Michael Singh's blog

By Michael Singh

One lesson of the financial crisis is that short-termism has plagued U.S. business; too often it plagues U.S. politics and policy as well. The Obama administration has been both victim and perpetrator of this offense. On the one hand, the Obama administration (like most new administrations) has been the target of the short-term thinking prevalent in political and media circles, which judges progress in weeks and months, even against problems which have persisted for decades or longer. On the other hand, the administration itself has exacerbated this problem by raising expectations that many of America's problems in the world could be solved with a simple shift in tactics, and to make matters worse often exaggerated its own tactical differences from its predecessors.

This latter tendency seems to flow from one of this administration's most curious characteristics -- its fixation on the past. When you are in government, your critics typically want to focus on the past, picking apart your record to find failures or inconsistencies, while you would rather focus on your plans for the future. As citizens, this is precisely what we want of our officials -- while as a society we may want -- and need -- to grapple with our past, we need policymakers to glean what lessons they can from it and look forward. After all, we are powerless to change the past, and duty-bound to shape the future. Nevertheless, the Obama administration seems caught in the past, continuing one year after the 2008 election to define itself by its repudiation of predecessors' policies rather than a clear articulation of its own vision for the future.

In reviewing the Obama administration's foreign policy record, whether in the Middle East or elsewhere, one finds things to criticize as well as to commend. But more important than what they have done thus far is what they will do next. The administration has poorly handled the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, which is at a standstill if not moving backwards.  Rather than simply pressing for a quick resumption of negotiations, the administration will need to think creatively about how to set the right regional and local context for talks and how to address the interests underlying the parties' seemingly rigid and incompatible positions. On the Iran nuclear issue, while one can dispute various tactical decisions it has made, the administration is to be commended for its decision to shift from its early near-exclusive focus on engagement to a policy that mixes pressure and negotiations. But again the crucial question is prospective; while the Obama administration has convincingly asserted its commitment to diplomacy, it has been relatively reticent about what it might do if diplomacy fails to halt Iran's nuclear march.

Because the Obama administration has yet to confront these big questions -- and has not moved to answer them preemptively, as would be useful in the Iran case -- we have plenty of information about its tactics, but its strategies have yet to come into focus. In two areas where it has made a sharp strategic break from the previous administration, its policy is best characterized, ironically, not as one of engagement but of disengagement. These are the promotion of human rights and democracy, on which this administration has been virtually silent, and trade, where protectionism has resurfaced and the promotion of free trade has ebbed. The United States stands for liberty, and when we stray from our values we succumb to the sort of short-term thinking for which we are bound to pay a hefty long-term price.

Pete Souza/The White House via Getty Images

By Michael Singh

When companies are faced with making a decision between multiple risky options, they will often seek out information in order to reduce their uncertainty. So, a pharmaceutical firm will conduct clinical trials in order to determine if a drug is safe or dangerous, information that could mean the difference between profitable sales and damaging litigation. Such an investment in information is never free -- indeed, it often comes at a significant cost that must be weighed against the value of the knowledge obtained.

In this sense, the recently concluded U.S.-Iran talks in Geneva can be considered a diplomatic purchase of information. The United States, by offering to remove Iran's low-enriched uranium and turn it into the raw material required to make medical isotopes, is testing Iran's claim of peaceable intent and the Obama administration's hopes for engagement. If the Iranians comply, they may be open to further compromise, perhaps as a result of the political pressure they have faced at home since the summer's election turmoil. Their refusal, on the other hand, would serve as a clear signal of intransigence and lead Washington to pursue an alternative path. The most likely result is somewhere in between -- Iran gives no clear answer, but seeks to draw out talks and divide the P5+1 -- meaning that the United States has to ensure that we and our allies agree on what constitutes an acceptable response from Tehran. Whatever the result, it is a bold and innovative gambit by the United States, and the Iran hands at the National Security Council should be commended for devising it.

Like all purchases of information, however, this one comes at a cost. The P5+1 have had to accept the uranium enrichment which Iran has conducted in recent years in defiance of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions. Even if it ultimately does not reach a deal to send its LEU abroad, Iran will surely seek to pocket this concession and declare a measure of victory. Similarly, by presenting the admission of IAEA inspectors to the until-recently-covert Qom enrichment plant as a concession, Iran gains tacit international acceptance of a facility built in defiance of its Nonproliferation Treaty obligations. If the P5+1 accepts this fait accompli and negotiates to limit rather than eliminate uranium enrichment in Iran and to monitor rather than shut down the Qom facility, the result could be a dangerous one for the stability of the Middle East and the viability of the global nonproliferation regime.

