Monday, July 12, 2010 - 3:44 PM

Other than those who are upset by his blunt language, most observers and pundits think that the choice of Jim Mattis to replace David Petraeus as commander, central command, was nothing short of inspired. Mattis, widely known for his blunt talk -- and for that very reason reviled by the left -- was actually on the way out when the CENTCOM job opened up. Ray Odierno had been nominated to replace Mattis as commander of the joint forces command, and the job of commandant of the Marine Corps, which was rumored to have been promised to Mattis, had gone to Jim Amos. There was, it seemed nothing left for the hero of Fallujah to do, but to retire.
Then came the McChrystal interview, and the events that led to Petraeus's transfer to Afghanistan. Although many observers hoped Mattis would take over CENTCOM, it was far from a sure thing. The man who had said it was "fun to shoot Afghans" and coined enough phrases so that they are now called Mattisisms might not have been a good fit for an administration that had already been criticized by its faithful for providing yet another pedestal for General "betray us."
But Mattis brings a lot more to the table than being a Marine's Marine -- which should be enough for most people anyway. He refuses to take any concept or doctrine at face value, without analyzing its strengths and weaknesses. And he acts on his conclusions. A good example was the memorandum he sent to his staff at the joint forces command shortly after he arrived in Norfolk. "Effects based operations," the notion that one might calculate enemy responses to calibrated attacks, was all the rage in military circles. Mattis informed his staff that he did not like the phrase, or the concept it represented, and ordered that it be dropped from the JFCOM vocabulary. In other words, buzz words, and the ideas behind them, are simply not in this warfighter's vocabulary.
Mattis, as a senior four-star, is one of the few military men to have the gravitas to face off against Petraeus if he deems it necessary to do so. That may not be required: Petraeus reportedly pushed for Mattis to get the job, and both men understand the nature of combat against irregular forces like few other senior American officers. Still, Mattis and Petraeus will generate a degree of creative tension that can only benefit American objectives in Afghanistan.
The Obama administration shot itself in the foot when it announced that it would begin to withdraw troops from Afghanistan a year from now. Having Petraeus and Mattis in charge of Afghan operations, supported by talented three stars like Bill Caldwell, who oversees the training of Afghan forces, at least takes the sting out of that announcement, and underscores the notion that Washington remains serious about defeating the Taliban. Equally important, having the "A-Team" of military leaders in charge of the Afghan mission begs the question of whether any withdrawal of forces will take place, if Petraeus and Mattis recommend against it. We shall see.
LESLIE E. KOSSOFF/AFP/Getty Images
Tuesday, June 22, 2010 - 7:16 PM

A follow-on musing on the McChrystal story...
How could he be so dumb? That question has nagged at me ever since I read the
original story. McChrystal already knew that the White House thought he
undermined them in public last fall (he didn't, really, but they
thought he did); and he already knew that his boss was very thin-skinned. How
then, could he get himself in this situation?
I think I have figured it out. If you read the Rolling Stone article
carefully, you can see that the reporter, Michael Hastings, has woven three
stories together. One story is the story of General McChrystal trying to keep
up morale in a tough war with his troops thinking he is too worried about
civilian casualties and he is forcing them to accept too many risks as
consequence. This is also the story of McChrystal feeling under time pressure
from Washington. I bet this is the story Hastings pitched to McChrystal's staff
and the story McChrystal thought was being reported. It is, indeed, sprinkled
throughout the Rolling Stone article, and in this thread McChyrstal is pretty
careful about what he says and generally comes off pretty well.
The second story is Hastings's rather tendentious reporting on what McChrystal's enemies and critics say against him -- their complaints, and their doubts about the war. While assessing reporter's motivations is always a dodgy business, I suspect that this is the story Hastings pitched to his editor. The whole thing has the feel of a hungry guy hoping to hunt a big trophy kill: taking down a four-star hero and showing that his war plan (note how Hastings describes the strategy as McChrystal's, not the president's) is fatally flawed and doomed to failure.
If those were the only two stories in the article, people would only be talking
about the Rolling Stone cover. The
problem for McChrystal is that there is a third story woven through the
article. This is the story of McChrystal and his staff on an unexpected layover
in Paris when a plane is grounded because of the volcano. This part of the
story has a "weekend in Vegas" feel to it. The staff get drunk. The French get
dissed. Holbrooke gets dissed. McChrystal and his staff joke about how they
would answer a tough question about Vice President Biden's theories about the
war. Without having access to Hastings' notes, I can't be sure, but I am
willing to wager that 95 percent of the really objectionable material comes
from that layover.
This third story was an accident - serendipity for the reporter and a
train-wreck for McChrystal. The underlying facts are not surprising or
accidental at all. Anyone who has interacted with the military, especially the
special ops community from which McChrystal hails, will recognize the swagger. More
to the point, we have known for over a year that Obama's national security team
is plagued with serious internal bickering and that many of the principals, and
especially the staffs, do not like each other. In short, it is not surprising
that they talked this way. The only surprising bit is that McChrystal and his
staff talked this way in front of a reporter, though less surprising when you
factor in the "sailors on unexpected shore leave" aspect.
Now, of course, none of this excuses McChrystal's behavior, nor the more egregious
behavior and comments of his staff. There is no "what happens in Paris, stays
in Paris exception" to civil-military relations. Clearly, he allowed an
unhealthy command climate to percolate and then bubble to the surface in
unguarded moments. And it was reckless in the extreme to talk this way in front
of a reporter who clearly was on a scalp-hunt (giving this particular reporter
this much access was a monumental blunder and the person responsible was the
first casualty of the day). Those are mistakes enough to justify McChrystal
submitting his resignation, though I am not sure accepting it is the right call
for the President. Civil-military norms demand better behavior from senior
commanders.
But I think I understand it a bit better now. A very sad episode, but a bit
less mystifying than when I first encountered it.
Alex Wong/Getty Images
Tuesday, June 22, 2010 - 4:46 PM

