Latin America

By José R. Cárdenas

The debate over U.S. policy towards Cuba heats up this week as the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) holds a hearing Thursday on whether to lift the U.S. travel ban against Fidel Castro's island-prison. Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) and Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA), Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Chairman of the HFAC, respectively, fired the first salvo with an op-ed in the Miami Herald calling for the unilateral lifting of the "anachronistic" ban, arguing that ordinary Americans can "serve as ambassadors for the democratic values we hold dear," thereby eroding the impediments to change in Cuba.

It is indeed a quaint conceit on the part of many in this country that Americans, just by being Americans, can demonstrate the errors in others' ways and infuse on the recalcitrant and autocratic a sudden appreciation for the commonweal, sparking a dawn of democratic reform and respect for human rights. Sadly, the world doesn't work quite that way and thugs like Castro will not be impressed by the earnestness of American tourists to engender a better Cuba.

Besides, if we are to take our cues from Canadian and European tourists, one wonders whether political agitation can compete with sun, sex, and cigars as the primary motivations for visiting the walled tourist compounds on the Island of Dr. Castro. This doesn't even countenance the motivations of U.S. businessmen, for whom political agitation would be the very last item on their agendas, given that their interests are served by a perceived vision of stability and cozy relations with the incumbent government.

This is not to recognize the moribund state of affairs in Cuba. Senator Lugar and Rep. Berman can hardly be blamed for being frustrated. Anyone who cares about Cuba is frustrated at Fidel Castro's pathological obstinacy and nominal leader and brother Raúl's craven inability to deviate from his brother's uncompromising ideological line.

But bad proposals are worse than none at all. The short of it is the Castro regime simply is more determined to maintain absolute power than the United States is in mercifully terminating its fifty years of misrule. Given that, opening the floodgates to U.S. tourists and businessmen will result in a desperately needed financial windfall and credibility boost that will only strengthen the regime, not undermine it.

Moreover, the debate over the U.S. travel ban and, more broadly, the U.S. economic embargo of Cuba clouds the real issues at hand. Namely, that the real conflict in Cuba is not between the United States and the Castro regime, but between the regime and the Cuban people. This is made abundantly clear in a searing new report by the International Republican Institute on the results of a recent survey conducted discretely among the Cuban people on the island

Conducted this past summer among a total of 432 Cuban adults from across the island, the survey found that Cubans do not need American tourists to tell them that things are rotten in their own country and that change is desperately needed.  Specifically, more than four in five citizens on the island (82 percent) do not believe things are going well, while a vast majority of Cubans would vote for fundamental political change (75 percent) and economic change (86 percent) if given the opportunity.

The survey also found that only 8.8 percent believed the U.S. embargo and "isolation" was the biggest problem in Cuba and only 7.9 percent said they thought ending the embargo would most help improve the economy.  What do Cubans overwhelmingly want? Multi-party elections, freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and economic freedoms, including opportunities to own property and run businesses.

Imagine, Cuban citizens came to those conclusions all on their own.

It remains to be seen whether Congress can mobilize the votes to overturn the travel ban (the restrictions were codified under the 1996 Helms-Burton Law), but the prospects seem unlikely. To its credit, the Obama administration has shown no inclination to support such an effort at this time. At the Inter-American Summit last April, the president's words on Cuba were cautious -- and sober. "The Cuban people are not free. And that's our lodestone, our North Star, when it comes to our policy in Cuba," he said. 

He also said his policy would be guided by reciprocity:

What we're looking for is some signal that there are going to be changes in how Cuba operates that assures that political prisoners are released, that people can speak their minds freely, that they can travel, that they can write and attend church and do the things that people throughout the hemisphere can do and take for granted ... And if there is some sense of movement on those fronts in Cuba, then I think we can see a further thawing of relations and further changes.

It is not U.S. policy to be stagnant and unimaginative on Cuba, as critics would have it. President Obama appears intent on continuing the Bush policy of trying to empower Cuban civil society through strategic engagement to operate more independently of the regime's control, although he obviously intends to go much further in opening new avenues to reach the Cuban people. The strategic goal behind such an offensive would be to expand pockets of independence within Cuban civil society and fortify networks among those pockets, putting Cubans who want a different future for their country in touch with other Cubans fed up with the same old struggle and deprivation the regime is only capable of offering.

That Castro's decrepit regime continues to limp along fifty years on understandably confounds many. But that is less an argument for relaxing pressure on the regime than it is an argument to persevere in a cause that is just and right.

