity heading towards the U.S. homeland at the same time, the administration
can be forgiven if their spin sounds a bit defensive.
Katrina arrived at a similarly bad time politically for the Bush administration. It
came on the heels of a bruising political fight over Social Security reform
culminating in August's cable news faux-crisis of Cindy Sheehan's vigil outside
the president's ranch in Crawford. And shortly after Katrina, the administration
got bogged down in a politically costly battle over a Supreme Court nomination
(yet another eerie parallel to present day with Obama's next Supreme Court pick
looming?). Many political veterans of the Bush administration view Katrina
and the political damage that ensued as the pivot point in the presidency.
It is too soon to say whether the oil spill will be become Obama's "Katrina
Moment." President Obama has advantages that President Bush did not have,
the most important of which are competent state and local leaders. But these
advantages will be sorely tested if the damage from the oil spill approximates
the worst-case estimates. Likewise, as my new Shadow Government colleague Mary
Habeck notes, it is scary to think what would have happened in Times Square if
the President's luck had run out and the car bomb had detonated as the
perpetrators had hoped. If the threats emanating
from Hakimullah Mehsud, the terrorist who survived a U.S. drone strike several
months ago, are credible, this is another sore test that will play out in the
coming weeks and months. And Ahmadinejad's visit is an untimely reminder
that the Iranian nuclear forecast remains bleak and getting bleaker by the day.
This would be a lot to handle even for Jack Bauer who can count on his
scriptwriters to rescue him at just the right moment. President Obama, however,
is writing his own script and so these next several months may prove to be pivotal
ones for his presidency.
YURI GRIPAS/AFP/Getty Images
Tuesday, January 19, 2010 - 7:54 PM

By Thomas Mahnken
John Barry, one of the nation's most insightful defense reporters, has posted a piece for Newsweek arguing that the Pentagon should be put in charge of the Haiti relief effort. As he notes, the only institution capable of meeting the demands of the Haiti crisis is not the United Nations, but the U.S. military.
As in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the U.S. armed forces have once again become the responder of first resort. In this case, the U.S. Navy is front and center: the USS Carl Vinson's heavy-lift helicopter and the USS Bataan and USS Ft McHenry's air cushioned landing craft are bringing needed supplies to the people of Haiti.
There are three lessons here. First, for all the talk of whole-of-government solutions, the U.S. military remains the most competent national security institution we have. In recent years, the men and women of the U.S. armed forces have time and time again responded admirably when called upon to conduct missions far beyond those for which they were trained.
Second, the very competence of the military has become a sort of trap. Time and time again, the military has taken up the slack when other national security institutions do not perform as well as they can or should. Tasks better performed by the State Department or U.S. Agency for International Development, state or local governments, or non-governmental organizations too often wind up being performed by soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines.
Third, when the American taxpayer bought today's Navy, he got a lot more than he thought he was getting. He not only got a force capable of defending American interests on the high seas, but also one possessing the flexibility to respond rapidly to contingencies across the spectrum of conflict. Let's hope that the Obama administration's Quadrennial Defense Review, to be released next month, reflects this reality.
The Obama administration has two choices. First, it can continue to hope that, with more funding and some presidential leadership, the other parts of the national security community will finally rise to the occasion. Both Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of State Clinton (both at Foggy Bottom and before that in the Senate) have been articulate advocates for whole-of-government approaches. I very much hope they succeed.
If not, the logical alternative is to do what John Barry says and give missions like Haiti to the Pentagon. Such an approach would, however, be undesirable; it would further dilute U.S. military capabilities while also delegitimizing those institutions that should be bringing their unique talents to bear on crisis situations.
Alex Wong/Getty Images
Thursday, January 14, 2010 - 4:21 PM
By Peter Feaver
The horrible tragedy in Haiti is an opportunity to put the Obama administration's mantra -- "you never want a serious crisis to go to waste" -- to the test. Reasonable people can debate whether the administration has wasted opportunities at home (the domestic economic crisis) or abroad (Iran political crisis). But in Haiti they get a fresh chance to apply that mantra.
