By Dov Zakheim

Ad hominem attacks are always, and by definition, below the belt and not to be taken seriously. But Larry Korb has gone too far in going after Mike Mullen.

Full disclosure: Mike Mullen is a personal friend. But it is precisely because I know him well that I can state without hesitation that Korb's assertions simply do not hold water. Mike Mullen is a man of bedrock integrity, who continues to serve his nation simply because he was asked to. It was not at all clear that Mike was prepared to serve a second term as chairman of the joint chiefs. But when his commander in chief asked him to do so, he agreed.

Korb's argument is in any event internally inconsistent: he quotes Mullen's response to Gen. Dan McNeill's 2007 request for 30,000 troops and then somehow blends it with Gen. Dave McKiernan's request a year later. Generals are always asking for more troops. It is the job of the Chairman to evaluate those requests, and say "no" when that is the proper answer. Perhaps we needed 30,000 more troops in 2007; not everyone was screaming from the ramparts that we did. And to cite Earl Wheeler's request for a million troops in 1965 is beside the point. Should we really have deployed a million troops? Would liberals like Larry Korb, who argued strongly against William Westmoreland's requests for more troops, really have supported Wheeler's request? Did they?

Everyone who knows Mike Mullen recognizes two things about the man: he is immensely modest, and he "calls them as he sees them." One can argue whether Mike made the right call in 2007; what is beyond argument, however, is that the call he made was not the call he really saw.

By Dov Zakheim

Kabul is a city at war. There are green zones and red zones, and roadblocks everywhere. The city is awash with a host of uniforms -- those of NATO states, as well as others, from Australia to Mongolia. Americans in uniform walk the streets fully equipped and armed. American government civilians wear body armor, as I did when making the short twenty minute walk from Camp Eggars to the U.S. Embassy.

In much of our government, however, the war is nowhere to be seen. Civil servants go about their business as if it were peacetime. There is still a serious shortage of U.S. government civilians here in Afghanistan, although their numbers are increasing. Many of those who do indeed serve here do not venture out of Kabul. This is so not because they are less dedicated to their mission. The sorry fact is that all too often they have little to offer in the field. Their expertise tends to be bureaucratic -- they are only equipped to manage and document projects and activities -- rather than technical.

The contrast with life back home could not be more striking. It is not just that most U.S. citizens go about their daily business unaffected by war, (unless they have a loved one serving in the military). Our executive branch does the same, with the notable exceptions of pockets in State, Treasury, and even smaller elements of other agencies.

And Congress is not much better. To be sure, it votes big supplemental budgets. But it has not done enough to lift restrictions on government activities that apply more to peacetime than to war zones.

As an example, while here I was told of the tragic story of a U.S. military couple deployed to Afghanistan and based at Bagram Air Base that had been bunking in a plywood structure with a tin roof called a B hut. The hut took a direct hit from a 107mm rocket; the wife was taking a shower outside the hut. When she returned she found her husband a victim of the hit.

Why were they in such a flimsy structure? Because of arcane Congressional spending limitations on what is called "minor military construction." There was no money to build the brick structures that might have saved the soldier's, and those of others like him.

The restrictions, and, more generally, the behaviors that make good sense in peace time are not appropriate in wartime. We cannot pretend to be a nation at peace even as we have the better part of 100,000 troops in Afghanistan, and a virtually like amount in Iraq, still very much at war. If we continue to do so, we will undermine the effectiveness of any troop increases, and make success -- already a challenging proposition -- even more difficult to achieve.

SHAH MARAI/AFP/Getty Images

By Dov S. Zakheim

Kabul has changed in many ways since I was last here in early 2004. Traffic is impossible at rush hour; there are many more signs in English; more shops are open. And the city has become a military citadel -- the military bases have grown, security precautions have been ramped up significantly. Parts of the city look like an expanded bunker.

Troop morale, including among allied forces I spoke to, remains high. There weren't many among the troops here who heard the speech -- there is a nine and one half (yes, one-half) hour difference with DC time. All agree, however, that President Obama made the right decision regarding an additional troop surge. As one officer put it, it was important that the president supported the commander on the ground, as, it appears, most troops here do.

But some of those I spoke with, military personnel and police trainers, both Americans and allies, men and women, are deeply troubled by Obama's announcement that troops would withdraw by July 2011.

A Canadian and Brit (female) both felt that the announcement could undermine their mission. A young American soldier (male) could not stop talking about the negative impact of the announcement. Two American officers, one male and one female, both agreed that the Taliban now have an incentive to "wait us out."

I have no doubt that unless the administration clarifies what it means by its statement regarding withdrawal, the announcement will have a serious, and negative, impact on morale here. And that would be unfortunate. Our forces, and those of our friends and allies, do not expect to "transform" this poor backward country. But they are determined to leave this place only when Afghanistan is safe and stable and not a moment sooner. They need to be reassured that this mission is intact and that their political masters intend to see it through.