General Stanley McChrystal is in hot water for a profile of him in the coming issue of Rolling Stone. That it's titled "The Runaway General" gives a pretty good indication of the slant of the article, which also describes the Marja offensive as "doomed."
I certainly agree with Peter's post -- McChrystal didn't do himself any favors and his staff sure didn't serve him well allowing the reporter to hear their rough talk. He says numerous impolitic things, including evidently telling the reporter he voted for President Obama (it's practically an article of faith in the American military to keep one's votes to one's self), and laughing when a staffer says something demeaning about Vice President Joe Biden.
But McChrystal also didn't commit treason, which is what the political backlash makes it sound like. He didn't disobey an order. He didn't go outside his chain of command to undercut the president. He didn't say he knew better than his elected leadership what needed to be done. He didn't even criticize the president other than to say he'd looked uncomfortable the first time he met the military leadership. This is not "his MacArthur moment," as commentators are suggesting.
The particular animus for Biden is unbecoming, but not unwarranted, for reasons the article itself makes clear (although it does not recognize). When told the Kandahar offensive will have to be postponed, the vice president crows that this validates his CT-plus approach. Not only is that petty score-keeping, it's substantively wrong. The "rising tide" operational approach to Kandahar is even further from the stand-off strikes approach Biden is reported to have advocated in the Afghanistan policy review.
The article does give the war's critics a rallying cry to call for the resignation of someone whose strategy they disagree with. This was McChrystal's real blunder: giving his opponents something to use against his position. Those who oppose our deepening involvement in Afghanistan are calling for his resignation. But the president would be stupid to fire McChrystal.
First of all, the president fired McChrystal's predecessor for being insufficiently creative in counterinsurgency, and no one doubts that McChrystal's approach is superior to any other, given what the president says our objectives are in Afghanistan. The president himself endorsed the administration's second Afghan policy review.
Alex Wong/Getty Images
Tuesday, June 22, 2010 - 10:03 AM

President
Obama's awkward relations with his senior military commanders have just taken a
turn for the worse - much worse. A new article for the Rolling Stone,
released in advance to reporters, dishes
all sorts of gossipy dirt on what General McChrystal - or more precisely, what
McChrystal's staff - really thinks about the key principals on Obama's National
Security Council team. Alas, McChrystal and his staff do not think very
highly of them, and they were foolishly willing to share their low opinions
with an obliging reporter.
The put-downs
are remarkably sophomoric -- "Biden? Did you say: Bite me?" -- and the entire
affair reads like a bad high school feud (cue the writers of Glee looking for material for next season).
Like a petty high school feud, this new flare-up is just the latest round
in a back-and-forth that has gone on for a long time; it is following a script
that was predictable
long ago. I do not know whether the
reporting timelines support this inference, but it sure seems to me like the Rolling
Stone story was McChrystal's staff retaliating for the equally disturbing
attacks on McChrystal and Petraeus by White House political advisors in
Jonathan Alter's semi-authorized account of the Afghan
Strategy Review.
McChrystal has already apologized
and his apology seems sincere. But it may not be enough to save his head
from this famously thin-skinned White House. The last time a senior
military commander spoke this unwisely to a reporter, he quickly resigned, and
rightly so because his bad behavior thoroughly squandered whatever confidence
his chain of command had in him by that point. McChrystal has a stronger
battlefield record and so may have started with a bit more confidence to
squander. Moreover, President Obama may not want the painful confirmation
hearings for McChrystal's successor that a hasty departure would generate.
And the McChrystal interview accurately notes that other members of the
Obama AfPak team are already on beltway insiders' short-lists to leave,
opening up the possibility of widespread chaos at the top during the most
critical year of the war so far. Obama might be wiser to bring
McChrystal in for a tongue lashing and send him back into the fight as quickly
as possible.
If Obama takes that course, he should also tongue-lash the other participants
in this feud, namely his closest circle of White House advisors and his country
team in Kabul. The Americans seem to be preoccupied with Washington
enemies when they should be directing their fire at the real enemy -- the one
that is firing bullets, not insults, at them. Indeed, the dissension and
back-biting that has characterized the Obama administration is precisely the
sort of divide-and-conquer confusion we are trying to foster among the Taliban
and Al Qaeda foes we are confronting in the AfPak theater. It is a
tragic irony that we have proven more capable of sowing it among our own ranks
than among the ranks of the enemy.
Good civil-military relations and the unity of command and effort they engender
may not be sufficient to win. But in a war this complex, they may be a
necessary condition for success. President Obama has not yet achieved
good civil-military relations in the conduct of his wars and he does not have
much time to get it right. Let us hope that he finally heeds the wake-up
call, however discordant and unfortunate it is.
JIM WATSON/AFP/Getty Images
Shadow Government is a blog about U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration, written by experienced policy makers from the loyal opposition and curated by Peter D. Feaver and William Inboden.
Read More