Another cost of the current U.S. initiative is that it risks demoralizing Iran's ascendant political opposition by bolstering the regime at a time when its legitimacy at home appears to be waning. Given that an internal transformation in Iran may be the best hope for long-run peace and stability in the region, any action that risks delaying it could be costly indeed. None of this is to say that the current approach should not be tried, given the paucity of attractive options; it is simply to say that it is not free. At some point the purchases of information must end, and a decision must be taken. A pharmaceutical company that conducts many clinical trials but sells no drugs eventually finds itself out of business.

SAMUEL KUBANI/AFP/Getty Images

By Michael Singh

In our polarized political world, U.S. presidents seem to inspire fervent devotion or passionate dislike, with little space in between. The initial reactions to President Obama winning the Nobel Peace Prize fit into this pattern.

To his backers, the award is a surprise, but a welcome one, confirming his political philosophy. To his detractors, the award is an embarrassment for which no justification can be made. For the president himself, the reward is a problem. Already criticized for overexposure and a dearth of tangible achievements, he may see the Nobel mostly as a headache that puts him in a corner: Decline and risk confirming critics' charges that you are undeserving, or accept and risk confirming their accusations of arrogance.

On balance, the right thing would have been to decline the Nobel. Supporters would applaud the humility, and critics would largely be disarmed. Further, the president in pointing to more deserving, less well-known candidates, could do significant good.

In the charged, bubble atmosphere that prevails in modern White House staffs, however, such modest actions are uncommon. Presidential aides and communicators these days are given to grandiloquence and self-congratulation, a crass trend whose momentum seems unfortunately unstoppable.

It isn't fair to criticize the president for winning this award, as it is a stretch to think that he or his staff sought to sway the vote. Those who deserve criticism are the Norwegian Nobel Committee. Their actions were crassly political, contributing to political polarization rather than diffusing it. They did President Obama no favors by prematurely awarding him this distinction. At its best, the Peace Prize shines a spotlight on the hard-won achievements of courageous peacemakers; at its worst, it is a political truncheon.

In accepting the Nobel, President Obama should explicitly reject any base political interpretation of it, regardless of the committee's purpose. Instead, he should do so on behalf of America and Americans, who have sacrificed much over the decades to further peace and prosperity in the world.

By Michael Singh

Earlier today, President Obama, British Prime Minister Brown, and French President Sarkozy dramatically confirmed that Iran has been covertly building near the city of Qom a second uranium enrichment facility. Obama said the "size and configuration" is "inconsistent with a peaceful program," suggesting that it is intended for military purposes. The revelation will prompt very different reactions from different people.

Some will find the news shocking. And that the Iranian regime would so brazenly flout the international community and the IAEA, despite Iran's own assurances of cooperation and the very real possibility of war or harsh sanctions, is something indeed. Others will find it utterly predictable, based both on the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate's December 2007 conclusion that "Iran would probably use covert facilities ... for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon" -- and on Iran's history of evasion. Iran concealed its first uranium enrichment plant at Natanz, opening it to IAEA inspections only following its public disclosure by Iranian dissidents in 2002, and continues to refuse to answer the IAEA's questions about its work on nuclear weaponization.

The Iranian regime and its backers will have a different reaction altogether -- they will insist that Tehran had no obligation to disclose the existence of the facility, having unilaterally terminated its implementation of the part of its NPT Safeguards Agreement requiring advance notice of the construction of nuclear sites. Thus far, Iranian nuclear officials have confirmed reports about the enrichment plant while insisting that it is for civilian purposes, and Iranian President Ahmadinejad has warned that it would be a "mistake" to press the regime on the issue.

Whatever one's reaction, the actions now taken in light of this news by Iran and the international community will be decisive. Obama, Brown, and Sarkozy were right to stress the need for the IAEA to investigate it seriously and for Iran to meet UN demands which it has heretofore disregarded. One can expect that the information revealed today will be used not only to press Iran to treat seriously the talks that are slated to begin on Oct. 1 in Geneva, but also to convince recalcitrant partners Russia and China (whose leaders are present in Pittsburgh but did not join Obama, Brown, and Sarkozy on the stage this morning) to support tough sanctions against Iran in the likely event that those talks prove inconclusive. If in fact Iran does not comply with international demands, then Moscow and Beijing will be put to the test -- if they refuse to support sanctions even in light of this new deception by Tehran, they are unlikely ever to do so, and the U.S. and its allies will need to move forward without them or weigh other options.

