Daniel Blumenthal's blog

By Daniel Blumenthal

Before President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao released their joint statement, Obama's Asia trip was underwhelming. But after the statement, Obama's foray into Asia went from empty to harmful.

Before Obama arrived in China, the trip's policy successes were minimal at best. He showed up to a major trade forum, APEC, with no trade policy. If, as Evan Feigenbaum has said, the "business of Asia is business," without a trade policy Obama is putting America out of business in the world's most economically dynamic region. And then he was stiffed by Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama's outright rejection of the American proposal for a high-level dialogue to resolve basing issues on Okinawa. Not exactly a sterling performance by the new team.

But then came the joint statement after talks with President Hu. Two items in the statement struck me: one about Taiwan, the other in regard to India.

On Taiwan, the statement says:

The two countries reiterated that the fundamental principle of respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity is at the core of the three U.S.-China joint communiqués which guide U.S.-China relations. Neither side supports any attempts by any force to undermine this principle. The two sides agreed that respecting each other's core interests is extremely important to ensure steady progress in U.S.-China relations.

The three communiqués do indeed mention respect for territorial integrity. But it is highly arguable that "respect for ... sovereignty and territorial integrity" represent the "core" of the understandings that led to Sino-American rapprochement. The Taiwan issue was treated more delicately by earlier American statesmen. Their basic idea was that we would acknowledge, without accepting, the position that Taiwan is part of China. We would continue strong, unofficial diplomatic ties with the island and we would provide for its security through the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). We thus found a way to normalize relations with China without letting China have its way with Taiwan. Both sides of the Strait have prospered since the U.S. rapprochement with China and the signing into law of the TRA and relations have been more or less peaceful.

Now consider the situation across the Strait today. China has built a military capable of destroying the island if America does not assist Taiwan. Though obligated by law, the Obama administration has not sold a single weapon system to Taiwan. There is in fact no U.S.-Taiwan agenda under the Obama administration. It is even more dangerous, then, to stress the parts of the Sino-American normalization documents that most appeal to China. Of course China wants us to reiterate that our respect for "territorial integrity" and "sovereignty" is at the core of the three communiqués. Beijing wants us to accept its argument that Taiwan is part of China and that we should respect their sovereignty over the island. Obama has thus far done so through deed. With the joint statement he comes closer to officially accepting the Chinese claim of sovereignty.

On India, the joint statement says: 

The two sides welcomed all efforts conducive to peace, stability and development in South Asia. They support the efforts of Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight terrorism, maintain domestic stability and achieve sustainable economic and social development, and support the improvement and growth of relations between India and Pakistan. The two sides are ready to strengthen communication, dialogue and cooperation on issues related to South Asia and work together to promote peace, stability and development in that region.

Here, President Obama broke new ground in ways harmful to both American and Indian interests. India and Japan are the two countries within Asia that can check China's desired dominance. For now, China has less to worry about with Japan as the Hatayoma government sorts through its foreign policies. But India is a different matter. It stood firm against China's pressure when the Dalai Lama visited Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian territory claimed by China. Delhi was sending two messages. First, do not interfere in India's internal affairs; the Dalai Lama is free to visit anywhere in India. Second, Arunachal Pradesh is India's territory. China had been putting military pressure on the border region but the Indians did not back down. Delhi is also standing firm in its maritime competition with China in the Indian Ocean. The Indian Navy will not allow China to build a sphere of influence in that maritime region.

Beijing's India strategy is to tie it down in South Asia to stop it from breaking out as a major power. The strategy has three basic pillars. First, Beijing has supported Pakistan's nuclear and conventional military programs. Second, China wants an acknowledged sphere of influence in South Asia. And third, Beijing wants to resurrect the so called "hyphenated" approach to India. It thus needs the United States to again think of India as part of an India-Pakistan problem, rather than as an emerging great power.

During the Bush and Clinton administrations, Delhi and Washington negotiated an arrangement that acknowledged Delhi's global role and increasing influence. This arrangement is of mutual benefit. Pakistan matters less to India as Delhi expands its strategic horizons. As Pakistan's importance to India lessons, so will Indian-Pakistani tensions. But as India frees itself from the weight of its Pakistan problem it has greater maneuverability to increase its influence in East Asia. China is threatened by that.

Thus, China won a diplomatic victory by getting Washington to agree to "cooperate" on issues of peace and development in South Asia. If China and America work together on South Asian issues, such as peace between India and Pakistan, then China is the great power while India is simply another South Asian country that needs help from others to solve its problems. With the joint statement, Obama officially accorded India junior status in Asia.

