Dan and Kori have great posts about U.S. policy towards Pakistan. Dan seems to suggest that we should war game what it would look like to walk away from our 57-year-old alliance with Pakistan, come what may. Kori thinks that is impractical and we are stuck with the ally we have, not with the ally we want. Both are primarily focused on Pakistan's foreign policy and how it affects American interests. But the thing we need to recognize is that Pakistan today is teetering on the brink of civil war, and this may be the greater danger to the United States than anything it does in Afghanistan or India.

According to the Brookings Index on Pakistan, insurgents, militants, and terrorists regularly launch more than 150 attacks on Pakistani government, military, and infrastructure targets per month, and have been for at least the last three years. Pakistan has deployed nearly 100,000 regular army soldiers to its western provinces since 2001 -- to combat fellow Pakistanis, not to counter an external threat. Nearly 3,000 soldiers have been killed in combat with militants since 2007. Tens of thousands of Pakistani civilians and militants -- the distinction between which is not always clear -- have been killed in daily insurgent and counterinsurgent operations that have accelerated dramatically in recent years across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and Baluchistan. Pakistan is facing its gravest domestic crisis since the Civil War of 1971 sundered the country in two and changed the map of South Asia.

The war is, broadly, between Islamist jihadists and the autocratic Pakistani Army. That is a vast simplification, because the jihadists are split into dozens of factions who all have different agendas, and the Pakistani military is hiding behind the fiction of civilian authority. (And, of course, the Pakistani military has ties to other militant groups and uses them as proxies in Afghanistan and India. They are mostly different groups from those waging an insurgency inside Pakistan). But the real contest for power is between those who want an Islamic State in all or part of Pakistan and those who want to continue the military-enforced secular order that has held power for most of Pakistan's national existence.

Neither side is very nice. Neither likes the United States very much. And neither side is committed to democracy or human rights. But between the two, the Pakistani military is plainly the better option. A jihadist-controlled nuclear Pakistan would be the gravest threat to American national security since the Axis Powers signed the Tripartite Pact in 1940 (more dangerous than the Soviet Union because the latter was more predictable and could be deterred). We need the military autocrats to win. We need them to win even though they support militant groups in Afghanistan, even though they actively oppose U.S. interests, even though they are themselves a source of instability and danger. If there were a third option, I'd take it, but there isn't.

That should be the starting point for U.S. Pakistan policy. It pains me to say it, but this is more important than the war in Afghanistan. Pakistan is too big to fail -- which, like Lehman, doesn't necessarily mean we can stop its failure, only that the consequences are so dire as to require our attention and effort. And for those bothered by the weakness of democracy in a military-controlled Pakistan, consider which side is more likely to consider reform and liberalization after the civil war is over.

That perspective I think can help us rethink through some of the issues Dan and Kori raised.

Military Aid. We should continue limited aid to the Pakistani military -- limited, that is, to counterinsurgency-relevant equipment and training. Helicopters and night-vision goggles, yes. F-16s and artillery, no. And we certainly should insist on more conditionality and transparency, even if that is unpopular with Pakistanis.  

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I was on the Diane Rehm show yesterday as part of a panel discussing Afghanistan. All of the questions and comments from the audience and the host boiled down to the same plaintive query: Won't we all be better off if we leave Afghanistan sooner rather than later, faster rather than slower, and doesn't the killing of bin Laden give us the perfect excuse to do so?

Bin Laden's death certainly provides a psychological moment to exit stage left. And Obama's base seems impelled to do so, driven by two somewhat contradictory sentiments.

On the one hand, part of the desire to leave seems predicated on the notion that Afghanistan is a lost cause. We have to get out because we are essentially defeated in the mission goals of defeating al Qaeda and degrading the Taliban down to the point where we can reach a political accommodation with the remnant and thereby stabilize a unified and effectively governing representative central authority in Kabul. The killing of bin Laden doesn't change this basic fact, so the thinking goes, but like a magician's trick it provides enough of a sensational distraction to hide what is essentially a strategic retreat.

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According to the New York Times, Pakistan has demanded that the United States halt drone strikes on Pakistani territory and draw down the number of CIA and Special Forces personnel in the country. The move is in response to the United States' insistence that Pakistan release American contractor Raymond Davis, who had been arrested on charges of murder. If true, and if Pakistan holds fast to its demands, the move could represent a watershed in U.S.-Pakistani relations.

Since 2001 U.S. relations with Pakistan have been premised on the idea that Pakistan shares U.S. interests in South Asia and is willing and able to cooperate with us. The first idea -- that we share interests -- is patently wrong. The second is increasingly doubtful. What then? What should U.S. policy towards Pakistan be?

For 60 years Pakistan has defined its national interest as the ability to compete with India, retain its hold on part of Kashmir, and advance its standing in the Muslim world. To that end it fought three wars (four if you count the Kargil conflict in 1999) with India since 1947, sought hegemony over Afghanistan as "strategic depth," developed nuclear weapons, and supported a range of militants as proxies against Afghanistan and India. None of this is in America's interest.

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The tragic shooting in Tucson is a signal event in recent U.S. history and could well have implications for domestic politics. But the implications for U.S. foreign policy (this blog's bailiwick) are likely minimal. Indeed, from a parochial foreign-policy perspective, the truly consequential act of violence against a politician last week occurred halfway around the world: the assassination of the Pakistani reformer and the governor of the Punjab region, Salman Taseer.