However, even if Iran, whether out of a genuine policy shift or simply an effort to forestall sanctions, embarks on negotiations and promises cooperation, this revelation will severely diminish the international community's confidence in the regime's sincerity, as Sarkozy noted today. As a result, the possible compromises -- whether promises from Tehran not to enrich or some form of "limited enrichment" on Iranian soil -- will look less attractive to the U.S. and its allies. If Iran could repeatedly assure the IAEA of its cooperation and publicly deny wrongdoing while at the same time secretly building an underground enrichment plant, what confidence can one have in an agreement that depends vitally on the regime's willingness to uphold its promises?

At the very least, today's revelations will mean that any agreement must contain water-tight verification provisions. However, they also mean that the international community's "no-deal option" -- a military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities -- will look more attractive. Sarkozy suggested today that "everything must be put on the table" likely will reflect greater support for the military option in Israel, the U.S., and elsewhere. Israel's decision, in particular, about whether to exercise that option will likely be heavily influenced not only by Iran's reaction to today's news, but also by that of Washington and the P5+1.

Today's revelation represents a crisis of confidence not only for international diplomacy with Iran, but also for the global nonproliferation regime. That both Syria and Iran could covertly build nuclear facilities despite IAEA activity in these countries suggests that rogue regimes have little respect for international nonproliferation rules. If the IAEA and the international community fail to act in response to the information revealed today, their attitudes will be vindicated and global counter-proliferation will be a shambles.

Gordon Brown suggested that Iran's "serial deception" meant that the "international community must draw a line in the sand." Such lines have been drawn in the past, and Iran has trampled them. What is needed now is not another ephemeral line, but international cooperation -- not only from the U.S. and Europe, but also from Russia and China and the world's emerging powers -- to build a firm wall that stops Iranian nuclear weapons progress and other illicit proliferation activities cold. If we cannot muster the determination to build such a wall and defend it, then we should gird ourselves for a far more dangerous world.

By Michael Singh

Economist Stephen Landsburg famously observed that "economics can be summed up in four words: people respond to incentives." "The rest," he said, "is commentary." Examples of such incentives -- in their proper sense as both prospective rewards and punishments -- in the economic sphere include the incentive to work less created by high marginal tax rates, or the encouragement of riskier behavior arising from the provision of insurance. It would not be too great a stretch to apply this same lesson to diplomacy. In international relations, incentives are a powerful force in determining the behavior of states and their rulers; a decision-maker who ignores the incentives his policies create does so at his peril.

Unfortunately, the United States has too often reverted to solipsism in its foreign policy. Ideally, policy should be informed by a careful assessment of the range of incentives influencing allies, enemies, and those in between, and decisions made in order to alter those incentives to produce the outcomes we desire. (This is similar to what Joseph Nye refers to as "contextual intelligence," a term borrowed from psychology.) Instead, policymakers often act with little thought for how others see the world, with the blithe expectation that other states' actions will be a direct function of U.S. power or popularity. It is solipsism, rather than any particular type of policy or action -- unilateral or multilateral, aggressive or accommodating -- which most often causes foreign policy to go awry.

Any occupant of the White House needs to pay careful attention to the incentives created by his policies, which can have an impact on U.S. national security that far outlasts his tenure. A frequently-cited example of this is the decision by President Reagan to pull U.S. Marines out of Lebanon following the bombing of their barracks in 1983, which may have suggested to future enemies that the U.S. is irresolute in the face of attack. Likewise, paying ransoms to pirates, while often seemingly the only choice available to save innocent people, is widely regarded to encourage further piracy. Such approaches, while surely justified in the eyes of decision makers faced with nothing but bad options, lead to trouble down the road.

In this same vein, President Obama should heed the incentives his policies create. Already we have seen that a tougher U.S. approach to Israel has not prompted Arab states to reach out to Israel, but rather has probably caused many of them to take harder lines on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as they have strong incentives to avoid political gambles at a time when the peace process is bogged down or to escape the appearance that they are more accommodating toward Israel than is Washington. At the same time, the deterioration in U.S.-Israel relations likely reduces the Israeli incentive to accept U.S. assurances in the future to offset risks taken to achieve a peace agreement. Of course, incentives work not only on those at whom they are targeted, but also other observers. Iran, for example, will watch carefully how the U.S. deals with North Korean belligerence and groups like Hamas will pay heed to how we approach the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Along the same lines, the U.S. needs to understand when its policies, even if popular, fail to change incentives. Obama's announcement of his intention to close Gitmo, for example, was met with applause around the world. Yet, few countries stepped forward to accept the prison's detainees, as their incentives for doing so were not changed by the U.S. announcement. Likewise, engagement with Iran has not yet succeeded in large part because the Iranian regime has strong incentives to refuse regardless of who occupies the White House. Iranian policy is not a function of U.S. actions, but rather the reflection of their own interests and ideology. Likewise, Russia and China's willingness to impose sanctions on Iran is unlikely to be greatly affected by a U.S. effort to engage, as their intransigence probably stems from their own incentives rather than a sense of fairness toward the Iranian regime.

