Tuesday, July 20, 2010 - 4:08 PM

Peter Feaver and Dov Zakheim have both already highlighted many of the manifest flaws in Jacob Heilbrunn's article on the purported extinction of establishment Republican internationalism. Normally I'd resist any further piling on, but Heilbrunn's article is so unserious that it merits thorough refutation.
Hence this question: What do Condi Rice, Steve Hadley, Rich Armitage, Bob Zoellick, Hank Paulson, Bob Kimmitt, John Negroponte, Gordon England, Andrew Natsios, and Henrietta Fore all have in common? At least three things: They all served in very senior foreign policy-related positions (at either the principal or deputy-level) in the George W. Bush administration. All fit comfortably in the internationalist camp of the Republican Party. And not one of them is mentioned even once in Heilbrunn's article.
There are many more Bush administration foreign policy alumni from the under- or assistant-secretary level who would also fit the bill for the three factors above. Moreover, many of the above continue to be influential in policy circles and will be courted by GOP contenders for the White House in 2012, as campaign advisors and potentially as presidential appointees. How Heilbrunn could write an article ostensibly assessing the state of GOP foreign policy discourse while ignoring so many senior policy-makers from a Republican administration that left office just one and a half years ago is a head-scratcher, to say the least.
JIM WATSON/AFP/Getty Images
Tuesday, July 20, 2010 - 11:12 AM

The last time I checked, George Shultz and Jim Baker were both Reagan Republicans. And they certainly were not shy about their views at the White House meetings I attended in those days. For his part, Henry Kissinger led a special commission for Reagan, working closely with my former boss, the "Reaganaut" Fred Ikle. George Shultz was also an early, and strong, supporter of George W. Bush. And both Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft advised the Governor of Texas as he was on the road to winning the Presidency (I write as an eyewitness on that score). Moreover, many of the people about whom Jacob Heilbrunn waxes nostalgic, the Joe Alsop crowd, would have had little time for Kissinger in particular -- something about his background perhaps, or, just maybe, the accent.
And, what, exactly, was wrong with Reagan's muscular approach to foreign
policy? Did it not convince Gorbachev that the Cold War was futile? Did it not
deter Muammar Qaddafi after the Gulf of
Sidra operation? Did it not convince the Ayatollahs to remain quiescent? Reagan
was no neo-con; he may have had Richard Perle on his team, but Baker, and
Shultz were both far more senior. And on certain key issues -- including
relations with the Soviets, Reagan sided consistently with the pragmatists.
As it happens, quite a few moderate Republicans have problems with the START
Treaty -- in particular, its not-too-muffled hints about a potential end to the
American missile defense program. The Russians, notably Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov, have unilaterally stated that this is the case, and while the administration
refutes their assertion -- the Treaty would not otherwise have a hope of
winning Senate approval -- it only does so sotto voce.
Oh, and one more item for Mr. Heilbrunn to consider: if he were to bother to look
around on Capitol Hill in particular, he would find many young Republicans,
twenty- and thirty- somethings, who are not at all committed to the kind of
international noblesse oblige that Woodrow Wilson shared with Rudyard Kipling,
and instead simply feel strongly about what they perceive as the erosion
of our national security posture. Were I their age, I would certainly
count myself among them.
TONY AVELAR/AFP/Getty Images
Monday, July 19, 2010 - 10:04 PM

