Kristen Silverberg's blog

By Kristen Silverberg

Mike's piece from earlier today is balanced and thoughtful, but I don't agree with his view that completion of this deal will provide the United States with valuable insight on Iran, other than to remind us that the Iranians are shrewd negotiators. Iran is getting more out of the deal than it's giving.  Although it has been described as a P5+1 breakthrough, ultimately the deal may undermine U.S. efforts to resolve the nuclear issue.

The argument in favor of the deal is that a decision by Iran to ship most of its enriched uranium stocks out of the country would give the United States and its allies assurance that, at least in the short-term, Iran could not deploy a nuclear weapon. Advocates of the deal say that for the time it would take Iran to restock its supply of low enriched uranium and then to further enrich the supplies to weapons grade fuel, the international community could rest easier knowing Iran would not be in a position to deploy a nuclear weapon.

It is not clear how much time Iran would need to restock its supply of low enriched uranium given the IAEA report that Iran has greatly enhanced its enrichment capabilities in recent months. Iran has now installed 8,300 centrifuges at Natanz, although they are using only 4,600, so may have the capability to speed up enrichment efforts when they decide to bring the additional centrifuges on line. Moreover, the disclosure of a hidden facility at Qom reminds us of the low likelihood that we have a complete picture of enrichment activities in Iran. At most, the deal will buy about a year in which the international community may be at decreased risk of an Iranian effort to move to breakout.

In exchange, the deal comes with an implicit (and perhaps explicit) understanding that the P5+1 will not impose additional sanctions. Once the fuel leaves Iran, it will much harder to convince the Europeans, let alone the Russians and Chinese, that continued pressure is appropriate. They will interpret and tout the deal as an example of Iran's willingness to negotiate in good faith and will drop talk of further sanctions. As Iran's Provisional Friday Prayer Leader Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami said at Friday prayers in Tehran a week ago, "Prior to the talks, they used to speak of suspension and sanctions against Iran but after the talks, there has not been any word of suspension or sanctions."

As a practical matter, as Mike points out, Iran will have earned the international community's acceptance of its continued enrichment activities. In other words, the international community may think it can breathe easier for a year, but, in exchange, the Iranians will have taken themselves off the hook for further sanctions indefinitely. 

The deal looks even worse if you credit the views of experts who believe the current Iranian supply of LEU may be defective. If that's true, Iran hasn't sacrificed anything to earn itself the right to continued enrichment. 

And, of course, the deal, negotiated in direct talks between the U.S. and the Iranian regime, puts the United States in the position of legitimizing a government whose legitimacy has been courageously challenged by the Iranian people. 

The real purpose and impact of the deal was the one Director General Elbaradei outlined in his press conference: "I very much hope that people see the big picture, see that this agreement could open the way for a complete normalization of relations between Iran and the international community." This agreement is designed to relieve tensions, not to resolve the continued threat of Iran's nuclear program.

BEHROUZ MEHRI/AFP/Getty Images

By Kristen Silverberg

There is an interesting piece in today's New York Times about the efforts of many members of the U.N. General Assembly to undermine the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). This idea, which was endorsed unanimously by heads of state during the World Summit of 2005, says, in essence, that governments have a responsibility to protect their citizens from grave human rights abuses like genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity -- and that if or when they fail, the international community, working through the Security Council, has a responsibility to act. Many countries believe this concept will invite Western meddling in internal affairs, and so General Assembly President D'Escoto and former Indian Permanent Representative Sen have rallied a coalition in opposition to the concept.  

There was one line in the Times piece that, I think, bears correcting. The author says that the Bush administration "disliked the doctrine on the ground that it might tie American hands in foreign policy decisions." In fact, the Bush administration endorsed R2P in 2005 and worked throughout the administration to see the principle put into practice. Secretary Rice, for example, cited R2P in calling on the Security Council to act in Darfur, and has many times cited her disappointment that we were not more successful in ensuring effective R2P action. We worked with other Security Council members to reaffirm R2P in U.N. Security Council resolution 1674, and as an assistant secretary of state, I endorsed the concept publicly many times. 

If anything, I think the Bush team was more aggressive than most U.S. administrations in pressing both the responsibility of states to protect their citizens from human rights abuses and the responsibility of the Security Council to act when governments fail. For most of U.S. history, the human rights abuses in Burma, for example, would not have fit within the U.S. government's definition of a "threat to international peace and security" sufficient to trigger U.N. Security Council jurisdiction. President Bush believed that human rights abuses may meet this standard, and so we led the effort to place Burma on the Security Council's agenda for the first time in history and even pressed a Security Council Resolution on the subject to the point of provoking a double Russian-Chinese veto.