There are times, of course, when morality or other obligations require that a certain course of action be pursued regardless of the consequences. Americans rightly demand that their government occupy the moral high ground. Barring such circumstances, policymakers are best served by fixing upon an objective and reasoning backward to determine how to achieve it, including by creating the incentives necessary to work with and through others. This approach does not, in itself, prejudge the content of one's foreign policy. Whatever outcome we seek, we must create or change incentives to bring it about. While the unpredictability and sometime irrationality of the world will sometimes thwart us, if we ignore the incentives our actions and policies create we will surely thwart ourselves.

By Michael Singh

When it comes to the Middle East, American presidents like to think big, and President Obama is no exception. His agenda for the region, at the outset, included ending thirty years of enmity between the U.S. and Iran, reviving American popularity amongst Arabs and Muslims, and resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Such big thinking is laudable (if not necessarily pragmatic), given the Middle East's increasingly prominent role in U.S. national security. When it comes to that last agenda item, however -- Arab-Israeli peace -- the President would be better served to think small. An opportunity exists to achieve progress between the Israelis and Palestinians, but it is a modest one, and the surest way to quash it is to overreach.

Despite Obama's talk at the White House press conference following Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's May 18 visit of a "historic opportunity" for peace, he surely understands that the odds are currently stacked against such progress. Hamas remains firmly in control of Gaza, and there are few prospects for dislodging, defeating, or taming the militant Islamist organization. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas appears likely to postpone presidential elections, and enjoys mixed support at best from his constituents. Netanyahu heads a right-wing coalition that may not support far-reaching peace talks. Further afield, Hizballah continues to rearm, a jumpy Iranian regime continues its march toward nuclear weapons, and Arab states are not, for the most part, forthcoming with outreach to Israel or financial assistance to the Palestinians.

Adding to these obstacles, relations between the U.S. and Israel have suffered, and the peace process itself has entered a diplomatic cul-de-sac over the otherwise peripheral issue of "natural growth" in West Bank settlements. With both Jerusalem and Washington staking out inflexible positions on the issue, it will take exceptional creativity on the part of special envoy George Mitchell to craft a compromise that neither undercuts Netanyahu politically nor tarnishes U.S. credibility with the Palestinians and Arab states. Far from eliciting support in the region or enhancing the American position as an "honest broker," the prolonged dispute has hardened the positions of Palestinians and Arab states, and undermined American reliability in Israeli eyes.

Amid these disheartening developments, however, are some areas of remarkable progress that suggest a way forward. According to Quartet envoy Tony Blair, Israeli and Palestinian officials have continued to cooperate on economic and security projects despite the freeze in political negotiations. And Netanyahu, who came to office speaking of economic progress with the Palestinians and improving the quality of life in the West Bank, appears to be following through on those promises. Checkpoints are being removed in the West Bank, economic activity is increasing (the IMF has predicted growth of 7 percent this year in the West Bank economy), and security is improving in many Palestinian cities. Added to these hopeful signs is the courageous message of outreach to Israel by Bahrain's Crown Prince Salman last week.

These "on-the-ground" developments are hardly peripheral to the peace process. The premise of the process launched at Annapolis in November 2007 was that, while political negotiations must be pursued in earnest, economic cooperation, institution building, and security efforts must be conducted in parallel. There is no reason why the logic of this structure should not continue to hold today. While the economic and security progress in the West Bank cannot serve as a substitute for political negotiations, it can provide an exit from the current dispute that has prevented the resumption of those negotiations. The need to improve life and ensure security for residents of the West Bank is a rare area of agreement between Netanyahu and the Palestinian leadership of Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, and the U.S. needs to take advantage of such convergences wherever they can be found.