So far there is no evidence that Jared Lee Loughner's murders sprang from a coherent worldview that commanded the loyalty of a significant number of his countrymen. On the contrary, all the reporting contributes to a picture of a loner who was haunted by inner demons, fueled by drug abuse, and driven to do what he did by factors as idiosyncratic as they were despicable.

No less despicable were the actions of Malik Qadri, the bodyguard-turned-assassin of Taseer, but unfortunately for Pakistan and for U.S. foreign policy, they were anything but idiosyncratic. Qadri killed Taseer, the man he had sworn to protect, because Taseer had spoken out against the application of draconian "blasphemy" laws that condemned a Christian peasant woman to die for allegedly saying derogatory things about Islam. Qadri's actions flowed directly from the militant Islamist worldview that fuels al Qaeda and is ripping Pakistan apart. And of great significance, Qadri has become a hero to many Pakistanis who share his agenda of imposing militant Islamism on the whole of Pakistan and beyond.

It is hard to spin worst-case scenarios out of the Tucson shooting that lead to an unraveling of American society. At worst, some handful of crazies will be inspired to try copycat attacks. Perhaps additional pundits will soil themselves by joining the ranks of those shameless partisans who rushed to blame this event on their political opponents. But these are minor compared to the scenarios that could well unfold in Pakistan. As Fareed Zakaria argued, the Taseer assassination springs directly from the gravest threat to Pakistan's survival, to the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, and therefore to core U.S. national security interests.

Of course, the world will pay close attention to how the United States responds to the Tucson tragedy and so there will be indirect implications for foreign policy. Loughner reinforces images that many foreign elites hold of the United States as a gun-obsessed culture where even deeply mentally disturbed individuals have ready access to Glocks. Other governments may join many Americans in calling for changes to our gun laws. Of somewhat greater consequence, apologists for dictators and tyrants will doubtless invoke this episode for tu quoque ad hominem defenses when U.S. leaders press other countries on human rights violations.

Global leaders will also watch closely to see how President Obama deals with the rhetorical challenge before him: how to speak on the topic of the day -- the highly charged partisan rhetoric -- when his own rhetoric is dotted with macho boasts about bringing guns to political fights or equating the opposition party with hostage-takers or simply using the language of "enemy" to mobilize his base on the eve of elections. Given his own highly charged rhetoric that crossed the lines of civility and responsible political discourse, Obama faces a daunting challenge in calling on others to a more elevated civility in politics. But if Obama is able to rise to the occasion and offer commentary that is honest, self-aware, and healing, some of the "Obama magic" that has been lost over the past two years could return, with attendant modest boosts in U.S. prestige and influence.

But beyond that, there will likely not be much foreign-policy consequence from the tragedy in Tucson. The tragedy in Lahore, however, will likely haunt U.S. foreign policy long after the Tucson episode recedes from the public memory.

I have held off commenting on the "Ground Zero mosque" controversy, in part because it seemed to be primarily a domestic political issue but mainly because I was dismayed by the hyperbole, demagoguery, and dishonest argumentation I found -- and, sadly, there are plenty of culprits on both sides of the debate. Some of the debate has been principled, nuanced, and careful, but not enough of it has and like an email flame war, the rhetoric has escalated even as the actual underlying points of dispute have narrowed.

However, one underappreciated point of consensus in the debate has prompted me to weigh in. Both sides of the debate appear to agree on one narrow claim: that the Ground Zero mosque is an important issue, symbolic or otherwise, in the ideological struggle in which the war on terror is embedded -- what Bush administration insiders referred to as the war of ideas.

I think it is certainly relevant to the war of ideas. Al Qaeda has sought to turn a broad civil war within the Muslim world into a war between Islam and the infidels (everyone else). If al Qaeda ever succeeded in that aim, our prospects for success would dim considerably. In fact, as President Bush and his advisors made clear within hours of the 9/11 attacks, and as leaders from both parties have emphasized repeatedly ever since -- and as most Americans have accepted to a remarkable degree -- the United States has not viewed the war on terror as a war against Islam. On the contrary, Americans have expended considerable blood and treasure to help protect Muslim victims of al Qaeda and other like-minded terrorist groups. And American leaders have sought, wherever possible, to reach out to the Muslim world and highlight America's long tradition of religious freedom and unrivaled record as a society that welcomes and integrates immigrants from all walks of life.

President Obama has made this particular aspect of the ideological struggle a personal priority of his and he deserves some credit for doing so.

Yet, all of the focus on the Ground Zero mosque controversy may now be having the ironic effect of distracting us from a much more important and much more urgent issue in that ideological struggle: the vast humanitarian crisis caused by the floods in Pakistan. The human toll is staggering, and that alone ought to be enough to prompt an outpouring of generosity from the American people.

But if you are not moved by the human suffering, perhaps the national-security concerns will prompt you into action. Pakistan is at the epicenter of the war on terror, and it is hard to see how that larger struggle will turn out well if the Pakistani state collapses and the society plunges into anarchy. The country was already teetering on the edge with a bankrupt economy, severe food and water problems, and an ongoing insurgency in Balochistan. And, by the way, al Qaeda and other terrorist networks are primarily in Pakistan, not Afghanistan -- indeed, several of the recent attempted terrorist attacks in the United States have originated from or had links to groups in Pakistan. Oh, and Pakistan has a sizable nuclear arsenal.

The stakes in Pakistan are exceptionally high and the international response thus far has been inadequate. The United States has done better than most, but we could do more. The most successful things the Bush administration ever did in the war of ideas were the rapid and substantial responses to the Asian tsunami of 2004/2005 and the Pakistan earthquake of 2005. More than anything, our actions confounded critics in the Muslim world (and elsewhere) and thwarted al Qaeda's goal of fostering a war between Islam and the West.

