Dov Zakheim's blog

By Dov Zakheim

Surprise?

I was surprised by the administration's deliberate downplaying of human rights issues. One might have expected a Democratic administration to emphasize such concerns rather than to pursue policies that are often ascribed to realist Republicans.

On the other hand, given the president's deliberate and sustained outreach to states with whom America's relations have been chilly at best, all of which have terrible human rights records, perhaps the decision not to mention those rights is not really surprising at all.

Mario Tama/Getty Images

By Dov Zakheim

The Norwegian Nobel Committee has long been known as an avid supporter of trendy left-leaning causes and people. Recall that the same committee gave the peace prize to Yasir Arafat. No one is trendier these days than Barack Obama. The fact, of course, is that he had done little except deliver some inspiring speeches -- and in fairness, how much could he have done in eight months to resolve some of the world's toughest crises?

By awarding President Obama the Nobel Peace prize, the Norwegian Nobel Committee has changed the focus of the prize from one of accomplishment to one of anticipation. Indeed, it has ratcheted up the expectations of what he might accomplish to superhuman levels. Moreover, these expectations center around his role on the international stage, when his acknowledged highest priorities are in fact very much at home, not abroad: the economy, health care, employment.

In addition, his primary international focus is not on peace, but on war -- specifically the war in Afghanistan. In these circumstances, it is difficult to see how the president can deliver on the expectations that the prize has certainly magnified. The Norwegian Nobel Committee has done Barack Obama no favors.

By Dov Zakheim

Press reports this past week indicate that the Western powers' discussions with Iran appear to have mollified the Israelis, at least to the extent that Jerusalem has toned down jeremiad-like rhetoric regarding the Iranian nuclear program. How long Israel will be prepared literally to hold its fire while Iran transfers some, but by no means all, of its enriched uranium for processing in Russia, and opens its facility in Qom for IAEA inspections, very much remains to be seen.

Clearly, with the West talking tough, Israel does not want to be viewed as carping on the sidelines. But the Israelis recognize that the so-called secret facility at Qom was not so secret at all; the United States and others were aware of its existence for some time. The Israelis also harbor grave doubts about the IAEA's ability to monitor Iranian activity that Tehran prefers it not monitor. And Jerusalem knows full well that sanctions have a mixed record of successfully obtaining whatever objective motivated their imposition.
 
At the same time, however, Israel recognizes that Washington is now increasingly positioning itself to take military action against Iran if the talks, transfers to Russia, and sanctions fail to halt the momentum of the Iranian program. In particular, the Obama administration's announcement that it will reposition its missile-defense forces so as better to protect Europe against an Iranian strike has the direct effect of supplementing Israel's missile defenses. In fact, the American military deterrent has far greater significance than the talks, sanctions, or reprocessing deal. By committing Aegis ships to the eastern Mediterranean, the administration is also putting its forces in harm's way: There is no way that ships off Israel could avoid the effects of an Iranian nuclear strike on that country.

Israelis have long recognized -- though rarely acknowledged -- that there is an additional factor that would give Iranians pause before they launched a nuclear attack. Even one successful detonation would likely have devastating effects not just on Israeli Jews, but on Palestinian Arabs (thereby offering one way, perhaps, to conclude the peace process, namely, by wiping out both sides), and, indeed, on neighboring Lebanese, Jordanians, Egyptians, and even Saudis. And while a cynic might point out that Persians have as much contempt for Arabs as they do for Jews, the fact that Jerusalem might not survive may be the greatest of all deterrents for an Iranian leadership that views itself at the vanguard of Islam.
 
On the other hand, there is no guarantee that the Obama administration's tough talk will translate into action; tough talk has accomplished little to move Pyongyang, for example. There is considerable uncertainty as to how exactly the administration will deploy naval forces to the Mediterranean: the Navy's force levels are dropping below 300, and the demand for Aegis ships in the Pacific and Indian Oceans has not diminished. Moreover, the fact that, in a remarkable exercise in role-switching, European leaders and intelligence analysts are more pessimistic about the progress of the Iranian nuclear program than their American counterparts, inspires little confidence in Washington's ultimate intentions.
 
The Israelis are prepared to give their closest ally the benefit of the doubt for the time being. And "the time being" may not be that long. In the end, however, unless they are absolutely certain that, as several senators proposed on Sunday, the United States commits itself to a military strike on Iran if the negotiations fail, they will act on their own. "Sinn Fein," ourselves alone, may be the name of an Irish movement, but it embodies the very essence of Israeli policy in the face of what it continues to view as a threat to its very existence.

By Dov Zakheim

The latest Japanese polls indicate that the Democratic Party of Japan, led by Yukio Hatoyama, is likely to inflict a crushing defeat on the Liberal Democrats, the country's long-time governing party. The DPJ, which won control of Japan's Upper House in 2007, could win as many as 300 seats in the Lower House, roughly equaling former Prime Minister's results in 2005, and sending a strong message both domestically and internationally that the victory is no fluke. That said, a DPJ victory is not likely to lead to a sea change in the U.S.-Japan alliance. In fact, the greater concern is that the United States doesn't respond enough and fails to give Japan its due as a great power.