Whatever the outcome of the General Assembly debate, the U.S. should continue to work to defend and strengthen the international community's ability to take action under R2P. Columbia Law School professor Matthew Waxman is currently finishing a report for the Council on Foreign Relations, due out this fall, with a number of important recommendations on how the U.S. can move ahead on R2P.

I have one modest suggestion to throw into the mix: The U.S. should make clear that it will not support any country for U.N. Security Council permanent membership without a demonstrated commitment to R2P. This means countries that have worked to shield Burma and Zimbabwe and Iran from international scrutiny need not apply. (Congress should also make clear that this is a requirement of U.S. ratification of any Security Council expansion proposal.) R2P action is challenging enough under the current membership. If the Obama administration is serious about supporting R2P, it needs a Security Council with members fully committed to effective action.

By Kristen Silverberg

A number of U.S. commentators are reading Prime Minister Netanyahu's speech as a bow to President Obama. I had the opposite reaction. Netanyahu's speech reads to me to be, at least in part, a rebuttal, including to Obama's Cairo speech.

It is unlikely the treatment of Iran in the Cairo speech escaped Israeli notice. To the extent Obama addressed the Iranian nuclear issue, it was largely to reiterate U.S. concessions to the Iranian government: He accepted U.S. responsibility for overthrowing the leader of Iran, restated U.S. willingness to move forward with negotiations with the Iranian government, and reaffirmed Iran's rights to peaceful nuclear power. The sole sentence critical of Iran stated only that "Iran played a role in acts of hostage-taking and violence against U.S. troops and civilians," but then expressed our willingness to let bygones be bygones. This approach, combined with Obama's declaration that the United States would give Iran until the end of the year to demonstrate good faith, as well as his view that progress in the Peace Process is a prerequisite to progress on Iran, undoubtedly has left the impression that the U.S. urgency on Iranian issues has flagged.

For Netanyahu, in contrast, Iran is the first issue he mentioned and is at the top of the list of the "three tremendous challenges" facing the world today. He stated clearly,

The Iranian threat still is before us in full force, as became quite clear yesterday. The greatest danger to Israel, to the Middle East, and to all humanity, is the encounter between extremist Islam and nuclear weapons.... I have been working tirelessly for many years to form an international front against Iran arming itself with nuclear weapons.

Likewise, Netanyahu disputed Obama on the origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict. While Obama's Cairo speech adopted the Arab view that Jewish claims to a homeland in Israel are rooted solely in the Holocaust, Netanyahu explained at length:

The connection of the Jewish People to the Land has been in existence for more than 3,500 years. Judea and Samaria, the places where our forefathers Abraham, Isaac and Jacob walked, our forefathers David, Solomon, Isaiah and Jeremiah. This is not a foreign land, this is the Land of our Forefathers.

The right of the Jewish People to a state in the Land of Israel does not arise from the series of disasters that befell the Jewish People over 2,000 years -- persecutions, expulsions, pogroms, blood libels, murders, which reached its climax in the Holocaust, an unprecedented tragedy in the history of nations.... The right to establish our sovereign state here, in the Land of Israel, arises from one simple fact: Eretz Israel is the birthplace of the Jewish People.

These aren't minor, rhetorical issues -- both our treatment of the Iranian question and U.S. views on the legitimacy of Israeli claims are at the core of the U.S.-Israel relationship. This was further confirmation that we have leaders with profoundly different worldviews, and suggests at least some reason for concern about the state of the U.S.-Israel relationship going forward.

By Kristen Silverberg

President Obama's speech last night regrettably omitted any mention of Iran. Any major presidential address is the subject of careful analysis in foreign capitals, and many of our partners will conclude that Obama views the Iranian nuclear question with less urgency than his predecessor. That is precisely the wrong message to send on the heels of the latest IAEA report, especially in Europe, where we need partners willing to continue tightening pressure against Iran.

The day after he became the presumptive Democrat nominee, Obama delivered a speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee outlining his approach to the Iranian nuclear question. As he described it, his Iran policy would have two elements: 1) direct engagement with Iran combined with 2) tougher multilateral sanctions. Before a skeptical crowd, he defended his willingness to engage Iran directly by drawing a link between the two elements, noting that our willingness to engage directly could be used as leverage to convince international partners to support tougher sanctions. This would allow us to pursue, as he put it, "diplomacy backed by real leverage."

Following Obama's election, European officials assumed there would be a link between U.S. willingness to engage Iran directly and Europe's responsibility to tighten financial pressure against the Iranian regime. As EU officials understood it, Obama would, like President Bush, adopt a carrot-and-stick approach, but would offer bigger carrots and would want to wield bigger sticks. Late last year, the EU -- perhaps anticipating an Obama request -- took a decision in principle to strengthen its own sanctions against Iran and began the process of debating specific measures. 