MASSOUD HOSSAINI/AFP/Getty Images

By Dov Zakheim

Surprise?

I was surprised by the administration's deliberate downplaying of human rights issues. One might have expected a Democratic administration to emphasize such concerns rather than to pursue policies that are often ascribed to realist Republicans.

On the other hand, given the president's deliberate and sustained outreach to states with whom America's relations have been chilly at best, all of which have terrible human rights records, perhaps the decision not to mention those rights is not really surprising at all.

Mario Tama/Getty Images

By Dov Zakheim

The Norwegian Nobel Committee has long been known as an avid supporter of trendy left-leaning causes and people. Recall that the same committee gave the peace prize to Yasir Arafat. No one is trendier these days than Barack Obama. The fact, of course, is that he had done little except deliver some inspiring speeches -- and in fairness, how much could he have done in eight months to resolve some of the world's toughest crises?

By awarding President Obama the Nobel Peace prize, the Norwegian Nobel Committee has changed the focus of the prize from one of accomplishment to one of anticipation. Indeed, it has ratcheted up the expectations of what he might accomplish to superhuman levels. Moreover, these expectations center around his role on the international stage, when his acknowledged highest priorities are in fact very much at home, not abroad: the economy, health care, employment.

In addition, his primary international focus is not on peace, but on war -- specifically the war in Afghanistan. In these circumstances, it is difficult to see how the president can deliver on the expectations that the prize has certainly magnified. The Norwegian Nobel Committee has done Barack Obama no favors.

By Dov Zakheim

Press reports this past week indicate that the Western powers' discussions with Iran appear to have mollified the Israelis, at least to the extent that Jerusalem has toned down jeremiad-like rhetoric regarding the Iranian nuclear program. How long Israel will be prepared literally to hold its fire while Iran transfers some, but by no means all, of its enriched uranium for processing in Russia, and opens its facility in Qom for IAEA inspections, very much remains to be seen.

Clearly, with the West talking tough, Israel does not want to be viewed as carping on the sidelines. But the Israelis recognize that the so-called secret facility at Qom was not so secret at all; the United States and others were aware of its existence for some time. The Israelis also harbor grave doubts about the IAEA's ability to monitor Iranian activity that Tehran prefers it not monitor. And Jerusalem knows full well that sanctions have a mixed record of successfully obtaining whatever objective motivated their imposition.
 
At the same time, however, Israel recognizes that Washington is now increasingly positioning itself to take military action against Iran if the talks, transfers to Russia, and sanctions fail to halt the momentum of the Iranian program. In particular, the Obama administration's announcement that it will reposition its missile-defense forces so as better to protect Europe against an Iranian strike has the direct effect of supplementing Israel's missile defenses. In fact, the American military deterrent has far greater significance than the talks, sanctions, or reprocessing deal. By committing Aegis ships to the eastern Mediterranean, the administration is also putting its forces in harm's way: There is no way that ships off Israel could avoid the effects of an Iranian nuclear strike on that country.

Israelis have long recognized -- though rarely acknowledged -- that there is an additional factor that would give Iranians pause before they launched a nuclear attack. Even one successful detonation would likely have devastating effects not just on Israeli Jews, but on Palestinian Arabs (thereby offering one way, perhaps, to conclude the peace process, namely, by wiping out both sides), and, indeed, on neighboring Lebanese, Jordanians, Egyptians, and even Saudis. And while a cynic might point out that Persians have as much contempt for Arabs as they do for Jews, the fact that Jerusalem might not survive may be the greatest of all deterrents for an Iranian leadership that views itself at the vanguard of Islam.
 
On the other hand, there is no guarantee that the Obama administration's tough talk will translate into action; tough talk has accomplished little to move Pyongyang, for example. There is considerable uncertainty as to how exactly the administration will deploy naval forces to the Mediterranean: the Navy's force levels are dropping below 300, and the demand for Aegis ships in the Pacific and Indian Oceans has not diminished. Moreover, the fact that, in a remarkable exercise in role-switching, European leaders and intelligence analysts are more pessimistic about the progress of the Iranian nuclear program than their American counterparts, inspires little confidence in Washington's ultimate intentions.
 
The Israelis are prepared to give their closest ally the benefit of the doubt for the time being. And "the time being" may not be that long. In the end, however, unless they are absolutely certain that, as several senators proposed on Sunday, the United States commits itself to a military strike on Iran if the negotiations fail, they will act on their own. "Sinn Fein," ourselves alone, may be the name of an Irish movement, but it embodies the very essence of Israeli policy in the face of what it continues to view as a threat to its very existence.