The DPJ's electoral focus has been primarily on domestic issues, directing particular criticism at the government's career bureaucracy. With respect to national security policy, the DPJ since its inception just over ten years ago has been somewhat critical of the Japanese military build-up. In the past it has called for termination of Japanese maritime refueling of American warships supporting the war in Afghanistan and for a renegotiation of both the Status of Forces Agreement and the Japanese-American agreement to transfer 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam. The latter is meant to be financed by both countries.

Nevertheless, like parties in other parliamentary democracies seizing the reins of power after more than a decade in opposition, the DPJ is unlikely to carry out its more extreme campaign promises, particularly as its powerful former leader, Ichiro Ozawa, worked closely with the United States while still a member of the Liberal Democrats. Despite its rhetoric, the DPJ, which is a mix of former right- and left-wing parties, will not necessarily cut back on Japan's recent military expansion. This is especially the case with respect to its missile defense program, given North Korea's aggressive stance on nuclear matters, and in light of both Kim Jong Il's mercurial policies and uncertainty about North Korean stability once he finally leaves the scene. Similarly, the DPJ appears to be backing away from its slogans about withdrawing support for US maritime operations related to the war in Afghanistan.

The DPJ has repeatedly called for a more equal relationship with the United States, and some observers fear that its ascension to power will lead to its demand for a renegotiation of the cost sharing provisions of   the US-Japanese Guam agreement that could result in the agreement's abrogation.  The withdrawal to Guam may well be delayed, if not halted, but less as a result of actions by a DPJ-led government than by legislation initiated by Congressman Neil Abercrombie (D-HI) to reserve 70 percent of all military construction jobs on Guam for American workers. Should the U.S. Congress pass Abercrombie's initiative, the resulting increase in the cost of developing Guam's infrastructure may well put the project on ice, given the increasing pressures on the US defense budget. Should there be a long-term delay, however, the DPJ is unlikely to object, much less offer to pour more Japanese funds into the effort.

On the other hand, the DPJ is unlikely to take a passive stance with respect to the relocation of the Marine Air Station from Futenma to Camp Schwab in Nago, both in Okinawa prefecture. The arrangement is highly unpopular in Japan, especially in Okinawa, where the local administration seeks to relocate the Marines to a more remote area off the island's coast The United States has resisted any change to the overall arrangement regarding the relocation to Guam, of which the move to Camp Schwab is an integral part. Any change would not only make training for the Marine Air Wing exceedingly difficult, but could result in demands for changes to other parts of the agreement, which has never been popular with the US military. For its part, the DPJ is holding firm on its demand for a renegotiation of the Futenma arrangement, and it will face little domestic opposition if it walks away from the deal regarding the Air Station's relocation.

All in all, the DPJ's foreign and security policy stance is unlikely to bring about fundamental changes in the relationship with the United States, or for that matter, with other countries in East Asia. The real danger to the US-Japanese relationship lies not in what Tokyo might do, but what Washington might not do. Since it became clear that Japan Inc. would not buy up the United States, past Administrations have tended to pay far more attention to China, often treating Japan as an afterthought, despite pious promises of developing a closer relationship with what is supposedly our closest Asian ally. With the DPJ in power, led by personalities who might be perceived in Washington as less accommodating to American interests in Asia and elsewhere than their Liberal Democrat predecessors, U.S. policymakers may be tempted once again to pay less attention to Japan than objective American interests call for. That would be a serious mistake. It is, moreover, a mistake that is easily avoidable, and it should not take place.

By Dov Zakheim

The Obama administration fought very hard to terminate the F-22 line of fighter aircraft, and in this respect it was right to do so. Early in his tenure, Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld, together with his team, were already considering limitations on the size of the F-22 force. Indeed, Rumsfeld did so even before U.S. forces became enmeshed in long wars against Afghan and Iraqi insurgents. The Defense leadership's reasoning was the same then as it is today: F-22s are wonderful fighters, but given their expense and the demands for less costly and more numerous air-to-ground capable aircraft, we simply have enough of them.

With an Air Force budget that was already strapped for cash, and requirements for new tankers, and other capabilities, Secretary Gates was effectively confronted with the choice of continuing to expand the F-22 fleet at the expense of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The latter not only will afford the United States the ultra-modern air-to-ground capability it needs in current and future combat environments, but also represents a joint effort with many of our closest allies. Reducing the JSF program in favor of the F-22 would certainly have alienated those very allies upon whom we rely for support in Afghanistan, and to whom we are likely to look for assistance in future combat environments.

Secretary Gates made the right choice, and he should be applauded for it.