To move forward, the U.S. should urge Netanyahu to flesh out his plans for "economic peace" with the Palestinians. It is likely that the resulting plan of action would find wide support among both Israelis and Palestinians, and provide an atmosphere in which the current unproductive confrontation over "natural growth" could give way to a narrower agreement restricting settlement activity, and perhaps even a resumption of peace talks. While it may be difficult to see through the fog of acrimony that has gathered over the peace process, Netanyahu's June 14 speech, while containing conditions unacceptable to the Palestinians, represents a watershed in that it is the first instance of a Likud Prime Minister accepting Palestinian statehood. This means that all three major political parties in Israel -- Labor, Kadima, and Likud -- accept the fundamental premise of the peace process, as does the Palestinian Authority. While this by no means suggests that Netanyahu and Abbas -- unlikely partners for peace -- will reach an agreement, it does provide hope that future movement in the peace process will be forwards, not backwards.

While not gripping stuff diplomatically, the importance of improving the quality of life, bolstering economic activity, and building accountable institutions in the West Bank cannot be overstated. These activities will build among both Palestinians and Israelis a constituency that will support the concessions ultimately necessary for a lasting peace. The greatest threat to capitalizing on this opportunity is that the U.S. will overlook it as it grasps for the brass ring of a final-status agreement, an effort that tends to crowd out all others due to its high consumption of diplomatic attention and energy. In this case, it is only by thinking small that the Obama Administration will achieve big things.

By Michael Singh

While the remarkable turmoil in the aftermath of Iran’s presidential election has captured the world’s attention, other news relating to Iran has slipped by relatively unnoticed. Last week, the head of the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency told Congress that Iran and North Korea were cooperating on ballistic missiles. Diplomats in Vienna told the press that Iran had denied an IAEA request to install additional monitoring cameras at the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, and IAEA director-general Mohammad ElBaradei asserted that Iran desires nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, two Hizballah operatives were reportedly arrested in Azerbaijan, bearing Iranian passports. 

The juxtaposition of these activities with the ferment in the streets of Tehran reveals two altogether different Irans struggling with one another -- one marked by political dynamism and a hunger for justice, and another that is autocratic, bent on projecting power, and in which elected officials have little influence. To Iranians, this sort of conflict follows a familiar pattern in Iran’s history. To Westerners, it has been eye-opening. What is surprising to outside observers is not that Iran’s elections were rigged, but that their manipulation has elicited such a powerful response from the Iranian people. 

While policymakers in the United States and elsewhere pin their hopes on the first, vibrant Iran, they must deal with the stark reality of the second, harsher one. This may explain the unusually cautious statements emanating from the White House, including President Obama’s own statement to the effect that Ahmadinejad and his challengers are not much different as far as the United States is concerned. This begs the question: Upon which Iran should U.S. policy be focused? Can the United States successfully support freedom in Iran without endangering its “tough diplomacy” aimed at the Iranian nuclear threat? 

In formulating an answer, it is important to note that prospects for U.S.-Iran engagement, never too great, have been diminished by the election and its aftermath. The Iranian regime’s willingness to flout international opinion and the yearnings of its own people reveals either overconfidence or, conversely, serious insecurity. A cautious regime might see an opportunity in President Obama’s offer of dialogue, but a regime that is either supremely confident or shakily insecure is unlikely to grasp Obama’s outstretched hand. A confident regime is likely to dismiss the consequences of defiance, and an insecure one will see any opening to the West as a threat rather than a prize. 

The results themselves suggest that engagement with the United States is not the regime’s top priority. Whereas his challengers argued during their campaign for improving U.S.-Iran relations, Ahmadinejad heaped scorn on those who would pursue “détente” with the West. He was supported by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who pronounced himself “ideologically disinclined” toward U.S.-Iran reconciliation and urged Iranian voters to reject candidates who would reach out to Washington. 

Nevertheless, whatever chances exist for successful engagement with the Iranian regime will not be dimmed by a vigorous defense of the rights of the Iranian people; rather, those prospects would paradoxically be enhanced.   

This crisis provides an opportunity to demonstrate to the regime that it will face multilateral penalties for flouting international norms, a lesson clearly transferrable to the nuclear question. While our allies may vary in their views on the risks posed by Iran’s nuclear program and the best way to deal with it, the regime’s actions against its own people are drawing broad condemnation from across the world. If even this global outcry is not translated into concrete action, Iran’s leaders will draw the lesson that the international community’s resolve has dissipated and will act accordingly.

Furthermore, vigorously defending Iranians’ rights, both now and in the context of any future dialogue with Iran, could enhance U.S. credibility inside Iran and boost support among Iranians for a compromise with the West.