We should not be surprised by China's positions. What is surprising -- and extremely problematic -- is that on these key issues Obama is acquiescing in them.

FREDERIC J. BROWN/AFP/Getty Images

By Dan Blumenthal

Overall, Obama's Asia policy has been largely driven by events and domestic priorities rather than by an overarching strategic vision. The Obama team had to closely coordinate with China on financial matters in response to the financial crisis. Passing a cap and trade bill at home means that we need China to sign up to a global climate change pact; Americans will chafe at a costly bill if the world's largest carbon emitters do not agree to carbon reductions.

The Obama team attempted a new policy on Burma. The idea is to find a way to engage the military junta which would strengthen relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, of which Burma is a member. But the policy change has been overtaken by events.

Aung San Suu Kyi was unfairly punished when an American swam across a lake to her residence. And the junta began a new round of repression, as its leaders jail and harass political opponents in the run up to their 2010 "elections." Obama could not radically shift Burma policy. Rather, adjustments to our relations with ASEAN and Burma have been only marginal. There has been some more contact with the junta. And as part of the broader attempt to build stronger relations with Southeast Asia, the administration signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). These and visits to Southeast Asia by Secretary Clinton and her deputy, Jim Steinberg, demonstrate a desire to deepen American engagement with that region. It is unlikely that engaging Burma or signing the TAC will increase America's regional influence.

Surprise?

There are several Obama Asia policies that have been surprising. On a positive note, the Obama team has given much greater attention to the Japan alliance than I had expected. Secretary Clinton's first stop in Asia was in Tokyo, which eased Japanese concerns that they were in for another round of "Japan passing." Since the Democratic Party of Japan took over last September, Obama officials have visited Japan frequently to get a sense of how to deal with a party that has never before governed. The Obama team should be commended for trying to find its way with this inexperienced and eclectic ruling coalition.

Constructive Criticism?

Other policies should give us pause. For example, Obama is sticking to his campaign promises on trade, which means we have no trade policy. The Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement has been collecting dust in the Congress. The rest of the region, however, is not standing still. China seems to sign a trade agreement a minute and South Korea is moving forward on an FTA with the EU. If this continues, not only will our economy be disadvantaged, but our regional leadership will also suffer. While the Obama administration has done a fine job showing up to Asian multilateral meetings, without new trade proposals it has shown up empty handed.

A second troubling policy is the absence of any agenda on Taiwan. The Obama team was effusive in its praise of President Ma when he was elected in March 2008 and they applaud his attempts to ease tensions with the Mainland. The Taiwan president is doing what he thinks Washington wants - easing cross Strait tensions. But there was an implicit bargain with Taiwan that we are not upholding. We were supposed to strengthen Ma's hand by strengthening our ties to Taiwan. The Obama team is not helping Ma.  We have not sold any arms to Taiwan even as China has continued its arms buildup across the Strait. And Obama has no plans of yet to deepen economic ties as Taiwan goes forward with a China FTA.

Third, the bluntness with which the team has downplayed China's miserable human rights record is an unfortunate break with past administrations' practices. Secretary Clinton announced that she would deemphasize human rights concerns on her first trip to China. This was followed by the president's refusal to meet with the Dalai Lama when the Tibetan spiritual leader was in Washington last month. The administration has also been silent on Uighur repression and will not meet with Uighur leader Rebiya Kadeer. It does not help either country for us to pretend that we are indifferent about Chinese respect for human rights, when in reality we have a huge stake in China's political liberalization.

Overall, despite a regular barrage of criticism by Candidate Obama directed at President Bush for his supposed neglect of Asia (never a fair criticism), the Obama team has not wowed the region with new ideas or lavished it with attention. During Bush's first year, his administration had offered the largest arms package ever to Taiwan, was well on its way to substantially upgrading ties with Japan, and was negotiating a diplomatic breakthrough with India of historical significance. Then-U.S. Trade Representative Bob Zoellick was negotiating free trade agreements with Singapore, Australia, and Korea.

The criticism of the Bush administration was that it was "distracted" by the war on terror. The Obama team is learning that fighting a war saps a nation's energy and attention. Now in office, the Obama team can see that the threat from Islamic extremism is very real. The Obama team may have really believed that they could "fix" Afghanistan, disengage from Iraq, and then move on to "re-engaging" the rest of the world.

As Obama is learning, it is not so easy to "move on" when you are at war. No president can disconnect a major foreign policy issue such as war from other foreign policy issues. Asians have a stake in America's Afghanistan policy. A loss in Afghanistan would have stark consequences, as friend and foe alike would question our resolve, and Islamic extremism would rear its head again in Southeast Asia.

