Facts and arguments regarding China’s military

Posted By Thomas G. Mahnken Monday, December 19, 2011 - 3:00 PM

Late last month, the front page of the Washington Post contained the kind of story that I, as a professional educator, like to see. The piece discussed the work of Georgetown University's Asian Arms Control Project. Specifically, it chronicled the laborious effort of a couple dozen Georgetown graduate students to uncover, over the course of years, China's "underground great wall," a network of thousands of kilometers of underground tunnels constructed by the People's Liberation Army Second Artillery Corps - the same branch of the Chinese military that controls Beijing's nuclear and conventional ballistic missiles. The students have amassed a lot of evidence, including some eye-catching pictures, of China's tunnel system.

The Georgetown project demonstrates the value of open-source basic research on the Chinese military. Unlike the Soviet Union, which closely guarded even the most mundane bits of information, China publishes quite a lot on its military, including voluminous information on its underground tunneling program. The problem is that, until the Georgetown students began to document the program, few in the United States paid much attention to the fact that China has poured massive amounts of resources into underground facilities over the course of decades. Indeed, it was not until this year's edition of the Pentagon's Congressionally mandated report on Chinese military power that China's tunneling program received official acknowledgement.

China's tunneling program is of more than academic interest, however. It raises legitimate questions about the ability of the United States to verify the scope of Chinese military modernization, including the size of China's missile force and its nuclear arsenal.

It is that inconvenient fact that has drawn the ire of the arms control community. Over the past month, arms controllers, including the Union of Concerned Scientists and the blog Arms Control Wonk have launched a series of vitriolic attacks on the Georgetown students; their professor, Phillip Karber; and that staunch member of the Vast Right Wing Conspiracy, the Washington Post, which had the temerity to report on the students' efforts. The Post's Ombudsman summarized the attacks - and stood by the paper's original story - yesterday.

Read on

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EXPLORE:EAST ASIA, CHINA, DEFENSE SPENDING, MILITARY

Sequestration as the preferred Defense option

Posted By Dov Zakheim Friday, November 11, 2011 - 4:26 PM

The Nov. 23 deadline for a "Supercommittee" budget agreement is fast approaching, and no such agreement is as yet in sight. The Pentagon appears to be panicking over the prospect of sequestration, and with it a reduction of some $600 billion in defense-related spending over the next decade. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta's warnings have become ever more dire. He has said that sequestration will "invite aggression from U.S. adversaries", that it will result in a "hollow force" of "ships without sailors" and "brigades without bullets."

The Secretary should know better. Not because sequestration, if implemented, would not be a disaster for DoD, but because the absence of an agreement, which would trigger a sequester, does not mean that sequestration will ever come to pass. It is important to note that the sequester would only come into force for the Fiscal Year 2013 budget; in other words, nearly a year must still pass before any cuts are mandated. And the Congress thus has nearly a year to legislate the sequester into the dustbin of history.

It has happened exactly that way before, as Mr. Panetta knows only too well. He was a veteran of the House Budget Committee in 1988 when the Congress reached a budget deficit agreement that wiped out a $20 billion sequestration that was supposed to have been "automatically" triggered by the 1985 Balanced Budget Emergency Deficit Control Act, popularly known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. And he was chairman of the House Budget Committee in 1990, when he played a major role in the enactment of Congressional legislation that again circumvented the 1985 Act by lowering sequestration levels from the "automatic" $16 billion that the Act would have mandated to just over $4.5 billion in budget reductions. Again in 1991, with Mr. Panetta still serving as House Budget Committee chairman, a smaller sequester of some $190 million was rescinded in subsequent legislation that year when the purported savings were found to be the result of a miscalculation.

It is arguable that the long term health of America's defense posture would be better served if the Supercommittee fails to produce an agreement than if it does. It will be much harder for the Congress to rescind a budget deal to which all sides agreed, than to rescind a sequester that was the product of an absence of agreement. Even under the best of circumstances, it is unlikely that Defense could avoid cuts of $200-300 billion in a deal that totals $1.2 trillion; and those cuts will be difficult, if not impossible to restore. On the other hand, the Congress can be expected to rescind sequestration precisely because of the warnings that the Pentagon's top leaders have issued. And once the Congress returns to square one, the prospects for protecting the Defense budget will radically improve.

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COMMENTS (0)

EXPLORE:DEFENSE SPENDING, ECONOMICS, OBAMA ADMINISTRATION

Heresy over defense, part 2

Posted By Tom Mahnken Friday, October 14, 2011 - 12:09 PM

One of the things that I enjoy most about Shadow Government is the diversity of views that its members hold. I was particularly heartened that my friend and former colleague Kori Schake responded to my call for a debate over defense spending by firing a volley in defense of the new orthodoxy on defense spending. Specifically, she attempts to make the case that the federal debt is a national security threat that demands further defense cuts, that the United States has a large margin of superiority over potential adversaries, and we need to seek greater efficiency in defense.