Of course, the primary focus should be on getting aid as quickly as possible to the hundreds of thousands of Haitians who are suffering. The Obama administration's initial response has been adequate but hopefully is just a down-payment. More can and should be done and, I expect, will be done.
But I also expect that there are more opportunities in this crisis than merely rushing in humanitarian aid (as important as that is). While the first-responders in the administration are straining every nerve to ramp up their efforts, I hope the strategic planners in the administration (who do not have operational responsibility for responding) are also busy thinking of ways to have the response to the crisis address more fundamental concerns.
The Bush administration's response to the late 2004 tsunami is instructive in this regard. Beyond meeting the initial humanitarian goals of helping alleviate the suffering, the Bush administration was able to have the U.S. response address three other goals:
(1) to reinforce a powerful counter-narrative to al Qaeda's propaganda that the United States was at war with Muslims. Al Qaeda's charge was never true -- no country has done more to defend and assist Muslims in recent decades than the United States -- but it resonated nonetheless. The irrefutable evidence of the United States taking the lead in helping the tsunami victims, many of whom were Muslim, and of doing more, faster than others were able to do (and doing it with military assets) still stands as the single greatest success in the ongoing war of ideas with what President Obama calls the network of violence and hatred.
(2) to demonstrate the utility of action-based multilateralism rather than deliberation-based multilateralism. Now that the label "coalitions of the willing" has been replaced with a more politically correct label of "minilateralism," the fashionable set of foreign policy pundits has finally embraced it. But, of course, this is precisely the kind of multilateralism that the Bush administration pursued all along, whether the issue was Iraq (the original coalition of the willing), Iran (P5+1), North Korea (6 Party Talks), Middle East Peace (the Quartet), WMD proliferation (Proliferation Security Initiative), or tsunami relief. It must be said, however, that no Bush effort at minilateralism worked as well as did the Regional Core Group, the ad hoc coalition created to lead the tsunami response and especially to provide the early bridge response before the older established agencies could get on the scene to do what they did best. The Regional Core Group is the best example of the action-oriented international cooperation the administration sought, often unsuccessfully, to promulgate.
(3) to help the Indonesian government reestablish responsible governance over regions, especially Aceh, that posed serious security problems before they were devastated by the tsunami. This goal has not been fully met, but the situation is better than what it had been and was an important opportunity that would otherwise not have been available.
I do not know what the similar opportunities are in the Haitian crisis, but I am confident that they exist. Haiti has been the victim of mismanagement and malgovernance for decades, producing misery no less profound than the dramatic pictures that we see today. Perhaps the earthquake has so broken the government that a whole new structure, one that will more closely approximate the goal of effective democracy -- human liberty, protected by democratic institutions -- can be established. Whatever the opportunities are, it should be the urgent priority of the strategic planners in the Obama administration to identify them and to sketch out ways of meeting them in the weeks and months to come.
Let us do everything we can to help Haiti, but let us not waste this serious crisis to do more than just meet the immediate first-aid needs.
UPDATE: Already, President Obama has made a good down-payment on the mantra by asking his two immediate predecessors to lead the bipartisan fundraising efforts for Haitian relief. This takes a page from Bush’s playbook -- he similarly asked his two predecessors (Clinton and Bush 41) to lead the disaster relief fundraising. More importantly, it is an excellent use of the crisis to get past the Anything But Bush syndrome that has afflicted the Obama Team this first year. President Bush’s decision to tap President Clinton for tsunami relief paved the way for the more intensive outreach across the aisle on foreign policy matters that characterized Bush’s second term (compared to the first). Perhaps Obama’s action will likewise pave the way for more intensive outreach to Republicans in Obama’s second year.
THONY BELIZAIRE/AFP/Getty Images
Shadow Government is a blog about U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration, written by experienced policy makers from the loyal opposition and curated by Peter D. Feaver and William Inboden.
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