The current Pakistan crisis dwarfs both of those prior disasters, but the international response, beginning with ours, has not yet been commensurate. There are many reasons for that, but maybe one of those reasons is our national preoccupation with the mosque debate.

Perhaps it is time for our national attention to pivot from the mosque controversy on to the far more serious Pakistan crisis. Perhaps it is time for all of those political leaders and pundits who have scored points on their partisan enemies on this issue to take a pause, make a donation to the International Red Cross, and urge others to do the same.

I have a few more musings on the "readjusting the war clocks" issue, specifically the question of accelerating the Afghan battle clock by getting more help from Pakistan. What might the outlines of a deal with Pakistan look like? I don't have specifics, but I can think of some design features and suggest some out-of-the-box things to think about. In the spirit of stimulating the strategic policy planners who have better access to the information necessary to do this exercise right, here are some considerations.

General Design Features

The absolutely essential element is explicit quid pro quo. It is fine for us to offer intangible, mood-setting quids, but their quo better be tangible and clearly spelled out in advance. The entire deal would not have to be public; indeed perhaps some elements would have to stay confidential. But the deal would have to be worth it to risk the inevitable leaks and set-backs and it is only worth it if Pakistan delivers concrete action.

The United States would also have to be willing to step back from the deal if the other players are not doing their part. This is harder to do than it sounds because, once established, every "deal" develops political inertia and American leaders can be reluctant to break it off even when it is clearly not delivering.

What should we ask for?

I would let General McChrystal draw up the list of asks, but I am pretty sure it would involve the movement of sizable Pakistani military units to put pressure on the areas that most affect the Taliban's freedom of movement as well as the sharing of intelligence that would substantially change the local balance of power on either side of the Durand line.

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I have been struck by how the various sides in the war on terror debate have all found justification for their prior positions in the unfolding drama of the Times Square terrorist. Advocates of treating terrorism primarily as a law enforcement problem praise the rapid forensics that caught the suspect (albeit, just barely). Critics point to the near-misses and other troubling details and renew their complaints about the Obama-Holder approach to terrorism.

So far, everyone seems pretty sure that their prior convictions were sound. Alas, I am no exception. It seems to me that the following four points, all of which I already believed, are supported by this case:

• We are safer but not yet safe. It is much harder today for terrorists to launch the kind of mass-casualty terrorist spectacle they launched on 9/11 -- let alone an even more devastating WMD attack -- than it was a decade ago. That does not mean the terrorists have given up their desire to kill Americans. There is still a terrorist threat.
• The amateurish nature of recent attacks is not proof that we can relax our guard. On the contrary, the amateurish nature of recent attacks seems rather to confirm the wisdom of many of the counter-terrorism policies the United States has adopted since 9/11. The attacks are amateurish because more devastating options have been made harder to execute.
• We cannot avoid taking action that motivates at least some terrorists. Reportedly, the Times Square terrorist was motivated by the drone strikes, a tactic that was begun under Bush (though had antecedents in the Clinton and even Reagan eras) and substantially ramped up under Obama. While some on the far left have rejected the drone-strike tactic altogether, and many more have raised questions about certain aspects, there is a strong bipartisan consensus that some version of this tactic -- killing key terrorist leaders that cannot be captured -- is a necessary component of any sound counter-terrorism policy. During the Bush years, many partisan Democrats advanced the theory that terrorists were motivated chiefly by Bush foreign-policy choices, choices the critics thought were foolish anyway like invading Iraq or not coercing Israel into making more concessions to Palestinians in the peace process. Obama's campaign accepted this premise, and seemed to offer a new era in which America would stop doing things to fuel the terrorists. It is now obvious that even Obama has not avoided actions that motivated someone to become a terrorist. Of course, this does not mean that we should cavalierly ignore Muslim sensibilities or gratuitously insult them. Obama is right to try to calibrate our language and approach to avoid pointless provocations. Likewise, we should debate the wisdom of foreign policy choices like the invasion of Iraq or the proper approach to Middle East peace and in those debates the extent to which terrorists can exploit the issue for propaganda purposes is a relevant, but by no means dispositive, consideration. For a hardened core of would-be terrorists, however, there is nothing we can or should do to fully assuage their hatred.
• Terrorist safe havens still matter, even in the age of al Qaeda 2.0. The terrorist movement may be more decentralized and web-based -- a necessary response to our counter-terrorism policies -- but terrorists still exploit safe havens if they can get access to them. Al Qaeda's great innovation was leveraging a vast infrastructure devoted to the weaponization of resentment and targeting it on the United States and our global interests -- turning angry individuals into terrorists willing to kill Americans and be killed for their cause. There were many key nodes in this infrastructure, but one of the most important was a safe-haven, a destination where would-be recruits were assembled, winnowed, trained, equipped, and finally commissioned. The invasion of Afghanistan and the denial of safe havens in that country is thus a vital step in the war on terror. Since the success of the initial invasion, however, some have speculated that the terrorist threat has morphed into an entirely web-based phenomenon, where the only "safe-haven" the terrorist needs is a virtual on-line one. If that day ever comes -- and I am skeptical -- we are certainly not there yet. Even an attack as unsophisticated as the Times Square attack, which in theory could have been hatched entirely through individual web-based research, apparently involved trips to North Waziristan. Control of territory still matters, which means that the Bush-era emphasis on helping responsible regimes establish effective governance is still an important part of the war on terror.