There are two breathless stories today that are hyped as shock and awe assaults
on the national security establishment. I have read both and tried several
times to muster the requisite emotion, but both struck me as the analytical equivalent
of fizzles.
The first and biggest, is the Washington Post's long-awaited investigative
series on the growth of the national security establishment. Taking its cue
from British tabloids, the Post has breathlessly promoted this series with its
own brand -- "Top Secret America" -- sensational headlines -- "A Hidden
World, Growing Beyond Control" -- and extravagant but somewhat unprovable
claims -- such as the charge that the intelligence community failed to connect
the dots in a timely manner on the recent terrorist attempts because of the
redundant nature of the system. Its most innovative aspect is a series of nifty
interactive features that allow tailored searches and graphics-rich displays of
two basic (and I would have thought, well-established) facts: (1) that the
national security world is complex and (2) that defense spending has grown in
the last decade. Bottom line: This is a very glossy website that so far seems
to try a bit too hard to shock viewers with how much gambling is going on in
the casino.
The series has just begun and perhaps future installments will offer more
bombshell revelations, but the first installment leaves me wondering what the
fuss was about. The major claim that the complexity of the intelligence
community has made it hard to manage in a centralized fashion is neither new
nor proven in a novel way. I am sympathetic to the charge -- anyone who has
worked in government understands how complex the national security
establishment is and can probably name a publication or an organization that,
in one person's humble opinion, could be dropped without fatally wounding
national security. The difficulty is that when you aggregate across a variety
of experienced perspectives, you do not come up with a common list of things to
axe. One man's meat is another man's fluff, and vice-versa. You need look no
further than this very series to establish this fact. The Washington Post team
have spent two years talking with scores of people and compile all of the
complaints without producing (yet, yet ... perhaps the best is yet to come) any
coherent and viable set of reforms.
The two leads, Dana Priest and Bill Arkin, have a wealth of experience bringing
obscure matters to a more general audience (full disclosure: Bill and I
co-moderated a discussion group at washingtonpost.com called Planet War for a
time). I would like to think that some of the purple prose got foisted upon them
by editors desperate to generate traffic to the website. So perhaps the series
will develop in a more constructive direction.
I have less high hopes for Jacob Heilbrunn's crocodile tears complaint
about the waning of establishment Republicans on foreign policy. He begins with
the hook that one of the leading Republican contenders for 2012, Mitt Romney,
came out opposed to the new START treaty with Moscow, a treaty supported with
varying degrees of enthusiasm by several senior Republican wise men. But
debates among Republicans about the wisdom of specific compromises on specific
nuclear arms control treaties is as old as, well, nuclear arms control. Indeed,
because Heilbrunn explicitly avoids taking up the merits of the case either
way, he does not demonstrate that this new debate is especially shallow or even
especially vigorous.
Alas, the piece goes downhill from there and quickly reaches farce by the
fourth paragraph, which reads:
Just as Republicans have united by reflexively saying no to Obama's domestic program, so they are also attacking his approach to foreign affairs as tantamount to a new round of Carteresque appeasement of foreign adversaries. Any deviations from the catechism, such as Republican National Committee Chairman Michael S. Steele's comment that Afghanistan is "Obama's war" and may not be winnable, are excoriated with the verbal equivalent of a death sentence by stoning in Iran. The liturgy is enforced by the likes of Liz Cheney or William Kristol and obediently recited by party leaders such as Republican House whip Eric Cantor, who informed the Heritage Foundation on May 4 that America's defenses are "hemorrhaging" and that Obama's "policies bespeak a naive moral relativism in which the United States bears much responsibility for the problems we face around the world.
I have read this paragraph several times and I still can't make sense of it.
Republicans have not reflexively criticized Obama's foreign policies. The
"stoning" of Michael Steele by other Republicans was actually a defense
of one set of Obama's foreign policies regarding Afghanistan. Bill Kristol has
been one of the loudest supporters of Obama on the foreign policy in question.
And so on.
But beyond mere sloppy editing, the paragraph and the entire piece betrays a
more fundamental wrong-headedness. It wants to claim that there is a new
Republican orthodoxy on foreign policy, and, of course, that the new orthodoxy
is flawed and a rejection of the old Republican establishment. But the evidence
it presents actually reveals something else: a rich panoply of debate among
Republicans today and throughout the Cold War. Doubtless some of those
positions were flawed and some of them are flawed today (put it this way,
George Will and Bill Kristol cannot both be right about Afghanistan). But there
is no orthodoxy and it is certainly not reflexively opposed to everything the
Obama administration has attempted to do on national security. And, of course,
neither is it reflexively anti-establishment. Even a casual reader of the
Shadow Government blog will find a range of opinion, and we are hardly the full
spectrum of Republican foreign policy specialists.
I can imagine an interesting piece doing the intellectual geography of mapping
out various Republican debates. But I haven't read that piece yet, and somehow
I doubt it will begin with the premise that Republican intellectuals have sold
out to the barbarians.
Two big pieces, both worth reading, but count me just poked, not provoked.
Bill Pugliano/Getty Images
Shadow Government is a blog about U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration, written by experienced policy makers from the loyal opposition and curated by Peter D. Feaver and William Inboden.
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