Will Inboden's blog

By Will Inboden

Ambassador James Lilley died on November 12. With his passing, America also lost one of its most accomplished Asia-hands. It is perhaps a fitting tribute to his legacy that his death occurred the same day that President Obama departed for an Asia shaped so much for the better by the devoted lifetime of service of Ambassador Lilley and his fellow statesmen. 

When Lilley joined the CIA in 1951 upon his graduation from Yale, Asia was convulsed with conflict and poverty, and communism seemed to be everywhere ascendant. China had just two years earlier fallen to Mao Zedong, foreshadowing years of isolation and totalitarian brutality. American troops were mired in a bloody stalemate on the Korean peninsula, trying to prevent Chinese forces from completing communist North Korea's invasion of the South. Taiwan was a beleaguered, impoverished island outpost for Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalists. Japan was a traumatized, war-torn nation in the nativity phase of its reconstruction. Southeast Asia was convulsed by anticolonialist nationalisms that often blended with communist insurgencies. 

Over the next four decades, Jim Lilley's career embodied Asia's remarkable transformation and America's evolving posture in the region. Born and raised in China, throughout his life he combined a deep and abiding affection for Asia with a patriot's love for America.  It seemed he was in the middle of almost every significant conflict or foreign policy development. He ran clandestine operations in China and the "secret war" in Laos, became the first CIA station chief in Beijing after the Nixon-Kissinger opening, helped solidify the US defense commitment to Taiwan, and played a key role as U.S. Ambassador in encouraging South Korea's transition to democracy in 1987. He served as Ambassador to China during the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, and for over a year afterwards sheltered Chinese dissident Fang Lizhi in the US Embassy compound. Ambassador Lilley demonstrated throughout his career that American interests and values need not be in conflict, that a wise Asia policy combines pragmatic cooperation with the regimes in power and principled commitments to universal values of human liberty and dignity. By the end of his government service, Asia was incomparably more prosperous, stable, and free.

As a junior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute some years ago, I had the privilege of knowing Ambassador Lilley during the twilight of his career and the early stages of my own. He was invariably engaging, animated, opinionated, and always ready to dispense bits of wisdom gleaned over a lifetime with the captivating style of an accomplished raconteur. His memoir China Hands: Nine Decades of Adventure, Espionage, and Diplomacy in Asia, written with his son Jeff, is an elegant model of erudition and insight, a profoundly moving family chronicle, and an indispensable resource for understanding the relationship between the United States and Asia in the 20th century.        

In short, his was a life lived in the spirit of his beloved alma mater: for God, for country, and for Yale. May he rest in peace.

By Will Inboden

The leaked cables from U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry this week add a new wrinkle to President Obama's protracted decision-making over his Afghanistan strategy. Eikenberry's cables apparently urge against increasing the US troop posture because of his concerns about Afghan President Karzai's corruption, competence, and legitimacy. Eikenberry and Karzai have long had a poor relationship, so while Eikenberry's concerns are no surprise, the public airing of them at this juncture is. The timing of the cables as well as their leak this late in the process is curious, given that Gen. McChrystal's request for more troops has been known since August, the senior Obama team's deliberations have been going on for a couple of months, and by many accounts the Administration plans to announce its decision within weeks. The cables and the leaks might represent some new front in the administration's internal battles, although there are hints that they might also reflect Obama's own search for an exit strategy. 

This is a further negative side effect of Obama's prolonged and increasingly public indecision on Afghanistan: it exacerbates internal administration divisions as they become more visible and thus less easy to gloss over or repair. It is also fraying relations with allies, especially America's most important NATO partner in the mission, as British leaders experience growing frustration with Obama's delays while facing declining public support for their own troop deployment.    