Jorge Rey/Getty Images

News of a negotiated "resolution" to the crisis in Honduras is no doubt being met with rounds of diplomatic back-slapping across the hemisphere, but such celebrations would be a bit premature. In other words, we'll be lucky if this is the last we hear of Manuel Zelaya. [Full disclosure: I helped a Honduran business delegation travel to Washington in July 2009 to brief U.S. policymakers on the crisis there.]

Negotiations to end the crisis that began June 28 when the oligarch-turned-leftist populist was legally deposed have culminated with agreement on, primarily, the creation of a national reconciliation government; no amnesty for political crimes; international recognition of the November 29th presidential elections; renunciation of any effort to organize a constitutional assembly to rewrite the Constitution  (Zelaya's mimic of Hugo Chavez in contravention of Honduran law that led to his removal); and a call to the international community to lift economic sanctions against Honduras.

But on the most controversial point of the whole affair ­ whether to unconditionally reinstate Zelaya to office to serve out the rest of his term, as he has been demanding and the interim government has steadfastly refused ­ the negotiators punted.  Actually, they tossed that hot potato back to the National Congress, which must now vote on his return, in consultations with the Supreme Court.

These are the same institutions that Zelaya has been confronting and antagonizing for the past year.  The same National Congress that back in June voted nearly unanimously (including members of Zelaya's own party) in favor of a decree censuring Zelaya for "repeated violations against the Constitution and laws of the Republic."  And the same Supreme Court that ordered his arrest by the military for his illegal actions and disregard for their rulings.

So, even while we'll have to wait and see what happens, it would certainly seem unlikely that there would be such a profound change of heart in these two institutions to see fit to restore him to office, if only for a few months.

And then what?  If they maintain their opposition to Zelaya's return to office, will Zelaya respect their verdict?

The answer is a likely a resounding "no". Recklessness and provocation have defined Zelaya's tenure in office.  Egged on by Hugo Chavez, with the assistance of the Cuban security apparatus, Zelaya is not about to go gently into that good night should Congress and the Supreme Court uphold their opposition to his returning.  He has already demonstrated he has the capacity and the will to put his personal interests over the national well-being.  One shudders at the thought of the chaos he can still create.

This puts a special onus on the Obama administration. Obviously, what opened the door to the compromise was their dropping of their ill-advised ultimatum that Zelaya's return was unconditional and that the administration would not recognize the results of the November elections unless Zelaya was reinstated -- a position that put them on the same side of the issue as Chavez and Fidel Castro.

But now they are on much more solid ground putting the final verdict on Zelaya back in the hands of the Honduran people and their representatives in Congress. This means that once that verdict is rendered, they need to immediately provide full support for the elections, and, more importantly, prevent Zelaya from any attempts to bring the whole temple down around him.

Even if in the unlikely event the courts and Congress move to reinstate Zelaya, he will still need to be closely watched so that he causes no more damage to the country, and the Obama administration, as brokers of this deal (three senior officials were in Honduras this week), bear a special responsibility on this.

The Honduran crisis is not over, but the administration has at least moved away from its untenable early stance and is in a much better position to affect a positive outcome.

What happens after the Nov. 29 election is another story. The administration's initial aping of the Chavez line on Honduras will not be soon forgotten across the hemisphere. A situation where a small, pro-American country attempted to stop a Chavez wannabe from running roughshod over its democratic institutions and installing himself in perpetual power was not met with support from the United States, but outright opposition and retribution. In this way, the stark differences with Chavez in our vision for this hemisphere ­ statism and class conflict versus freedom and opportunity for all ­ were regrettably blurred.  The citizens of the Americas need a clear alternative to the snake oil that Chavez is selling and by muddying that distinction, let's hope we haven't done too much harm to our interests in our own neighborhood.

By José R. Cárdenas

Kudos to the House Foreign Affairs Committee for scheduling a joint subcommittee hearing Tuesday on Iran's activities in the Western Hemisphere. While the foreign-policy establishment has understandably been focused on myriad global crises elsewhere, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's regime has been steadily expanding its reach in what it undoubtedly sees as America's "soft underbelly." The House hearing follows a blockbuster (but, unfortunately, little noticed) speech last month at the Brookings Institution by legendary New York District Attorney Robert Morgenthau detailing the growing ties between Iran and Hugo Chávez's Venezuela.