I agree with Kori that our national debt is an important national security concern, but I also agree with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey that it is not our most important one. In my view, it would be strategically unsound, even if it were economically possible, to balance the budget on the back of defense.

I agree that defense should not be "out of bounds" in budget matters. But the fact is that in a period that has witnessed a massive expansion of government spending, the Defense Department has already sustained several rounds of cuts, dating back to the first months of the Obama administration. As both Robert Gates and Leon Panetta have argued, additional cuts cannot help but affect U.S. security.

Kori and I disagree as to the magnitude of America's military advantage. Some parts of the world (Europe, for example) are clearly safer and more secure than in decades past. But other parts of the world, such as Asia, are less secure. Of particular concern is China's ongoing military modernization, a portion of which is aimed at coercing U.S. allies and denying the United States access to the Western Pacific. As I have argued elsewhere, the United States has consistently underestimated the scope and pace of China's fielding of new weapons, including those designed to counter U.S. power projection forces. Moreover, over the past decade the weapons most needed to respond to such developments have received short shrift in the Pentagon budget. As a result, the United States faces an increasingly unfavorable military balance in the Western Pacific.

Kori argues that the U.S. armed forces have undergone a "rolling modernization." In fact, however, the post-9/11 military buildup has produced few new weapon systems, and those that have been fielded over the past decade have been geared toward a particular kind of war against a particular kind of foe. For example, the United States fielded thousands of Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles for Iraq and a sent a second generation to Afghanistan. Such vehicles are unlikely to be of much use in future wars, however. And the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles that have been crucial to U.S. success in combating insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and targeting terrorists in Pakistan are unlikely to survive in a conflict with an adversary that possesses even a rudimentary air defense network.

Whole parts of the U.S. armed forces have been left out of whatever "rolling modernization" has taken place. U.S. Air Force aircraft are on average more than 23 years old, the oldest in Air Force history, and are getting older. Many transport aircraft and aerial refueling tankers are more than 40 years old, and some may be as old as 70-80 years before they retire. The U.S. Navy is smaller now than it was before the United States entered World War I, and is getting smaller. No "rolling modernization" will reverse these trends; only full-scale recapitalization of the U.S. armed forces will.

As a veteran of the war in Iraq and as someone who has dedicated a good portion of my professional career to educating officers, I am immensely proud of the men and women of the U.S. armed forces. Kori and I agree that they are "amazingly proficient and adaptive." But the U.S. armed forces have devoted the past decade to perfecting a particular type of warfare - counterinsurgency. Tomorrow's wars are likely to look much different than today's, and in focusing on winning today's wars we have all too often neglected preparing for tomorrow's.

Finally, Kori and I agree that efficiency is desirable. I applauded Secretary of Gates' efforts to seek efficiencies in the defense budget, and certainly feel that more can be done. However, the ultima ratio of defense is effectiveness, not efficiency. That is, defense spending ultimately exists to provide security to the American people. Inefficient yet effective defense remains preferable to efficient yet ineffective defense.

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EXPLORE:DEFENSE SPENDING

A heretic responds

Posted By Kori Schake Thursday, October 13, 2011 - 6:20 PM

Since I have often argued in these electronic pages for reducing defense spending, I feel the need to respond to Tom Mahnken's post, and hopefully draw out the arguments for and against maintaining or increasing our current DOD accounts.

I agree with Tom that our current level of defense spending is not an undue burden on the American economy. Since the end of World War II, spending levels have been far in excess of our current roughly 4 percent of GDP without demonstrable negative economic effects.

But three other factors persuade me that reductions to defense spending should be undertaken. First, we have a national security vulnerability of epic proportions in our federal debt. Defense is not the primary cause of that debt; obviously, our medical and retirement programs need to be reduced and brought into sustainable proportions. But defense is a significant contributor to the debt. Military strength is not the sole basis of American power -- our economy, our values, our vibrancy demand we put ourselves on sound financial footing, which requires us to address the problem of American debt addiction. I have a difficult time seeing how either the math or the politics work to bring federal spending into line with receipts if conservatives rule defense out of bounds.

Second, our near-term margin of error is actually enormously wide in defense compared to any prospective challenger. The world is much more conducive to American interests than it was when Defense spending as a proportion of GDP was much higher: we are militarily dominant, the threats to us are fewer and less apocalyptic, our allies are more capable to handle their own problems, our enemies less so, and our values on the ascendancy. Coming off two intellectually and operationally demanding wars, the American military is weary but amazingly proficient and adaptive.