But the greatest damage may be in Kabul where the Obama administration has taken their Karzai challenge -- the difficulty of working with an erratic and corrupt leader -- and turned it into their Karzai crisis, as the Afghan president becomes increasingly uncooperative and increasingly vocal in his criticisms of American intentions. Criticisms which, as Jackson Diehl notes, may just be reflecting some of Obama's own words. Which is why the White House needs to remember that Obama's rhetoric on Afghanistan has at least four important yet different audiences: the American public; leaders in allied nations; American troops deployed to Afghanistan; and the Afghan people and government. His rhetorical efforts to assuage American domestic anxieties about the Afghan mission might inadvertently also signal lack of resolve to allied leaders and U.S. troops, and needlessly alienate Karzai even further.     

If there is one overriding lesson from Iraq, it is that security precedes political progress. As Peter Feaver observed, the Bush administration faced similar acute concerns about Prime Minister Maliki in Iraq. But then (as now in Afghanistan) it was neither right nor feasible for the United States to forcibly install another leader. And as important, the Bush administration realized that the first step needed in Iraq was to restore basic security with a new counterinsurgency strategy and troop surge. This eventually created the space for political progress and substantially improved performance by Maliki. The parallels with Afghanistan are hardly exact, but the principle remains the same: The first step towards a more honest and effective Afghan government will be protecting the Afghan population and defeating the Taliban.

Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

By Will Inboden

Surprise?

If one year ago on Election Day someone would have told me that the same President Obama whose campaign promised to repair America's global image would spend his first year in office visibly rejecting human rights and democracy promotion, I would not have believed it. Though I and many others have commented on this previously, it still ranks as the biggest surprise (and biggest disappointment) of his foreign policy thus far. Especially since America's historic commitment to human rights and democracy promotion has been one of its greatest soft power assets and sources of global goodwill.

Praiseworthy?

One thing worthy of praise is the administration's emerging Africa policy. President Obama's speech in Ghana was an admirable call for improved governance, reduced corruption, growth through enterprise, and African responsibility for Africa's future -- and it could not have been delivered by a more effective messenger.

Constructive Criticism?

One growing worry is the Obama administration's shaky relations with the Great Powers which -- whether from poor personal chemistry or divergent interests -- could significantly hinder U.S. leverage going forward on several fronts. U.S.-Japan relations are near their worst in a generation (though the Obama administration was dealt a tough hand with the DPJ's election victory). The chill between Sarkozy and Obama is also hurting U.S. relations with France. Russia has thus far offered no significant reciprocal gestures for the U.S. capitulation on missile defense. Obama enjoys little chemistry with Gordon Brown (though to be fair, few leaders do) and has signaled indifference towards the U.S.-UK Special Relationship. U.S.-Germany ties are strong but will soon be tested by Germany's economic relationship with Iran. The Obama administration's China policy is too focused on financing U.S. debt while not pressing China to play a more constructive role on North Korea and Iran's nuclear weapons programs. And while the administration is atoning for its early neglect of India by hosting Prime Minister Singh soon for a state visit, the U.S.-India relationship will need consistent and high level attention in order to reach its potential -- attention that it is not clear the White House will maintain, especially if doing so incurs China's displeasure.  

MICHEL EULER/AFP/Getty Images

By Will Inboden

What does a successful country look like? Why do some countries seem to have growing economies, well-functioning governments, happy citizens, peace, and security -- and others don't? While gross domestic product remains probably the most prevalent single snapshot for assessing a country's progress, GDP is lamented for its deficiencies as often as it is cited. The most recent and prominent example of this is the Sarkozy Commission's report laying out a new, comprehensive set of measures of national progress, a welcome if imperfect model.

While we don't pretend to have all the answers, the Legatum Institute, the London think tank where I work, today released our 2009 Prosperity Index as one effort to provide a more comprehensive set of measures. The Prosperity Index is the world's only global assessment of wealth and well-being, assessing 104 countries across a range of variables including economic fundamentals, entrepreneurship and innovation, democratic governance, health, education, security, and social capital. Though the country rankings themselves will produce few surprises -- Finland is 1st, and Zimbabwe is last at 104th -- the larger aim of the Prosperity Index is to inquire into the common factors behind countries with successful economies and happy citizens. Overall, the top tier is dominated by North Atlantic and Anglosphere countries, with 18 out of the top 20 nations being European, North American, or Australia and New Zealand. Countries that do well seem to have a mutually reinforcing set of goods including sound economies, limited and effective governments, and high levels of social capital.