Morgenthau, whose base in New York makes him one of the country's premier experts on international financial transactions (especially those of the unsavory kind), charged that Iran and Venezuela are establishing "a cozy financial, political, and military partnership" that is "rooted in a shared anti-American rhetoric and policy." "The Iranians," he said, "calculating and clever in their diplomatic relations, have found the perfect ally in Venezuela. Venezuela has an established financial system that, with Chávez's help, can be exploited to avoid economic sanctions. As well, its geographic location is ideal for building and storing weapons of mass destruction far away from Middle Eastern states threatened by Iran's ambition and from the eyes of the international community." He said, "Now is the time for policies and actions in order to ensure that the partnership produces no poisonous fruit."

As if on cue, two days after Morgenthau's speech, the tiny principality of Andorra announced the freezing of bank accounts of several individuals said to have close ties to Chávez as part of an international investigation into terrorism financing. The move came amid a U.S. Treasury Department investigation of accounts and financial activity linked to Chávez family members and Venezuelan government officials, according to an Andorran newspaper. The paper said the bank accounts, in Miami, Panama, China and Andorra, could be used to transfer funds to terrorist groups including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Hezbollah, Hamas, and ETA.

Another recent worrying development is Chávez's admission that Iran is helping Venezuela explore for uranium. According to a new paper from my colleague Ambassador Roger Noriega, a Canadian uranium exploration company, U308 Corp, recorded a substantial source of uranium in the border region between Guyana and Venezuela. It just so happens that Iranian companies and others with Middle Eastern backgrounds now operate mines, a "tractor factory," and a cement plant in the same area; at least two of these facilities have direct access to the navigable Orinoco River, which provides a ready route to the Atlantic Ocean.

Chávez's assurances that he would only use nuclear energy for peaceful means ring somewhat hollow when you consider yet another incident earlier this year where Turkish authorities seized cargo headed from Iran to Venezuela that contained lab equipment capable of producing explosives. The shipment was labeled "tractor parts" for the aforementioned "tractor factory."

Complicating matters further for U.S. interests in the region is the fact that Chávez has used his friendly relations with other like-minded radicals to gain further entrée for the Iranians in the Americas. Iran has signed trade, investment, and assistance deals -- and, in some cases, weapons deals -- with Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. Even the Big Boy of Latin America, Brazil, has gotten into the act, defending Iran's nuclear program and preparing to host Ahmadinejad on a state visit in late November 2009.

Fortunately, these issues and no doubt many more will be examined by House subcommittee members. It is long past time to bring greater scrutiny to Iranian activities in the Western Hemisphere and develop appropriate responses. Continuing to investigate shady financial transactions and sanctioning perpetrators is a given, as well as working with our allies to monitor Iran's trading relationships with countries in the hemisphere. But more is needed. For starters, the Obama administration should strengthen our relationships with those countries who aren't interested in what Chávez and Ahmadinejad are selling, and that means seeking congressional approval for the Colombia and Panama free trade agreements that have lain dormant since January. It should also breathe new life into the Pathways for Prosperity in the Americas initiative, a group of 14 hemispheric countries working together to extend the benefits of free trade throughout their societies. The point is the vast majority of Latin Americans are loath to see their countries getting involved in contentious global controversies in which they have no stake, but they need to see the United States visibly and actively promoting an alternative way forward.

Granted, the administration's foreign-policy plate continues to be full with pressing matters. But when you recognize that the Iranian regime is playing for keeps, and that its Western Hemisphere strategy is an important part of its efforts to evade international scrutiny -- and sanctions -- regarding its nuclear program, then certainly its activities close to home merit more high-level attention and response.

Photo by Evan Agostini/Getty Images

The news that a "deal" may be in the works to return former Honduran President Manuel "Mel" Zelaya to office is a defeat for democratic order and rule of law in the Americas. [Full disclosure: I helped a Honduran business delegation travel to Washington in July 2009 to brief U.S. policymakers on the crisis there.] Tiny Honduras has been bludgeoned by the international community -- including the United States -- into effectively violating its own constitution and trampling its own political processes by reinstating this would-be autocrat, despite formal charges against him for acts of fraud, treason, and abuse of power that no serious observer disputes. 

For decades, U.S. policy towards Latin America has been to work with our neighbors to supplant "rule of the strongman" with rule of law and fealty to constitutional processes. So how is it that now the United States is advocating the complete reversal of a long-standing bipartisan policy approach in our hemisphere?  Unfortunately, the Obama administration's slow response to the deposing of Zelaya -- despite the crisis building in Honduras over the past year - allowed the ever-opportunistic Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez to exploit the situation by portraying himself as the defender of "democracy" in the region by demanding his ally Zelaya's immediate return to power.