Prediction?

Obama's Asia team must be finding that during wartime, presidential attention is the scarcest of commodities. Obama has no choice but to focus on "the wars we are in," often at the expense of the Obama team's hopes for a grand "re-engagement" with Asia.

Win McNamee/Getty Images

By Daniel Blumenthal

The symmetry is almost perfect. The week that President Obama breaks with 18 years of precedence and snubs the Dalai Lama (the man Jon Stewart called the international prince of peace) while he is in Washington, D.C., Obama wins the Nobel Peace Prize. Perhaps an even greater coincidence is that the Dalai Lama was the prize's recipient 20 years ago, in 1989. The Norwegian Nobel Committee's presentation of that year's prize is worth quoting:

This year's Nobel Peace Prize has been awarded to H.H. The Dalai Lama, first and foremost for his consistent resistance to the use of violence in his people's struggle to regain their liberty....

This policy of nonviolence is all the more remarkable when it is considered in relation to the sufferings inflicted on the Tibetan people during the occupation of their country. The Dalai Lama's response has been to propose a peaceful solution which would go a long way to satisfying Chinese interests. It would be difficult to cite any historical example of a minority's struggle to secure its rights, in which a more conciliatory attitude to the adversary has been adopted than in the case of the Dalai Lama.

The Nobel Committee's presentation speech went on to describe the Dalai Lama's continued policy of nonviolent resistance even in the face of violent suppression by the Chinese of a peaceful protest by Tibetans.

The committee noted that the Dalai Lama had been a generous and patient negotiator. He abandoned claims of Tibetan independence and conceded China's authority over defense and foreign policy in the region as well. He asked only for "elementary human rights" and "a halt to Chinese immigration to Tibet."

"This [Chinese immigration] has proceeded," said the committee, "on such a scale that there is a risk of the Tibetans becoming a minority in their own country."

As part of its reassurance policy (defended here by New Yorker writer Evan Osnos) the Obama administration seems to want to eliminate any Chinese-defined obstacles to a good Sino-American relationship. Personally, I am skeptical that this approach will maintain peace, prosperity, and the growing freedom in Asia over the long term. If I am correct, the current snubbing of a former Nobel Peace Prize winner by the current one will have sacrificed our principles without securing our interests.

By Daniel Blumenthal

John Pomfret's front page article in the Washington Post on the Obama administration's arm twisting of the Dalai Lama is quite astounding.

It is further reason to doubt that Obama's "strategic reassurance" policy is anything but a policy of appeasing the PRC. How far will this lead? Successive U.S. administrations have balanced the desire to integrate China into the international political order with concerns over China's intentions as it continues to gain in power. This is the historic challenge that all established powers face in dealing with rising powers. No matter what Obama thinks, America cannot just avoid basic dilemmas in international politics with which all great powers have had to grapple.

The other challenge, since China is a dictatorship and the United States is a highly ideological country (in the most basic sense that we are a people tied together by a set of ideas we believe to be universal), has always been how to engage China without abandoning core democratic principles. Obama, like his Secretary of State before him, has made great strides in undoing that balance. Why? What exactly will he get from abandoning a long-term U.S. policy of publicly supporting the Dali Lama?

"Sources" claim that they hoped to gain cooperation from the Chinese on North Korean disarmament and the attempt to halt Iran's nuclear weapons drive. Another "source" claimed Obama is not "interested in symbolism" or "photo ops" that have not worked in the past.

These administration sources have now laid out the criteria against which Obama should be judged. Let's look for "deliverables" out of Obama's November China trip. We certainly have tried many times before to get the Chinese to be more proactive in disarming North Korea and in helping to resist Iran's destabilizing behavior. So let's see if the Obama administration's capitulation on the Dalai Lama now secures real Chinese moves against these countries which China so heavily subsidizes. It would be nice to get some concessions first before making concessions ourselves. Have the Chinese secretly agreed to squeeze the North Koreans or Iranians? Have we told Beijing we are going ahead with the sale of F-16s to Taiwan? I doubt it.

Then let's watch closely to see if the move away from "symbolism" (ironic as that is, given Obama's belief that his very existence as president is in and of itself changing the world) with respect to Tibet actually secures Tibetans' basic rights of religious freedom and cultural autonomy.

Count me as skeptical. Without many other levers of statecraft to affect Chinese behavior in Tibet, our "symbolic" high level meetings with the Dalai Lama are important morale boosters for Tibetans and human rights activists throughout China. And, these meetings provide some restraint over a China willing to go to extreme levels of brutality in repressing Tibetan rights.