The United States ranks a respectable 9th overall, and is the top-ranked large country in the world ("large" being a population of more than 50 million). Of particular interest, the U.S. ranks first globally in the "entrepreneurship and innovation" category, and second in the world in the "democratic institutions" category -- both good reminders that predictions of American decline may be premature.  At 7th in the world, the U.S. also does quite well in social capital. Taken together, these areas where the U.S. does well will over time be indispensable not just for America's domestic prosperity but also for its international power as well.

Also of note is the split within the BRICs -- to wit, Brazil (41st) and India (45th) rank solidly in the middle tier, while Russia (69th) and China (75th) are much further back. This is because the Prosperity Index privileges democratic institutions, human rights, and social capital -- all elements of "soft infrastructure" that are much stronger in Brazil and India than in Russia or China, and seem to account for why Brazilians and Indians are on average happier than Russians or Chinese.  

Then there are the problem countries, those much in the news of late for acute security concerns (Pakistan at 99th; Iran at 94th) or tyrannical oppression (Sudan at 103rd; Zimbabwe at 104th) who are also stuck at the bottom of the index. Iran's numbers are especially striking. While its economy has been sustained on an unhealthy diet of petroleum and gas exports, the underlying economic fundamentals are very fragile, and the Iranian people are widely and deeply dissatisfied with their lives.

What might all of this suggest for American policy and even grand strategy? A few implications come to mind. First, the distinction between domestic and foreign policy is very thin -- America's education system, health-care system, domestic economy, and even family and community strength, are inseparably linked to its international posture and power. In other words, yes, the prevailing debate about health care is in part a foreign-policy issue. Second, for all of the very legitimate worries about growing divisions between the U.S. and Europe, the common strengths and values that bridge the Atlantic are vivid and enduring, and form a solid foundation for ongoing cooperation. Third, a long-term American strategy towards security threats and thuggish dictators must include the promotion of economic opportunity, political liberty, and human capital. Call it a new, better version of "Finlandization" -- not this, but this.

Today we welcome John Hannah to the ranks of Shadow Government. 

Currently a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, John previously served on former Vice President Dick Cheney's national security affairs staff from 2001-2009, including as the vice president's national security advisor during the Bush administration's second term. John's previous government service also includes two stints at the State Department during the administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. Having had the privilege of working with John during my White House sojourn, I can attest that he combines an expert's knowledge on national security issues with a gentleman's winsome bearing.   

By Will Inboden

Seven months ago, when President Obama announced the appointment of retired Maj. Gen. Scott Gration as special envoy on Sudan, I offered some cautious words of praise and a few constructive suggestions. As the White House prepares for Monday’s roll-out of the administration’s new Darfur strategy, it is a good time to make a mid-course assessment. It is not positive.

According to weekend news reports prompted by administration officials previewing the strategy, in a head-snapping departure from Obama's own campaign promises, the new approach will be a combination of "pressure and incentives" that privileges positive engagement. But no new measures of "pressure" are mentioned, and the administration's own descriptions place all of the emphasis on incentives and dialogue: "to get to the best-case scenario -- which is to change the behavior of the Khartoum government -- we are going to have to work with a government responsible for so many atrocities."

But what if that government doesn't want to work with you? And what if it continues to refuse to change its behavior? Recent events and policy trends do not lend a favorable interpretation to the administration's line. Consider:

• Gration's first few months on the job have included losing the confidence of important stakeholders in Sudan such as displaced Darfurians and rebel groups, antagonizing key members of Congress and Darfur activists, and even (in a "life imitates the Onion" moment) offering "cookies" and "gold stars" to an indicted war criminal and perpetrator of genocide (and Sudanese president), Omar Hassan al-Bashir. The collective effect has been to erode Gration's credibility as an honest broker, and to unilaterally diminish the administration's leverage with the Bashir regime.
• The Obama administration self-consciously frames its Sudan policy in the context of its overall approach of unconditionally engaging with pariah states. "Unconditionally" is the operative word, since while it can well be useful and effective at times to negotiate with bad guys, in places from Burma to Iran to Sudan the administration is on a troubling course of offering outstretched hands full of carrots, yet no new sticks. This reflects a false dichotomy posited between sanctions and diplomacy, when in fact the imposition and tightening of sanctions can help strengthen the hand of diplomacy.
• It ignores history. For a White House that prides itself on its ostensible intellectual sophistication, the Obama administration seems rather obtuse about the lessons of history, even the recent past. Such as remembering that Bashir, besides presiding over the serial murder of his own people, is also a serial violator of negotiated agreements. Or that it was only under the pain of sanctions (and a poignant awareness of American military might in the wake of 9/11) that Khartoum came to the negotiating table with then-Special Envoy John Danforth to eventually end the North-South war and forge the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in early 2005. Or that the Bush administration's efforts in its latter years to end the Darfur genocide included a series of positive inducements offered to Bashir by numerous presidential envoys -- such as upgraded diplomatic relations, removal from the terrorism sponsor list, cessation of sanctions, etc. -- that ultimately did not avail in changing Bashir's behavior.
• It ignores China. As Sudan's largest investor and most consistent "heat shield" against meaningful international pressure, any robust solution to Khartoum's depredations runs through Beijing. Yet the Obama administration's posture toward China appears to be a one-dimensional "China-as-our-central-banker" strategy run out of the Treasury Department, and there are no signs of significant efforts to enlist China in pressing Sudan.
• It ignores international law. For an administration supposedly committed to a new multilateral posture and cooperation with international institutions, the Obama White House is displaying a stunning -- dare we say, "unilateral" -- disregard for international law and the international community. Bashir, after all, has been indicted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity. Yet the Obama administration directly undermines the ICC through go-it-alone efforts to engage Bashir and cooperate with him as a purportedly legitimate partner in peace efforts.
• It could be worse. In what seems to be an emerging "Goldilocks approach" of defaulting to the via media policy option, Obama appears to have rejected the most conciliatory posture by continuing with some of the current sanctions and not handing Bashir all of the inducements he would like up front (such as eschewing the term "genocide," or allowing Khartoum to register a Washington lobbyist, or removing it from the terrorism list, or extending full diplomatic relations). Whether this approach represents a coherent strategy or just a split-the-difference compromise between Gration and U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice (said to favor a harder line) remains to be seen.

All of the above is not meant to diminish the very real complexities in Sudan, the manifest faults on many sides, or the failures of past efforts. But campaign rhetoric notwithstanding, the prospects for real progress in ending the suffering and bringing justice to Sudan are not promising under the new strategy.

The Shadow Government ranks keep growing, as this afternoon we also welcome Jamie Fly as our newest contributor. Jamie is Executive Director of the Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI), a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization in Washington, D.C. dedicated to supporting U.S. international engagement.

Prior to joining FPI, Jamie served in the Bush administration at the National Security Council (2008-2009) and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (2005-2008) working on the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For his work in the Department of Defense, he was awarded the Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Public Service. Prior to his service in government, Jamie worked for the Republican National Committee on President Bush's 2004 reelection campaign in Ohio, and has also worked at the Council on Foreign Relations on European and national security issues, and at the World Bank. Jamie is quite a policy entrepreneur and a welcome addition to Shadow Government.

Today we welcome Jose Cardenas to our ranks of contributors. Jose is currently an Associate with the consulting firm VisionAmericas. From 2004-2009, he served in various senior positions in the Bush administration working on inter-American relations, including in the Department of State, the National Security Council, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, where he served as Acting Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean and oversaw nearly $1 billion in U.S. development assistance to the region. He also served as a Senior Advisor at the Organization of American States and as a senior professional staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I had the privilege of working with Jose at the NSC, and we are very excited to have him on board, particularly with the expertise he brings on such a strategic region.