For an Obama administration seemingly following a reflexive "Anything But Bush" policy in the region, there was thus little option but to take the same side as Chavez and Fidel Castro -- not exactly the side to be on when the issues are democratic order and rule of law in the Americas. What the Administration should have done is support Honduras' democratic institutions in their removal of a rogue president and help the country prepare for the previously scheduled Presidential elections on Nov. 29 (with the formal transfer of power to occur in January 2010), after which interim President Roberto Micheletti would step down and constitutional order would prevail.

The stakes in Honduras couldn't be higher. For the first time since Hugo Chavez led a succession of neo-populists into power in the region, leaders who immediately set about undermining separation of powers and aggrandizing control in the executive, a polity has stood up and, acting within its own legal boundaries, basically rejected such a future for themselves. By siding with the Honduran people in this crisis, the United States could have done much to deflate Chavismo in the region. It is a missed opportunity that will come back to haunt us.

As for the present, given Zelaya's confrontational and reckless behavior since being removed from the country -- buzzing the capital in an aircraft and sneaking back into the country to take up residence in the Brazilian Embassy and exhort his followers into the streets -- his remaining days in power are unlikely to be quiet and uneventful. The Honduran people deserve better, as do all struggling democrats in the Americas.

ORLANDO SIERRA/AFP/Getty Images

By Tom Mahnken

At a time when Afghanistan's difficulties and Iraq's fragility grab the headlines, it is worth highlighting the remarkable progress that Colombia has made in combating its long-running narco-terrorist insurgency, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC. Colombia's success was brought home to me and to a group of leading counterinsurgency experts from across the globe this week at a conference held under the sponsorship of the Colombian Ministry of Defense and U.S. Southern Command in Bogota.

It was not long ago that the FARC controlled large swathes of Colombian territory. Within these safe havens, the narco-terrorists established parallel political and economic institutions and forced the local population to grow coca that the FARC used to fund its activities. From these safe havens, the FARC launched waves of kidnapping, murder, and terror, which grew to threaten Bogota itself.

In recent years, through the competent application of counterinsurgency best practices, the Colombian government -- indeed, the Colombian people -- have been able to turn the tide against the FARC. The Colombian experience deserves treatment at greater length than I can offer here, but its main features include:

• The development and implementation of a comprehensive strategy, the Policy for the Consolidation of Democratic Security, for defeating the FARC and other terrorist groups.
• The personal leadership and involvement of President Alvaro Uribe, as well as the formation of an interagency integration group run out of his office to implement the strategy.
• The professionalization of the Colombian armed forces and the development of specialized counterinsurgency units, such as Joint Task Force Omega and its Rapid Deployment Force.
• The mobilization of popular support against the FARC, demonstrated most concretely on February 4, 2008, when around five million Colombians took to the streets in a public rally (organized using Facebook) against the FARC.

The results of this approach have been striking. Through a series of precisely targeted operations, the Colombian military has killed or captured a large portion of the FARC's leadership. It has also brought to justice large numbers of drug traffickers and members of the right-wing paramilitaries that grew up, often with a wink and a nod from the government, to combat the FARC. On July 2, 2008, the Colombian military launched Operation Jaque, a sophisticated effort that rescued hostages, including three Americans, that the FARC had been holding for between five and ten years.

More impressive than operations to kill or capture FARC leaders have been efforts to get insurgents to demobilize and rejoin Colombian society. The fact that progressively more, and more experienced, insurgents are laying down their arms is perhaps the most compelling measure of the success of this approach.

It is trite but true to observe that military efforts form but a small part of a successful counterinsurgency strategy. Colombia's approach is notable for its commitment to following up military operations to clear FARC-held territory with dedicated social and economic development measures. Visitors to the La Macarena region in the southeast part of Colombia can now see efforts to reintegrate -- actually, to integrate for the first time -- whole swaths of Colombia into the life of the nation.

President Uribe speaks passionately and articulately of the need for the Colombian state to build just, democratic institutions throughout its territory and to recover the monopoly of force and justice within its borders. Along those lines, it is notable that his government has waged counterinsurgency without seeking or receiving extraordinary legal powers.

Colombia deserves the credit for its success against the FARC, but U.S. assistance played an important, though supporting, role. U.S. efforts to assist Colombia (and the Philippines) thus deserve scrutiny as examples of the indirect approach to counterinsurgency. In some instances, the U.S. military may have to intervene directly to eliminate terrorists. More often, however, it will support local partners as they seek to defeat insurgents on their own territory. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote in the 2008 National Defense Strategy, "arguably the most important military component of the struggle against violent extremists is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we help prepare our partners to defend and govern themselves". 