It is possible that these and other similar points are merely evidence that I am a victim of confirmation bias, seeing in a new case only those things that confirm what I already believed. If so, I am probably in very good company. At least I am willing to ask: what in this case disproves these four points?

This week's bad news on nuclear proliferation far outweighed the pleasant production values surrounding the Washington Nuclear Security Summit. But let's look at the good news first.

Representatives of 47 nations declared this week that nuclear terrorism is a bad possibility. They issued a communiqué to that effect and provided a non-binding work plan to counter "one of the most challenging threats to international security," as the communiqué characterized it. The White House blog was stronger, calling nuclear terrorism "the most dire threat of our time." The fact that the administration recognizes this is very welcome.

But such declarations are not new. The United States saw the problem immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union and, under President Clinton, worked with Russia to safeguard nuclear material. The United Nations recognized the danger and in 2005 adopted by consensus the Convention for the Suppression of the Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. That extensive set of measures entered into force in 2007 and, by the end of last year, had been ratified and agreed by 59 nations, more than attended this summit. Both this week's communiqué and work plan recall that convention and call for its implementation.

Nothing in the work plan is binding beyond agreement to meet again in South Korea in 2012. The tentative wording of the plan often betrays its own ineffectual outcome. For example, it says:

Participating States encourage nuclear operators and architect/engineering firms to take into account and incorporate, where appropriate [emphasis added], effective measures of physical protection and security culture into the planning, construction, and operation of civilian nuclear facilities and provide technical assistance, upon request, to other States in doing so."

Is there somewhere it would be inappropriate to incorporate physical protection and safety culture into nuclear facilities? But at least the participants were able to agree that, for the most part, this is a good idea.

The other outcomes of the summit -- reiteration of a 2000 agreement between the United States and Russia on plutonium disposal, a fuzzy but positive step forward on Ukraine's disposal of nuclear materials, closure of a Russian nuclear facility that ceased production last year -- were all useful. They are, however, unlikely to achieve any real reduction in the risk of proliferation and nuclear terrorism.

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Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban's putative No. 2 and organizer of military operations was captured several days ago at a madrassa near the Pakistani city of Karachi. U.S. and Pakistani intelligence operatives are interrogating him, according to the New York Times.  

This is very good news. First and foremost, a deadly and effective enemy of the United States is no longer able to plan, coordinate, or carry out attacks against us.  

It will further isolate other senior leaders, such as Mullah Omar, and cause them to rely on less-trusted replacements. In the last three years, six of the nineteen members of the Taliban senior council have been killed. This is significant progress, and suggests that the United States is beginning to have the kind of intelligence, and the ability to use it to good effect, that will eventually grind down the Taliban.  

The surge of NATO troops to Afghanistan, and particularly operations in the Taliban stronghold of Marjah will produce yet more intelligence, as Taliban light up communications networks, are forced to move and therefore can be tracked, their operations in the region are disrupted, their funding streams from drug trafficking reduced, and as Afghan, U.S., and British forces engaged in the fight reassure the population they will be subsequently secure.

Cooperation between Pakistan's Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence and our CIA looks to have been extensive and beneficial. The BBC cites a senior Pakistani military officer describing the capture as "a joint operation between Pakistan and the United States based on shared intelligence." CIA agents evidently were along on the raid. Such intensive cooperation would be impossible without trust between the two spy agencies, and is difficult to build even among allies of long-standing. Given Pakistan's understandable concern about American fickleness, the cooperation is extraordinary. Those who castigate the Pakistani government as not serious about the fight against the Taliban, or who believe the ISI are insubordinate to their government's direction, will have a difficult time explaining this outcome.

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A story out of Pakistan today shows that the rhetorical/policy trimming that marred President Obama's Afghan escalation speech has done some damage to the prospects for the policy. The bottom line: the Pakistanis are not doing what we need them to do because they interpreted the escalation-plus-timeline as an indication of Obama's irresolution. Or, as the reporter put it:

The core reason for Pakistan's imperviousness is its scant faith in the Obama troop surge, and what Pakistan sees as the need to position itself for a regional realignment in Afghanistan once American forces begin to leave."

This story provides a timely, if unfortunate, rebuttal to the president's own efforts at post-speech spin control. Obama went on "60 Minutes" on Sunday to offer a vigorous defense of the West Pont speech.

What struck me was this exchange recorded in the transcript:

KROFT: The West Point speech was greeted it was a great deal of confusion.

PRESIDENT OBAMA: I disagree with that statement.

KROFT: You do?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: I absolutely do. 40 million people watched it. And I think a whole bunch of people understood what we intend to do.

KROFT: But it raised a lot of questions. Some people thought it was contradictory. That's a fair criticism.

PRESIDENT OBAMA: I don't think it's a fair criticism. The situation in Afghanistan is complex, and so people who are looking for simple black and white answers won't get them. And the speech wasn't designed to give those black and white answers.

Part of my job here, I believe, is to make sure that the American people understand what we're getting into. What we where we've been and where we're going. And they're not simple. I think that what you may be referring to is the fact that on the one hand I said, "We're gonna be sending in additional troops now." On the other hand, "By July 2011, we're gonna move into a transition phase where we're drawing out troops down."

KROFT: Right.

PRESIDENT OBAMA: There shouldn't be anything confusing about that.

KROFT: Well--

PRESIDENT OBAMA: First of all, that's something that we did in Iraq. And we executed over the last two years in Iraq. So, I think the American people are familiar with the idea of a surge.