By Dov Zakheim

The latest Japanese polls indicate that the Democratic Party of Japan, led by Yukio Hatoyama, is likely to inflict a crushing defeat on the Liberal Democrats, the country's long-time governing party. The DPJ, which won control of Japan's Upper House in 2007, could win as many as 300 seats in the Lower House, roughly equaling former Prime Minister's results in 2005, and sending a strong message both domestically and internationally that the victory is no fluke. That said, a DPJ victory is not likely to lead to a sea change in the U.S.-Japan alliance. In fact, the greater concern is that the United States doesn't respond enough and fails to give Japan its due as a great power.

The DPJ's electoral focus has been primarily on domestic issues, directing particular criticism at the government's career bureaucracy. With respect to national security policy, the DPJ since its inception just over ten years ago has been somewhat critical of the Japanese military build-up. In the past it has called for termination of Japanese maritime refueling of American warships supporting the war in Afghanistan and for a renegotiation of both the Status of Forces Agreement and the Japanese-American agreement to transfer 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam. The latter is meant to be financed by both countries.

Nevertheless, like parties in other parliamentary democracies seizing the reins of power after more than a decade in opposition, the DPJ is unlikely to carry out its more extreme campaign promises, particularly as its powerful former leader, Ichiro Ozawa, worked closely with the United States while still a member of the Liberal Democrats. Despite its rhetoric, the DPJ, which is a mix of former right- and left-wing parties, will not necessarily cut back on Japan's recent military expansion. This is especially the case with respect to its missile defense program, given North Korea's aggressive stance on nuclear matters, and in light of both Kim Jong Il's mercurial policies and uncertainty about North Korean stability once he finally leaves the scene. Similarly, the DPJ appears to be backing away from its slogans about withdrawing support for US maritime operations related to the war in Afghanistan.

The DPJ has repeatedly called for a more equal relationship with the United States, and some observers fear that its ascension to power will lead to its demand for a renegotiation of the cost sharing provisions of   the US-Japanese Guam agreement that could result in the agreement's abrogation.  The withdrawal to Guam may well be delayed, if not halted, but less as a result of actions by a DPJ-led government than by legislation initiated by Congressman Neil Abercrombie (D-HI) to reserve 70 percent of all military construction jobs on Guam for American workers. Should the U.S. Congress pass Abercrombie's initiative, the resulting increase in the cost of developing Guam's infrastructure may well put the project on ice, given the increasing pressures on the US defense budget. Should there be a long-term delay, however, the DPJ is unlikely to object, much less offer to pour more Japanese funds into the effort.

On the other hand, the DPJ is unlikely to take a passive stance with respect to the relocation of the Marine Air Station from Futenma to Camp Schwab in Nago, both in Okinawa prefecture. The arrangement is highly unpopular in Japan, especially in Okinawa, where the local administration seeks to relocate the Marines to a more remote area off the island's coast The United States has resisted any change to the overall arrangement regarding the relocation to Guam, of which the move to Camp Schwab is an integral part. Any change would not only make training for the Marine Air Wing exceedingly difficult, but could result in demands for changes to other parts of the agreement, which has never been popular with the US military. For its part, the DPJ is holding firm on its demand for a renegotiation of the Futenma arrangement, and it will face little domestic opposition if it walks away from the deal regarding the Air Station's relocation.

All in all, the DPJ's foreign and security policy stance is unlikely to bring about fundamental changes in the relationship with the United States, or for that matter, with other countries in East Asia. The real danger to the US-Japanese relationship lies not in what Tokyo might do, but what Washington might not do. Since it became clear that Japan Inc. would not buy up the United States, past Administrations have tended to pay far more attention to China, often treating Japan as an afterthought, despite pious promises of developing a closer relationship with what is supposedly our closest Asian ally. With the DPJ in power, led by personalities who might be perceived in Washington as less accommodating to American interests in Asia and elsewhere than their Liberal Democrat predecessors, U.S. policymakers may be tempted once again to pay less attention to Japan than objective American interests call for. That would be a serious mistake. It is, moreover, a mistake that is easily avoidable, and it should not take place.

By Dov Zakheim

The Obama administration fought very hard to terminate the F-22 line of fighter aircraft, and in this respect it was right to do so. Early in his tenure, Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld, together with his team, were already considering limitations on the size of the F-22 force. Indeed, Rumsfeld did so even before U.S. forces became enmeshed in long wars against Afghan and Iraqi insurgents. The Defense leadership's reasoning was the same then as it is today: F-22s are wonderful fighters, but given their expense and the demands for less costly and more numerous air-to-ground capable aircraft, we simply have enough of them.

With an Air Force budget that was already strapped for cash, and requirements for new tankers, and other capabilities, Secretary Gates was effectively confronted with the choice of continuing to expand the F-22 fleet at the expense of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The latter not only will afford the United States the ultra-modern air-to-ground capability it needs in current and future combat environments, but also represents a joint effort with many of our closest allies. Reducing the JSF program in favor of the F-22 would certainly have alienated those very allies upon whom we rely for support in Afghanistan, and to whom we are likely to look for assistance in future combat environments.

Secretary Gates made the right choice, and he should be applauded for it.