One hears among the Colombian military much talk of "victory" and "irreversibility", but these remain goals rather than reality. Military success is not the same thing as final victory. Successful counterinsurgency requires patient, dedicated effort over years and decades. And as Carl von Clausewitz wrote two centuries ago, "in war, the results are seldom final." 

The FARC has demonstrated throughout its life that it is an adaptive foe.  Moreover, democracies have all too often demonstrated the tendency to take their eye off the ball when things appear to be going well. The United States could choose to be a fickle partner, reducing its assistance in a short-sighted move to economize rather than reinforcing success. 

If Colombia has yet to achieve final victory over the FARC, one suspects that it has reached the tipping point. But just as importantly, in an integrated, whole-of-government approach to counterinsurgency, it appears to have developed the formula that will bring eventual victory.

By Christian Brose

For too long, Mexico's intensifying war against narcogangs has gone largely unnoticed in U.S. debate. At last, that's changing. For starters, there was the Joint Forces Command report late last year warning that Mexico, like Pakistan, is in danger of near-term collapse. Barry McCaffrey weighed in with his now famous memo warning much the same thing. Alma Guillermoprieto offered a bleak picture in beautiful prose in the New Yorker. Even Newt Gingrich is jumping in, warning that Mexico is worse than Iraq and Afghanistan. Mary O'Grady raised a red flag yesterday in the Journal. 

This is all good, but by going from 0 to 60 as fast as we have, are we now in danger of painting the situation as more dire than it actually is? To be sure, a country that had more than 5,300 citizens killed in drug-related violence last year isn't in good shape. But from reading recent U.S. commentary and analysis, you'd think Mexico is the next failed state. This isn't sitting well with Mexican President Felipe Calderon, as the L.A. Times reported yesterday, and his government is pushing back against their country's depiction as Pakistan south of the border. (By the way, while most major newspapers have largely missed the Mexico story, the L.A. Times has totally owned coverage of it. Their series Mexico Under Siege is not to be missed.)

Now, of course the Mexican government is supposed to say that things aren't as bad as recent U.S. coverage would have us believe, but to some degree they have a point. I'm still horrified and alarmed about what's going on in Mexico, but here are a few reasons to keep our feet on the ground -- for now. 

1.The narcogangs still seem to be largely focused on fighting each other, not on bringing down the Mexican state. They have stepped up attacks on Mexican officials, police, and the army, but more out of necessity because Calderon has taken the war to them. As yet, there is no alliance unifying all of the narcogangs into one force that seeks to challenge and topple the Mexican state. Now, this could still happen, and even if it didn't Mexico could still be fatally compromised, but thus far the gangs are still mostly killing each other.

2. The gangs have no political agenda; their main goal remains selling dope. They are not providing basic services to Mexico's citizens, nor are they trying to create a parallel system of political order to rival the Mexican state and erode its legitimacy in the eyes of the people. In fact, even if most Mexicans think the gangs are winning, they by all accounts still hate them and what they are doing to the country. In that sense, Mexico's gangs are not a true insurgency. There are signs -- literally, in this sense -- that the gangs are beginning to compete for the allegiances of the Mexican people and wage a strategic communications battle against Calderon. This is a troubling development. But for now, these campaigns are not focused on advancing rival forms of gang-led governance; their goal is simply to brand their cartel opponents as illegitimate in the eyes of the Mexican people.

3. Calderon's government is fighting for its life, but it hasn't lost (yet). In fact, there is still a chance that the worsening trend of the past few years actually reflects a problem getting worse before it gets better. Calderon may yet break the backs of the gangs, and the recent surge in violence may reflect the increasingly desperate actions of cartels that, for the first time in Mexican history, are now up against an adversary that is not content merely to look the other way, but is instead willing to do what is necessary to reclaim his country. Even if he succeeds, for his troubles, Calderon will likely spend the rest of his life after government in exile from his own country out of fear for his life.

The Merida Initiative will help Calderon, and thus far, President Obama -- rightly -- seems committed to carrying on the unprecedented security assistance to Mexico that President Bush and the last Congress began. This is good. Calderon was the first head of state Obama chose to meet, which is likely more than just the old visit-with-the-neighbors-first tradition. Obama would also be wise to recognize how the Mexican gangs are largely fighting their war with U.S.-bought weapons, a point well made in this FP column by Shannon O'Neil -- who, by the way, has a great Latin America blog.

I would be interested to know what the counterinsurgency community's read of Mexico is: Does it fit the model of an insurgency? And if so, should Calderon be mounting more of a COIN campaign, focusing on population security as opposed to the largely seek-and-destroy operations his army seems to be waging?