By Dov Zakheim

There are several issues at play regarding the so-called secret CIA programs to target and kill al-Qaeda leadership. The first is whether the CIA should have told the Congress what it planned prior to actually fleshing out a complete program. One could argue that the Congress, or at least its senior leaders, should have been informed immediately upon the CIA's consideration of such an effort. But one could argue to the contrary that, until the program was fully formulated -- with the various legal, international, and other concerns fully resolved -- there was nothing to inform the Congress about. Indeed, one might assert that informing the Congress -- with the attendant risk of leaks -- would have damaged that CIA program prematurely, and, far more importantly, would have sullied America's reputation abroad on the basis of a hypothetical policy that might never have come into being. The proof of this latter consideration is that, in the end, the program never got off the ground.

As for Mr. Cheney, while the press delights in attacking him, and he appears to delight in goading the press, he should not be at the center of this issue. Rather, the debate should be about both whether the United States can and should even consider a program to kill those who wish to massacre thousands upon thousands of our citizens, and at what point in the process of formulating such a program the Congress should be informed.

Reasonable people can debate these issues. For my part, I feel that with respect to sensitive programs of this nature, the probability of a leak resulting from informing the Congress about them must be balanced against the likelihood of their actually being approved for execution. When a program's fate is highly in doubt, the risk of a leak is high, and the consequences of that leak certain to be highly damaging. Thus, it may be better to wait until the program is more fully defined before informing the Congress of its existence.

Ultimately, the question of whether to mark terrorists for death will not really go away until al-Qaeda and its copycat organizations are defeated. What Mr. Cheney may or may not have done nearly a decade ago is a sideshow in this debate, nothing more.

By Dov Zakheim

Secretary Gates is on the Hill today to defend his decision, before a not entirely friendly audience, to cut some heavy weapons systems and invest more instead on irregular war. He is right to press for capabilities that are important to those wars -- unmanned aerial vehicles, for example. Still, Gates has overcompensated for irregular wars. And by emphasizing cyber warfare, which represents the most sophisticated technologies that could be launched against us, he is implicitly conceding that we must worry about major peer competitors. The cutbacks in major conventional systems, notably naval systems, seem out of "synch" with the emphasis on cyber warfare. Similarly, cutbacks in airlift programs, and of the C-17 in particular, are inconsistent with increases in Army end-strength.

Gates appears to assume that no peer competitor could emerge within the next fifteen to twenty years. Yet both Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia both became superpowers within a shorter time frame: it took Germany less than a decade from Hitler's rise to power until the fall of France; the Soviet Union took less than two decades from Lenin's death to the defeat of Germany. Taking Moore's law into account, the pace of military growth is potentially much greater than it was some seventy years ago. We could confront a conventional threat within fifteen years -- and perhaps even sooner.

By Dov Zakheim

The momentum of Pakistani instability appears to be accelerating: Six months ago there was no evidence that the Taliban would break out of its mountain hideaways in the Northwest Frontier Province to move within 60 miles of Islamabad. While the Pakistani Army may finally have woken up to the threat, the loyalties of its rank and file are far from clear. In short, Pakistan in 2009 is looking more and more like Iran thirty years earlier, when the seemingly impregnable Shah fell in the face of hostile demonstrations and a passive army.

The United States cannot afford to stand by and let Pakistan either fall to the Taliban or fragment in some way. Yet it would be foolhardy to try to prop up any Pakistani government, be it the current Zardari regime, or as recent press reporting indicates, the opposition leader Nawaz Sharif. It was the last Sharif government whose incompetence and corruption prompted the 1999 military coup led by Pervez Musharraf. Sharif's government also conducted Pakistan's first nuclear test, continued the long-time support of A.Q. Khan's activities, and launched the first Kargil War. Why a new Sharif government would be more reliable or competent than its predecessor is not at all clear. Furthermore, American efforts to promote particular governments have not exactly been overwhelmingly successful in recent years, including in Pakistan itself. Surely one can ask if Pakistan is better off today under Zardari than it was under Musharraf.

Instead of trying to play politics in Islamabad, the United States should employ its forces to support those of Pakistan's military. Only in this manner can there be some assurance that Pakistani morale will not collapse, and that the Taliban insurrection can be crushed. The Pakistani military can be ruthless, and nothing else will do in dealing with the Taliban. American tactics and firepower can back up that ruthlessness.

It might be argued that the United States should try to "take out" Pakistan's nuclear capability. In so doing, it would certainly ensure that the Pakistani military would turn on the United States and come to terms with the Taliban. The United States must fight alongside Pakistan's army, not against it.
 
Now is not the time for squeamishness or political correctness. Do-gooders no doubt will howl at the sight of the collateral damage that would inevitably result if American units enable Pakistani forces to pulverize Taliban strongholds. The Zardari government may howl that America has sidestepped it by going directly to the military.

Let them all howl. A nuclear armed Pakistan, or even worse, a fragmented country whose nuclear weapons are up for grabs, would result in far more cries of anguish by far more people than anything that might result from the elimination of the Taliban threat. Time is running out. The United States must act now.