In terms of the rationale for doing it, we don't have an Afghan military right now, security force, that can stabilize the country. If we are effective over the next two years, by putting in these additional troops -- clearing enough space and time for the Afghan security forces to get set up in an effective way -- that then frees us up to transition into a place where we can start drawing down.

The alternative is to stand pat where we are, in which you never have a stable Afghan security force. And we are potentially signed up for being in Afghanistan for the next decade.

This is remarkable and a bit scary, because Obama's defense is so fundamentally misleading. It is, if you will forgive the historical reference, a moment when President Obama channels the predecessor he usually avoids talking about, the one who answered a direct question with the memorable line: "It depends on what the meaning of the word is is."

For let's concede at the outset that President Obama, like President Clinton, may be technically correct. Because so many people watched the speech, and even more heard about the speech, it is almost a statistical certainty that "a whole bunch of people understood what [the Obama administration] intended to do," especially if we accept a conventional interpretation of "whole bunch" to be in the hundreds, thousands, or even ten thousands.

But Kroft's leading question is more honest than Obama's response was, because the confusion arising out of Obama's "deadline" was far, far more consequential than the statistical probability that some fraction of the audience got it.  For days after the speech, administration officials offered contradictory clarifications, with Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen clearly suggesting that the deadline was a token target that would not drive the withdrawal schedule and spokesman Gibbs talking about the deadline as "etched in stone."

The policy compromise embodied in the speech and the underlying policy decision was in fact intended to square a number of circles. It was an escalation-with-a-prearranged-deadline-for-beginning-a-withdrawal-but-vagueness-about-how-fast-and-the-conditions-under-which-the-subsequent-withdrawal-would-happen sort of compromise.

It was designed to let administration hawks say we are in this war to win it and administration doves to say that we are not making an open-ended commitment to win this war. 

It was designed to split Obama's opposition so that, as has happened, some Republicans praised the escalation part and other Republicans excoriated the artificial deadline part, and some anti-war Democrats bit their tongues over the escalation and clung bitterly to the artificial deadline while others saw the artificial deadline as a fiction and loudly denounced the escalation.

It was designed to confuse domestic political enemies and it achieved that goal. An unintended consequence was that it also confused international allies, as the Pakistan story makes clear. Reasonable people can debate whether President Obama had better options that were less confusing. Reasonable people can debate whether the benefits of the confusion outweigh the costs of the confusion. Reasonable people will conclude -- and I am one of them -- that on balance the speech and the underlying policy position were worth supporting.

But -- and here is the absolutely crucial part -- no reality-based observer can pretend that the speech and the underlying policy was not confusing. To pretend otherwise is either to peddle absurd spin or, worse, to be so infected with a bunker mentality that one is operating in a bubble.  

As a general rule, I don't like media interpretations that reduce to "the president and the White House team are in a fantasy world bubble." In my experience, that allegation has been leveled many times when I know for a fact that it has been untrue. But if the administration really believes that the "deadline" that is not really a deadline has not produced confusion at home and abroad, then I am hard-pressed to come up with explanations that do not mention bubbles.

Win McNamee/Getty Images

By Daniel Blumenthal

Before President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao released their joint statement, Obama's Asia trip was underwhelming. But after the statement, Obama's foray into Asia went from empty to harmful.

Before Obama arrived in China, the trip's policy successes were minimal at best. He showed up to a major trade forum, APEC, with no trade policy. If, as Evan Feigenbaum has said, the "business of Asia is business," without a trade policy Obama is putting America out of business in the world's most economically dynamic region. And then he was stiffed by Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama's outright rejection of the American proposal for a high-level dialogue to resolve basing issues on Okinawa. Not exactly a sterling performance by the new team.

But then came the joint statement after talks with President Hu. Two items in the statement struck me: one about Taiwan, the other in regard to India.

On Taiwan, the statement says:

The two countries reiterated that the fundamental principle of respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity is at the core of the three U.S.-China joint communiqués which guide U.S.-China relations. Neither side supports any attempts by any force to undermine this principle. The two sides agreed that respecting each other's core interests is extremely important to ensure steady progress in U.S.-China relations.

The three communiqués do indeed mention respect for territorial integrity. But it is highly arguable that "respect for ... sovereignty and territorial integrity" represent the "core" of the understandings that led to Sino-American rapprochement. The Taiwan issue was treated more delicately by earlier American statesmen. Their basic idea was that we would acknowledge, without accepting, the position that Taiwan is part of China. We would continue strong, unofficial diplomatic ties with the island and we would provide for its security through the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). We thus found a way to normalize relations with China without letting China have its way with Taiwan. Both sides of the Strait have prospered since the U.S. rapprochement with China and the signing into law of the TRA and relations have been more or less peaceful.

Now consider the situation across the Strait today. China has built a military capable of destroying the island if America does not assist Taiwan. Though obligated by law, the Obama administration has not sold a single weapon system to Taiwan. There is in fact no U.S.-Taiwan agenda under the Obama administration. It is even more dangerous, then, to stress the parts of the Sino-American normalization documents that most appeal to China. Of course China wants us to reiterate that our respect for "territorial integrity" and "sovereignty" is at the core of the three communiqués. Beijing wants us to accept its argument that Taiwan is part of China and that we should respect their sovereignty over the island. Obama has thus far done so through deed. With the joint statement he comes closer to officially accepting the Chinese claim of sovereignty.