Some have argued that Iranians will naturally resent any perceived involvement by foreign powers in their affairs, citing as an example the American-backed overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadeq in 1953. This reading of history strains credulity. Iranians’ wariness of outside powers arises in large part from Western indifference to the oppression of Iranians and failure to support their struggle for justice, whether in the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11, or during the Mossadeq era. Iranians do not want outsiders, including the United States, to pick winners in their elections. But silence in the face of a violent crackdown in Iran would compound these historical errors, not reverse them.   

Iran is a multifaceted nation which demands a multifaceted U.S. policy. A successful approach to Iran will require the United States to simultaneously confront head-on the challenges posed by both Irans evident today -- to support the first Iran, which is demanding justice, and to deter the second, determined to challenge international security. If we fail to do so, we will unwittingly be writing yet another tragic chapter in the troubled history of U.S.-Iran relations.

By Michael Singh

To most Westerners, Iranian politics is essentially a black box, making it difficult to know what to hope for out of Friday’s presidential elections. Knowledgeable commentators offer vastly differing opinions regarding the extent to which the results will reflect the will of the Iranian people versus that of Iran’s ultimate authority, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. 

It is widely agreed, however, that the elections are manipulated from start -- (via the vetting of candidates) to finish (via the distortion of the results), and that whatever their outcome, true power on vital issues such as Iran’s nuclear program and relations with the United States remain strictly in the hands of Khamenei. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to conclude that the elections are irrelevant to U.S. interests. Their outcome, and the U.S. reaction to it, will be critical to the nuclear showdown with Iran.

The first thing that U.S. officials will be looking for from Friday’s election is what their outcome reveals about prospects for U.S.-Iran engagement. The incumbent president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, despite his quixotic outreach to the United States, has heaped scorn on his predecessors for pursuing “détente” with the West and has shown disdain for international cooperation. His challengers, meanwhile, have professed a desire for better relations with the West and lambasted Ahmadinejad for leaving Iran internationally isolated and friendless. Whatever else it may reflect about Iran, an Ahmadinejad victory would mean that Iran’s leaders are shaking their still-clenched fists at President Obama’s outstretched hand.

While a reformist victory might pave the way for U.S.-Iran dialogue, it would by no means guarantee such an outcome. Instead, several scenarios are possible. Ahmadinejad’s defeat could result in paralysis or turmoil as hardliners and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps -- which has publicly warned against a “velvet revolution” -- clash with the newly-elected government.

More troubling is the possibility that a reformist victory could lead Iran to engage in dialogue with the United States at the initiative of the new government, while continuing apace its nuclear program and support for terrorism at the direction of the Supreme Leader. This was the case during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami, who was courted by the West, who was the beneficiary of a series of unilateral gestures by the Clinton administration, but who made little change to Iran’s most troubling policies. Nevertheless, a reformist win would likely evaporate whatever support exists for sanctions in Russia, China, and much of Europe, and spark instead a rush to Tehran for diplomatic and economic dealmaking. As a result, this outcome could paradoxically leave the Obama administration facing the bitter choice between military action and accommodation. Adding to the complexity, it is likely to take some time -- perhaps months -- to determine how the outcome of the election is affecting Iran's nuclear program and its policy toward the West.

So how should the United States proceed in the elections’ aftermath? 

It is vital to keep in mind that Iran’s presidential elections are not about the United States. As with elections everywhere, foreign policy will be only one element of voters’ decisions, and it will likely take a back seat to more pressing economic and social issues. Thus, while the results will have consequences for the United States, Washington should not fall prey to solipsism by reading them simplistically as a referendum on bilateral relations.  

In that vein, the results of the elections should not be allowed to affect U.S. policy toward Iran. We do not have the luxury of choosing our Iranian interlocutors, despite the oft-stated recommendation that we negotiate only with the Supreme Leader’s staff and bypass the other organs of Iranian government. We should likewise take care not to fall into the trap of allowing Iran’s own choice of interlocutor to dictate our policy. If one of Ahmadinejad’s challengers is victorious, he should be given a blank slate, but the Iranian regime should not. The United States and its allies can ill afford any delay or slackening of pressure with the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran looming ever closer.

In his own pursuit of the presidency, Barack Obama campaigned on the themes of hope and change. While the challengers in Iran’s presidential elections similarly inspire hope among the Iranian people, they have little ability to deliver the sort of change sought by the United States. Whatever the outcome on Friday, the U.S. message to Iran’s leaders should be simple: we honor not the trappings of democracy but the free exercise of it, and we will judge you not by your words but by your actions.