Moreover, our military services are better than at any time in history. They have conducted a rolling modernization, replacing equipment with much better equipment as it was exhausted in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have battle tested forces that can successfully span the spectrum from high-intensity warfare to counterinsurgency, excelling at individuals taking initiative. While others may learn from studying our operations, there's no substitute for the doing we have been doing.

Third, the American military is brilliant at effectiveness; efficiency, not so much. As Admiral Mullen confessed during the last budget cycle, money has been plentiful in DOD for so long we've forgotten how to budget and economize. We tend to overwhelm problems with resources. That's not a bad strategy, but it's a profligate strategy, and we ought to hold ourselves to a higher standard. Our strongest suit is not spending but innovation, and because of the demands of the wars, we have a military primed for tackling the problems with more innovative approaches.

Spending does not guarantee capability; in many cases, it impedes finding better solutions and creates complacency. We have more than doubled the baseline budget in the past ten years, even before adding in the operational costs of the wars. Is the world twice as dangerous as it was in 2001? I doubt it. Besides, inputs are not the right measure of outputs. I believe it's genuinely wrong to equate spending with commitment to defense. Our safety lies in our ability to find better solutions, not our ability to spend more than our adversaries.

I'd be very interested in Tom and other Shadow colleagues' thinking on the three issues of whether they consider debt a greater threat, our margin of error militarily wide, and whether they see the need for greater efficiency in our approach to defense challenges.

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EXPLORE:DEFENSE SPENDING

Heresy over defense

Posted By Tom Mahnken Thursday, October 13, 2011 - 11:29 AM

In recent months, a new orthodoxy has crept into discussions of defense spending. This narrative holds that the United States spends too much on defense, is suffering economically because of it, and therefore the United States can and should make major cuts in the size of the defense budget. The orthodox view increasingly substitutes arbitrary budget targets for an appreciation of America's enduring interests. The alternative, heretical, view starts with an understanding of America's unique global role and then seeks to identify the strategy and resources needed to fulfill it. Mitt Romney began to challenge this orthodoxy in his speech on foreign policy last Friday at The Citadel. One hopes that this is but the first round of a much-needed debate on defense spending.

The Orthodox View: The current level of defense spending is unsustainable. The U.S. government will need to make major cuts in defense spending in upcoming years.

The Heresy: The Defense Department has already undertaken several rounds of cuts since the Obama administration took office, and the Obama administration plans to cut an additional $400 billion in defense expenditures. If the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction does not reach its targeted level of cuts, the Defense Department will face unprecedented automatic cuts. As former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates cautioned shortly before leaving office, additional cuts in defense will call into question the role that the United States has played in the world for more than half a century. As he put it, "The tough choices ahead are really about the kind of role the American people -- accustomed to unquestioned military dominance for the past two decades -- want their country to play in the world."

The United States may actually have to spend more on defense to defend U.S. territory, protect our allies, and safeguard our interests. In the words of the Congressionally-mandated 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, "The [U.S.] force structure needs to be increased in a number of areas, including the need to counter anti-access challenges; strengthen homeland defense, including cyber threats; and conduct post-conflict stabilization missions. It must also be modernized." These are not the words of some paleo- or neo-conservative, but rather the findings of a group of 20 senior officials who have served Democratic and Republican presidents over decades. The Independent Panel called for an increase in the size of the U.S. Navy, the acquisition of a next-generation bomber, and new long-range strike systems. The panel acknowledged that although the Defense Department must do everything it can to achieve cost savings on acquisition and overhead, "substantial additional resources will be required to modernize the force."

The Orthodox View: Defense spending is a drain on the U.S. economy.

The Heresy: Defense spending provides tangible benefits to the American people both internationally and domestically.

Internationally, American military dominance has benefited the United States and the world as a whole. The fact that the U.S. Navy has commanded the maritime commons has allowed trade to flow freely and reliably, spurring globalization and lifting millions out of poverty. It is unclear whether the stability that American military dominance has yielded would continue in its absence. As Bill Clinton's Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., famously noted, security is like oxygen: you don't notice it until it begins to run out.

Domestically, defense does more to stimulate the U.S. economy than most things the U.S. government spends money on. The defense budget creates job and spurs the development of new technology. It is hard to think of other categories of government expenditure that are as stimulative of economic growth, yet the Defense Department was largely exempt from the Obama administration's stimulus plans.

The stakes are too high to accept the new orthodoxy on defense on face value. The American people deserve a full-scale debate over the direction of American national security. As last year's Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel put it, "Although there is a cost to recapitalizing the military, there is also a price to be paid for not re-capitalizing, one that in the long run would be much greater."

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EXPLORE:DEFENSE SPENDING

Shadow Government is a blog about U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration, written by experienced policy makers from the loyal opposition and curated by Peter D. Feaver and William Inboden.