On India, the joint statement says: 

The two sides welcomed all efforts conducive to peace, stability and development in South Asia. They support the efforts of Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight terrorism, maintain domestic stability and achieve sustainable economic and social development, and support the improvement and growth of relations between India and Pakistan. The two sides are ready to strengthen communication, dialogue and cooperation on issues related to South Asia and work together to promote peace, stability and development in that region.

Here, President Obama broke new ground in ways harmful to both American and Indian interests. India and Japan are the two countries within Asia that can check China's desired dominance. For now, China has less to worry about with Japan as the Hatayoma government sorts through its foreign policies. But India is a different matter. It stood firm against China's pressure when the Dalai Lama visited Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian territory claimed by China. Delhi was sending two messages. First, do not interfere in India's internal affairs; the Dalai Lama is free to visit anywhere in India. Second, Arunachal Pradesh is India's territory. China had been putting military pressure on the border region but the Indians did not back down. Delhi is also standing firm in its maritime competition with China in the Indian Ocean. The Indian Navy will not allow China to build a sphere of influence in that maritime region.

Beijing's India strategy is to tie it down in South Asia to stop it from breaking out as a major power. The strategy has three basic pillars. First, Beijing has supported Pakistan's nuclear and conventional military programs. Second, China wants an acknowledged sphere of influence in South Asia. And third, Beijing wants to resurrect the so called "hyphenated" approach to India. It thus needs the United States to again think of India as part of an India-Pakistan problem, rather than as an emerging great power.

During the Bush and Clinton administrations, Delhi and Washington negotiated an arrangement that acknowledged Delhi's global role and increasing influence. This arrangement is of mutual benefit. Pakistan matters less to India as Delhi expands its strategic horizons. As Pakistan's importance to India lessons, so will Indian-Pakistani tensions. But as India frees itself from the weight of its Pakistan problem it has greater maneuverability to increase its influence in East Asia. China is threatened by that.

Thus, China won a diplomatic victory by getting Washington to agree to "cooperate" on issues of peace and development in South Asia. If China and America work together on South Asian issues, such as peace between India and Pakistan, then China is the great power while India is simply another South Asian country that needs help from others to solve its problems. With the joint statement, Obama officially accorded India junior status in Asia.

We should not be surprised by China's positions. What is surprising -- and extremely problematic -- is that on these key issues Obama is acquiescing in them.

FREDERIC J. BROWN/AFP/Getty Images

By Dan Twining

The problem with the current debate over Afghanistan is that it is too focused on Afghanistan. There is no question that the intrinsic importance of winning wars our country chooses to fight -- to secure objectives that remain as compelling today as they were on September 12, 2001 -- is itself reason for President Obama to put in place a strategy for victory in Afghanistan. But the larger frame has been lost in the din of debate over General McChrystal's leaked assessment, President Obama's intention to ramp up or draw down in Afghanistan, and the legitimacy of the Afghan election. In fact, it is vital for the United States and its allies to recommit to building an Afghan state that can accountably govern its people and defeat the Taliban insurgency -- for reasons that have to do not only with Afghanistan's specific pathologies but with the implications of failure for the wider region and America's place in the international system.

The surreal belief in some quarters that abandoning Afghanistan -- described as a "graveyard of empires" with its complicated tribes, forbidding terrain, and peripheral strategic importance -- would not have direct and bloody consequences for the United States, never mind the Afghan people, can be answered with three numbers: 9-11. It is troubling that our political and foreign policy elites even need to engage this debate (including its more sophisticated but equally illusory variants like moving to an "over-the-horizon" strike-and-retreat strategy). At the same time, the experts (correctly) advocating a counterinsurgency strategy make the same mistake of framing their arguments purely with reference to Afghanistan's internal dynamics. As important as they are, they constitute only part of a wider strategic landscape that would be upended by a U.S. decision to reduce its political and military commitment to Afghanistan.

A recent trip to Islamabad and Lahore revealed to me that most Pakistani elites -- including the small minority that could credibly be described as sympathetic to Western goals in Afghanistan -- already believe that the game is up: the will of the transatlantic allies is broken, Obama doesn't have the courage or vision to see America's mission in Afghanistan through to victory, and the U.S. is well along the road to walking away from Afghanistan as it did after 1989. This widespread Pakistani belief has encouraged behavior deeply inimical to Washington's regional aims, with the effect that the American debate over whether Afghanistan is worth it is inspiring Pakistani actions that will make success all the harder to achieve.

After all, why shouldn't the Pakistani security services continue to invest in their friendly relations with the Taliban if Mullah Omar and company soon will take power in Afghanistan's Pashtun heartland? Why should the Pakistani military take on the militant groups that regularly launch cross-border attacks into Afghanistan when the NATO targets of those attacks will soon slink away in defeat? Why should the Pakistani government get serious about wrapping up the Quetta Shura when the Afghan Taliban appears to be ascendant in the face of Western weakness? Why should Pakistan's intelligence service break its ties to Lashkar-e-Taiba, one of the world's most potent terrorist groups, when it forms such a useful instrument with which to bleed U.S. ally India? And why should Pakistani civilian and military leaders overtly cooperate with the United States when it appears such a weak and unreliable ally of the Afghan people -- incapable, despite its singular wealth and resources, of defeating a 25,000-man insurgency in one of the poorest countries on Earth?