Today, however, the Obama administration seems poised to miss the opportunity to work with Europe to tighten financial pressure against Iran.  Having heard repeated public reassurances that the United States is looking for opportunities to engage, without an equally strong public insistence that Europe first produce tougher sanctions, the EU seems less inclined to follow through on its earlier decision to consider new measures. For now, the EU has told Obama administration officials that further sanctions would be inappropriate before the administration completes its Iran policy review, but one worries that the EU has concluded that it is off the hook permanently.    

If this moment is missed, it will be a terrible lost opportunity. EU sanctions, even more than unilateral U.S. sanctions, are capable of capturing the Iranian regime's attention, as we learned following the EU's decision last year to freeze the assets of Bank Melli, one of Iran's most important banks. 

What's more, once a negotiating process with the United States has begun, it will be difficult to convince Europe to take punitive action that could risk disrupting ongoing discussions. A commitment from Europe, China, and Russia to adopt new sanctions only if discussions with Iran eventually fail would be meaningless. By the time talks fail, it will be too late. I'm not optimistic that direct engagement with Iran will produce an acceptable agreement, but if the Obama administration is committed to this course, it would be wise to give itself the strongest possible chance for success.

Obama has enormous capital to use in Europe, and Europeans will be reluctant to turn down a public U.S. request. If we are going to convince Europe to move ahead, it will happen only as a result of explicit insistence from the Obama administration that new European (and ideally Chinese and Russian) sanctions are a necessary prerequisite to any new diplomatic strategy. 

Obama administration officials have been vocal in criticizing the Bush team's approach to Iran, but Bush's multilateral diplomacy produced overwhelming support in the UN Security Council for five Chapter VII Security Council resolutions, three of which impose binding multilateral sanctions. The Bush administration worked with numerous capitals, including Brussels, to adopt sanctions even beyond those mandated by the Security Council.

What's more, the Bush administration, led by Treasury Undersecretary Stuart Levey (who President Obama has wisely decided to retain) persuaded international financial institutions that Iran's deceptive use of front companies had so blurred the lines between licit and illicit conduct that legitimate financial institutions could no longer afford to do business with official Iranian entities. Some eighty financial institutions have since suspended business with Iran, and its difficulties in obtaining financing in turn dried up Western investment in the Iranian oil and gas sector.

The Obama administration has the opportunity to further increase Iran's incentives to take a different course. Let's hope they seize it.

By Kristen Silverberg

This weekend, the Washington Post reported plans by the Obama administration for a "sweeping overhaul" of the National Security Council to give it new authorities and membership. Some of the "reforms" described in the article appear to me to be direct continuation of Bush administration practice, as Will suggests here. The Post, for example, outlined plans to make the NSC "more elastic" by including departments other than State and Defense. This has been the case since the adoption of the National Security Act of 1947. Depending on the issue, NSC meetings under the Bush administration included some combination of the intelligence community, Treasury, Justice, Energy, Commerce, USAID, the ambassador to the United Nations, and so on.   

There is, however, one idea under consideration that would be a genuine and, I think, unwise departure from Bush administration practice. The Obama team is, apparently, still considering subsuming Homeland Security Council functions within the National Security Council. This would mean either that the issues would be managed by a lower-ranking official -- presumably a deputy national security advisor -- or that General Jones would have ultimate responsibility for both national and homeland security. Either way, it's a bad idea.    

A deputy national security advisor would not have sufficient heft. The dramatic post-9/11 improvements in our country's preparedness level have been, in large part, the result of high-level White House attention to the issue. For example, I watched more than once as Vice President Cheney carefully examined officials from Health and Human Services on bioterror contingency plans, sessions that significantly energized that department's efforts. It is not likely that cabinet-level heads of agencies will be as responsive to an official they outrank. 

The alternative -- relying on General Jones to manage both homeland and national security -- is equally impractical. No national security advisor, no matter how competent, has the bandwidth to cover both effectively. Almost by definition, homeland security issues won't seem urgent until there is an attack. Asking the national security advisor to keep one eye on container security and the vaccine stockpile while he is simultaneously coordinating policy on Afghanistan, the Middle East peace process, and Iran will ensure that homeland security issues always get short shrift.

Finally, the proposal is not reassuring in terms of signalling White House priorities. In other areas, President Obama has indicated his commitment to an issue by elevating the rank of the person in charge (Daschle as would-be health czar, Browner as environment czar, Holbrooke as special representative for Afghanistan-Pakistan, Susan Rice in the cabinet as U.N .ambassador, etc.). I don't think that's the best indictor of commitment, but it seems to be the one he is using.

What does it tell us, in an administration engaged in rank inflation, that the one area in which the official in charge may be lower level than his predecessor is homeland security?