As Chris Brose and I recently argued, it is vital for the West to prevail in Afghanistan because of its effect in shaping Pakistan's strategic future. Proponents of drawing down in Afghanistan on the grounds that Pakistan is the more important strategic prize have it only half right: if Pakistan is the strategic prize, it should be unthinkable not to press for victory in Afghanistan given the spillover effects of a Western defeat there. All of Pakistan's pathologies -- from terrorist sanctuary in ungoverned spaces, to radicalized public opinion that creates an enabling environment for violent extremism, to lack of economic opportunity that incentivizes militancy, to the (in)security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, to the military's oversized role in political life in ways that stunt the development of civilian institutions -- all of this will intensify should Afghanistan succumb to the Taliban as the West withdraws.

These dynamics, in turn, will destabilize India in ways that could torpedo the country's rise to world power -- and the strategic dividends America would reap from India's success. New Delhi is now a truer proponent of Washington's original objectives in Afghanistan -- the Taliban's decisive defeat by military force rather than reconciliation and the construction of a capable Afghan democracy -- than some American leaders are now. Afghanistan is in India's backyard -- they shared a border until 1947 -- and the collapse of its government would destabilize Pakistan in ways that would quickly cost Indian dearly. Indian strategists fear that the spillover from a Taliban victory in Afghanistan would induce Pakistan's "Lebanonization," with the Pakistani Taliban becoming a kind of South Asian Hezbollah that would launch waves of crippling attacks against India. India cannot rise to be an Asian balancer, global security provider, and engine of the world economy if it is mired in interminable proxy conflict with terrorists emanating from a weak or collapsing state armed with nuclear weapons on its border.

The strategic implications of a Western defeat in Afghanistan for American relations with other major powers are similarly troubling. The biggest game-changer in the nuclear standoff with Iran is not new sanctions or military action but a popular uprising by the Iranian people that changes the character of the radical regime in Tehran -- a prospect one would expect to be meaningfully diminished by the usurpation through violence of the Afghan government, against the will of a majority of Afghans, by the religious extremists of the Taliban. And despite welcome new unity in the West on a tougher approach to Iran's development of nuclear weapons following revelations of a new nuclear complex in Qum, how can Washington, London, Paris, and Berlin stare down the leaders of Iran -- a potentially hegemonic Middle Eastern state with an advanced conventional and near-nuclear arsenal and a vast national resource base -- if they can't even hold their own against the cave-dwelling, Kalashnikov-wielding despots of the Taliban?

Russia appears to be quietly reveling in the prospect that NATO, which appeared so threatening to Russian eyes during its multiple rounds of enlargement during the 1990s, could be defeated in its first real out-of-area operation. A NATO defeat in Afghanistan would call into question the future of the alliance and the credibility of American leadership with it, possibly creating a new and lasting transatlantic breach and intensifying concerns about the alliance's ability to protect weak European states against a resurgent Russia. China has no interest in Afghanistan's collapse into a sanctuary for Islamist extremists, including Uighers who militate against China's rule in Xinjiang. But a Western defeat in Afghanistan, which if historical precedent holds would be followed by a bout of U.S. isolationism, would only create more space for China to pursue its (for now) peaceful rise.

And that is the point: the debate over whether to prevail in Afghanistan is about so much more. An American recommitment to a sustained counterinsurgency strategy that turned around the conflict would demonstrate that the United States and its democratic allies remain the principal providers of public goods -- in this case, the security and stability of a strategically vital region that threatens the global export of violent extremism -- in the international system. A new and sustained victory strategy for Afghanistan would show that Washington is singularly positioned to convene effective coalitions and deliver solutions to intractable international problems in ways that shore up the stability of an international economic and political order that has provided greater degrees of human freedom and prosperity than any other.

By contrast, a U.S. decision to wash its hands of Afghanistan would send a different message to friends and competitors alike. It would hasten the emergence of a different kind of international order, one in which history no longer appeared to be on the side of the United States and its friends. Islamic extremism, rather than continuing to lose ground to the universal promise of democratic modernity, would gain new legs -- after all, Afghan Islamists would have defeated their second superpower in a generation. Rival states that contest Western leadership of the international order and reject the principles of open society would increase their influence at America's expense. Just as most Afghans are not prepared to live under a new Taliban regime, so most Americans are surely not prepared to live in a world in which the United States voluntarily cedes its influence, power, and moral example to others who share neither our interests nor our values.

By Dov Zakheim

The momentum of Pakistani instability appears to be accelerating: Six months ago there was no evidence that the Taliban would break out of its mountain hideaways in the Northwest Frontier Province to move within 60 miles of Islamabad. While the Pakistani Army may finally have woken up to the threat, the loyalties of its rank and file are far from clear. In short, Pakistan in 2009 is looking more and more like Iran thirty years earlier, when the seemingly impregnable Shah fell in the face of hostile demonstrations and a passive army.

The United States cannot afford to stand by and let Pakistan either fall to the Taliban or fragment in some way. Yet it would be foolhardy to try to prop up any Pakistani government, be it the current Zardari regime, or as recent press reporting indicates, the opposition leader Nawaz Sharif. It was the last Sharif government whose incompetence and corruption prompted the 1999 military coup led by Pervez Musharraf. Sharif's government also conducted Pakistan's first nuclear test, continued the long-time support of A.Q. Khan's activities, and launched the first Kargil War. Why a new Sharif government would be more reliable or competent than its predecessor is not at all clear. Furthermore, American efforts to promote particular governments have not exactly been overwhelmingly successful in recent years, including in Pakistan itself. Surely one can ask if Pakistan is better off today under Zardari than it was under Musharraf.

Instead of trying to play politics in Islamabad, the United States should employ its forces to support those of Pakistan's military. Only in this manner can there be some assurance that Pakistani morale will not collapse, and that the Taliban insurrection can be crushed. The Pakistani military can be ruthless, and nothing else will do in dealing with the Taliban. American tactics and firepower can back up that ruthlessness.

It might be argued that the United States should try to "take out" Pakistan's nuclear capability. In so doing, it would certainly ensure that the Pakistani military would turn on the United States and come to terms with the Taliban. The United States must fight alongside Pakistan's army, not against it.
 
Now is not the time for squeamishness or political correctness. Do-gooders no doubt will howl at the sight of the collateral damage that would inevitably result if American units enable Pakistani forces to pulverize Taliban strongholds. The Zardari government may howl that America has sidestepped it by going directly to the military.

Let them all howl. A nuclear armed Pakistan, or even worse, a fragmented country whose nuclear weapons are up for grabs, would result in far more cries of anguish by far more people than anything that might result from the elimination of the Taliban threat. Time is running out. The United States must act now.

By Dan Twining

As President Obama hosts the leaders of Pakistan and Afghanistan in Washington tomorrow and calls on Congress to increase assistance to both countries, his administration can claim credit for regionalizing America's strategy for victory in Afghanistan. This was an overdue shift, one recommended by the Bush administration's various 2008 strategic reviews of Afghanistan policy. But Pakistan's latest internal crisis underlines how the fusion of "Af-Pak" as a guide to U.S. interests in South Asia also carries risks. 

Clearly, taking into account and leveraging regional dynamics is essential to the success of U.S. policy towards both countries. But there is also a danger that the unitary "Af-Pak" prism fails to sufficiently account for America's differentiated interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan. To put it bluntly, U.S. policy towards Pakistan offers some compelling lessons for what not to do in Afghanistan. 

Under successive Democratic and Republican administrations, the United States personalized Pakistan policy, investing in a single leader at the expense of a broader constellation of civic forces. In doing so, Washington has become a decisive actor in Pakistan's domestic politics; Pakistanis lament that their leaders rule only with the consent of the "Army, Allah, and America." U.S. interventionism has unwittingly weakened political parties, discouraged coalition-building, stifled reform, and tied American interests to unpopular strongmen.   

Meanwhile, billions of dollars in unconditional assistance to Pakistan's military has created perverse incentives for its leaders to manage rather than defeat Islamist militancy in order to keep the aid money flowing. Flush with American resources, Pakistan's security services have played a double game: fighting some militant groups while sponsoring others as instruments of strategic influence -- including, ironically, against U.S. forces in Afghanistan, as well as against friendly governments in Kabul and New Delhi. 

Although its government and armed forces contain many patriots, its dependence on and manipulation of foreign aid flows means that Pakistan risks becoming, like some African countries, a rentier state in which predatory elites pursue policies designed to maximize external patronage in service to parochial interests, rather than national ones. The Pakistani military's reluctance to engage Taliban militants in Swat can be understood in this light. The military is most useful as a partner of the United States -- one deserving of billions of dollars in new hardware and equipment, naturally -- only as long as the militant threat persists. This creates incentives to keep jihadism simmering without boiling over.

So what are the lessons for Afghanistan? America's interest lies in a genuinely free and fair national election this fall. Washington shouldn't play favorites; nor should it appear to be actively undermining President Karzai's candidacy, as some senior administration officials seemed to do earlier this year. Western assistance should build Afghan capacity at all levels of government, rather than creating structural dependencies on international aid that hollow out domestic institutions, decrease incentives for reform, and benefit a narrow ruling elite.

The United States must be especially careful to match its sustained buildup of Afghan security forces with investments of equal scale in Afghanistan's civilian institutions.  Governance and development require security.  But if the Afghan National Army - by far the most capable institution in the country today - retains this role over time, we will have put Afghanistan on a slippery slope to Army dominion over political life, as in Pakistan.

America can afford to match its military buildup with sustained investments in Afghanistan's civilian institutions, as the Kerry-Lugar legislation before Congress proposes to do for Pakistan, because the Taliban in both countries are defeatable adversaries. More Taliban foot soldiers fight for money than love of jihad, and polling by the Asia Foundation shows they enjoy the support of only 7 percent of Afghans. By contrast, 78 percent believe democracy is the best form of government.

In Pakistan, Islamists garnered their highest popular support during General Musharraf's dictatorship; in the 2008 elections, Islamist parties received only a fraction of the vote. While President Zardari is deeply unpopular, polls show that over 4 in 5 Pakistanis support his mainstream rival Nawaz Sharif, who condemns Taliban efforts to extend medieval rule in Swat across the Pakistani heartland. 

Despite all its problems, a moderate majority and strong army make Pakistan unripe for an Iranian-style Islamic revolution. But weak institutions and dysfunctional civil-military relations handicap the government's ability to respond to the Taliban challenge. That is why Congress must carefully benchmark military assistance -- both to promote near-term counterterrorism goals and to redress the civil-military imbalance that remains the Achilles' heel of the Pakistani state. 

It is also why the international community should focus on "hardening" Afghanistan against cross-border threats from Pakistan as part of a generational commitment to state-building in both countries. The alternative -- tying progress in Afghanistan to the resolution of Pakistan's enormous security and governance challenges, as senior administration officials have suggested -- is a recipe for strategic failure.   

A successful South Asia policy, while attentive to regional dynamics, will pursue differentiated strategies toward Pakistan, Afghanistan -- and India. An enduring Indo-U.S. partnership remains the region's great strategic prize. Just as President Bush de-hyphenated India and Pakistan, so should Obama de-hyphenate Af-Pak.